{
  "id": 11918005,
  "name": "WILLIE M. BROWN, Plaintiff-Employee, v. PUBLIC WORKS COMMISSION, Defendant-Employer, SELF-INSURED, Defendant-Carrier",
  "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Public Works Commission",
  "decision_date": "1996-05-21",
  "docket_number": "No. COA95-751",
  "first_page": "473",
  "last_page": "477",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "122 N.C. App. 473"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "449 S.E.2d 762",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "764"
        },
        {
          "page": "764"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "117 N.C. App. 126",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8524468
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "128"
        },
        {
          "page": "128"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/117/0126-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "241 S.E.2d 324",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "329",
          "parenthetical": "Courts construing statutes are to adopt an \"interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "294 N.C. 60",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8570860
      ],
      "year": 1978,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "68",
          "parenthetical": "Courts construing statutes are to adopt an \"interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/294/0060-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 489,
    "char_count": 9399,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.756,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.7535731048976166e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7088768495769444
    },
    "sha256": "8f37bceeb9aa1392d08c79d2f209d9805cc0371f3faa5ad5d4b6021056c72187",
    "simhash": "1:aeadefef592b0084",
    "word_count": 1453
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges EAGLES and WALKER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "WILLIE M. BROWN, Plaintiff-Employee, v. PUBLIC WORKS COMMISSION, Defendant-Employer, SELF-INSURED, Defendant-Carrier"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals an order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) awarding plaintiff 48 2/7 additional weeks of partial disability compensation pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-30 (1991). We affirm the Commission\u2019s order.\nPertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: Plaintiff was injured 1 April 1988 by accident in the course of his employment with defendant. He thereafter received temporary total disability benefits for a period of 48 2/7 weeks. Although plaintiff returned to work, his wages were reduced 7 February 1990 from their pre-injury level in consequence of his diminished physical capacity. Plaintiff subsequently received partial disability benefits pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 97-30, which provides in pertinent part:\nExcept as otherwise provided in G.S. 97-31, where the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, as hereinafter provided, to the injured employee during such disability, a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter, but not more than the amount established annually to be effective October 1 as provided in G.S. 97-29 a week, and in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be greater than 300 weeks from the date of injury. In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, the latter period shall be deducted from the maximum period herein allowed for partial disability.\n(emphasis added).\nThe period of 300 weeks from the date of plaintiff\u2019s injury ran until 6 January 1994. However, defendant ceased paying partial disability benefits to plaintiff 25 February 1993, 48 2/7 weeks prior to 6 January 1994. Defendant\u2019s proffered rationale was that G.S. \u00a7 97-30 calls for a reduction in the 300 week maximum benefit period by the number of weeks a claimant has received temporary total benefits. According to defendant, therefore, plaintiff was entitled to receive benefits (either temporary total or partial) no longer than 251 5/7 weeks \u2014 the maximum statutory period of 300 weeks minus the 48 2/7 weeks of temporary total benefits he received.\nUpon request of plaintiff to resolve the parties\u2019 dispute concerning the proper term of his benefit period, the Full Commission ultimately ordered defendant to pay plaintiff 48 2/7 additional weeks of compensation. In its order, filed 3 May 1995, the Commission observed:\nDefendant has misread the second sentence of [G.S. \u00a7 97-30]. . . . [E]ven if the \u201cincapacity for work resulting from the injury\u201d was initially total rather than partial, claimant would receive periodic benefits of either kind for no more than 300 weeks following the injury. The \u201cperiod of total disability\u201d is \u201cdeducted\u201d by counting that period as a part of \u201cthe maximum period herein allowed for partial disability.\u201d\nDefendant filed notice of appeal to this Court 5 June 1995.\nDefendant reiterates to this Court the interpretation of the statute at issue which it advanced before the Commission. Defendant also notes that no reported appellate decision has addressed the meaning of the directive in G.S. \u00a7 97-30 that the period of total disability benefits \u201cshall be deducted from the maximum period herein allowed for partial disability.\u201d Plaintiff responds that the section is unambiguous and thus appellate analysis has been unnecessary:\nBecause periods of partial disability often follow periods of total disability, the General Assembly needed to clarify whether the 300-week maximum partial disability period includes the time during which temporary total disability is paid or is in addition to the time in which temporary total disability is paid. The language [in the second sentence of the statute] makes clear that temporary total disability is included in the 300-week period.\nWe agree.\nThe plain meaning of the statute is that the term of partial disability, not the term of total and partial disability combined, is to last no longer than 300 weeks less the period of total disability. Indeed, the statute pointedly and specifically states that the period of total disability \u201cshall be deducted from the maximum period herein allowed for partial disability.\u201d (emphasis added). Defendant\u2019s interpretation could be sustained only if the statute mandated that the period of total disability be \u201cdeducted\u201d from the period permitted for any disability rather than from the maximum period allotted for partial disability.\nWere we to adopt defendant\u2019s approach, moreover, an employee who has suffered serious injury and received total disability would be eligible for less partial disability when healed than an individual with a less serious injury who became only partially disabled, rather than totally, upon sustaining the injury. For example, under defendant\u2019s analysis, an employee who suffers a devastating injury and is totally disabled for 150 weeks would be entitled to no subsequent wage-loss benefits despite a probable drastic reduction in earning power, since the 150 week period of temporary total disability benefits would be \u201cdeducted\u201d from the 300 week maximum period to yield only 150 weeks \u2014 which had already been paid as temporary total disability. On the other hand, an employee with a less severe injury who experiences some wage loss over the entire 300 weeks would be permitted to receive 300 weeks of benefits without \u201cdeduction.\u201d\nSuch illogical results as the foregoing could not have been intended by our General Assembly. See Comr. of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978) (Courts construing statutes are to adopt an \u201cinterpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\u201d). Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s first assignment of error and likewise determine its second, couched in similar vein, to be without merit.\nIn addition to responding to defendant\u2019s appeal, plaintiff has also requested pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88 (1991) that defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs expenses incurred in connection with the instant appeal. Defendant retorts that plaintiff has appealed all decisions entered below save the Order for the Full Commission at issue herein on defendant\u2019s appeal. Defendant further argues that plaintiff has nowhere suggested defendant\u2019s appeal is \u201cwithout reasonable ground,\u201d citing N.C.G.S.\u201d\u00a7 97-88.1 (1991).\nRegarding defendant\u2019s first argument, we note this Court has previously held that attorney\u2019s fees may be awarded an injured employee by the Commission or a reviewing court\n[u]nder section 97-88, ... if (1) the insurer has appealed a decision to the full Commission or to any court, and (2) on appeal, the Commission or court has ordered the insurer to make, or continue making, payments of benefits to the employee.\nEstes v. N.C. State University, 117 N.C. App. 126, 128, 449 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1994). Appeals by plaintiff within the Commission notwithstanding, defendant has appealed the Full Commission\u2019s order to this Court, which has affirmed the directive that defendant pay additional benefits to plaintiff. The statutory requirements thus have been met. Moreover, the proviso that \u201creasonable ground\u201d be found lacking applies to fees sought under G.S. \u00a7 97-88.1 at the original hearing before the Commission. G.S. \u00a7 97-88, governing \u201c[ejxpenses of appeals brought by insurers,\u201d contains no similar \u201cwithout reasonable ground\u201d language. Defendant\u2019s second argument thus is inapposite.\nIn our discretion, see Estes, 117 N.C. App. at 128, 449 S.E.2d at 764, we grant plaintiff\u2019s request, and remand this matter to the Commission for determination of the amount owed plaintiff for the costs of this appeal, including a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee.\nAffirmed and remanded.\nJudges EAGLES and WALKER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JOHN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Patterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, by Donnell Van Noppen III, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Reid, Lewis, Deese, Nance & Person, by Renny W. Deese, for-defendant-appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WILLIE M. BROWN, Plaintiff-Employee, v. PUBLIC WORKS COMMISSION, Defendant-Employer, SELF-INSURED, Defendant-Carrier\nNo. COA95-751\n(Filed 21 May 1996)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 258 (NCI4th)\u2014 term of partial disability \u2014 interpretation of statute\nThe plain meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-30 is that the term of partial disability, not the term of total and partial disability combined, is to last no longer than 300 weeks less the period of total disability.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 381.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 478 (NCI4th)\u2014 costs of appeal\u2014 recovery by employee\nEven though plaintiff employee had appealed decisions within the Industrial Commission, plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs, including attorney\u2019s fees, incurred in this appeal by defendant employer of the order of the Full Commission where the appellate court affirmed the directive that defendant pay additional benefits to plaintiff. Furthermore, plaintiff was not required to show that defendant\u2019s appeal was \u201cwithout reasonable ground\u201d in order to recover such costs.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 722, 725.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 3 May 1995 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 1996.\nPatterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, by Donnell Van Noppen III, for plaintiff-appellee.\nReid, Lewis, Deese, Nance & Person, by Renny W. Deese, for-defendant-appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0473-01",
  "first_page_order": 509,
  "last_page_order": 513
}