{ "id": 11918566, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDNA HINES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hines", "decision_date": "1996-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA95-733", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "553", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 N.C. App. 545" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "5 ALR2d 444", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200638 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 191", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 214", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12031909 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 L. Ed. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 927", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6259081, 6257099, 6257452, 6256407, 6258416, 6258710, 6256758, 6259382, 6258108, 6257758 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0927-09", "/us/456/0927-03", "/us/456/0927-04", "/us/456/0927-01", "/us/456/0927-07", "/us/456/0927-08", "/us/456/0927-02", "/us/456/0927-10", "/us/456/0927-06", "/us/456/0927-05" ] }, { "cite": "650 F.2d 1033", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1239957 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/650/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "citing Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 72 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527384 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "citing Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 72 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916359 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027325 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559163 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 U.S. 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 186255 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/269/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604316 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564130 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-234", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531340 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179-80" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 849, "char_count": 18406, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.306295453773362e-07, "percentile": 0.9168995953045911 }, "sha256": "089bd4d7acbfd7825e15a72a921597338ac0a399ae2fc8db46274531173326df", "simhash": "1:4b3fb9682d1209d2", "word_count": 3068 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDNA HINES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nDefendant Edna Hines, chairperson of the Hertford County Board of Elections, was convicted by a jury of willfully intimidating or attempting to intimidate an election officer in the discharge of his duties and of willfully communicating threats. The offenses were consolidated for judgment and defendant was given a thirty day sentence, which was suspended on the condition that she pay a $250.00 fine and $185.00 in court costs. Defendant made a motion for appropriate relief asking the court to set aside the verdict, dismiss the charges or grant a new trial. The trial court denied this motion. Defendant appeals.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that at the time of the alleged incident, the Hertford County Board of Elections consisted of two democratic members, defendant and Sally Moore, and one Republican member, Doug Askew. Mr. Askew testified that around 5 p.m. on 2 November 1993 he and Ms. Moore counted the absentee ballots, as previously arranged. Later that evening Ms. Hines took the absentee ballots into a back room at the Board of Elections to recount them. Since one member of each party must be present while ballots are counted, Mr. Askew followed her. Once Mr. Askew entered the room, Ms. Hines told him that he needed to be a \u201cteam player.\u201d When Mr. Askew asked her to explain her comment, defendant began to scream at him and accuse him of undermining her authority as chairperson. According to Mr. Askew\u2019s testimony, Ms. Hines told him he \u201cdidn\u2019t know who [he] was messing with\u201d and threatened to \u201ckill [him]\u201d and \u201cchoke the shit out of [him].\u201d While she was yelling at Mr. Askew, Ms. Hines had him backed up against a desk. Mr. Askew testified that Ms. Hines was mad and upset and that he was scared to move.\nSheriff Winfred Hardy, another witness for the State, testified that he was sitting in the outer room of the Board of Elections during the evening of 2 November 1993. From the back room, he heard a woman\u2019s voice very loudly say, \u201cI\u2019ll kill you.\u201d He jumped out of his chair and went into the back room where Ms. Hines was shaking her finger in Mr. Askew\u2019s face, saying \u201cI\u2019ll kill you\u201d and \u201cI\u2019ll choke the shit out of you.\u201d Sheriff Hardy approached Ms. Hines and pulled her arm down to her side because he thought she was going to hit Mr. Askew. The sheriff told Ms. Hines to calm down. Ms. Hines replied by telling the sheriff to get Mr. Askew\u2019s \u201cdamn ass\u201d out of the room.\nMr. Gary Bartlette, Executive Secretary Director of the State Board of Elections, testified that Chapter 163-234(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes requires a member of each party to be present for the counting and recounting of absentee ballots.\nDefendant testified that on the day in question she began to recount the absentee ballots in the front room but moved to the back room to get away from Mr. Askew, who was talking to her and distracting her. He then followed her into the back room, standing behind her and \u201cbreath[ing] down [her] neck.\u201d She testified that she asked him to sit down, but he refused. Instead, he stood over her, telling her that she did not know what she was doing. After Mr. Askew did something Ms. Hines described as \u201coutrageous,\u201d although she could not remember what it was, she told him he should be more respectful and leave her alone. Ms. Hines testified that Sheriff Hardy removed Mr. Askew from the room. Ms. Hines stated that she never intended to harm Mr. Askew or try to intimidate him.\nDefendant\u2019s witness, Shirley Thompson, an employee of the Hertford County Board of Elections in November 1993, testified that she was in the back room when the confrontation happened on 2 November 1993. She stated that she saw Mr. Askew standing over Ms. Hines\u2019 shoulder as defendant counted the votes. Ms. Thompson testified that Ms. Hines rose from her chair and that both Ms. Hines and Mr. Askew were speaking very loudly at one another. Ms. Thompson heard Ms. Hines call the sheriff and tell him to get Mr. Askew out of the room before she killed him. Sometime after the sheriff came in, Mr. Askew left the room, but returned ten or fifteen minutes later to apologize to Ms. Hines. It was Ms. Thompson\u2019s testimony that Mr. Askew had a propensity to \u201cflare up.\u201d\nAfter defendant presented her evidence, the State recalled Sheriff Hardy who testified that Ms. Hines did not call for him to remove Mr. Askew. He repeated his prior testimony that he entered the back room after hearing Ms. Hines threaten to kill Mr. Askew. Sheriff Hardy further testified that he did not hear Mr. Askew raise his voice.\nMr. Askew also returned to the stand and testified that he was not breathing down Ms. Hines\u2019 neck, but was leaning up against a desk behind her. He denied telling Ms. Hines that she did not know what she was doing and stated that Ms. Moore and Ms. Thompson were in the room yelling at him as well.\nDefendant makes eight assignments of error but only argues six in her brief. Therefore, assignments of error numbers one and seven are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (1996).\nDefendant first contends that the trial court should have dismissed the claim that she violated N.C. Gen. Stat. section 163-275(11) because there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Askew was an \u201celection officer\u201d as mentioned in the statute and additionally because members of county board of elections are not protected by the statute. We disagree.\nG.S. 163-275(11) provides:\nAny person who shall, in connection with any primary, general or special election held in this State, do any of the acts or things declared in this section to be unlawful, shall be guilty of a Class I felony. It shall be unlawful:\n* * *\n(11) For any person, by threats, menaces or in any other manner, to intimidate any chief judge, judge of election or other election officer in the discharge of his duties in the registration of voters or in conducting any primary or election.\nG.S. \u00a7 163-275(11) (1995) (emphasis added). The term \u201celection officer\u201d is not defined in the statute.\nIn support of her argument that a board of elections member is not an election officer under the statute, defendant points to N.C. Gen. Stat. section 163-274(3) which makes it a misdemeanor \u201cto interfere in any manner with the performance of any duty imposed by law upon any election officer or member of any board of elections.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 163-274(3) (1995) (emphasis added). Defendant argues that since the legislature made a distinction between an election officer and a board of elections member in this statute, it intended the two to be distinct. Furthermore, defendant argues, if the legislature intended to include a member of the board of elections in G.S. 163-275(11), it would have done so, as it did in G.S. 163-274(3).\nIn construing a statute, undefined words should be given their plain meaning if it is reasonable to do so. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 338, 407 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991). An \u201cofficer\u201d is \u201cone who is appointed or elected to serve in a position of trust . . . .\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1968). Trust is defined as \u201ca charge or duty imposed in faith or confidence . . . .\u201d Id. Therefore, an \u201celection officer\u201d is anyone charged with an election duty. Additionally, statutes should be construed to ensure that the purpose of the legislature is accomplished. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227. G.S. 163-275(11) is part of Article 22, entitled \u201cCorrupt Practices and Other Offenses against the Elective Franchise,\u201d which the North Carolina Supreme Court has determined was \u201cdesigned to prohibit various kinds of practices thought to be inimical to fair elections.\u201d State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 179-80, 432 S.E.2d 832, 838 (1993).\nCounty boards of elections, and their members, have clearly been delegated election duties by our legislature. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-33 (1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-234 (1995). As a result, according to the plain meaning of the term, we hold that members of county boards of elections are \u201celection officers\u201d for the purpose of applying G.S. 163-275(11). To conclude otherwise would also frustrate the obvious intent of the legislature in passing G.S. 163-275(11): to promote fair elections and to ensure that threats and intimidation do not interfere with the duties of any person charged with running an election.\nDefendant also argues that Mr. Askew had no duties in conducting the election because any duties in conducting an election are given to the board as an entity and not to the individual board members. As defendant points out, the board is an entity. Therefore, it is incapable of performing any duties independent of its individual members. We hold that as a member of the board, Mr. Askew is-charged with all duties imposed on the board itself. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of her Motion for a Bill of Particulars. She contends that the indictment was not sufficient to allow adequate preparation of her defense. In her motion, defendant asked for various information including the exact time, date and location of the alleged conduct, the specific language or conduct alleged and the specific duties in the election Mr. Askew was conducting. Subsequently, during discovery, the State provided defendant with the statements of three witnesses and a list of over twenty statements allegedly made by defendant on the evening in question. Immediately prior to trial, defendant requested a ruling on her motion for a bill of particulars; the court denied the motion.\nAn appellate court should reverse the denial of a motion for a bill of particulars only if it clearly appears that the \u201clack of timely access to the requested information significantly impaired defendant\u2019s preparation and conduct of his case.\u201d State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 601, 268 S.E.2d 800, 805 (1980). Since we find no evidence in the record that a lack of information \u201csignificantly impaired\u201d Ms. Hines\u2019 preparation of her defense, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying her motion for a bill of particulars. Through discovery, Ms. Hines was provided with enough of the requested information to adequately prepare her case. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by denying her Motion for Appropriate Relief. She provides two grounds for this proposition. First, Ms. Hines argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on G.S. 163-274(3), which she contends is a lesser included offense.\nA trial court is obligated to instruct on a lesser included offense \u201cwhen and only when there is evidence from which the jury could find that such included crime of lesser degree was committed.\u201d State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 159, 84 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1954). As stated above, G.S. 163-274(3) makes it a misdemeanor to \u201cinterfere in any manner with the performance of any duty imposed by law upon any election officer or member of any board of elections.\u201d We hold that even if this is a lesser included offense of G.S. 163-275(11), the trial court did not err in failing to include it in the instructions. The State\u2019s evidence was such that if the jury found defendant guilty at all, it was because she intimidated Mr. Askew by threats. There was no evidence presented which showed that Ms. Hines interfered with his election duties in any other way. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also argues that her motion for appropriate relief should have been granted because G.S. 163-275(11) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. We find no merit in these contentions.\nDefendant argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if \u201cmen of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.\u201d Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926). However, \u201c[w]hen the language of a statute provides adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct forjudges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met. In Re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531, 169 S.E.2d 879, 888 (1969), aff\u2019d, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1971). Defendant has the burden of proving that there is inadequate warning or that the statute is incapable of uniform judicial interpretation and administration. Caswell County v. Hanks, 120 N.C. App. 489, 493, 462 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1995).\nDefendant has failed to meet this burden. G.S. 163-275(11) prohibits anyone from 1) intimidating or attempting to intimidate 2) in any manner 3) someone who is conducting an election. Only the term \u201cintimidate\u201d could possibly be considered vague and we find no legal problem.\nUndefined words in a statute should be given their plain meaning if it is reasonable to do so. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227. \u201cIntimidate\u201d is commonly defined as \u201cto make timid or fearful: inspire or affect with fear: frighten.\u201d Websters Third New International Dictionary (1968). Clearly, in G.S. 163-275(11) the legislature intended to prohibit anyone from frightening an individual while conducting election duties. We conclude that this statute is specific enough to warn individuals of common intelligence of the conduct which is proscribed and is certainly capable of uniform judicial interpretation.\nDefendant also contends that the statute is overbroad so as to violate the free speech guarantees of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. She argues that it unnecessarily sweeps into areas of protected speech. Again, we disagree.\n\u201cThe overbreadth doctrine holds that a law is void on its face if it sweeps within its ambit not solely activity that is subject to governmental control, but also includes within its prohibition the practice of a protected constitutional right.\u201d Treants Enterprises, Inc. v. Onslow County, 94 N.C. App. 453, 458, 380 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1989) (citing Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 72 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1982)). It is undisputed that each state has \u201ca compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.\u201d Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Com., 489 U.S. 214, 231, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271, 287 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has \u201c \u2018upheld generally-applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.\u2019 \u201d Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 185, 432 S.E.2d at 841 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 15 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 557 n.9 (1983)).\nG.S. 163-275(11) is not overbroad, but rather is tailored as narrowly as possible to serve North Carolina\u2019s compelling interest in ensuring electoral integrity. The statute is generally-applicable and its regulations are even-handed. We conclude that G.S. 163-275(11) is not unconstitutionally broad.\nMs. Hines also argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied and that it impermissibly burdens her freedom of conscience. After reviewing these arguments, we find them to be without merit. We rule that G.S. 163-275(11) is constitutional, both on its face and as applied.\nDefendant also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s failure to dismiss count two of the indictment. She argues that since the felony statute is unconstitutional, the misdemeanor charge was not properly consolidated with a felony as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. section 7A-271(3). Since we have found the statute to be constitutional, we see no reason to address this assignment of error.\nWe conclude that Ms. Hines received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges GREENE and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Sharon C. Wilson, for the State.", "Howard C. McGlohonfor defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDNA HINES\nNo. COA95-733\n(Filed 4 June 1996)\n1. Elections \u00a7 13 (NCI4th)\u2014 county board of election member \u2014 election officer\nMembers of county boards of elections are \u201celection officers\u201d for the purpose of applying the statute prohibiting the intimidation of such officers, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-275(11).\nAm Jur 2d, Elections \u00a7\u00a7 374-376.\n2. Indictment, Information, and Criminal Pleadings \u00a7 43 (NCI4th)\u2014 bill of particulars \u2014 denial no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a bill of particulars in a prosecution for intimidating an election officer in the discharge of his duties where defendant was provided through discovery with enough of the requested information to prepare her case.\nAm Jur 2d, Indictments and Informations \u00a7\u00a7 154-164.\nRight of accused to bill of particulars. 5 ALR2d 444.\n3. Elections \u00a7 13 (NCI4th)\u2014 intimidating election official\u2014 interference with performance of duty of election official \u2014 instruction on lesser offense not required\nEven if N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-274(3), which makes it a misdemeanor to interfere with the performance of any legal duty of any election officer or member of any board of elections, is a lesser included offense of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-275(11), which makes it a felony to threaten or intimidate an election officer in the discharge of his duties, the trial court did not err in failing to so instruct, since the State\u2019s evidence was such that if the jury found defendant guilty at all, it was because she intimidated a member of the board of elections by threats.\nAm Jur 2d, Elections \u00a7\u00a7 374-376.\n4. Elections \u00a7 13 (NCI4th)\u2014 prohibition against intimidating election official \u2014 statute not unconstitutional\nThe statute which prohibits anyone from intimidating or attempting to intimidate in any manner someone who is conducting an election, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-275(11), is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, since the statute is specific enough to warn individuals of common intelligence of the conduct which is proscribed and is capable of uniform judicial interpretation, is tailored as narrowly as possible to serve the state\u2019s compelling interest in ensuring electoral integrity, is generally applicable, and its regulations are even-handed.\nAm Jur 2d, Elections \u00a7\u00a7 374-376.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 5 January 1995 by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr. in Hertford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 March 1996.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Sharon C. Wilson, for the State.\nHoward C. McGlohonfor defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 581, "last_page_order": 589 }