{ "id": 11918770, "name": "WILLIAMSON PRODUCE, INC., Plaintiff v. J.H. SATCHER, JR., d/b/a J.H. SATCHER, JR. FARMS and WEYERHAUSER PAPER COMPANY, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Williamson Produce, Inc. v. Satcher", "decision_date": "1996-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA95-476", "first_page": "589", "last_page": "595", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 N.C. App. 589" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11306135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358429 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734507 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527372 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "213" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" }, { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" }, { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521011 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393-94" }, { "page": "394-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525277 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0165-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 657, "char_count": 14768, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1064797784418789e-07, "percentile": 0.5696642931692156 }, "sha256": "e2e0de15c1aae00567fc135f3ea70a18b0c039869febcf3e53d63255a1b90f2a", "simhash": "1:094957d194ce3738", "word_count": 2292 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, JOHN C., and MARTIN, MARK D., concur." ], "parties": [ "WILLIAMSON PRODUCE, INC., Plaintiff v. J.H. SATCHER, JR., d/b/a J.H. SATCHER, JR. FARMS and WEYERHAUSER PAPER COMPANY, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nThe issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant Satcher\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant Satcher argues that under these facts the courts of North Carolina cannot assert personal jurisdiction over him consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree. Because it is based on due process concerns, defendant Satcher\u2019s appeal is properly before us pursuant to G.S. 1-277(b). E.g., Patrum v. Anderson, 75 N.C. App. 165, 167, 330 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1985).\nWhen determining whether a non-resident defendant is subject to the personal jurisdiction of our courts, we apply a two-pronged analysis. CFA Medical, Inc. v. Burkhalter, 95 N.C. App. 391, 393-94, 383 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1989). We must determine first whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant falls within the language of North Carolina\u2019s long-arm statute, and second \u201cwhether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina such that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\u201d Better Business Forms, Inc. v. Davis, 120 N.C. App. 498, 500, 462 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1995).\nDefendant Satcher first argues that he is not covered by the broad language of G.S. 1-75.4, often referred to as North Carolina\u2019s long-arm statute. We disagree. G.S. 1-75.4 establishes the relevant jurisdictional authority here and provides in pertinent part that:\nA court of this State having jurisdiction over the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person . . . under any of the following circumstances:\n(5) Local Services, Goods or Contracts. \u2014 In any action which:\na. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff\u2019s benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this State or to pay for services to be performed in this State by the plaintiff; or\nb. Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this State, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this State if such performance within this State was authorized or ratified by the defendant; or\nc. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff\u2019s benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this State, or to ship from this State goods, documents of title, or other things of value; or\nd. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction; or\ne. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually received by the plaintiff in this State from the defendant through a carrier without regard to where delivery to the carrier occurred.\nG.S. 1-75.4 (1983 & Supp. 1995). If there is competent evidence in the record to support \u201ca finding which comports with one of the above provisions, jurisdiction will follow under the long-arm statute.\u201d Dataflow Companies v. Hutto, 114 N.C. App. 209, 212, 441 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1994).\nGenerally speaking, the language of the long-arm statute is sufficiently broad that the limits of personal jurisdiction are defined by due process rather than by statute. E.g., Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C 361, 365, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986). The provisions of G.S. 1-75.4(5) are to be \u201cliberally construed in favor of finding personal jurisdiction, subject only to due process considerations.\u201d Dataflow, 114 N.C. App. at 212, 441 S.E.2d at 582. Here, we conclude that the due process analysis is indeed controlling because no fewer than three subsections of G.S. 1-75.4(5) are applicable to the facts of this case.\nSpecifically, defendant Satcher fulfills the requirements of G.S. 1-75.4(5) (a) in that he made \u201ca promise . . . for the plaintiffs benefit ... to pay for services to be performed in this State by plaintiff. . . .\u201d The promise was the contract between the parties and the services performed were plaintiffs marketing and sale here in North Carolina of defendant\u2019s peaches grown in South Carolina. Accordingly, having determined that G.S. l-75.4(5)(a) is applicable here, we point out in passing that the provisions of G.S. l-75.4(5)(b) and (d) also would suffice to bring defendant within the reach of our \u201clong-arm\u201d statute.\nTurning now to the dispositive question of whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process, we recognize that our State courts may not exercise jurisdiction \u201cunless defendants have had \u2018certain minimum contacts\u2019 with the forum state such that the \u2018maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u201d Dataflow, 114 N.C. App. at 213, 441 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Tom Togs, Inc., 318 N.C. at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 786). In determining whether the requisite minimum contacts are present, \u201cit is essential that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully availed [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.\u201d Cameron-Brown Co. v. Daves, 83 N.C. App. 281, 285, 350 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1986). It is well settled, however, \u201cthat a defendant need not physically enter North Carolina in order for personal jurisdiction to arise.\u201d Better Business Forms, 120 N.C. App. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834.\nA contract alone may establish the necessary minimum contacts where it is shown that the contract was voluntarily entered into and has a \u201csubstantial connection\u201d with this State. Tom Togs, Inc., 318 N.C. at 367, 348 S.E.2d at 786. When a contract bears a substantial connection to the forum state, a defendant who enters into that contract \u201ccan reasonably anticipate being haled into court . . .\u2019\u2019in the forum state. CFA Medical, 95 N.C. App. at 394-95, 383 S.E.2d at 216 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980)). Here, the evidence is clear that defendant Satcher\u2019s contract with plaintiff bears a \u201csubstantial connection\u201d to North Carolina and that defendant Satcher \u201cshould not be surprised with being haled into a North Carolina court.\u201d Chapman v. Janko, U.S.A., 120 N.C. App. 371 376, 462 S.E.2d 534, 538 (1995).\nDefendant Satcher contests this conclusion arguing that the assertion of jurisdiction is improper since plaintiff approached defendant Satcher in South Carolina and then travelled to South Carolina to negotiate the contract. Defendant Satcher\u2019s argument, however, would have us consider this factor to the virtual exclusion of all others, and that is not the law. Our analysis is not accomplished by using \u201ca mechanical formula or rule of thumb but by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.\u201d Better Business Forms, 120 N.C. App. at 500, 462 S.E.2d at 833.\nIt is true that plaintiff initiated the original contact in South Carolina with defendant Satcher and secured the original agreement following negotiations taking place entirely in South Carolina. The original contract between the parties provided that plaintiff would have the sole right to market and sell defendant Satcher\u2019s peach crop, that plaintiff would receive 8% of the sales price for its efforts, and that plaintiff would advance operating capital to defendant Satcher up to a total of $100,000.00. Were this the only contact, defendant Satcher\u2019s due process argument would be considerably more persuasive.\nHere, however, the parties made several additional agreements and modifications thereto at defendant Satcher\u2019s prompting. On at least three occasions, defendant Satcher contacted plaintiff requesting additional sums of money beyond the $100,000.00 promised as part of the original contract. Defendant Satcher also contacted plaintiff to secure assistance in procuring the necessary packaging boxes for the peach crop. Following this contact, plaintiff agreed to pay Weyerhauser to produce the necessary boxes at its plant in North Carolina and to ship them, on defendant Satcher\u2019s order, to defendant\u2019s farm in South Carolina. Plaintiff even agreed to pay a surcharge on the cost of each box to help retire a debt owed by defendant Satcher to Weyerhauser that was incurred prior to defendant Satcher\u2019s original agreement with plaintiff. At its height, defendant Satcher\u2019s indebtedness to plaintiff, including that authorized in the original agreement, totalled $292,000.00.\nAdditional facts relevant in determining the quantity and quality of defendant Satcher\u2019s contacts with North Carolina include the following: that defendant Satcher directly contacted Weyerhauser in North Carolina and ordered the necessary boxes; that the parties installed a dedicated phone line to facilitate communication between plaintiff and defendant Satcher; that plaintiff\u2019s marketing and sales efforts took place almost entirely in Wilson, North Carolina, and; that, pursuant to the parties\u2019 agreement, plaintiff sent a representative to South Carolina to monitor packaging operations, and sent trucks to South Carolina to pick up the peaches.\nBased on this evidence, we conclude that defendant Satcher had sufficient minimum contacts to permit this State to exercise personal jurisdiction over him consistent with the due process clause. E.g., Dataflow, 114 N.C. App. at 209, 441 S.E.2d at 580; Chapman, 120 N.C. App. at 376, 462 S.E.2d at 538. Accordingly, we conclude that the decision of the trial court denying defendant Satcher\u2019s motion to dismiss must be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN, JOHN C., and MARTIN, MARK D., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Connor, Bunn, Rogerson & Woodard, P.A., by C. Timothy Williford, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Lee, Reece & Weaver by Cyrus F. Lee and Rachel V. Lee, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAMSON PRODUCE, INC., Plaintiff v. J.H. SATCHER, JR., d/b/a J.H. SATCHER, JR. FARMS and WEYERHAUSER PAPER COMPANY, Defendants\nNo. COA95-476\n(Filed 4 June 1996)\n1. Courts \u00a7 16 (NCI4th)\u2014 financing and marketing of South Carolina grower\u2019s peach crop in North Carolina \u2014 applicability of long-arm statute\nDefendant South Carolina peach grower made a promise for plaintiff\u2019s benefit to pay for services to be performed in the State by plaintiff within the purview of the long-arm statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(a), where a contract between the parties provided that plaintiff would advance operating capital to defendant and gave plaintiff the sole right to market defendant\u2019s peaches, and plaintiff marketed and sold defendant\u2019s peaches in North Carolina.\nAm Jur 2d, Courts \u00a7 80.\n2. Courts \u00a7 16 (NCI4th)\u2014 personal jurisdiction of nonresident defendant \u2014 sufficient minimum contacts\nDefendant, a South Carolina peach grower, had sufficient minimum contacts to permit North Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction over him consistent with the due process clause where plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation, initiated the original contact in South Carolina with defendant and secured the original agreement following negotiations taking place entirely in South Carolina; the original contract between the parties provided that plaintiff would have the sole right to market defendant\u2019s crop for a percentage of the profits and would advance defendant operating capital up to a specified limit; on at least three occasions defendant contacted plaintiff requesting additional sums of money beyond that promised in the original contract; defendant also contacted plaintiff to secure assistance in procuring the necessary boxes for the crop; plaintiff agreed to pay a North Carolina manufacturer to make and ship boxes, on defendant\u2019s order, to defendant\u2019s farm in South Carolina; the parties installed a dedicated phone line to facilitate their communication; plaintiff\u2019s marketing and sales efforts took place almost entirely in North Carolina; and pursuant to the parties\u2019 agreement, plaintiff sent a representative to South Carolina to monitor packaging operations and sent trucks to South Carolina to pick up the peaches.\nAm Jur 2d, Courts \u00a7 80.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 15 February 1995 by Judge G.K. Butterfield in Wilson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 January 1996.\nDefendant Satcher owned and operated between 1,000 and 1,100 acres of peach orchards in and around Johnston, Edgefield County, South Carolina. Defendant Satcher did business with his son David S. Satcher under the name of J.H. Satcher, Jr. Farms (hereinafter \u201cSatcher Farms\u201d). In January 1994, plaintiff contacted defendant Satcher and offered to sell Satcher Farms\u2019 1994 peach crop. William R. Williamson, representing himself as the owner and operator of plaintiff corporation, travelled to South Carolina to negotiate with defendant Satcher. The parties reached an agreement under which plaintiff would advance funds to defendant Satcher to cover production of the 1994 peach crop and plaintiff would then market Satcher Farms\u2019 crop, acting in the nature of a commission merchant for the sale of the peach crop. Plaintiff ultimately loaned defendant Satcher a total of $292,000.00. In addition, a special telephone line was installed between plaintiff and defendant Satcher to facilitate communication between the parties.\nAs of January 1994, defendant Satcher maintained an outstanding balance with defendant Weyerhauser stemming from previous purchases of wooden boxes necessary to ship Satcher Farms\u2019 peaches. Because of this outstanding debt, defendant Weyerhauser would no longer allow defendant Satcher to purchase boxes on credit. Plaintiff then agreed to purchase boxes for defendant Satcher and recover the additional advance over the course of the contract. This arrangement allowed defendant Satcher to directly call defendant Weyerhauser\u2019s North Carolina production facility and order needed boxes, the invoice for which would be sent directly to plaintiff by defendant Weyerhauser.\nDuring the course of performance of the contract, a dispute developed between the parties regarding the quality of peaches produced by defendant Satcher and the sale price plaintiff was able to obtain for the peaches it sold. Attempts to resolve this dispute resulted in plaintiff travelling to South Carolina to negotiate further with defendant Satcher. These attempts to resolve the problem ultimately failed and on 12 October 1994 plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Wilson County, North Carolina. Defendant Satcher then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) alleging that the Wilson County Superior Court could not statutorily or constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over him and his business, Satcher Farms. After hearing, the trial court denied defendant Satcher\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nDefendant appeals.\nConnor, Bunn, Rogerson & Woodard, P.A., by C. Timothy Williford, for plaintiff-appellee.\nLee, Reece & Weaver by Cyrus F. Lee and Rachel V. Lee, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0589-01", "first_page_order": 625, "last_page_order": 631 }