{ "id": 11918858, "name": "LUIS A. SANHUEZA, Employee, Plaintiff v. LIBERTY STEEL ERECTORS, Employer; MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Sanhueza v. Liberty Steel Erectors", "decision_date": "1996-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA95-468", "first_page": "603", "last_page": "608", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 N.C. App. 603" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "3 ALR5th 907", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "72 ALR4th 905", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560726 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492968, 2496467, 2498198, 2496765, 2494143 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0488-05", "/nc/327/0488-03", "/nc/327/0488-01", "/nc/327/0488-02", "/nc/327/0488-04" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522424 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0302-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 657, "char_count": 13291, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0837448779341653e-07, "percentile": 0.8581564021686207 }, "sha256": "b5235e31c0ada56f1978eccb7bd079a2c8a28b9bcf78c251a0e8ee453fbbc882", "simhash": "1:e510cd4e2de64e1c", "word_count": 1935 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, JOHN C., and MARTIN, MARK D., concur." ], "parties": [ "LUIS A. SANHUEZA, Employee, Plaintiff v. LIBERTY STEEL ERECTORS, Employer; MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nPlaintiff first argues that the Industrial Commission erred in concluding that plaintiff unjustifiably refused to cooperate with defendants\u2019 reasonable vocational efforts. Plaintiff argues that any failure to cooperate on his part was justified and that he is therefore entitled to continuing temporary total disability benefits. We disagree.\nThe findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. Watkins v. City of Asheville, 99 N.C. App. 302, 303, 392 S.E.2d 754, 756, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 488, 397 S.E.2d 238 (1990). Our review is limited to determining \u201cwhether there was competent evidence before the Commission to support its findings and ... whether such findings support its legal conclusions.\u201d McLean v. Roadway Express, 307 N.C. 99, 102, 296 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1982). The Industrial Commission is the sole judge of witness credibility. E.g., Burwell v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, 114 N.C. App. 69, 74, 441 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1994).\nHere, the Commission as finder of fact chose to believe defendants\u2019 evidence, including the testimony of Ms. Baker and Mr. Hinson and the videotape taken by Mr. Hinson. Ms. Baker testified in detail as to plaintiff\u2019s consistently uncooperative conduct. Mr. Hinson\u2019s videotape corroborates Ms. Baker\u2019s contention that plaintiff was intentionally uncooperative with her efforts to assist him in returning to the work force. Although, plaintiff\u2019s testimony tended to contradict defendants\u2019 evidence, the Commission chose not to believe plaintiff\u2019s testimony. The Commission\u2019s assessment of witness credibility is conclusive. Burwell, 114 N.C. App. at 74, 441 S.E.2d at 149. Accordingly, we conclude that there is competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiff unjustifiably refused to cooperate with defendants\u2019 rehabilitation efforts.\nPlaintiff next argues that the Commission erred in concluding that plaintiff\u2019s benefits must be terminated pursuant to G.S. 97-25 because plaintiff unjustifiably refused to cooperate with defendants\u2019 rehabilitation efforts. Plaintiff asserts that G.S. 97-25 is inapplicable to the vocational rehabilitation efforts employed by defendants here. We disagree. G.S. 97-25 provides in pertinent part that:\nMedical Compensation shall be provided by the employer. In case of a controversy arising between the employer and employee relative to the continuance of medical, surgical, hospital, or other treatment, the Industrial Commission may order such further treatment as may in the discretion of the Commission be necessary.\nThe refusal of the employee to accept any medical, hospital, surgical or other treatment or rehabilitative procedure when ordered by the Industrial Commission shall bar said employee from further compensation until such refusal ceases ....\nG.S. 97-25 (1991). Plaintiff\u2019s argument misinterprets this statutory language. While the title of G.S. 97-25 is \u201cMedical treatment and supplies,\u201d the title does not identify the full breadth of the statute\u2019s language.\nG.S. 97-25 explicitly pertains to \u201cmedical compensation.\u201d G.S. 97-2(19) defines \u201cmedical compensation\u201d as \u201cmedical, surgical, hospital, nursing, and rehabilitative services, and medicines, sick travel, and other treatment, including medical and surgical supplies, as may reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relief and for such additional time as, in the judgment of the Commission, will tend to lessen the period of disability . . . .\u201d G.S. 97-2(19) (1995). Reading these two statutory sections in pari materia, it is clear that \u201ctreatment,\u201d \u201crehabilitative procedures\u201d or \u201crehabilitative services\u201d are all within the purview of G.S. 97-25 so long as they \u201cwill tend to lessen the period of disability.\u201d Id.\nHere, the Industrial Commission found that defendants secured vocational rehabilitation services for the plaintiff \u201cin order to assist [plaintiff] in obtaining the type of suitable alternate light/sedentary work required by his permanent back injury . In this context, we hold that an attempt to secure suitable employment for plaintiff is an appropriate attempt to \u201clessen the period of disability.\u201d We conclude therefore that G.S. 97-25 is controlling and that defendants here have met their burden of showing that plaintiff has unjustifiably refused to cooperate with defendants\u2019 rehabilitation efforts. Accordingly, we conclude that the portion of the Industrial Commission\u2019s opinion and award that suspends plaintiff\u2019s benefits pursuant to G.S. 97-25 should be affirmed.\nThe terminology of the Industrial Commission\u2019s opinion and award, however, effectively terminates plaintiff\u2019s right to receive future disability benefits rather than merely suspending that right for the period of plaintiff\u2019s unjustified refusal to cooperate with defendants\u2019 vocational rehabilitative efforts. Plaintiff argues that this is contrary to the language of G.S. 97-25. We agree. G.S. 97-25 is clear in its mandate that a claimant who refuses to cooperate with a rehabilitative procedure is only barred from receiving further compensation \u201cuntil such refusal ceases . . . .\u201d Accordingly, we must reverse the Commission\u2019s opinion and award as to its conclusion that plaintiff is \u201cno longer entitled to any further weekly compensation benefits . . .\u201d after 6 February 1991. The Commission\u2019s opinion and award must reflect the fact that plaintiff may again be entitled to weekly compensation benefits upon a proper showing by plaintiff that he is willing to cooperate with defendants\u2019 rehabilitative efforts.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.\nJudges MARTIN, JOHN C., and MARTIN, MARK D., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Todd, Parham & Harris, by Ken Harris, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Golding, Meekins, Holden, Gosper & Stiles, by Henry C. Byrum, Jr., for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUIS A. SANHUEZA, Employee, Plaintiff v. LIBERTY STEEL ERECTORS, Employer; MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. COA95-468\n(Filed 4 June 1996)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 296 (NCI4th)\u2014 employee\u2019s refusal to cooperate with rehabilitation efforts \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiff employee unjustifiably refused to cooperate with defendants\u2019 rehabilitation efforts where it tended to show that plaintiff was belligerent toward a vocational counselor hired by defendant to assist plaintiff in finding employment; on interview days plaintiff wore old clothes and nearly always wore his back brace, although he did not wear it often otherwise; plaintiff exaggerated and accentuated his symptoms during interviews and became disruptive and abusive when speaking with his vocational counselor and prospective employers; plaintiff failed to attend scheduled meetings and interviews; plaintiff argued that his English skills were inadequate in spite of the fact that he communicated well with the counselor in English and refused to attend English classes arranged by the counselor; and a videotape of plaintiff shows him performing a variety of physical activities for substantial periods of time without the appearance of pain.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 389, 390.\nWorkers\u2019 compensation: reasonableness of employee\u2019s refusal of medical services tendered by employer. 72 ALR4th 905.\nWhat amounts to failure or refusal to submit to medical treatment sufficient to bar recovery of workers\u2019 compensation. 3 ALR5th 907.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 296 (NCI4th)\u2014 employee\u2019s refusal to cooperate with rehabilitation efforts \u2014 suspension of benefits\nThe employer\u2019s provision of vocational rehabilitation services to plaintiff employee in an attempt to assist him in finding suitable employment is an appropriate attempt to \u201clessen the period of disability\u201d and comes within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-25. Therefore, plaintiff\u2019s unjustified refusal to cooperate with the employer\u2019s rehabilitation efforts supported the suspension of, but not the termination of, plaintiff\u2019s right to receive future disability benefits. Plaintiff may again be entitled to weekly compensation benefits upon showing that he is willing to cooperate with the employer\u2019s rehabilitation efforts.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 389, 390.\nWorkers\u2019 compensation: reasonableness of employee\u2019s refusal of medical services tendered by employer. 72 ALR4th 905.\nWhat amounts to failure or refusal to submit to medical treatment sufficient to bar recovery of workers\u2019 compensation. 3 ALR5th 907.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an opinion and award entered 1 December 1994 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 January 1996.\nPlaintiff, Luis Sanhueza, was born in Chile on 21 June 1953. In Chile, plaintiff completed two years of college level electronics training and served as a navigator in the Chilean Navy and for various shipping companies after his naval service ended. In 1980, plaintiff moved to America where he married an American citizen and found employment as a steel worker. Plaintiff worked as a steel worker for several different employers until 1986 when plaintiff took a similar position with defendant-employer, Liberty Steel Erectors.\nOn 13 July 1989, plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident when he injured his back helping a fellow employee move a piece of steel. Plaintiff entered into a Form 21 agreement for the payment of compensation which was approved by the Industrial Commission. Following his injury, plaintiff came under the primary care of Dr. Stephen H. Sims and Dr. Bruce Darden. These doctors supervised plaintiffs treatment which included spinal fusion surgery, medication, rest and physical therapy.\nAs time progressed, plaintiff continued to complain that his condition was not improving. An extensive battery of tests performed by Dr. Darden revealed no identifiable abnormalities. The doctor-patient relationship then deteriorated between Dr. Darden and plaintiff. Dr. Darden testified that he came to suspect \u201csymptom magnification.\u201d On 18 June 1991, Dr. Darden discharged plaintiff after determining that plaintiff suffered 25% permanent partial impairment to his cervical spine. Dr. Anthony Wheeler also examined plaintiff and assigned a 25-30% permanent partial disability rating to plaintiffs back.\nOn 29 August 1991, defendant-insurer began a vocational rehabilitation program with plaintiff. Defendant-carrier retained vocational counselor Hilda E. Baker to assist plaintiff in finding employment. At that time, plaintiff\u2019s work restrictions included no lifting greater than 20 pounds and avoiding bending and stooping, but plaintiff was not required to wear a lumbar corset full time or to wear a body brace.\nMs. Baker testified that her relationship with plaintiff was marked from the beginning by plaintiff\u2019s belligerence and uncoopera-tiveness. Ms. Baker testified that plaintiff consistently undermined her efforts to secure employment for him. Ms. Baker testified that plaintiff would (1) wear old clothes on days when interviews were scheduled, (2) nearly always wear his back brace to interviews although he did not wear it often otherwise, (3) exaggerate and accentuate his symptoms during interviews, (4) become disruptive and abusive when speaking with Ms. Baker or with prospective employers, or (5) fail to attend scheduled meetings and interviews. Plaintiff also argued that his English language skills were inadequate despite the fact that plaintiff communicated well with Ms. Baker in English and refused to attend English classes arranged by Ms. Baker.\nFinally, defendant-carrier hired Rick Hinson, a private investigator, to conduct surveillance of plaintiff. The videotape taken by Mr. Hinson reveals plaintiff performing a variety of physical activities for substantial periods of time without the appearance of pain. Plaintiff was videotaped climbing over a four foot wall without difficulty, and otherwise bending, stooping and climbing without apparent limitation. Moreover, plaintiff was videotaped spending the day walking around with his family at the Carowinds amusement park in Charlotte, North Carolina. Plaintiff was not wearing a back brace, nor was plaintiff limping or dragging his leg as he often did while attending job interviews. Mr. Hinson\u2019s videotape captured plaintiff in a variety of settings and plaintiff was almost always dressed neatly and appropriately. Conspicuously absent were the old sweatpants and sweater that plaintiff regularly wore on days when he would be interviewing.\nBased on the evidence collected, defendants requested a hearing alleging that plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement and was no longer totally disabled. After hearing, Deputy Commissioner Lawrence B. Shuping, Jr., determined (1) that plaintiffs receipt of temporary total disability benefits should be terminated as of 6 February 1992 because plaintiff was no longer totally disabled and because plaintiff unjustifiably refused to cooperate in vocational rehabilitation efforts, and (2) that plaintiff had sustained a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability to his back and that plaintiff should be compensated on that basis only. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, and the Full Commission affirmed.\nPlaintiff appeals.\nTodd, Parham & Harris, by Ken Harris, for plaintiff-appellant.\nGolding, Meekins, Holden, Gosper & Stiles, by Henry C. Byrum, Jr., for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0603-01", "first_page_order": 639, "last_page_order": 644 }