{ "id": 11919450, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH WAYNE CHAPLIN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chaplin", "decision_date": "1996-06-18", "docket_number": "No. COA95-1051", "first_page": "659", "last_page": "666", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 N.C. App. 659" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "71 L. Ed. 2d 983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "78 ALR3d 297", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533", "parenthetical": "delay of twenty-two months sufficient to trigger consideration of factors" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2401091 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "delay of twenty-two months sufficient to trigger consideration of factors" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564644 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "failure to make findings does not require remand where facts not in dispute" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524851 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "failure to make findings does not require remand where facts not in dispute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719430, 4723594, 4718385, 4721618, 4722418 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0609-04", "/nc/313/0609-02", "/nc/313/0609-01", "/nc/313/0609-03", "/nc/313/0609-05" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526837 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397-98" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570811 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "case calendared six times in six months did not alone \"demonstrate!] prosecutorial negligence or willfulness\"" }, { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "delay of sixteen months sufficient to trigger consideration of factors" }, { "page": "352" }, { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552733 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679", "parenthetical": "case calendared six times in six months did not alone \"demonstrate!] prosecutorial negligence or willfulness\"" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "680" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571067 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767", "parenthetical": "quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118 (1972)" }, { "page": "767", "parenthetical": "delay of two years, two months sufficient to trigger consideration of factors" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118 (1972)" }, { "page": "365-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 741, "char_count": 15780, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.103904711685104e-07, "percentile": 0.9098090274761192 }, "sha256": "91c60f61c45a86736d8c90cbfd1cc0d075fe520a60f3c721eceabe74f8fc29e4", "simhash": "1:b971b52a276e09cf", "word_count": 2607 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:39:52.508825+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, John C., and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH WAYNE CHAPLIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nKenneth Wayne Chaplin (defendant) appeals from the trial court\u2019s 23 March 1995 Judgment and Commitment, sentencing him to seven years in prison for trafficking in cocaine by transporting cocaine, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95.\nDefendant, a resident of New York, and three passengers in his vehicle were arrested on 28 April 1992 for possession of marijuana and trafficking in cocaine, after being stopped at an interdiction check point on Interstate 95. Jaquan Price (Price), Gerald McDonald (McDonald) and Mark Thompson (Thompson), none of whom defendant knew before 28 April 1992, were passengers in defendant\u2019s car on a trip from New York to North Carolina. Defendant remained in jail in Halifax County for sixty-four days from his initial arrest. Subsequent to defendant\u2019s arrest, Price pled guilty to the above charges and was sentenced to seven years in prison.\nDefendant\u2019s unrefuted evidence shows that between the years of 1992 and 1995, defendant\u2019s case was placed on the trial calendar thirty-one times. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant ever asked for a continuance. In fact, the record reveals that the district attorney never called the case to trial, until 20 March 1995.\nDuring this time, defendant made efforts to locate McDonald and Thompson to have them testify at trial, but was unable to locate them. Defendant also notified the State of his intention to call Price to testify and had information that Price would testify that the cocaine \u201cwas exclusively his contraband and was to the exclusion of all others in that automobile.\u201d In fact, defendant requested that the Department of Correction, where Price was serving his sentence for the earlier guilty plea, have Price \u201cbrought to the courthouse on the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum on several terms prior to\u201d the actual trial of defendant\u2019s case. At the time of the actual trial of defendant\u2019s case, however, Price had been released from the Department of Correction and defendant was informed by Price\u2019s family that he had been deported from the United States to Trinidad.\nOn 22 February 1995, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the present action against him because he had been denied his right to a speedy trial, pursuant to the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution. Defendant specifically argued that his case had been delayed for trial, while cases \u201cof less significance and with the indictment date subsequent to that of this Defendant\u2019s\u201d had been tried and concluded. Defendant also argued that the State was allowing Price to serve his sentence and thereby gain the possibility of parole before defendant\u2019s trial, which would make defendant\u2019s locating Price to testify at defendant\u2019s trial \u201cvirtually impossible.\u201d\nOn 20 March 1995, defendant\u2019s case was called to trial, and after empaneling the jury, but before any hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, stating that \u201c[t]he Court has read and considered\u201d the motion. Defendant then requested that \u201c[a]t some point in time\u201d he be allowed to \u201cget in the events of the calendar since the date of indictment.\u201d To which the trial court initially responded that \u201cthe court records would speak for themselves,\u201d but subsequently did allow defendant\u2019s request to introduce all court calendars and minutes from the date of defendant\u2019s charge until 20 March 1995. Defendant also requested that he be allowed to \u201cget\u201d evidence of defendant\u2019s prejudice \u201cinto\u201d the record and defendant was allowed to argue to the court that the State\u2019s delay of defendant\u2019s trial \u201csubstantially prejudiced defendant,\u201d by requiring defendant to travel from New York to North Carolina thirty-one times and thus, miss work and lose income. Defendant also argued that he was prejudiced by the delay, because he was denied a material witness. Defense counsel offered to \u201ctender [defendant] who\u2019ll testify that the evidence \u2014 the information from the family of Jaquan Price is that he\u2019s in Trinidad.\u201d The trial court then asked the clerk of court if defendant had in fact moved to have Price brought to court, to which the clerk responded positively and stated that Price was not in the Department of Correction, because Price was paroled.\nThe State responded to defendant\u2019s argument by stating that \u201cthere is no indication, whether it be in the form of a statement by Mr. Price . . . that is going to indicate that he would, in fact, testify as [defense counsel] has said.\u201d The State also argued that \u201caccording to a motion by the previous attorney . . . the other two witnesses . . . Thompson and ... McDonald ... would provide the same information that . . . Price would provide.\u201d Defendant, however, responded that Thompson and McDonald\u2019s cases had been dismissed by the State and attempts to locate them had been unsuccessful. After hearing these arguments, the trial court again denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThe issue is whether the defendant has been denied his constitutional rights to a speedy trial.\nIn determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, N.C. Const. art I, \u00a7 18; U.S Const. amend-VI, our courts consider four interrelated factors together with \u201c \u2018such other circumstances as may be relevant.\u2019 \u201d State v. Groves, 324 N.C. 360, 365, 378 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1989) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118 (1972)). The factors are \u201c(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.\u201d Id. \u201cNo single factor is regarded as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.\u201d State v. McKoy, 294 N.C 134, 140, 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978). Instead the factors and other circumstances are to be balanced by the court with an awareness that it is \u201cdealing with a fundamental right of the accused\u201d which is \u201cspecifically affirmed in the Constitution.\u201d Id. The burden is, nonetheless, on the defendant to show that his constitutional rights have been violated and a defendant \u201cwho has caused or acquiesced in the delay will not be allowed to use it as a vehicle in which to escape justice.\u201d Id. at 141, 240 S.E.2d at 388. Thus the defendant is required to show that the unreasonable delay in his trial was caused by the \u201cneglect or wilfulness of the prosecution,\u201d as the Constitution does not \u201coutlaw good-faith delays which are reasonably necessary for the State to prepare and present its case.\u201d Id. A showing of a particularly lengthy delay establishes a prima facie case that the delay was due to the neglect or wilfulness of the prosecution and requires the State to \u201coffer evidence fully explaining the reasons for the delay and sufficient to rebut the prima facie showing.\u201d See id. at 143, 240 S.E.2d at 390; cf. State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 679, 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (case calendared six times in six months did not alone \u201cdemonstrate!] prosecutorial negligence or willfulness\u201d).\nIn ruling on a motion for a speedy trial the trial court is not always required to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of facts and conclusions of law. See State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 495, 223 S.E.2d 357, 362 (1976). In those instances, however, when the motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial is based on allegations not \u201cconjectural and conclusory [in] nature,\u201d an evidentiary hearing is required and the trial court must enter findings to resolve any factual disputes and make conclusions in support of its order. Id. When there is no objection, evidence at the hearing may consist of oral statements by the attorneys in open court in support and in opposition to the motion to dismiss. See State v. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. 387, 397-98, 324 S.E.2d 900, 907 (findings properly based on oral arguments of attorney where opposing party did not object to procedure), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 609, 330 S.E.2d 615 (1985).\nIn this case the allegations asserted by the defendant in support of this motion to dismiss are substantive and entitled him to an evi-dentiary hearing. Although it does appear that the trial court was initially reluctant to allow the defendant to present evidence, it did subsequently permit the defendant to submit evidence and attorneys for the defendant and the State, without objection, made oral presentations. The State did not present any evidence or request that it be permitted to present evidence.\nThe information before the trial court is not in dispute and thus the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact does not prevent review by this Court. See Harris v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 91 N.C. App. 147, 150, 370 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1988) (failure to make findings does not require remand where facts not in dispute). Whether the undisputed evidence supports the implied conclusion of the trial court that defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated requires application of legal principles and thus is reviewable de novo. See Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 713, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980).\nLength of Delay\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s trial did not occur until 1055 days, or thirty-five months, or nearly three years from the date of his arrest. \u201cWhile not enough in itself to conclude that a constitutional speedy trial violation has occurred, this delay is clearly enough to cause concern and to trigger examination of the other factors.\u201d Webster, 337 N.C. at 679, 447 S.E.2d at 351 (delay of sixteen months sufficient to trigger consideration of factors); Groves, 324 N.C. at 365-66, 378 S.E.2d at 767 (delay of two years, two months sufficient to trigger consideration of factors); State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 721, 314 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1984) (delay of twenty-two months sufficient to trigger consideration of factors).\nReason for the Delay\nIn this case, the record reveals that the defendant\u2019s case was placed on the trial calendar thirty-one times; five times in 1992, fourteen times in 1993, nine times in 1994, and three times, prior to 20 March, in 1995. On average, defendant\u2019s case was calendared for trial once a month for a period of three years, but never called by the district attorney. This is sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the State was either negligent or wilful in not calling defendant\u2019s case to trial. Although given the opportunity to argue against the defendant\u2019s motion and present evidence, the State presented no argument or evidence justifying the delay. Furthermore there is the unrefuted argument of the defendant that the State delayed the defendant\u2019s trial until after Price was paroled, thus making it more difficult for the defendant to secure Price\u2019s presence at the defendant\u2019s trial.\nAssertion of Right\nAlthough a \u201c[defendant is not required to demand that the [S]tate prosecute him,\u201d the failure to assert his right to a speedy trial weighs heavily against defendant. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. at 395, 324 S.E.2d at 906; Webster, 337 N.C. at 680, 447 S.E.2d at 352. The defendant did not formally assert his right to a speedy trial until 22 February 1995 and his trial was held within thirty days of this assertion.\nPrejudice\nTwo important aims of the right to a speedy trial are the minimization of \u201canxiety and concern of the accused\u201d and to limit the \u201cpossibility that the defense will be impaired.\u201d Webster, 337 N.C. at 681, 447 S.E.2d at 352 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118 (1972)). The most serious aim of the right to a speedy trial is the prevention of impairing the defense, \u201cbecause the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.\u201d Id. In this case, the defendant has suffered great prejudice. Not only has he been required to travel away from his family in New York, to North Carolina, thirty-one times during the course of three years, thus missing work and losing income, he has also lost the ability to locate his key witness. The nearly three-year delay has allowed Price to be released from the control of the Department of Correction and deported from the United States, thus, outside of defendant\u2019s subpoena power. Defendant has information that Price would have testified that the drugs were his to the exclusion of all others in the car. Although the State argued that there is nothing in the record to \u201cindicate that [Price] would\u201d testify that the drugs were his, the State did not object to the motion being determined upon defense counsel\u2019s oral argument and defendant\u2019s argument regarding Price\u2019s expected testimony is record evidenc\u00e9 that Price would, in fact, exculpate defendant. Furthermore, although given an opportunity to do so, the State did not offer any evidence to refute defendant\u2019s argument that Price was an essential witness who was no longer available. The denial of this key, exculpatory witness works a substantial prejudice and injustice to defendant\u2019s defense of the charges against him.\nFurthermore, although the State argues that defendant could subpoena McDonald and Thompson, there is no evidence that defendant knows where McDonald and Thompson are now located. In any event, even if they were located, appeared and testified for the defendant, it does not remedy the prejudice caused by the absence of Price.\nBalancing\nIn this case the substantial prejudice to the defendant, the conduct of the State, and the lengthy delay far outweigh defendant\u2019s failure to formally assert his right to a speedy trial. Thus the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial and the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. This case is remanded to the trial court for dismissal of the charges. See McKoy, 294 N.C. at 144, 240 S.E.2d at 390.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges MARTIN, John C., and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.", "Law Office of Jimmie R. \u201cSam\u201d Barnes, by Sam Barnes and, Laura-Jean Alford, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH WAYNE CHAPLIN\nNo. COA95-1051\n(Filed 18 June 1996)\nConstitutional Law \u00a7 327 (NCI4th)\u2014 three-year delay between arrest and trial \u2014 unavailability of witness \u2014 denial of speedy trial\nDefendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss where nearly three years elapsed between defendant\u2019s arrest and trial; his case was calendared thirty-one times, requiring defendant to travel from New York to North Carolina, thus missing work, losing income, and losing the ability to locate his key witness; the witness\u2019s testimony that drugs found in defendant\u2019s car were his alone would have in fact exculpated defendant; although given an opportunity to do so, the State did not offer any evidence to refute defendant\u2019s argument that the witness was an essential witness who was no longer available; there was no evidence that defendant could locate other potential witnesses; and the substantial prejudice to defendant, the conduct of the State, and the lengthy delay far outweighed defendant\u2019s failure to formally assert his right to a speedy trial. N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 18; U.S. Const, amend. VI.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 655.\nIllness or incapacity of judge, prosecuting officer, or prosecution witness as justifying delay in bringing accused speedily to trial \u2014 state cases. 78 ALR3d 297.\nAccused\u2019s right to speedy trial under Federal Constitution \u2014 Supreme Court cases. 71 L. Ed. 2d 983.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 March 1995 in Halifax County Superior Court by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 1996.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray, for the State.\nLaw Office of Jimmie R. \u201cSam\u201d Barnes, by Sam Barnes and, Laura-Jean Alford, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0659-01", "first_page_order": 695, "last_page_order": 702 }