{ "id": 11911831, "name": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INS. CO., Plaintiff v. LANDIS O. WILLIAMS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Williams", "decision_date": "1996-07-02", "docket_number": "No. COA95-320", "first_page": "103", "last_page": "108", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 N.C. App. 103" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "tortfeasor's liability coverage must be less than victim's UIM coverage to meet threshold requirement for \"underin-sured motor vehicle\" status under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529506, 2531270, 2532329, 2526292, 2531865 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "tortfeasor's liability coverage must be less than victim's UIM coverage to meet threshold requirement for \"underin-sured motor vehicle\" status under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0559-04", "/nc/335/0559-02", "/nc/335/0559-05", "/nc/335/0559-03", "/nc/335/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "tortfeasor's liability coverage must be less than victim's UIM coverage to meet threshold requirement for \"underin-sured motor vehicle\" status under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521168 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62", "parenthetical": "tortfeasor's liability coverage must be less than victim's UIM coverage to meet threshold requirement for \"underin-sured motor vehicle\" status under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S .E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779283 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519996 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 F.3d 1010", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11322209 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014", "parenthetical": "under North Carolina law, corporate president not a \"named insured\" because corporation was the sole \"named insured\" on policy declarations page." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/21/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522334 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555126 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554116, 2554596, 2555557, 2554553, 2557083 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0786-01", "/nc/329/0786-05", "/nc/329/0786-03", "/nc/329/0786-02", "/nc/329/0786-04" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519484 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537537, 2539785, 2542308, 2540999 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0577-01", "/nc/328/0577-02", "/nc/328/0577-03", "/nc/328/0577-04" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "citation omitted." }, { "page": "47, 49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "citation omitted." }, { "page": "143, 147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736888 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0378-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 586, "char_count": 11351, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.277482144185391e-07, "percentile": 0.6161797463867584 }, "sha256": "c1414105baed0d86f04d437e195df52671b99accda97e795586259cb039c08dc", "simhash": "1:4b4b9d56998fcc5e", "word_count": 1826 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:31.519627+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and WYNN concur." ], "parties": [ "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INS. CO., Plaintiff v. LANDIS O. WILLIAMS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nIn this declaratory action, defendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion for summary judgment and its entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (Nationwide). For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant is not entitled to underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage under any Nationwide insurance policy applicable to the instant cause of action.\nPertinent background and procedural information is as follows: On 7 November 1992, defendant sustained serious personal injuries as the result of a motor vehicle collision (the collision) between an automobile owned and operated by Nellie Carmichael (Carmichael) and a 1988 Ford automobile operated by defendant and owned by his father, Donell Williams.\nAt the time of the collision, defendant resided in the same household as his wife, Evelyn Pittman Williams (Evelyn), and her mother, Vernell Lawrence (Vernell). Defendant\u2019s father-in-law, Harvey Lawrence (Harvey), maintained a completely separate residence as he and Vernell had divorced approximately nine months earlier. It is undisputed that Carmichael\u2019s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision and defendant\u2019s injuries.\nAll insurance policies applicable to the collision were issued by Nationwide and included the following relevant provisions: (1) Carmichael\u2019s policy provided liability coverage with limits of $50,000 per person/$ 100,000 per accident; (2) Vernell\u2019s policy provided UIM coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person/$100,000 per accident; and (3) Harvey\u2019s policy provided UIM coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.\nUpon exhaustion of the liability limits of Carmichael\u2019s policy, defendant asserted entitlement to UIM coverage under the policies of both Vernell and Harvey for a stacked amount of $100,000, and thus sought from Nationwide $50,000 in UIM coverage payments after setting off the liability coverage he had received under Carmichael\u2019s policy. Nationwide admitted coverage of defendant for UIM purposes under Vemell\u2019s policy, but stressed he was \u201cnot entitled to UIM coverage under [Harvey\u2019s] [p]olicy and, since the amount of UIM coverage in [Vernell\u2019s] [p]olicy equals the amount of liability coverage available,\u201d Nationwide has no UIM coverage obligation.\nFollowing the parties\u2019 cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order granting Nationwide\u2019s motion and denying that of defendant. The latter filed notice of appeal to this Court 1 March 1995.\nThe issue herein is whether defendant is afforded UIM coverage under Harvey\u2019s policy (the policy). Defendant claims coverage because Evelyn (1) was a \u201clisted driver\u201d under the policy and 2) was co-owner of a vehicle appearing on the policy declarations page. He asserts \u201cNationwide Insurance Company should not be allowed to limit its exposure by denying [defendant] coverage on the ground that his wife was not a \u2018named insured\u2019 \u201d under the policy. \u201cIt would be patently unfair,\u201d defendant continues, \u201cto allow Nationwide to capitalize on their technical distinction between a named insured and a listed driver where an extension of coverage would have been available to [Evelyn] at no additional premium.\u201d We find defendant\u2019s arguments unpersuasive.\nOur Supreme Court has noted \u201cthe well-settled principle that an insurance policy is a contract, and its provisions govern the rights and duties of the parties thereto.\u201d Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dortch, 318 N.C. 378, 380, 348 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1986). We as a court must \u201cconstrue and enforce insurance polices as written, without rewriting the contract or disregarding the express language used,\u201d id., and only when the contract is ambiguous does strict construction become inappropriate. Id. at 381, 348 S.E.2d at 796.\nThe uninsured/UIM motorist coverage provisions of the policy at issue herein allow insureds to recover for personal injuries, defining \u201cinsured\u201d as:\n1. You or any family member;\n2. Any other person occupying:\na. your covered auto; or\nb. any other auto operated by you;\n3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this coverage applies sustained by a person listed in 1. or 2. above.\n\u201cYou\u201d and \u201cyour\u201d under the policy means \u201c[t]he \u2018named insured\u2019 shown in the Declarations\u201d and \u201c[t]he spouse if a resident of the same household.\u201d\nOur Supreme Court has determined the nearly identical formulations contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) to establish two classes of insureds for purposes of UIM coverage:\n\u201c(1) the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of the named insured and relatives of either and (2) any person who uses with consent, express or implied, of the named insured, the insured vehicle, and a guest in such vehicle.\u201d\nSmith v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 143, 400 S.E.2d 44, 47, reh\u2019g denied, 328 N.C. 577, 403 S.E.2d 514 (1991) (citation omitted.) We therefore consider whether defendant qualifies as a class one or class two insured under the policy.\nDefendant argues that \u201cas the spouse of a named insured,\u201d he should be \u201cconsidered [a] [c]lass one insured.\u201d While defendant might be correct if Evelyn indeed were a named insured, our examination of the policy reveals Harvey to be the sole \u201cnamed insured,\u201d while Evelyn is listed only as a \u201cdriver\u201d for underwriting purposes.\nEnforcing the policy as written and declining to rewrite its terms, Fidelity, 318 N.C. at 380, 348 S.E.2d at 796, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that the term \u201cdriver\u201d is synonymous with \u201cnamed insured.\u201d Dispositive on this issue is Brown v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 103 N.C. App. 59, 404 S.E.2d 172, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408 S.E.2d 515 (1991), wherein this Court held that listing the plaintiff as an \u201cadditional insured\u201d on a policy of insurance did not operate to qualify him as a \u201cnamed insured\u201d within that policy. Id. at 62-63, 404 S.E.2d at 174-75. As in Brown, we find no authority to \u201cexpand[] the term \u2018named insured\u2019 beyond its explicit common sense meaning. The term appears frequently in the statute at issue in such a way as to distinguish the \u2018named insured\u2019 from other covered persons.\u201d Id. at 63, 404 S.E.2d at 175.\nSimilarly, in Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 609, 407 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1991), our Supreme Court held employees of a corporation were not included as \u201cnamed insureds\u201d under a policy of insurance for UIM purposes when only the corporation was listed as a \u201cnamed insured\u201d within that policy. Likewise in Busby v. Simmons, 103 N.C. App. 592, 406 S.E.2d 628 (1991), under circumstances where a corporation was the sole \u201cnamed insured\u201d on a policy, this Court ruled plaintiff-shareholder did not qualify for \u201cnamed insured\u201d status although she \u201chad exclusive business and personal use\u201d of the covered vehicle and her name appeared as a \u201cnamed driver and person insured for coverage\u201d on the declarations page of the policy. Id. at 593-594, 406 S.E.2d at 629-30. Accord Sheppard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 1010, 1014 (10th cir. 1994) (under North Carolina law, corporate president not a \u201cnamed insured\u201d because corporation was the sole \u201cnamed insured\u201d on policy declarations page.)\nDefendant attempts to distinguish Sproles and Busby on grounds that the business auto policies at issue therein were between \u201ctwo sophisticated parties,\u201d while \u201cin a personal automobile insurance policy the consumer is an unsophisticated, weaker party and [] require [s] the protection of the court.\u201d However, as indicated above, the policy clearly and unambiguously identified Harvey as the solitary insured. \u201cBoth the insured and the insurer are presumed to know the terms, provisions, and conditions of the policy, and are bound by them.\u201d Chavis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 79 N.C. App. 213, 215, 338 S.E.2d 787, 789, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 317 N.C. 683, 346 S .E.2d 496 (1986). Defendant therefore fails to meet the definition of a class one insured.\nDefendant also suggests he qualifies as a class two insured for UIM purposes under the policy because one of the vehicles listed thereon is co-owned by his wife, Evelyn. This contention is unfounded.\nA class two insured ordinarily is afforded UIM coverage only if occupying an \u201cinsured\u201d or \u201ccovered\u201d vehicle involved in a collision. Smith, 328 N.C. at 143, 147, 400 S.E.2d at 47, 49. Under the policy sub judice, a claimant may be a class two insured if injured while \u201coccupying your [the named insured\u2019s or their resident spouse\u2019s] . . . covered auto[,] or... any other auto operated by you.\u201d The policy defines \u201cyour covered auto\u201d essentially as any vehicle shown in the Declarations or other vehicles which the named insured or their resident spouse might acquire.\nAt the time of the collision, defendant was occupying a 1988 Ford automobile owned by his father, which was neither a \u201ccovered vehicle\u201d under the policy nor an auto being operated by Harvey or his resident spouse. Defendant therefore was not a class two insured under the policy.\nBecause Harvey\u2019s policy is unambiguous, we enforce it as written, see Fidelity, 318 N.C. at 381, 348 S.E.2d at 796, and hold defendant has no valid claim to UIM coverage under that policy. As defendant is entitled only to the $50,000 UIM coverage provided by Vernell\u2019s policy, Nationwide is correct in concluding \u201cthe amount of UIM coverage in [Vernell\u2019s] [p]olicy equals the amount of liability coverage available, [and] defendant is not entitled to any UIM coverage from [Nationwide.]\u201d See Ray v. Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co., 112 N.C. App. 259, 261-62, 435 S.E.2d 80, 81, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 559, 439 S.E.2d 151 (1993) (tortfeasor\u2019s liability coverage must be less than victim\u2019s UIM coverage to meet threshold requirement for \u201cunderin-sured motor vehicle\u201d status under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4).\nBased on the foregoing, the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Nationwide is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and WYNN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey & Dixon, by David S. Coats, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Keel Law Offices, by John E. Aldridge, Jr. and Susan M. O\u2019Malley, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INS. CO., Plaintiff v. LANDIS O. WILLIAMS, Defendant\nNo. COA95-320\n(Filed 2 July 1996)\nInsurance \u00a7 527 (NCI4th)\u2014 UIM provision \u2014 named insured and listed driver not synonymous \u2014 defendant not driving covered vehicle \u2014 no UIM coverage\nDefendant driver was not a class one insured entitled to UIM coverage under an auto policy naming defendant\u2019s father-in-law as the named insured and his wife as a \u201clisted driver\u201d since the term \u201cdriver\u201d is not synonymous with \u201cnamed insured,\u201d and he was thus not entitled to coverage as the spouse of a named insured. Nor did defendant quality as a class two insured under his father-in-law\u2019s policy because one of the vehicles listed thereon was co-owned by defendant\u2019s wife where, at the time of the accident, defendant was occupying an automobile owned by his father which was neither a \u201ccovered vehicle\u201d under the policy nor a vehicle being operated by the named insured or his resident spouse.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 246 et seq.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 27 February 1995 by Judge Robert L. Farmer in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 December 1995.\nBailey & Dixon, by David S. Coats, for plaintiff-appellee.\nKeel Law Offices, by John E. Aldridge, Jr. and Susan M. O\u2019Malley, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0103-01", "first_page_order": 137, "last_page_order": 142 }