{ "id": 11911888, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VINCENT ARTIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Artis", "decision_date": "1996-07-02", "docket_number": "No. COA95-1323", "first_page": "114", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 N.C. App. 114" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 L. Ed. 2d 1046", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522123 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523035 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502284 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0491-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 592, "char_count": 11127, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6856254361847664e-07, "percentile": 0.891699284398434 }, "sha256": "6a0657efcc4944eec310ed88ef9f0c3e842082d3a6329b83383803042fb49b64", "simhash": "1:e39292a65bda2179", "word_count": 1839 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:31.519627+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VINCENT ARTIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nOn 3 April 1995, a Guilford County grand jury indicted defendant Vincent Artis on one count of trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine). Defendant later filed a pretrial motion to suppress physical evidence seized from his person. Following a voir dire hearing on 24 May 1995, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. A jury subsequently found defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of thirty-five (35) months imprisonment and a maximum of forty-two (42) months imprisonment. The trial court also imposed a $50,000.00 fine.\nThe following evidence was presented at trial: Detective J. E. Hoover of the Greensboro Police Department\u2019s Vice and Narcotics Unit testified that he was a part of a drug interdiction task force at the Piedmont Triad International Airport on 23 January 1995. On that date, he observed defendant operating a basketball machine in the airport game room, a location which had a reputation for drug activity. Detective Hoover also testified that the game room was in a location before it was necessary for the public and passengers to pass through the airport\u2019s metal detectors positioned near the departure gates.\nDetective Hoover was dressed in casual clothes when he approached defendant in the game room. He introduced himself as a police officer and displayed his badge and picture identification card to defendant. After defendant agreed to talk with him, Detective Hoover questioned him and learned that defendant intended to take a departing flight. At this point in Detective Hoover\u2019s testimony, defense counsel asked to approach the bench.\nAfter a bench conference, the trial court sent the jury out of the courtroom. The State then began its voir dire examination of Detective Hoover. The detective described seeing a large crescent-shaped bulge in defendant\u2019s left front pocket on the date in question, which appeared to be either brass knuckles or a weapon\u2019s handgrip. Although Detective Hoover asked defendant several times if defendant was carrying any weapons or drugs, defendant responded each time by asking, \u201cWhy would I carry weapons or drugs?\u201d\nDetective Hoover then told defendant that he thought defendant was carrying a weapon in his left front pocket. He informed defendant that he wanted to pat the area down to satisfy himself that the object was not a weapon. As he made this statement, Detective Hoover reached for this area of defendant\u2019s person. Defendant, however, turned away from Detective Hoover and attempted to take a step backwards. The detective, placed his hand on the object as defendant stepped back, and captured it with his hand inside defendant\u2019s pants pocket as defendant continued stepping back. Because the object was hard and fit the curvature of his hand, Detective Hoover thought that it was brass knuckles.\nDefendant attempted to reach into the pocket at that time, despite a request by Detective Hoover that he not do so. Detective Hoover then reached into defendant\u2019s pocket to get control of the suspected weapon. When the detective removed the object, it was a clear plastic bag which appeared to contain crack cocaine. He subsequently placed defendant under arrest.\nThe trial court then ordered that defendant\u2019s suppression motion be denied and that the seized evidence be admitted. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues that his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution were violated by the search and seizure. Defendant asserts that Detective Hoover \u201cobviously did not see any bulge\u201d because his shirt covered the top of the pocket in question, and that the detective\u2019s reason for searching him was a pretext. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order which denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and remand for a new trial.\nThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, like Article I, Section 20 of our Constitution, permits reasonable searches and seizures based upon probable cause. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 417 S.E.2d 502 (1992). Notably, the Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states- through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 446 S.E.2d 67 (1994) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961)). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the probable cause requirement which allows a police officer to \u201cfrisk\u201d a person in order to find weapons which the officer reasonably believes or suspects are in the possession of the person stopped. Id. The rationale for this exception is the need for quick action by a police officer \u201cto insure that the person stopped is not armed with a weapon that would be used against the police or others in close proximity.\u201d State v. Harris, 95 N.C. App. 691, 696, 384 S.E.2d 50, 53 (1989). However, the \u201cbrief investigative stop of an individual must be based on specific and articulable facts as well as inferences from those facts, viewing the circumstances surrounding the seizure through the eyes of a reasonable cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.\u201d State v. Allen, 90 N.C. App. 15, 25, 367 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1988).\nIn its order denying defendant\u2019s suppression motion, the trial court made the following findings of fact:\n4. In his experience Detective Hoover was aware of the reputation of the airport game room for drug activity and had personal knowledge of several narcotics arrests having been made in and around the game room.\n5. Hoover approached the Defendant in the game room and asked him questions about his destination and what he was doing after identifying himself as a police officer.\n6. The Defendant responded that he was on his way out of the airport and was waiting for a friend to bring him his airline ticket.\n7. The officer knew at that time that if the Defendant was on his way out that he had not gone past the metal detectors at the airport security checkpoints.\n8. As Detective Hoover talked with the Defendant, he observed his clothing and also observed a bulge in [Defendant\u2019s] left front pants pocket which appeared to the officer in his experience to be a weapon. The shape of the bulge led Hoover to think the object was either brass knuckles or the handle of a gun.\n9. After some conversation about the bulge, Detective Hoover attempted to pat down that area on the Defendant and the Defendant moved back to avoid same.\n10. Hoover then grabbed the object and it had a crescent shape and was hard to the touch which caused him to think that it was brass knuckles.\n11. After Hoover grabbed the object the Defendant attempted to get it himself at which point Hoover reached in the Defendant\u2019s pocket and retrieved the object.\n12. The object was a clear plastic bag containing off-white hard material which appeared to the detective in his experience to be crack cocaine and was later determined by a lab analysis to be crack cocaine.\n13. The Defendant was then arrested and a further search incident to said arrest yielded an airline ticket and other items of personal property from the person of the Defendant.\nFrom these and other findings of fact, the trial court concluded that:\n1. The officer had a right to grab what he believed to be a weapon in order to conduct a pat down search for safety purposes.\n2. When the Defendant attempted to grab the object, the officer had a right to grab the object first to complete his limited search for safety reasons.\n3. Any other items of property seized from the Defendant subsequent to that were seized incident to a lawful arrest.\nWhile competent evidence in the record supports the findings of fact made by the trial court, we conclude that the facts relied upon by Officer Hoover and the rational inferences which he was entitled to draw from said facts were inadequate to support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. Officer Hoover had only a generalized suspicion, based upon defendant\u2019s presence in the airport game room \u2014 a bulge in defendant\u2019s pants pocket \u2014 and the fact that defendant had not yet passed through the airport\u2019s metal detectors. To infer from the bulge in defendant\u2019s pocket that he possessed a weapon because defendant would not have passed through the airport metal detectors was not reasonable.\nNor was there any apparent need for quick action by Officer Hoover to insure that defendant was not armed with a weapon that would be used against him or others nearby. When Detective Hoover approached defendant, defendant was merely operating a video game machine. A reasonably prudent officer in those circumstances would not have been warranted in the belief that his or her safety or that of others was in danger. Officer Hoover\u2019s subsequent actions did not comport with the exception created by Terry, and therefore, defendant\u2019s seizure was not legally justified.\nHaving determined that defendant\u2019s initial seizure was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the evidence seized as a result must be suppressed. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-974 (1988). Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his person is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial.\nNew trial.\nJudges WYNN and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHNSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert G. Webb, for the State.", "Public Defender Wallace G. Harrelson, by Assistant Public Defender Frederick G. Lind, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VINCENT ARTIS\nNo. COA95-1323\n(Filed 2 July 1996)\nSearches and Seizures \u00a7 81 (NCI4th)\u2014 defendant in airport game room \u2014 warrantless search based on general suspicion \u2014 violation of Fourth Amendment \u2014 evidence not suppressed \u2014 error\nThe trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress crack cocaine seized from his pocket at an airport during an investigatory stop and frisk where the officer had only a generalized suspicion of criminal activity, based upon defendant\u2019s presence in the airport game room which was a known area of drug activity, a bulge in defendant\u2019s pants pocket which the officer thought was either brass knuckles or the handle of a gun, and the fact that defendant had not yet passed through the airport\u2019s metal detectors, since there was no apparent need for quick action by the officer to insure that defendant was not armed with a weapon which would be used against him or others nearby.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 51, 78.\nLaw enforcement officer\u2019s authority, under Federal Constitution\u2019s Fourth Amendment, to stop and briefly detain, and to conduct limited protective search of or \u201cfrisk,\u201d for investigative purposes, person suspected of criminal activity \u2014 Supreme Court cases. 104 L. Ed. 2d 1046.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 May 1995 by Judge Howard R. Greeson, Jr. in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 June 1996.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert G. Webb, for the State.\nPublic Defender Wallace G. Harrelson, by Assistant Public Defender Frederick G. Lind, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0114-01", "first_page_order": 148, "last_page_order": 153 }