{ "id": 11888471, "name": "TONY B. NICHOLSON, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN SAFETY UTILITY CORPORATION, DUKE POWER COMPANY and NORTH HAND PROTECTION, a division of SIEBE NORTH, INC., SIEBE NORTH HOLDINGS CORP., SIEBE, INC., SIEBE INDUSTRIES, INC., and SIEBE PLC, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Nicholson v. American Safety Utility Corp.", "decision_date": "1996-10-15", "docket_number": "No. COA95-554", "first_page": "59", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "124 N.C. App. 59" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 ALR3d 501", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "16 ALR3d 683", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "75 ALR2d 39", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "53 ALR3d 239", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "6 ALR3d 91", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "76 ALR2d 9", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "502 U.S. 820", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6296418, 6296835, 6298276, 6295847, 6294924, 6296141, 6297678, 6295183, 6297392, 6297137, 6297905, 6294640, 6295487 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/502/0820-07", "/us/502/0820-08", "/us/502/0820-13", "/us/502/0820-05", "/us/502/0820-02", "/us/502/0820-06", "/us/502/0820-11", "/us/502/0820-03", "/us/502/0820-10", "/us/502/0820-09", "/us/502/0820-12", "/us/502/0820-01", "/us/502/0820-04" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306498, 5308738, 5305879, 5304824, 5309148 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0598-01", "/nc/326/0598-05", "/nc/326/0598-02", "/nc/326/0598-04", "/nc/326/0598-03" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507", "parenthetical": "\"Plaintiff may be contributorily negligent if his conduct ignores unreasonable risks or dangers which would have been apparent to a prudent person exercising ordinary care for his own safety.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564386 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "\"Plaintiff may be contributorily negligent if his conduct ignores unreasonable risks or dangers which would have been apparent to a prudent person exercising ordinary care for his own safety.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 411.320", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 L. Ed. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "926 F.2d 331", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542100 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/926/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 173", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520709 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528856, 2527185, 2531750, 2528976 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0238-03", "/nc/335/0238-01", "/nc/335/0238-02", "/nc/335/0238-04" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522827 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798756, 798954, 798961, 798841, 798877 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0306-01", "/nc/343/0306-02", "/nc/343/0306-03", "/nc/343/0306-05", "/nc/343/0306-04" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 843", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918481 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0843-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "\"In the construction of statutes, [the court's] primary task is to determine legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562923 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "\"In the construction of statutes, [the court's] primary task is to determine legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4754000, 4752627, 4751480, 4758777, 4754845 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0082-01", "/nc/312/0082-05", "/nc/312/0082-03", "/nc/312/0082-04", "/nc/312/0082-02" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526333 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526054 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "contributory negligence acted as bar to recovery of damages \"whether plaintiffs claim [was] based on negligence or breach of warranty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526584 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533", "parenthetical": "contributory negligence acted as bar to recovery of damages \"whether plaintiffs claim [was] based on negligence or breach of warranty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2559053, 2559597, 2556144, 2559347, 2556376 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0736-01", "/nc/339/0736-03", "/nc/339/0736-02", "/nc/339/0736-05", "/nc/339/0736-04" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" }, { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524584 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4744038 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 25-2-314", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734", "parenthetical": "\"law imposes upon every [entity which] enters upon an active course of conduct a positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and a violation of such duty constitutes negligence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169915 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "\"law imposes upon every [entity which] enters upon an active course of conduct a positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and a violation of such duty constitutes negligence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313197 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329-30", "parenthetical": "seller not mere conduit if it performs \"auxiliary functions in connection with sale\" such as assembling and installing product" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "332-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526331 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E. 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "dangerous product is one which puts life and limb in great peril when negligently made" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627711 ], "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216-17", "parenthetical": "dangerous product is one which puts life and limb in great peril when negligently made" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/205/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568730, 8568807, 8568767 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0393-01", "/nc/304/0393-03", "/nc/304/0393-02" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520085 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523436 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" }, { "page": "650-51" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560105, 8560138, 8560085, 8560120, 8560095 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0194-03", "/nc/300/0194-05", "/nc/300/0194-01", "/nc/300/0194-04", "/nc/300/0194-02" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548995 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560193, 8560231, 8560172, 8560211, 8560154 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0195-03", "/nc/300/0195-05", "/nc/300/0195-02", "/nc/300/0195-04", "/nc/300/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554636 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/44/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "because of \"peculiarly elusive nature of the term 'negligence', the jury generally should pass on the reasonableness of conduct in light of all the circumstances of the case\"" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8523032 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708418 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0419-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1328, "char_count": 30814, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.232497667121807e-07, "percentile": 0.8677863072325839 }, "sha256": "9324c6b46d64154e20a053c700e280e3ff6eaebfd85228ae800e409fc09cb08a", "simhash": "1:73445048843e605e", "word_count": 4944 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:03:33.335576+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges EAGLES and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "TONY B. NICHOLSON, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN SAFETY UTILITY CORPORATION, DUKE POWER COMPANY and NORTH HAND PROTECTION, a division of SIEBE NORTH, INC., SIEBE NORTH HOLDINGS CORP., SIEBE, INC., SIEBE INDUSTRIES, INC., and SIEBE PLC, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment and by denying his motion for partial summary judgment. We agree in part.\nPertinent facts and procedural information are as follows: On 26 January 1990, plaintiff, an electrical lineman for Harrison-Wright, Inc., was working on a Duke Power project to connect high-voltage overhead power lines to an underground cable. On the date in question, plaintiff was standing in an elevated, two-person aerial utility bucket located beneath energized overhead lines. At that time, plaintiff was connecting a de-energized conductor to a de-energized underground cable. The overhead energized lines carried approximately 7,200 volts of electricity, \u201cphase-to-ground.\u201d In accordance with Duke Power regulations, plaintiff or his helper placed rubber hoses over the energized lines to shield them from the close proximity of the lines, and in addition the men wore protective helmets and thick rubber lineman\u2019s safety gloves.\nPlaintiff\u2019s helmet had blown off at least twice prior to the incident at issue, and each time he had lowered the utility bucket to retrieve it. However, after a gust of wind blew the helmet off a third time, plaintiff continued tightening a \u201csplit bolt.\u201d An energized line thereupon either touched or came within an extremely short distance of plaintiff\u2019s unprotected head. Electricity raced from the overhead line to plaintiff\u2019s head and through his body, exiting via his gloved hands which were holding a de-energized, grounded cable. Plaintiff suffered severe and permanent brain and nervous system injuries.\nThe gloves worn by plaintiff at the time of his injury were purchased by defendant American Safety Utility Corporation (ASU) on 18 March 1989 from defendant Siebe North (Siebe); thereafter, the gloves were sold and delivered by ASU to plaintiff\u2019s employer in January 1990. Siebe sold the gloves as Class II lineman\u2019s gloves, safe for use with energized lines up to 17,000 volts. Plaintiff obtained the gloves from his employer 23 January 1990 and suffered the subject accident 26 January 1990.\nPlaintiff commenced the instant products liability action by filing a complaint 9 December 1992 and an amended complaint 19 January 1993. Suit was brought against Siebe as manufacturer of the gloves worn by plaintiff at the time of the accident, as well as against seller ASU and Duke Power, the latter not a party to this appeal.\nContending he was injured \u201cwhen electrical current completed as a direct result of the dangerously defective condition of the subject safety gloves,\u201d plaintiff alleged claims of negligence against Siebe and ASU based upon their failure, inter alia, to \u201cexercise due care in the testing, inspection, marketing, promotion, sale and/or delivery of the subject safety gloves.\u201d Plaintiffs complaint also contained claims of breach of express and implied warranties, including specifically \u201cthe failure to provide necessary warnings.\u201d\nAll defendants answered denying liability and asserting numerous affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence, lack of privity, and alteration or damage to the gloves subsequent to defendants\u2019 release of possession and control thereof.\nDefendants Siebe and ASU moved for summary judgment on all issues, and plaintiff sought summary disposition of the issues of breach of implied warranty and contributory negligence. Following a hearing 13 February 1995, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motions and denied that of plaintiff. From these orders, plaintiff appeals.\nWe note at the outset that plaintiff has assigned error to the denial of his motion for summary judgment on the issues of breach of implied warranty and contributory negligence. Denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and non-appealable. See Lamb v. Wedgewood Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 424, 302 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1983). Except as may arise in dealing with arguments properly before this Court, therefore, we decline to consider plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error directed to denial of his motion for summary judgment.\nIt is well-established that\n[t]o succeed in a summary judgment motion, the movant has the burden of showing, based on pleadings, depositions, answers, admissions, and affidavits, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nTaylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C. App. 604, 606, 436 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1993), cert. denied, 336 N.C. 77, 445 S.E.2d 46 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate only when it appears that \u201ceven if the facts as claimed by [the non-movant] are taken as true, there can be no recovery,\u201d Lowder v. Lowder, 68 N.C. App. 505, 506, 315 S.E.2d 520, 521, disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 759, 321 S.E.2d 138 (1984), with the non-movant\u2019s materials being \u201cindulgently regarded\u201d and the movant\u2019s \u201cclosely scrutinized,\u201d Burrow v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 88 N.C. App. 347, 350, 363 S.E.2d 215, 217, disc. review denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910 (1988).\nA summary judgment movant may meet its burden of showing the lack of a triable issue of fact by demonstrating the non-existence of an essential element of plaintiffs claim or by establishing an affirmative defense as a matter of law. Green v. Wellons, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 529, 532, 279 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1981). If a movant is successful in its showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant to produce a forecast of evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Cockerham v. Ward and Astrup Co. v. West Co., 44 N.C. App. 615, 618, 262 S.E.2d 651, 654, disc, review denied, 300 N.C. 195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980).\nPlaintiffs action, brought pursuant to the Products Liability Act (the Act), see N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 99B (1989), is based on two separate theories \u2014 negligence and breach of warranty, both express and implied. We discuss each separately.\nI. Negligence\nSummary judgment is generally inappropriate in a negligence action, Brown v. Power Co., 45 N.C. App. 384, 386, 263 S.E.2d 366, 368, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d 615 (1980),\neven when there is no dispute as to the facts, because the issue of whether a party acted in conformity with the reasonable person standard is ordinarily an issue to be determined by a jury.\nSurrette v. Duke Power Co., 78 N.C. App. 647, 650, 338 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1986). See also Green, 52 N.C. App. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 39 (because of \u201cpeculiarly elusive nature of the term \u2018negligence\u2019, the jury generally should pass on the reasonableness of conduct in light of all the circumstances of the case\u201d). Notwithstanding, summary judgment may be proper in a negligence action\nwhere there is no question as to the credibility of witnesses and the evidence shows either (1) a lack of any negligence on the part of the defendant, or (2) that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.\nSurrette, 78 N.C. App. at 650-51, 338 S.E.2d at 131 (citations omitted),\nThe essential elements of a products liability action predicated upon negligence are: \u201c(1) evidence of a standard of care owed by the reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances; (2) breach of that standard of care; (3) injury caused directly or proximately by the breach, and; (4) loss because of the injury.\u201d Ziglar v. Du Pont Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 150, 280 S.E.2d 510, 513, disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 393, 285 S.E.2d 838 (1981) (citation omitted). In addition, a plaintiff must present evidence the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the defendant\u2019s control. See Cockerham, 44 N.C. App. at 619, 262 S.E.2d at 655.\nA manufacturer must use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of products, and this includes the duty to perform \u201creasonable tests and inspections to discover latent hazards.\u201d Id. at 619, 262 S.E.2d at 654. Moreover, a manufacturer must exercise \u201cthe \u2018highest\u2019 or \u2018utmost\u2019 caution, commensurate with the risks of serious harm involved, in the production of a dangerous instrumentality or substance.\u201d Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 154, 280 S.E.2d at 515. See Corum v. Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 216-17, 171 S.E. 78, 80 (1933) (dangerous product is one which puts life and limb in great peril when negligently made).\nIn addition, a manufacturer is under an obligation to provide warnings of any dangers associated with the product\u2019s use \u201csufficiently intelligible and prominent to reach and protect all those who may reasonably be expected to come into contact with [the product].\u201d Id. at 155, 280 S.E.2d at 516. Failure to warn adequately renders the product defective. Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 155, 280 S.E.2d at 516.\nA non-manufacturing seller acting as a \u201cmere conduit\u201d of the product, on the other hand, ordinarily has no affirmative duty to inspect and test a product made by a reputable manufacturer. See Sutton v. Major Products Co., 91 N.C. App. 610, 614, 372 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1988). However, this rule does not stand where the seller knows or has reason to know of a product\u2019s dangerous propensity. Id. Moreover, where the seller acts as more than a \u201cmere conduit,\u201d such as in the case sub judice where seller performed product tests and inspections, it must do so with reasonable care. See Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, 106 N.C. App. 324, 329-30, 416 S.E.2d at 924, 928 (1992) (seller not mere conduit if it performs \u201cauxiliary functions in connection with sale\u201d such as assembling and installing product); see also Baker v. Dept. of Correction, 85 N.C. App. 345, 346, 354 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1987) (\u201claw imposes upon every [entity which] enters upon an active course of conduct a positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and a violation of such duty constitutes negligence\u201d).\nFurther, the exercise of due care requires a seller to warn of any hazard associated with use of a product if: (1) the seller has \u201cactual or constructive knowledge of a particular threatening characteristic of the product;\u201d and (2) the seller \u201chas reason to know that the purchaser will not realize the product\u2019s menacing propensities for himself.\u201d Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 151, 280 S.E.2d at 513.\nReview of the record in light of the foregoing principles reveals the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged failure of defendants Siebe and ASU to test and inspect the gloves properly and to convey adequate warning of potential deficiencies in the gloves.\nAt the summary judgment hearing, defendants presented evidence tending to show their compliance with industry inspection procedures for lineman safety gloves, including the subject gloves herein. Each defendant presented evidence it had conducted industry standard visual inspections and dielectric safety tests on the gloves used by plaintiff on 26 January 1990, the Siebe test taking place on or about 17 February 1989 and the ASU test on or about 12 January 1990.\nDielectric testing is a process of immersing and filling a glove in a vat of water, and then subjecting the inside and outside of the glove to increasing voltage. If the glove fails to insulate, a circuit is completed and the failure is recorded by the testing machine. Siebe\u2019s evidence indicated the gloves withstood dielectric testing of 20,000 volts for three minutes; ASU indicated it utilized a dielectric test of 20,000 volts for one and one-half minutes.\nDefense counsel for ASU argued plaintiff had failed to present evidence of a discoverable defect, and Siebe\u2019s counsel contended there was no proof a defect existed when the gloves left Siebe\u2019s possession approximately 10 months prior to the accident. Ultimately, both defendants maintained the gloves must have been damaged by plaintiff in use or storage during the three days prior to the accident, and further argued that plaintiff\u2019s post-accident tests, which revealed defects in both gloves, had been improperly performed.\nIn contrast, plaintiff presented evidence, including his cross-examination at deposition of defense witnesses, that (1) there were no signs plaintiff had abused or misused the gloves or that the gloves had been improperly stored subsequent to leaving defendants\u2019 possession, (2) that line workers, including plaintiff, were expected to rely on rubber safety gloves such as those at issue for protection from electrocution, and were permitted to do so by the National Electrical Safety Code and OSHA, and (3) that plaintiff had been electrocuted at approximately 7,200 volts \u2014 far less than the rated \u201cuse\u201d voltage of 17,000 for the gloves.\nPlaintiff also presented evidence that the right and left hand gloves each failed dielectric testing subsequent to the accident. According to statistical evidence developed from Siebe\u2019s own production reports and presented by plaintiff\u2019s expert, failure of this test by both gloves was a virtual impossibility if both Siebe and ASU had indeed properly tested the gloves as they asserted. In addition, the expert countered defendants\u2019 claims that plaintiff\u2019s test results were unreliable due to failure to wash the gloves prior to testing, and presented an explanation of why the right hand glove failed in the field at approximately 7,200 volts, but a failure did not register during subsequent testing until 10,000-15,000 volts were administered. Further, record evidence tended to show that despite defendant Siebe\u2019s knowledge that a certain percentage of gloves would fail in the field due to manufacturing defects, Siebe warned neither ASU nor line workers such as plaintiff of the potential for failure.\nFinally, regarding the less-contested element of proximate cause, plaintiff presented evidence that burns on plaintiff\u2019s right hand correlated precisely with the area of the gloves which failed during post-accident testing.\nViewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, see Lowder, 68 N.C. App. at 506, 315 S.E.2d at 521, we conclude plaintiff produced a forecast of evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in response to defendants\u2019 attempted showing of the non-existence of an essential element of plaintiff\u2019s negligence claim. See Green, 52 N.C. App. at 532, 279 S.E.2d at 40. Most notably, evidence of the electrocution of plaintiff at 7,200 volts, far less than the \u201cuse\u201d rating of the gloves, evidence of certain manufacturing defects in the gloves, and the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s expert calling into question defendants\u2019 assurances of testing and inspecting the gloves, work to offset defendants\u2019 showing. Questions of fact therefore remain regarding whether defendants \u201cacted in conformity with the reasonable person standard,\u201d see Surrette, 78 N.C. App. at 650, 338 S.E.2d at 131, in testing and inspecting the gloves and, particularly as to defendant Siebe, in providing adequate warnings.\nII. Breach of Warranties\nBecause plaintiff did not assign as error the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment for defendants on the issue of express warranty, this issue is not properly before the Court, see N.C. R. App. P. 10(a), and we do not address it.\nASU and Siebe first attack plaintiff\u2019s claim of breach of implied warranty by asserting lack of privity. As to ASU, which sold the gloves, we find this argument persuasive.\nPrivity via a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the seller or manufacturer of an allegedly defective product is required to maintain a suit for breach of implied warranty, \u201c[e]xcept where the barrier of privity has been legislatively or judicially removed.\u201d Crews, 106 N.C. App. at 331, 416 S.E.2d at 929. Regarding an action against a \u201cmanufacturer\u201d under the Act, our General Assembly in G.S. \u00a7 99B-2(b) has eliminated the privity requirement for employees of the- buyer. See id. at 332, 416 S.E.2d at 929-30. However, a buyer\u2019s employee nonetheless is barred from suit against a seller grounded upon breach of implied warranty in that neither the Act, see G.S. Chapter 99B, nor the U.C.C. provisions regarding implied warranties, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 25-2-314 to 25-2-318 (1986), abolish the privity requirement in such instance. See Crews, 106 N.C. App. at 332-33, 416 S.E.2d at 930.\nThe involvement of ASU as seller in testing and inspecting the gloves does not fulfill the definitional requirements of a \u201cmanufacturer\u201d under the Act. See G.S. \u00a7 99B-1(2). Plaintiff\u2019s products liability claim against ASU predicated upon breach of implied warranty was therefore barred, and entry of summary judgment in favor of ASU on this issue was not error.\nHowever, it is undisputed that Siebe qualifies as a manufacturer under G.S. \u00a7 99B-1(2), and plaintiff\u2019s implied warranty claim against it thus is not precluded by lack of privity. See G.S. \u00a7 99B-2(b). Notwithstanding, Siebe further argues summary judgment in its favor was proper because it demonstrated the absence of an essential element of plaintiff\u2019s implied warranty claim. We disagree.\nA successful plaintiff in a breach of implied warranty of merchantability action under G.S. \u00a7 25-2-314 and, by reference, under the Act, see Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.C. 298, 303, 354 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1987), must prove (1) the goods bought and sold were subject to an implied warranty, (2) the goods did not comply with the warranty in that they were defective at the time of sale, (3) the defective nature of the goods caused injury; and (4) that damages resulted. Id. at 301, 354 S.E.2d at 497. Moreover, an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability may be based upon the manufacturer\u2019s failure to warn. Bryant v. Adams, 116 N.C. App. 448, 465, 448 S.E.2d 832, 841 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 736, 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995).\nSpecifically, Siebe contends it is entitled to summary judgment by virtue of having demonstrated a failure of the evidence relating to the second element \u2014 proof of defect at the time of sale. However, having determined above there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a defect in the gloves at the time they left Siebe\u2019s possession, we similarly conclude those issues of fact to be present with reference to plaintiffs claim of breach of implied warranty against Siebe.\nIII. Contributory Negligence\nFinally, both Siebe and ASU argue summary judgment was in any event proper on grounds plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Assuming arguendo contributory negligence acts as a bar to products liability actions based upon either negligence or breach of warranty, see Charles E. Daye & Mark W. Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts, \u00a7 26.42 (1991) (contributory negligence normally not a bar in action for breach of warranty, because \u201cthe defenses set out in section 99B-4 protect the manufacturer or seller from liability in \u2018any products liability action;\u2019 \u201d presumably contributory negligence available no matter what the theory of recovery); see also Gillespie v. American Motors Corp., 69 N.C. App. 531, 533, 317 S.E.2d 32, 33 (1984) (contributory negligence acted as bar to recovery of damages \u201cwhether plaintiffs claim [was] based on negligence or breach of warranty\u201d), defendants\u2019 argument fails.\nWe note initially that the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence rests with defendants, and that\n[w]hen the party with the burden of proof moves for summary judgment [it] must show that there are no genuine issues of fact, that there are no gaps in [its] proof, [and] that no inferences inconsistent with [its] prevailing on the motion] arise from the evidence. . . .\nParks Chevrolet, Inc. v. Watkins, 74 N.C. App. 719, 721, 329 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1985). Further, as with ordinary negligence actions, summary judgment is appropriate on issues of contributory negligence only where \u201cno other reasonable conclusion may be reached.\u201d Bryant, 116 N.C. App. at 472, 448 S.E.2d at 845 (citation omitted).\nIn N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 99B-4, the Act codifies contributory negligence as it applies to product liability actions and additionally \u201csets out or explains more specialized fact patterns which would amount to contributory negligence in a products liability action.\u201d Champs Convenience Stores v. United Chemical Co., 329 N.C. 446, 452-53, 406 S.E.2d 856, 860 (1991). The section provides:\nNo manufacturer or seller shall be held liable in any product liability action if:\n(3) The claimant failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in his use of the product, and such failure was a proximate cause of the occurrence that caused injury or damage to the claimant.\nG.S. \u00a7 99B-4(3) (1989) (emphasis added).\nDefendants maintain that plaintiff\u2019s action should be barred as a matter of law because he \u201cfailed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances\u201d as required by the statute. In the main, defendants point to plaintiff\u2019s failure to secure or monitor adequately the position of the hoses placed over the energized lines, his failure to keep his helmet properly secured and to retrieve it immediately after it blew off, and his performance of the job in the proximity of energized lines when it could have been completed after de-energizing the lines.\nOn the other hand, plaintiff emphasizes that\n[sjection 99B-4(3) requires that the failure of the Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care must be in his use of the product involved in the case.\n(emphasis in original). Therefore, plaintiff continues, contributory negligence does not apply unless plaintiff\u2019s use of the gloves was unreasonable under the circumstances, regardless of any alleged failure otherwise to employ safety devices and act in an appropriate manner.\nIn resolving the question raised by plaintiff, our duty is to construe G.S. \u00a7 99B-4(3) in context with other provisions of the Act, or as a \u201ccomposite whole\u201d so as to harmonize the sections in order to effectuate legislative intent. Duke Power Co. v. City of High Point, 69 N.C. App. 378, 387, 317 S.E.2d 701, 706, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 82, 321 S.E.2d 895 (1984). See also Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 594, 374 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1988) (\u201cIn the construction of statutes, [the court\u2019s] primary task is to determine legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise.\u201d).\nA manufacturer or seller can avoid liability under the Act if, under G.S. \u00a7 99B-4(1), plaintiff was negligent in his \u201cuse of the product. . . contrary to any express and adequate instructions or warnings,\u201d or additionally, under G.S. \u00a7 99B-4(2), if plaintiff \u201cuse[d] ... the product\u201d even after his discovery of a \u201cdefect or unreasonably dangerous condition.\u201d Interpreting G.S. \u00a7 99B-4(3) in context with these neighboring subsections, we conclude it likewise requires the negligence of a plaintiff to be in the \u201cuse of the [allegedly defective] product.\u201d\nIndeed, research reveals that in the cases before our Courts in which contributory negligence under G.S. 99B-4 has been alleged, all have involved the plaintiff\u2019s use of the alleged defective product. See, e.g., Champs, 329 N.C. 446, 406 S.E.2d 856 (1991); Finney v. Rose\u2019s Stores, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 843, 463 S.E.2d 823 (1995), cert. denied, 343 N.C. 306, 471 S.E.2d 70 (1996); Bryant, 116 N.C. App. 448, 448 S.E.2d 832 (1994); Morgan v. Cavalier Acquisition Corp., 111 N.C. App. 520, 432 S.E.2d 915, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 238, 439 S.E.2d 149 (1993); Smith v. Selco Products, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 151, 385 S.E.2d 173 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 598, 393 S.E.2d 883 (1990). See also Sexton by and through Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 338-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820, 116 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1991) (although plaintiff\u2019s negligence in operating unlighted motorcycle at sundown while traveling too close to center line and not watching road may have contributed to collision, \u201cno evidence has been advanced to show that he negligently used the helmet or that the negligent use of the helmet was a cause of his injuries;\u201d plaintiff\u2019s product liability action against helmet manufacturer thus not barred by applicable contributory negligence statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 411.320(3), nearly identical to G.S. \u00a7 99B-4(3) herein).\nIn the event G.S. \u00a799B-4 requires, as we have held, lack of reasonable care by plaintiff in use of the gloves, defendants contend plaintiff\u2019s exclusive reliance upon his gloves to protect himself from electrocution constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law. This argument is unavailing in that it comprises a circular reassertion of defendants\u2019 contention that plaintiff was negligent in general \u2014 as opposed to in his use of the product \u2014 by failing to employ other means of ensuring his safety from electrocution.\nDefendants further assert plaintiff damaged the gloves or failed to store them properly during the three day period of his possession, and that he failed to examine the gloves for damage prior to use. Assuming arguendo such contentions find support in the evidence, we cannot say \u201cno other reasonable conclusion may be reached,\u201d Bryant, 116 N.C. App. at 472, 448 S.E.2d at 845, and hence defendants likewise do not establish as a matter of law plaintiffs negligent use of the gloves \u201cunder the circumstances.\u201d See also Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 673, 268 S.E.2d 504, 507 (1980) (\u201cPlaintiff may be contributorily negligent if his conduct ignores unreasonable risks or dangers which would have been apparent to a prudent person exercising ordinary care for his own safety.\u201d).\nBased on the foregoing, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of ASU on the issue of breach of implied warranty and in favor of both defendants on the issue of breach of express warranty. However, regarding the issues of the defendants\u2019 negligence, Siebe\u2019s breach of implied warranty, and plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence, the grant of summary judgment is reversed.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nJudges EAGLES and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Twiggs, Abrams, Strickland, & Trehy, P.A., by Douglas B. Abrams and Jerome P. Trehy, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Wankser and Lindler, by PL. Bright Lindler, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, by Linda Ambrose, for Harrison- Wright.", "Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P, by Richard W. Ellis and Leslie C. O\u2019Toole, for defendant-appellees Siebe North, Inc. and Siebe Holdings Corp.", "Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P, by Robert W. Sumner and H. Lee Evans, Jr., for defendant-appellee American Safety Utility Corp." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TONY B. NICHOLSON, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN SAFETY UTILITY CORPORATION, DUKE POWER COMPANY and NORTH HAND PROTECTION, a division of SIEBE NORTH, INC., SIEBE NORTH HOLDINGS CORP., SIEBE, INC., SIEBE INDUSTRIES, INC., and SIEBE PLC, Defendants\nNo. COA95-554\n(Filed 15 October 1996)\n1. Products Liability \u00a7 28 (NCI4th)\u2014 safety gloves \u2014 failure to inspect and warn \u2014 summary judgment improper\nSummary judgment was improperly entered for defendants in plaintiff electrical lineman\u2019s product liability action based upon negligence against the manufacturer and seller of safety gloves worn by plaintiff when he was injured by electricity from an energized line where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged failure of defendants to properly test and inspect the gloves and to convey adequate warning of potential deficiencies in the gloves.\nAm Jur 2d, Products Liability \u00a7\u00a7 305, 324; Summary Judgment \u00a7 27.\nManufacturer\u2019s or seller\u2019s duty to give warning regarding product as affecting his liability for product-caused injury. 76 ALR2d 9.\nManufacturer\u2019s duty to test or inspect as affecting his liability for product-caused injury. 6 ALR3d 91.\nFailure to warn as basis of liability under doctrine of strict liability in tort. 53 ALR3d 239.\n2. Products Liability \u00a7 9 (NCI4th)\u2014 manufacturer and seller \u2014 privity\u2014buyer\u2019s employee\nWhile the privity requirement has been eliminated for a buyer\u2019s employee to bring an action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product for breach of implied warranty, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 99B-2(b), a buyer\u2019s employee is still barred by lack of privity from suit against a seller grounded upon breach of implied warranty.\nAm Jur 2d, Products Liability \u00a7\u00a7 602, 613.\nPrivity of contract as essential to recovery in action based on theory other than negligence, against manufacturer or seller of product alleged to have caused injury. 75 ALR2d 39.\nPrivity of contract as essential in action against remote manufacturer or distributor for defects in goods not causing injury to person or to other property. 16 ALR3d 683.\n3. Products Liability \u00a7 9 (NCI4th)\u2014 testing by seller \u2014 seller not manufacturer \u2014 buyer\u2019s employee \u2014 privity required\nA seller\u2019s testing and inspection of safety gloves sold to plaintiff\u2019s employer did not render the seller a \u201cmanufacturer\u201d of the gloves, and an action by the buyer\u2019s employee against the seller for breach of implied warranty was barred by a lack of privity.\nAm Jur 2d, Products Liability \u00a7\u00a7 569, 596.\n4. Products Liability \u00a7 28 (NCI4th)\u2014 safety gloves \u2014 breach of implied warranty \u2014 issue of fact\nA genuine issue of material fact was presented regarding the existence of a defect in plaintiff electrical lineman\u2019s safety gloves at the time they left defendant manufacturer\u2019s possession so that summary judgment was improperly entered for defendant manufacturer in plaintiff\u2019s action for breach of implied warranty.\nAm Jur 2d, Products Liability \u00a7\u00a7 224, 228; Summary Judgment \u00a7 27.\n5. Products Liability \u00a7 18 (NCI4th)\u2014 contributory negligence \u2014 use of defective product\nAssuming arguendo that contributory negligence bars a product liability action based upon either negligence or breach of warranty, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 99B-4(3) requires that the contributory negligence be in the use of the allegedly defective product.\nAm Jur 2d, Products Liability \u00a7\u00a7 933, 947.\nContributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense to action for personal injury, death, or property damage resulting from alleged breach of implied warranty. 4 ALR3d 501.\n6. Products Liability \u00a7 18 (NCI4th)\u2014 safety gloves \u2014 contributory negligence not shown\nPlaintiff electrical lineman\u2019s product liability action against the manufacturer and seller of safety gloves was not barred by plaintiffs contributory negligence where (1) defendants\u2019 contention that plaintiff relied exclusively upon his gloves and failed to employ other safety measures to protect himself from electrocution did not relate to his use of the allegedly defective gloves, and (2) defendants did not establish that plaintiff was con-tributorily negligent as a matter of law in his use of the gloves by damaging the gloves, failing to store them properly, or failing to examine the gloves for damage prior to use.\nAm Jur 2d, Products Liability \u00a7 932, 933.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 21 February 1995 by Judge Robert L. Farmer in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 1996.\nTwiggs, Abrams, Strickland, & Trehy, P.A., by Douglas B. Abrams and Jerome P. Trehy, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nWankser and Lindler, by PL. Bright Lindler, for plaintiff-appellant.\nHedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, by Linda Ambrose, for Harrison- Wright.\nSmith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P, by Richard W. Ellis and Leslie C. O\u2019Toole, for defendant-appellees Siebe North, Inc. and Siebe Holdings Corp.\nCranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P, by Robert W. Sumner and H. Lee Evans, Jr., for defendant-appellee American Safety Utility Corp." }, "file_name": "0059-01", "first_page_order": 97, "last_page_order": 110 }