{ "id": 11889774, "name": "BROOKWOOD UNIT OWNERSHIP ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff v. WELBON DELON and BARBARA A. DELON, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Brookwood Unit Ownership Ass'n v. Delon", "decision_date": "1996-11-05", "docket_number": "No. COA96-21", "first_page": "446", "last_page": "450", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "124 N.C. App. 446" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "77 ALR3d 1290", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529224 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524827 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4", "parenthetical": "quoting United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 494, 403 S.E.2d 104, 111 (1991), aff'd, 335 N.C. 183, 437 S.E.2d 374 (1993) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914394 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151", "parenthetical": "quoting United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 494, 403 S.E.2d 104, 111 (1991), aff'd, 335 N.C. 183, 437 S.E.2d 374 (1993) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565706, 8565678, 8565647, 8565744, 8565627 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0240-04", "/nc/288/0240-03", "/nc/288/0240-02", "/nc/288/0240-05", "/nc/288/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550315 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816-17", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561053 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0286-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 484, "char_count": 8479, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.163144987143734e-07, "percentile": 0.5845410292260282 }, "sha256": "75acadaf26c7ee78c2ac3166d0b59f4235a28b39b78684baa57f09f7c7f437bd", "simhash": "1:f5ebc7e00014e446", "word_count": 1305 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:03:33.335576+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, JOHN C., and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "BROOKWOOD UNIT OWNERSHIP ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff v. WELBON DELON and BARBARA A. DELON, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nDefendants first argue that the trial court erred in awarding reasonable attorney\u2019s fees in excess of fifteen percent of the plaintiff\u2019s judgment. Defendants argue that G.S. 6-21.2(2) is controlling and provides the fifteen percent limitation on the recovery of attorney\u2019s fees. We disagree.\nPlaintiff Association is a unit ownership project created prior to 1 October 1986 and organized pursuant to the North Carolina Unit Ownership Act. G.S. 47A-1 to -37 (1983). Thereafter, effective 1 October 1986, the General Assembly enacted the North Carolina Condominium Act as codified at 47C-1-101 el seq. (1986). Generally speaking, the Condominium Act applies prospectively \u201cto all condominiums created . . . after October 1, 1986.\u201d G.S. 47C-1-102 (1986). The Condominium Act also expressly lists, however, a number of sections which are to be retroactively applied to condominiums created prior to 1 October 1986.\nOne of these provisions, G.S. 47C-4-117, expressly authorizes the recovery of attorney\u2019s fees and provides in pertinent part:\nIf a declarant or any other person subject to this chapter fails to comply with any provision hereof or any provision of the declaration or bylaws, any person or class of person adversely affected by that failure has a claim for appropriate relief. The court may award reasonable attorney\u2019s fees to the prevailing party.\nG.S. 47C-4-117 (1986). This statute is specific authority contained within the very Chapter that currently governs in part the operation of plaintiff Association. G.S. 47C-1-102 expressly provides that G.S. 47C-4-117 applies to plaintiff Association and all others similarly situated. Accordingly, we conclude that G.S. 47C-4-117 is controlling here.\nDefendant would have us believe that G.S. 6-21.2(2) somehow supersedes G.S. 47C-4-117 and creates a broad general rule that \u201creasonable\u201d attorney\u2019s fees always means fifteen percent of the outstanding balance. We are not persuaded. In 1967, the General Assembly enacted G.S. 6-21.2 as part of a package of provisions designed to amend the \u201cUniform Commercial Code \u2018and other related statutes.\u2019 \u201d Stillwell Enterprises, Inc. v. Equipment Co., 300 N.C. 286, 293, 266 S.E.2d 812, 816-17 (1980) (citations omitted). Nineteen years later, in 1986, the General Assembly enacted the North Carolina Condominium Act, which was based upon the Uniform Condominium Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Had the General Assembly wished that the recovery of attorney\u2019s fees under the Condominium Act be governed by G.S. 6-21.2, the General Assembly could have included language to that effect. G.S. 47C-4-117 is a subsequently enacted, more specific statute and, absent express direction from the General Assembly, we cannot give greater effect to the earlier, more general provisions of G.S. 6-21.2.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact as to whether plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees were \u201creasonable.\u201d We agree.\nIt is well-settled that when awarding reasonable attorney\u2019s fees, the trial court must make findings of fact to support the award. E.g., Hill v. Jones, 26 N.C. App. 168, 170, 215 S.E.2d 168, 170, disc. review denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 664 (1975).\n[T]o determine if an award of counsel fees is reasonable, \u201cthe record must contain findings of fact as to the time and labor expended, the skill required, the customary fee for like work, and the experience or ability of the attorney\u201d based on competent evidence.\nWest v. Tilley, 120 N.C. App. 145, 151, 461 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1995) (quoting United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 494, 403 S.E.2d 104, 111 (1991), aff'd, 335 N.C. 183, 437 S.E.2d 374 (1993) (citations omitted)). The record here contains no findings whatsoever with regard to the reasonableness of the attorney\u2019s fees awarded. Accordingly, we remand with direction to the trial court to make findings of fact as to the reasonableness of the attorney\u2019s fees sought to be recovered by plaintiff.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.\nJudges MARTIN, JOHN C., and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hunter Law Firm, by R. Christopher Hunter and Gregg S. Pasternack, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Paul G. Ennis for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BROOKWOOD UNIT OWNERSHIP ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff v. WELBON DELON and BARBARA A. DELON, Defendants\nNo. COA96-21\n(Filed 5 November 1996)\n1. Housing \u00a7 74 (NCI4th)\u2014 condominium \u2014 assessment\u2014 attorney\u2019s fees \u2014 in excess of fifteen percent\nThe trial court did not err in awarding plaintiffs attorney\u2019s fees in excess of fifteen percent of plaintiffs\u2019 judgment in an action arising from a condominium assessment. The controlling statute is N.C.G.S. \u00a7 47C-4-117, which provides for the award of a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee to the prevailing party. Although defendant argues that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.2(2) creates a broad general rule that \u201creasonable\u201d attorney\u2019s fees always mean fifteen percent of the outstanding balance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 47C-4-117 is a subsequently enacted more specific statute and, absent express direction from the General Assembly, the Court of Appeals cannot give greater effect to the earlier, more general provisions.\nAm Jur 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments \u00a7 37.\nExpenses for which condominium association may assess unit owners. 77 ALR3d 1290.\n2. Housing \u00a7 74 (NCI4th); Attorneys at Law \u00a7 55 (NCI4th)\u2014 condominium \u2014 assessment\u2014attorney\u2019s fees \u2014 no findings as to reasonableness\nThe trial court erred by not making findings of fact as to whether plaintiffs\u2019 attorney\u2019s fees were reasonable in an action arising from a condominium assessment.\nAm Jur 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments \u00a7 37.\nExpenses for which condominium association may assess unit owners. 77 ALR3d 1290.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 31 August 1995 by Judge Joseph Buckner in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 September 1996.\nPlaintiff Brookwood Unit Ownership Association (\u201cAssociation\u201d) is a unit ownership project organized pursuant to the North Carolina Unit Ownership Act. G.S. 47A-1 to -37 (1983). Defendants Welbon Delon and Barbara A. Delon, as owners of condominium unit number 13, are members of plaintiff Association.\nIn the summer of 1988, architect Knox Tate investigated the cause of a sagging floor in one unit and found that poor ventilation and a build-up of excess moisture had caused extensive \u201cdry rot\u201d in the structural members under the unit. Upon learning of this problem, the Association\u2019s Board of Directors (\u201cBoard\u201d) directed Mr. Tate to inspect the remainder of the premises. Mr. Tate\u2019s completed inspection revealed that the moisture problem had caused severe and extensive structural problems affecting fifty-seven of the total sixty-one condominium units. The extent of the damage threatened the stability of the structures and the safety of the occupants.\nUpon Mr. Tate\u2019s recommendation, the Board undertook various repairs including replacing damaged structural members, installing fans, adding foundation vents, installing plastic sheeting at ground level and installing new drainage equipment. The Board determined that the repairs were maintenance expenses and assessed a common charge on every unit, including those units not directly affected by the repairs. As their unit was unaffected by the dry rot, defendants refused to pay the common charge, contending that the repairs were capital improvements for which they could only be charged a special assessment following a vote by the unit owners.\nUltimately, on 19 October 1988, plaintiff Association filed a complaint against defendants seeking arrearage in the amount of $1,670.00, which complaint plaintiff later amended to seek total damages of $5012.00. After trial, the court entered judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Board had indeed violated the Association\u2019s own bylaws in charging defendants as it did. On 5 April 1993, plaintiff appealed and on 3 January 1995 this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff.\nThereafter, on 7 April 1995, plaintiff filed a \u201cmotion for appeal costs and attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d Orange County District Court Judge Joseph Buckner heard plaintiff\u2019s motion and, on 31 August 1995, Judge Buckner ordered defendants to pay plaintiff $15,408.00 for attorney\u2019s fees and costs incurred in bringing the cause of action against defendants.\nDefendants appeal.\nHunter Law Firm, by R. Christopher Hunter and Gregg S. Pasternack, for plaintiff-appellee.\nPaul G. Ennis for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0446-01", "first_page_order": 484, "last_page_order": 488 }