{
  "id": 11890059,
  "name": "ROBERT DENNIS EIBERGEN, Petitioner-Appellee v. ALEXANDER KILLENS, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Eibergen v. Killens",
  "decision_date": "1996-11-19",
  "docket_number": "No. COA95-1326",
  "first_page": "534",
  "last_page": "538",
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      "cite": "124 N.C. App. 534"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
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      "year": 1993,
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    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28.1",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:03:33.335576+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges EAGLES and McGEE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "ROBERT DENNIS EIBERGEN, Petitioner-Appellee v. ALEXANDER KILLENS, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent-Appellant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nOn 25 May 1994, at 10:30 p.m., petitioner was stopped in Orange County and charged with driving while impaired. Petitioner thereafter submitted to a chemical analysis of his breath which established that he had a .15 percent blood alcohol content. Petitioner then appeared before an Orange County magistrate, who issued a \u201cRevocation Order When Person Present,\u201d revoking petitioner\u2019s driver\u2019s license for ten days. The magistrate ordered that petitioner\u2019s \u201clicense or privilege to drive be revoked, and he is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of North Carolina during the period of revocation; and [t]he revocation remains in effect for at least ten days from the date he surrenders his license to the Court....\u201d The time and date of the order was 11:42 p.m., 25 May 1994. Because petitioner stated he did not have his driver\u2019s license card with him, the magistrate marked the box on the order which stated that petitioner \u201cwas validly licensed but unable to locate his license card and filed an affidavit which constituted surrender of the driver\u2019s license.\u201d No affidavit was filed in this case.\nThe next morning, 26 May 1994, at 8:20 a.m., petitioner was stopped in Alamance County and charged with driving while impaired, driving while license revoked, and speeding. At this time, however, petitioner had his driver\u2019s license card with him. A chemical analysis was conducted on his breath, which indicated that he had a .11 blood alcohol content. On 22 November 1994, petitioner pled guilty in Alamance County to driving while impaired, and the other charges were dismissed. The district court found the magistrate\u2019s order in Orange County had not yet become effective when petitioner was stopped in Alamance County because his \u201cdriver\u2019s license was not in fact revoked . . . .\u201d Thereafter, petitioner received notice from respondent that his driver\u2019s license was revoked for one year for having committed a moving violation during a period when his driver\u2019s license was revoked pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28.1(b)(1) (1993). The moving violation referred to in the notice was the Alamance County charge.\nOn 10 February 1995, petitioner filed a petition in Alamance County Superior Court seeking to have respondent enjoined from revoking his license for one year. A hearing was held on 10 July 1995, and the superior court found that petitioner had not surrendered his driver\u2019s license in Orange County because petitioner had his driver\u2019s license in his possession when he was stopped in Alamance County. The court held petitioner\u2019s conviction in Alamance County did not constitute a moving violation during a period of license suspension and ordered the revocation of petitioner\u2019s license permanently enjoined.\nBecause the facts of this case are not in dispute, we need only address whether the evidence in the record supports respondent\u2019s revocation of petitioner\u2019s license pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28.1(b)(1) for the commission of a moving violation during a period of driver\u2019s license suspension. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the Orange County magistrate\u2019s ten day revocation order immediately revoked petitioner\u2019s driver\u2019s license. Respondent contends that the magistrate\u2019s order immediately revoked petitioner\u2019s driver\u2019s license, and that petitioner committed a moving violation during a period of revocation by operating a motor vehicle the next day in Alamance County.\nThe Orange County magistrate had the authority to order a ten day revocation of petitioner\u2019s driver\u2019s license under N.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 20-16.5(b)(4)(b) (1993), which states that a person\u2019s driver\u2019s license is subject to immediate revocation if the person \u201c[h]as an alcohol concentration of .08 or more within a relevant time after the driving . . . .\u201d Because petitioner was found to have a blood alcohol content of .15 when he was arrested in Orange County, his driver\u2019s license was subject to immediate revocation. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that because he did not have his driver\u2019s license card with him at the time and because no affidavit in this regard was filed by the magistrate, his driver\u2019s license was not validly revoked on 25 May 1994. We disagree. The ten day revocation of petitioner\u2019s license took effect immediately upon the issuance of the magistrate\u2019s order, even though petitioner stated he did not have his driver\u2019s license card with him and even though the magistrate filed no affidavit.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(17) (1993) defines \u201clicense\u201d as\nAny driver\u2019s license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under or granted by the laws of this State including: (a) Any temporary license or learner\u2019s permit; (b) The privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license; and (c) Any nonresident\u2019s operating privilege.\n(Emphasis added). The term \u201clicense\u201d encompasses more than the license card itself; it includes the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State. In addition, \u201crevocation or suspension\u201d is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(36) (1993) as \u201c[t]ermination of a licensee\u2019s or per-mittee\u2019s privilege to drive . ...\u201d Thus, when a person\u2019s driver\u2019s license is suspended or revoked, it is the surrendering of the privilege to drive, not the license card itself, that is of significance. If revocation could become effective only when a licensee elected to turn in his or her driver\u2019s license card, the intent of the legislature and the purpose of the statute would be frustrated.\nFinally, according to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.5(e) (1993), if the revocation report is filed with the judicial official when the person is present, \u201c[u]nless the person is not currently licensed, the revocation under this subsection begins at the time the revocation order is issued and continues until the person\u2019s license has been suspended for ten days and the person has paid the applicable costs.\u201d (Emphasis added). Therefore, petitioner\u2019s license was revoked at the time he was operating a motor vehicle in Alamance County on 26 May 1994, and the Alamance County charge constituted a moving violation during a period of license suspension.\nThe evidence in the record before us supports respondent\u2019s revocation of petitioner\u2019s license pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28.1(b)(1) for the commission of a moving violation during a period when his driver\u2019s license was revoked. The judgment of the Alamance County Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges EAGLES and McGEE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WALKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Roberson, Richardson & Deal, by James K. Roberson, for 'petitioner-appellee.",
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Sondra C. P\u00e1nico, for respondent-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ROBERT DENNIS EIBERGEN, Petitioner-Appellee v. ALEXANDER KILLENS, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent-Appellant\nNo. COA95-1326\n(Piled 19 November 1996)\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 130 (NCI4th)\u2014 driver\u2019s license suspension \u2014 card not turned in \u2014 effective date of suspension\nIn an action involving revocation of a driver\u2019s license as a result of driving while impaired, the trial court erred by holding that petitioner\u2019s second conviction did not constitute a moving violation during a period of license suspension and ordering that revocation of petitioner\u2019s license be permanently enjoined where petitioner was stopped on 25 May 1994 in Orange County; chemical analysis of his breath thereafter established that he had a blood alcohol content of .15; a magistrate then issued an order revoking petitioner\u2019s license for ten days; the magistrate marked the box which stated that petitioner was unable to locate his license card and filed an affidavit which constituted surrender of the license, but no affidavit was filed; petitioner was stopped the next morning in Alamance County with a blood alcohol content of .11; he subsequently pled guilty to driving while impaired and the district court found that the magistrate\u2019s order had not yet become effective when petitioner was stopped in Alamance County; and petitioner thereafter received notice from respondent that his license was revoked for one year pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-28.1(b)(1) for committing a moving violation while his license was revoked. Revocation or suspension is the termination of the privilege to drive; the ten day revocation of petitioner\u2019s license in Orange County took effect immediately upon the issuance of the magistrate\u2019s order even though petitioner stated that he did not have his driver\u2019s license card with him and even though the magistrate filed no affidavit.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic \u00a7\u00a7 115-117.\nAutomobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator\u2019s license for \u201chabitual,\u201d \u201cpersistent,\u201d or \u201cfrequent\u201d violations of traffic regulations. 48 ALR4th 367.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 10 July 1995 by Judge James C. Spencer, Jr. in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 1996.\nRoberson, Richardson & Deal, by James K. Roberson, for 'petitioner-appellee.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Sondra C. P\u00e1nico, for respondent-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0534-01",
  "first_page_order": 572,
  "last_page_order": 576
}