{ "id": 11865573, "name": "RICHARD LEON QUICK, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Quick v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles", "decision_date": "1997-01-07", "docket_number": "No. COA96-361", "first_page": "123", "last_page": "127", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 N.C. App. 123" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 ALR2d 1064", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798768 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459-60" }, { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798794, 798862, 798863, 798960, 798928 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0512-03", "/nc/343/0512-04", "/nc/343/0512-05", "/nc/343/0512-02", "/nc/343/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916727 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554567 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 723", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "726-27", "parenthetical": "distinguishing unlawful arrest from unconstitutional arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553598 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "574" }, { "page": "572-73", "parenthetical": "distinguishing unlawful arrest from unconstitutional arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 479, "char_count": 9465, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4434627120688474e-07, "percentile": 0.8033165254036047 }, "sha256": "cb4791be7cfc97a7a8a50905d729d8299e46ea9c229c3358b6e295185e3c71cd", "simhash": "1:a7e98717b42d9295", "word_count": 1523 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:02.941264+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and MARTIN, John C., concur." ], "parties": [ "RICHARD LEON QUICK, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nRichard Leon Quick (petitioner) appeals a judgment from superior court upholding the revocation of his drivers license by the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles (respondent).\nThe undisputed facts are that on 18 January 1995 at 12:45 a.m. Officer Newcomb (Newcomb) responded to a call concerning a single car accident. Upon arriving at the scene, Newcomb saw that another law enforcement officer was on the scene and that a vehicle was on the side of the road and damaged to the point it was not driveable. Upon seeing that the driver of the vehicle, petitioner, was a fellow police officer and in no need of medical attention, Newcomb radioed for a senior officer and another officer to help with the accident scene.\nNewcomb smelled alcohol coming from petitioner and noticed that petitioner was having difficulty standing and \u201cappeared to be upset about something\u201d and told Newcomb that he had been out driving around and \u201csomething about problems at home of some sort.\u201d Petitioner was cooperative and told Newcomb to \u201cdo your job.\u201d\nNewcomb said that petitioner \u201cperformed rather poorly\u201d on the field sobriety tests and blew a .14 on the alco-sensor. From petitioner\u2019s results on all the tests, Newcomb formed the belief that petitioner had committed an implied-consent offense and placed him under arrest. Petitioner was transported to the intake center where a chemical analyst advised petitioner of his rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-16.2 (1993). After explaining the procedure to take the breath test, petitioner was asked to blow into the machine two separate times and both times he refused. Petitioner was recorded as having willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis and his license was revoked pursuant to section 20-16.2(a)(2).\nPetitioner requested a de novo hearing in superior court to appeal the revocation of his license. At the hearing, petitioner moved to suppress any evidence of his willful refusal to take the chemical analysis based on the argument that pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401(b)(2) (1988), his arrest was unlawful. Affirming the revocation of petitioner\u2019s license, the trial court concluded: (1) petitioner was charged with an implied-consent offense; (2) Newcomb had reasonable grounds to believe petitioner committed such offense; (3) petitioner was notified of his rights; and (4) petitioner willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis.\nThe issue is whether petitioner\u2019s willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis can be used to revoke his drivers license when his arrest was not in compliance with section 15A-401(b)(2).\nThe petitioner argues that because his arrest was not in compliance with section 15A-401 (b)(2), his willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis could not be the basis for the revocation of his license under section 20-16.2(d). We disagree.\nEven assuming the arrest of the petitioner was not in compliance with section 15A-401(b)(2), because petitioner was \u201ccharged with an implied-consent offense\u201d after driving on a \u201chighway or public vehicular area\u201d and because Newcomb had \u201creasonable grounds to believe [the petitioner] ha[d] committed the implied-consent offense,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.2(a), the trial court correctly affirmed the revocation of the petitioner\u2019s license on the basis of his refusal to take the chemical analysis.\nIn In re Gardner, 39 N.C. App. 567, 251 S.E.2d 723 (1979), and In re Pinyatello, 36 N.C. App. 542, 245 S.E.2d 185 (1976), this Court determined that even if an arrest for an implied-consent offense does not comply with section 15A-401 (b)(2), \u201cthe petitioner . . . could not willfully refuse to take the [chemical analysis] without incurring\u201d the revocation of his license. Gardner, 39 N.C. App. at 572, 251 S.E.2d at 726; see Pinyatello, 36 N.C. App. at 545, 245 S.E.2d at 187; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.2(d) (1993) (twelve months revocation of license for willfully refusing to submit to chemical analysis). When determining whether revocation of petitioner\u2019s license was proper, \u201cwe are not concerned with the admissibility or suppression of evidence,\u201d but only with \u201cwhether the petitioner\u2019s driving privilege was properly revoked . . . because of his willful refusal to take a [chemical analysis.]\u201d Gardner, 39 N.C. App. at 574, 251 S.E.2d at 727. \u201cThe question of the legality of his arrest. . . [is] simply not relevant to any issue presented in\u201d the hearing to determine whether his license was properly revoked. Id.\nWe are aware that section 20-16.2 has been amended by the legislature since our decisions in Gardner and Pinyatello. At the time of Gardner and Pinyatello, section 20-16.2(a) stated that:\nAny person who drives or operates a motor vehicle upon any highway or any public vehicular area shall be deemed to have given consent subject to the provisions of G.S. 20-139.1, to a chemical test or tests of his breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The test or tests shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving or operating a motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. . . .\n1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 206, \u00a7 1, amended, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 435, \u00a7 11 (emphasis added). The same section now states that:\nAny person who drives a vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area thereby gives consent to a chemical analysis if charged with an implied-consent offense. The charging officer must designate the type of chemical analysis to be administered, and it may be administered when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person charged has committed the implied-consent offense.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.2(a) (1993) (emphasis added). The petitioner argues that these changes reflect an intention by the legislature to overrule Gardner and Pinyatello and thus require that the petitioner be lawfully \u201ccharged\u201d before he can be required to take the chemical analysis. We disagree. Although the legislature did substitute \u201ccharged\u201d for \u201carrested,\u201d it did not add any language suggesting that the charge must be lawful as a prerequisite to requiring the driver to submit to a chemical analysis.\nPetitioner argues alternatively that we should overturn Gardner and Pinyatello on the basis that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest (the refusal to submit to a chemical analysis) should be excluded from the civil revocation proceeding. This Court is bound by its prior decisions addressing the same questions, Moore v. Stern, 122 N.C. App. 270, 274, 468 S.E.2d 607, 609-10, disc. rev. denied, 343 N.C. 512, 472 S.E.2d 15 (1996), and therefore petitioner\u2019s request to overturn our prior decisions is rejected.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and MARTIN, John C., concur.\nThe petitioner does not argue, and we do not address whether evidence of his refusal to submit to a chemical analysis must be suppressed (at the civil revocation hearing) on the grounds that the arrest was unconstitutional. Indeed the petitioner concedes that the arrest was constitutional in that Newcomb had \u201cprobable cause to believe that [petitioner] had committed the offense of Driving While Subject to an Impaired Substance.\u201d See In re Gardner, 39 N.C. App. 567, 572-73, 251 S.E.2d 723, 726-27 (1979) (distinguishing unlawful arrest from unconstitutional arrest).\n. A person is \u201ccharged\u201d within the meaning of section 20-16.2(a) \u201cif he is arrested for [an implied-consent offense] or if criminal process for the offense has been issued.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.2(al) (1993).\n. The United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the context of civil proceedings, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046,1064 (1976), and our own Supreme Court has held that a license revocation proceeding is civil in nature. State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 207, 470 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1996).", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ledford & Murray, by Joseph L. Ledford, for petitioner-appellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General T Lane Mallonee, for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICHARD LEON QUICK, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent\nNo. COA96-361\n(Filed 7 January 1997)\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 92 (NCI4th)\u2014 unlawful arrest \u2014 refusal to take breathalyzer test \u2014 revocation of license\nPetitioner\u2019s willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis could be used to revoke his driver\u2019s license pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.2 even if his arrest did not comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-401 (b)(2) where petitioner was charged with an implied-consent offense after driving on a highway or public vehicular area and the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe petitioner had committed an implied-consent offense. The 1983 amendment which substituted \u201ccharged\u201d for \u201carrested\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 2046.2(a) did not require that the charge be lawful in order to require the driver to submit to a chemical analysis.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic \u00a7\u00a7 122-132.\nSuspension of revocation of driver\u2019s license for refusal to take' sobriety test. 88 ALR2d 1064.\nAppeal by petitioner from judgment entered 3 January 1996 in Mecklenburg County Superior Court by Judge Robert P. Johnston. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 December 1996.\nLedford & Murray, by Joseph L. Ledford, for petitioner-appellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General T Lane Mallonee, for the State." }, "file_name": "0123-01", "first_page_order": 161, "last_page_order": 165 }