{ "id": 11866112, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLIE W. HICKS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hicks", "decision_date": "1997-01-07", "docket_number": "No. COA96-92", "first_page": "158", "last_page": "160", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 N.C. App. 158" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "17 ALR3d 1181", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756963 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2396898 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798912 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0061-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 321, "char_count": 5131, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.32788108495900725 }, "sha256": "73cff0b908d107c24354e1d01500f7259e223b392065dd0f9170c8d3ebd115f1", "simhash": "1:ab0ae8fe0606efd5", "word_count": 845 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:02.941264+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and MARTIN, Mark D. concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLIE W. HICKS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nOn 16 February 1994, while serving sentences for felony convictions, defendant escaped from the Dallas Prison Unit. On 7 August 1995, defendant was indicted on felony escape and habitual felon charges. The felony escape indictment stated that defendant\u2019s felony conviction was imposed on 23 January 1986 in Gaston County.\nAt trial, the State introduced three convictions in support of the habitual felon allegation: (1) a breaking and entering conviction from Gaston County on 23 January 1986, (2) an assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer, and (3) a felony larceny conviction. On 6 November 1995, defendant was convicted and pursuant to a plea agreement, he then pled guilty to felony escape.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the 1986 breaking and entering felony in both the felony escape indictment and as one of the three felonies used to sustain the charge of habitual felon. Defendant relies on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4 (a)(1) to support his contention. This statute prohibited the use of a felony conviction to show an aggravating factor at sentencing when that same felony conviction had previously been used to prove an element of the offense. Defendant argues that the same prohibition should apply here and that the State should not be allowed to use the same underlying felony to prove felony escape and to establish the defendant as an habitual felon. We need not address this precise issue as we cannot conclude from the record that the same felony was used to prove both charges.\nThe record does reveal that on 23 January 1986, defendant was convicted of two felonies \u2014 breaking and entering and common law robbery. The felony escape indictment does not identify the felony for which the defendant was serving a sentence. The record also does not reveal any objection by the defendant to the breaking and entering conviction being used for the habitual felon charge or any objection by the defendant at the sentencing hearing to require the State to elect which felony it intended to use. Thus, we cannot conclude that the breaking and entering felony was used twice.\nThe habitual felon indictment originally alleged that all of the previous felony convictions were committed after the defendant reached the age of eighteen. Defendant contends that the State should not have been permitted to amend the indictment to allege that all but one of the previous felony convictions were committed after the defendant reached the age of eighteen.\nOur Supreme Court discussed the issue of when an amendment to an indictment would be allowed in State v. Snyder, 343 N.C. 61, 468 S.E.2d 221 (1996). The Court initially noted that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-923 (e) (1988) provides that a bill of indictment may not be amended and that the term \u201camendment\u201d ... means any change in the indictment which would substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment. Id. at 65, 468 S.E.2d at 224 (citing State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596, 598, 313 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1984)). Further, in Snyder, the Court stated that:\nan indictment ... is constitutionally sufficient if it apprises the defendant of the charge against him with enough certainty to enable him to prepare his defense and to protect him from subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The indictment must also enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce in the event of conviction.\nId. at 65-66, 468 S.E.2d at 224 (quoting State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 434-35, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984)).\nIn the case at hand, the amendment to the indictment against defendant did not substantially alter the charge of habitual felon. The three underlying felonies required to constitute the offense of habitual felon remained the same. The only change was to specify correctly that one of the felonies was committed prior to the defendant\u2019s eighteenth birthday. Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court allowing the State to amend the habitual felon indictment.\nNo error.\nJudges LEWIS and MARTIN, Mark D. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General David R. Minges, for the State.", "Assistant Public Defender John H. Russell, Jr. for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLIE W. HICKS\nNo. COA96-92\n(Filed 7 January 1997)\nIndictment, Information, and Criminal Pleadings \u00a7 36 (NCI4th) \u2014 amendment\u2014not prejudicial \u2014 not substantial\u2014 habitual felon \u2014 defendant\u2019s age \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in allowing the State to amend its habitual felon indictment to correctly specify that one of the defendant\u2019s felonies was committed prior to his eighteenth birthday. It is permissible to amend an indictment so long as the amendment does not substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-923\nAm Jnr 2d, Indictments and Informations \u00a7\u00a7 166 et seq.\nComment Note. \u2014 Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment. 17 ALR3d 1181.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 November 1995 by Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr. in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 October 1996.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General David R. Minges, for the State.\nAssistant Public Defender John H. Russell, Jr. for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0158-01", "first_page_order": 196, "last_page_order": 198 }