{ "id": 11866624, "name": "ROGER D. WOODS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant v. CITY OF WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Woods v. City of Wilmington", "decision_date": "1997-02-04", "docket_number": "No. COA96-429", "first_page": "226", "last_page": "234", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 N.C. App. 226" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732777, 4738513, 4738804, 4734109, 4737790 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0417-02", "/nc/318/0417-01", "/nc/318/0417-03", "/nc/318/0417-04", "/nc/318/0417-05" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524395 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "ultra vires contract is wholly void as against a municipality" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564122 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388", "parenthetical": "ultra vires contract is wholly void as against a municipality" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 F.3d 1401", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10533922 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1408" }, { "page": "1408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/31/1401-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" }, { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679649, 4682146, 4682983, 4680616, 4682706 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0303-03", "/nc/311/0303-04", "/nc/311/0303-05", "/nc/311/0303-02", "/nc/311/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" }, { "page": "924", "parenthetical": "property interest can be created by implied contract" }, { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526055 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209-210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782964 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "571-572" }, { "page": "557-558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 L. Ed. 2d 1007", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 604992, 605504, 604930, 605324, 605968, 605330, 605812, 605468, 605524, 605302, 605529, 605692, 605565, 604894, 604863 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/1100-15", "/us/490/1100-10", "/us/490/1100-01", "/us/490/1100-13", "/us/490/1100-05", "/us/490/1100-04", "/us/490/1100-11", "/us/490/1100-07", "/us/490/1100-06", "/us/490/1100-03", "/us/490/1100-08", "/us/490/1100-12", "/us/490/1100-09", "/us/490/1100-02", "/us/490/1100-14" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2565270 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523142 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522950 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280-281" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313316 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-417" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "417" }, { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "824-826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "339-342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0331-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 924, "char_count": 19784, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0647514222075983e-07, "percentile": 0.5580906454391743 }, "sha256": "7780f699ef1bf2c74f03ab580f5ae93091fbacab45263592971cecef962fa1e3", "simhash": "1:6929862e46698e54", "word_count": 3014 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:02.941264+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "ROGER D. WOODS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant v. CITY OF WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Mark D., Judge.\nPlaintiff Roger Woods appeals from the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to defendant City of Wilmington on plaintiffs claims for violation of the North Carolina Constitution.\nOn 11 August 1986 plaintiff was hired by defendant as Survey Party Chief in the City Engineering Department. Plaintiff was subsequently promoted to the position of Engineer I. In at least three separate performance reviews \u2014 15 June 1990, 13 December 1990, and 24 June 1991 \u2014 Hugh Caldwell, Jr., (Caldwell) plaintiffs supervisor, rated plaintiffs job performance as \u201cabove expected.\u201d The December 1989 performance review indicated plaintiff was p\u00e9rforming at the \u201cexpected\u201d level.\nIn April 1991 plaintiff began an extra-marital relationship with Teresa Strother (Strother), a co-worker. At that time plaintiff and Strother were still married to, and living with, their respective spouses. On 22 April 1991 plaintiff revealed his relationship with Strother to Caldwell. Two days later Howard Wood (Wood), City Engineer, requested a meeting with plaintiff and Strother. At this meeting Wood, at least in general terms, conveyed that an employee\u2019s personal life must not interfere with the discharge of job-related duties. By the end of May 1991, plaintiff and Strother had left their respective spouses and moved in together.\nOn 25 June 1991 Wood met with plaintiff to discuss a recent phone call from plaintiffs now estranged wife. On 2 July 1991 Wood again met with plaintiff concerning several phone calls that Phillip Strother, Strother\u2019s estranged husband, placed to Wood, to the city manager, and to the mayor. On 15 July 19.91 Wood informed plaintiff and Strother they must take the necessary steps to dissuade further phone calls from either ex-spouse.\nOn 23 September 1991, at approximately 5:21 p.m., plaintiff, driving Strother\u2019s car, entered the Phar-Mor parking lot on South College Street in Wilmington. Phillip Strother attacked plaintiff as he was exiting the car. During the ensuing encounter, plaintiff retrieved a pistol from the glove compartment and shot Phillip Strother. Plaintiff was arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. Plaintiff was released on $25,000 bond.\nOn 25 September 1991 Wood notified plaintiff that he was being placed on non-disciplinary suspension, without pay, pursuant to Section 8-166 of the Wilmington City Code (Wilmington Code). Later that day, plaintiff and Wood met with Joe Dixon, City Personnel Officer, to discuss further plaintiff\u2019s suspension, specifically the potential effect on plaintiff\u2019s insurance and other benefits.\nBy letter dated 17 February 1992, Wood notified plaintiff he was being terminated effective 1 March 1992, pursuant to Wilmington Code \u00a7 8-165. The 17 February letter indicated plaintiff was being terminated because \u201cof the nature of the pending criminal charges, the situation that led to the charges, the disruption that these developments have caused in the work in the Engineering Department, and the potential for further disruptions . . . .\u201d Defendant admits there was:\nno [specific] act or conduct of Plaintiff that occurred between September 25, 1991 and February 17, 1992 [which justified the immediate suspension and subsequent termination of plaintiff]. The act that justified the termination of Plaintiff\u2019s employment was his shooting of Phillip Strother on September 23, 1991, and the circumstances leading up to and following that incident.\nPlaintiff\u2019s supervisors were concerned about the possibility of another confrontation occurring on City premises, perhaps resulting in injury to innocent persons. In view of the potential danger that Plaintiff\u2019s presence in the work place presented, it was necessary to remove him from the work place immediately and indefinitely through non-disciplinary suspension.\nPlaintiff\u2019s continued employment was never dependent on the outcome of his criminal trial.\nFurther, Wood testified he initiated plaintiff\u2019s termination because he \u201cwas concerned for the safety of [his] employees, and the safety of anyone else that may come into contact with this situation, whether it be a private citizen on a project or in the office or otherwise.\u201d Plaintiff appealed his termination to City Manager William Farris (Farris). By letter dated 16 April 1992, Farris, without a hearing on the matter, \u201csustained the decision to terminate [plaintiff\u2019s] employment with [defendant].\u201d\nOn 13 May 1992 plaintiff\u2019s criminal trial began in New Hanover County Superior Court. On 14 May 1992, at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the trial court dismissed the criminal charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney subsequently contacted Thomas Pollard (Pollard), City Attorney, concerning the possibility of re-instating plaintiff. After consulting with Farris and Wood, Pollard advised plaintiff, through his attorney, that defendant was not willing to re-hire plaintiff.\nOn 10 August 1994 plaintiff instituted the present action claiming his termination infringed on rights guaranteed by Article I, Sections 19 (law of the land clause), 24 (right to jury trial), and 30 (right to bear arms) of the North Carolina Constitution. On 29 December 1995 defendant made a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim for violation of his due process rights secured under Article I, Section 19 which the trial court subsequently granted.\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff\u2019s termination violated the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause, Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nSummary judgment is only appropriate when, on the basis of the materials before the trial court, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56 (1990).\nIt is undisputed that plaintiff was an employee-at-will and, thus, could generally be discharged for arbitrary, irrational, indifferent, or illogical reasons without any legal recourse. See Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985). Further, under the present facts and circumstances, plaintiffs termination does not fall within the two narrow, albeit well-recognized, exceptions to the at-will doctrine. See Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 339-342, 328 S.E.2d at 824-826; Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 415-417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 280-281 (1992). Accordingly, defendant could lawfully terminate plaintiff unless circumstances existed which elevated, even if only temporarily, plaintiffs employment above mere at-will status.\nToward that end, plaintiff argues that, at the time he was discharged, plaintiff had a property interest, protected by the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause, in continued employment with defendant. Plaintiff therefore concludes that his discharge without a hearing, and before the conclusion of his criminal trial, violated the procedural due process guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution.\nAdmittedly, an at-will employee may gain a property interest in continued employment which is protected by Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution \u2014 the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause. See Howell, 106 N.C. App. at 415, 417 S.E.2d at 280; Kearney v. County of Durham, 99 N.C. App. 349, 351, 393 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1990). The \u201claw of the land\u201d clause is considered \u201csynonymous\u201d with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 163, 368 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1988), aff\u2019d, 323 N.C. 703, 374 S.E.2d 866, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1989). Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning federal due process are highly persuasive aids in interpreting the scope of, and protection accorded by, the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause. See id.\n\u201cThe requirement of procedural due process appl[ies] only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s protection of liberty and property.\u201d Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556 (1972). Although \u201cliberty\u201d and \u201cproperty\u201d should be accorded broad and expansive meanings, id. at 571-572, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 557-558, plaintiffs at-will employment does not, in and of itself, create a cognizable property interest in continued employment, Howell, 106 N.C. App. at 417, 417 S.E.2d at 281. \u201cA property interest in employment can, [however], be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract.\u201d Burwell v. Griffin, 67 N.C. App. 198, 209, 312 S.E.2d 917, 924 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684, 690 (1976)), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 303, 317 S.E.2d 678 (1984).\nPlaintiff, here, asserts that he secured a property interest in continued employment through the provisions of the Wilmington Code or, in the alternative, assurances made by his superiors.\nA.\nWe first consider plaintiff\u2019s allegation the Wilmington Code accorded him a cognizable property interest in continued employment.\nNotably, plaintiff\u2019s argument, taken to its logical conclusion, presents an apparent anomaly \u2014 an employee properly placed on nondisciplinary suspension under section 8-166 for alleged improper behavior secures a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment when his or her co-workers remain mere at-will employees and, thus, subject to termination at defendant\u2019s whim. In support of his proposition, plaintiff relies heavily on (1) this Court\u2019s decision in Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417 S.E.2d 277 (1992), and (2) sections 8-156(b) and 8-166 of the Wilmington Code.\n1.\nIn Howell, plaintiff, a police captain, was discharged after distributing a somewhat inflammatory memorandum to the chief of police and all sworn officers. Howell, 106 N.C. App. at 412, 417 S.E.2d at 278. Eight days after his termination, plaintiff dispatched a written request for hearing to the town attorney, town manager, mayor, and the town board. Id. at 413, 417 S.E.2d at 279. It was undisputed that, prior to plaintiff\u2019s dismissal, defendant adopted a Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual creating a grievance procedure \u201c[t]o provide a means whereby any employee who feels that he/she has been subjected to unfair . . . treatment may secure a hearing without delay . . . .\u201d Id. at 415, 417 S.E.2d at 280. In fact, the personnel manual expressly required a hearing to take place within twenty-five days of the incident leading to the employee\u2019s dismissal. Id.\nIn the present case, the Wilmington Code does not expressly require the city manager to grant all discharged employees a hearing. Rather, \u201c[t]he city manager, at his discretion, may or may not hear the employee but will render a decision to the aggrieved employee within the ten (10) working days following receipt of the grievance . . . .\u201d Wilmington City Code \u00a7 8-164 (1983). Therefore, despite plaintiff\u2019s protestations to the contrary, this Court\u2019s decision in Howell does not necessitate reversal of the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment.\n2.\nThe express policy behind the Wilmington Code is to ensure the city \u201cact[s] with integrity and justice toward each employee, and each employee ... complies] with instructions, policies,... and standards of personal conduct necessary for satisfactory completion of the job.\u201d Wilmington City Code \u00a7 8-156(b) (1983). When, as here, an employee is involved in a criminal proceeding, section 8-166 provides:\nDuring the investigation, hearing, or trial of an employee on anv criminal charge or during the course of any civil action involving an employee, the department head may suspend the employee without pay for the duration of the proceeding as a nondisciplinary action. Full recovery of pay and benefits for the period of nondisciplinary suspension is authorized if the suspension is terminated with full reinstatement of the employee.\nWilmington City Code \u00a7 8-166 (1983) (emphasis added).\nSection 8-166 does not, on its face, elevate a suspended employee above at-will status or limit defendant\u2019s right to terminate an employee on non-disciplinary suspension pursuant to section 8-165 (immediate termination). Further, by listing the stages of a criminal proceedings \u2014 investigation, hearing, and trial \u2014 in the disjunctive, section 8-166 implies an employee may be removed from suspended status at any stage of the criminal proceeding. Simply put, the plain language of section 8-166 does not expressly foreclose defendant from making personnel decisions, e.g., termination, prior to the resolution of the criminal proceedings which initially necessitated that employee\u2019s suspension. Therefore, section 8-166 does not vest plaintiff, or any other employee suspended under section 8-166, with a cognizable property interest in continued employment pending resolution of the criminal proceeding instituted against that employee.\nB.\nWe next consider plaintiff\u2019s assertion that statements made by his superiors concerning his non-disciplinary suspension imbued him with a reasonable expectation he would not be terminated, if at all, until the conclusion of his criminal trial.\nThe United States Supreme Court has stated that a \u201cperson\u2019s interest in a benefit is a \u2018property\u2019 interest for due process purposes if there are . . . mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit . . . Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 580 (1972). See also Burwell, 67 N.C. App. at 209, 312 S.E.2d at 924 (property interest can be created by implied contract). Statements by a superior, however, \u201ccannot form the basis of a \u2018mutually explicit understanding\u2019 unless th[ose] official[s] [have] the authority to make the representations.\u201d Fittshur v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 31 F.3d 1401, 1408 (7th Cir. 1994). In fact, the officials must possess the actual authority to alter the employment relationship because a municipality cannot be liable for an ultra vires representation by one city employee to a subordinate. Id. See also Moody v. Transylvania County, 271 N.C. 384, 388, 156 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1967) (ultra vires contract is wholly void as against a municipality); Pritchard v. Elizabeth City, 81 N.C. App. 543, 553, 344 S.E.2d 821, 827 (\u201cmunicipality cannot be [] liable for breach of an express contract . . . when the official making the contract has exceeded his or her authority by entering into such a contract.\u201d), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 598 (1986).\nIn the present case, plaintiff contends that certain statements made by Wood and Joe Dixon, Director of Personnel, evidence an understanding that plaintiffs employment status was not merely at-will during his non-disciplinary suspension. Even assuming that Wood and Dixon made such statements, the Wilmington Code clearly indicates Wood and Dixon did not have the actual authority to alter plaintiff\u2019s employment relationship with defendant.\nFirst, as to Wood, the Wilmington Code delegates \u201c[t]he authority to suspend, remove and take other actions . . .\u2019\u2019to the head of engineering. Wilmington City Code \u00a7 8-157 (1983). Second, Dixon, as Personnel Director, is responsible for reviewing and recommending \u201cto the city manager policies and revisions for pay, classification and personnel administration. Under the direction of the city manager, the personnel director shall develop and administer such procedures as are necessary to assure fairness and honesty in . . . maintaining an effective and responsible work force.\u201d Wilmington City Code \u00a7 8-7 (1983). Notably, however, the city council is vested with the sole authority \u201cto establish a . . . system of personnel administration . . . [and] personnel ordinances, including [] position classification Wilmington City Code \u00a7 8-5 (1983). Although the city council and, at least arguably, the city manager, see Wilmington City Code \u00a7 8-6 (1983), Fittshur, 31 F.3d at 1408, have the authority to alter plaintiff\u2019s employment-at-will status, it is readily apparent neither Wood nor Dixon was vested with the requisite authority. Therefore, under Fittshur, Moody, and Pritchard, neither Dixon nor Wood could legally alter plaintiffs at-will employment status with defendant.\nPlaintiff nonetheless argues that section 8-157 specifically delegates the authority to alter his employment status to department heads, like Dixon and Wood. To the contrary, section 8-157 delegates only \u201c[t]he authority to suspend, remove and take other actions outlined in this chapter . . . .\u201d Wilmington City Code \u00a7 8-157 (1983). Because the authority to alter an employee\u2019s at-will status is not among the \u201cother actions\u201d expressly delineated in the remaining pertinent provisions of the Wilmington Code, plaintiffs argument must fail.\nAccordingly, we conclude plaintiff did not possess a cognizable property interest in continued employment protected by the North Carolina' Constitution.\nC.\nEven though plaintiff did not possess a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, plaintiff must receive, at a minimum, the process mandated by the Wilmington Code. Burwell, 67 N.C. App. at 209-210, 312 S.E.2d at 924. Careful review of the present record indicates that plaintiff was terminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in Wilmington Code \u00a7 8-165.\nAccordingly, as plaintiff is an employee-at-will, defendant\u2019s actions do not implicate Article I, Section 19, of the North Carolina Constitution and defendant complied with its own internal termination procedures, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and WALKER concur.\n. Although not contained in the record on appeal, plaintiff states that his claims for violation of Article I, Sections 24 and 30 were dismissed by the trial court pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. R 12. Because plaintiff does not assign error to this ruling, we do not consider it on appeal. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a).", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Mark D., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Virginia R. Hager for plaintiff-appellant.", "Michael B. Brough & Associates, by William C. Morgan, Jr., for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROGER D. WOODS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant v. CITY OF WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant-Appellee\nNo. COA96-429\n(Filed 4 February 1997)\n1. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 378 (NCI4th)\u2014 city employee\u2014 nondisciplinary suspension \u2014 continued employment \u2014 no city code right \u2014 termination\u2014procedural due process not required\nA city code did not vest an at-will employee placed on a nondisciplinary suspension because of a pending criminal charge against him with a cognizable property interest, protected by the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause of the North Carolina Constitution, in continued employment with the city pending resolution of the criminal charge so as to require that the employee be afforded procedural due process in order for the city to terminate him. N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 19.\nAm Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, & Other Political Subdivisions \u00a7\u00a7 309 et seq.\n2. Municipal Corporations \u00a7 378 (NCI4th)\u2014 city employee\u2014 nondisciplinary suspension \u2014 statements by superiors\u2014 continued employment \u2014 no property interest created\nStatements made to a city employee by the city engineer and the city personnel director concerning his nondisciplinary suspension because of a pending criminal charge against him did not give the employee a cognizable property interest in continued employment protected the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause of the North Carolina Constitution.\nAm Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, & Other Political Subdivisions \u00a7\u00a7 309 et seq.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 29 February 1996 by Judge James E. Ragan, III, in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 1997.\nVirginia R. Hager for plaintiff-appellant.\nMichael B. Brough & Associates, by William C. Morgan, Jr., for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0226-01", "first_page_order": 264, "last_page_order": 272 }