{ "id": 11868081, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DARRELL E. HAMILTON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hamilton", "decision_date": "1997-02-18", "docket_number": "No. COA96-299", "first_page": "396", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 N.C. App. 396" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "118 ALR Fed. 567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "A.L.R. Fed.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "45 ALR3d 581", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "94 F.3d 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11327395 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/94/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563315 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 A. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 4428999 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "automatic prerogative of police during lawful traffic stop to order motorist out of vehicle does not extend to passengers, absent some individualized or particularized suspicion" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/106/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 So. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7506566 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "permitting police to require passengers to exit vehicle absent any particularized suspicion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/588/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180104 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109-11" }, { "page": "336-37" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" }, { "page": "835" }, { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916495 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523319 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 F.2d 321", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d. 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 (1964)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558310 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 (1964)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 L. Ed. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11746960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0806-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 620, "char_count": 12995, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.2547066792371987e-07, "percentile": 0.8691566573958559 }, "sha256": "10f64ea587db3b445e0dde934b508b58c6d2e9a12e0d1f74c670967cb2141b51", "simhash": "1:b6bbe64a2f561356", "word_count": 2213 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:02.941264+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges EAGLES and MARTIN, John C., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DARRELL E. HAMILTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nDarrell E. Hamilton (defendant) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to suppress 192.5 grams of crack cocaine that were found during a search of his person. The defendant pled guilty to the crime of trafficking of cocaine by transportation after the court denied his motion to suppress this evidence at a pre-trial conference. As part of the plea arrangement, defendant preserved his right to appeal the denial of this motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-979(b) (1988).\nIt is undisputed that on 5 May 1995 Sergeant George Shaver (Shaver) of the New Bern Police Department Narcotics unit observed the defendant and Wayne F. McDowell (McDowell) getting off a Greyhound bus from New York City at the New Bern bus station carrying only a small piece of luggage. After looking in the direction where the officer was sitting in his car, the defendant appeared nervous. He and McDowell were seen immediately entering a cab driven by the Reverend Otis Turnage (Turnage), the owner of a small cab company who was frequently in court regarding traffic violations and at that time under investigation because of a problem with his cab permit.\nThe evidence shows that Shaver called \u201cthe other officers in the area and told them that [he had seen] two black males [who] had exited the bus very quickly, acting in a very nervous manner, carrying one carry-on bag and had gotten into a cab and exited the area very quickly\u201d in the direction of the Trent housing project (housing project), a neighborhood where drugs were known to be sold. Ronnie Lovick (Lovick), an investigator with the New Bern Police Department, was one of the officers whom Shaver radioed. Lovick was told to \u201cinvestigate [and] use [his] skills to decide if or what was going on.\u201d Lovick then followed the cab in an unmarked car and shortly thereafter noticed that neither Turnage nor the defendant (who was in the front passenger seat) had his seat belt on. Lovick testified that he \u201cdecided to go ahead and stop them on the main part of the highway\u201d rather than wait until they reached the housing project. Lovick further testified that he then approached the front passenger side of the car and informed the defendant that he \u201cwas a police officer\u201d and then the defendant\u2019s \u201chand began to reach toward his left side\u201d which lead Lovick to suspect he was reaching for a weapon. Lovick then asked the defendant to step outside of the car and told him that he was going to frisk him. He then had the defendant face the car and began to pat down his body. When he reached the point just below the defendant\u2019s stomach, he felt \u201csomething very, very large and very, very hard\u201d which he thought might be a gun. He removed the item which was later discovered to be 192.5 grams of crack cocaine.\nBased on this evidence and findings consistent with the evidence the trial court denied the motion to suppress concluding that both the stop and the search of the defendant were proper. In its order the trial court found that the defendant\u2019s actions \u201ccaused Lovick to be concerned for his personal safety.\u201d\nThe issues are whether: (I) the stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger was consistent with the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures; (II) the officer had the authority, within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, to ask defendant to exit the vehicle in which he was a passenger; and (III) the search of the defendant, outside the vehicle, was consistent with the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches.\nI\nThe defendant argues that the stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger for the stated purpose of issuing a citation for a seat belt violation was a mere pretext for investigating the defendant for possession of illegal drugs. As such, the defendant contends, the stop violates the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.\nThe United States Supreme Court has recently held that the temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated a traffic law is not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist. Whren v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98 (1996). Probable cause exists if \u201c \u2018the facts and circumstances within [the] knowledge [of the officer] were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing the offense.\u2019 \u201d State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 207, 195 S.E.2d. 502, 505 (1973) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 (1964)). Thus it is immaterial to Fourth Amendment analysis that the officer may have had \u201culterior motives\u201d for the traffic stop, id.; United States v. Stribling, 94 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1996), and the inquiry (under the United States Constitution) is no longer what a reasonable officer would do, see State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 427, 393 S.E.2d 549, 548 (1990), but instead what the officer could do.\nIn North Carolina an officer may stop and issue a citation to any motorist who \u201che has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor or infraction.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-302(b) (1988). In North Carolina \u201c[e]ach front seat occupant [of a motor vehicle] who is 16 years of age or older\u201d is required to wear a seat belt if the \u201cvehicle is in forward motion on a street or highway.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-135.2A(a) (1993). Any person violating this statute commits an infraction. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-135.2A(e).\nIn this case there is no dispute that Lovick had probable cause to stop the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger. The officer observed that neither the driver nor the defendant passenger was wearing a seat belt and thus had authority to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing a seat belt citation. The stop of the vehicle was therefore not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, even though a reasonable officer may not have made the stop. The trial court thus did not err in denying the motion to suppress on this basis.\nII\nThis Court has recently held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when an officer requires a driver of a vehicle, stopped for a traffic violation, to exit the vehicle. State v. McGirt, 122 N.C. App. 237, 239, 468 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1996). This procedure reduces the likelihood of assault on the officer and \u201cis not a \u2018serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336-37 (1977)).\nIn this case it is the passenger, not the driver, that is asked to exit the vehicle. There is substantial disagreement among the courts in other jurisdictions whether the police have the constitutional right to require passengers to exit a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, in the absence of some individualized or particularized suspicion of that passenger. See State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345, 347 (La. 1991) (permitting police to require passengers to exit vehicle absent any particularized suspicion); but see also Maryland v. Wilson, 664 A. 2d 1, 10 (Md. 1995) (automatic prerogative of police during lawful traffic stop to order motorist out of vehicle does not extend to passengers, absent some individualized or particularized suspicion).\nWe need not address the issue raised in Maryland and Landry in this case. In those cases there is no evidence that police had probable cause to believe that the passengers in the vehicle had committed any crime or infraction. Indeed the Maryland court notes that the \u201cpassenger has not committed any wrongdoing, even at the level of a traffic violation.\u201d Maryland, 664 A. 2d at 9. In this case, Lovick had probable cause to believe that the defendant passenger had committed the infraction of riding in the front seat of a vehicle without wearing a seat belt and thus his detention was more than an inevitable incident of the stopping of the vehicle. As such, the rationale that supports allowing the police to per se request a driver detained for a traffic violation to exit the vehicle applies to a request to a passenger who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a crime or infraction. Accordingly the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress on this basis.\nIll\nWhile a routine traffic stop \u201cdoes not justify in every instance a protective search for weapons,\u201d an officer is \u201cpermitted to conduct a \u2018pat-down\u2019 for weapons once the defendant is outside the automobile ... if the circumstances give the police reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant may \u2018be armed and presently dangerous.\u2019 \u201d McGirt, 122 N.C. App. at 239, 468 S.E.2d at 835 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 337 (1977)).\nIn this case, the defendant\u2019s \u201chand began to reach toward his left side\u201d (just before exiting the vehicle) which the trial court found caused Lovick to believe that the defendant was reaching for a weapon. This finding is supported in the evidence and we are bound by it. State v. Crews, 286 N.C. 41, 45, 209 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1974). Thus the pat-down for weapons was justified because Lovick had \u201creasonable grounds to believe the defendant could be \u2018armed and presently dangerous.\u2019 \u201d McGirt, 122 N.C. App. at 239, 468 S.E.2d at 835 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 337). The trial court thus did not err in denying the motion to suppress on this basis.\nAffirmed.\nJudges EAGLES and MARTIN, John C., concur.\n. In Whren v. United States, - U.S. -, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), the Court did not discuss whether its ruling would also apply to those situations where the officer did not have probable cause but had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. As that issue is not presented in this case we do not address it. We do note that at least one federal circuit court has extended Whren to reasonable suspicion cases. United States v. Dumas, 94 F.3d 286, 290 (7th Cir. 1996).", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. Come and Special Deputy Attorney General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.", "William F. Ward, III, P.A., by William F. Ward, III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DARRELL E. HAMILTON\nNo. COA96-299\n(Filed 18 February 1997)\n1. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 35 (NCI4th)\u2014 stop of vehicle\u2014 seat belt violation \u2014 cocaine\u2014passenger\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress where a police officer discovered 19.2 grams of cocaine on defendant after the officer stopped the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. The officer had authority to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing a seat belt citation because he had observed that neither the driver nor the defendant was wearing one. The stop of the vehicle was therefore not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, even though a reasonable officer may not have made the stop.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7 68.\n2. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 35 (NCI4th)\u2014 stop of vehicle\u2014 seat belt violation \u2014 asking passenger to exit vehicle \u2014 discovery of cocaine\nIt was not error for the trial court to deny defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of 19.2 grams of cocaine which was seized from defendant, a passenger in a vehicle which was stopped during a routine traffic violation, after defendant was asked to exit the vehicle. The police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant passenger had committed the infraction of riding in the front seat of a vehicle without wearing a seat belt and thus his detention was more than an inevitable incident of the stopping of the vehicle. As such, the rationale that supports allowing the police to per se request a driver detained for a traffic violation to exit the vehicle applies to a request to a passenger who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a crime or infraction.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 67, 68, 70.\n3. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 82 (NCI4th)\u2014 traffic stop \u2014 pat-down search for weapons \u2014 discovery of cocaine\nThe evidence supported the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress cocaine discovered during a pat-down search of defendant pursuant to a routine traffic stop. The defendant\u2019s hand began to reach toward his left side just before exiting the vehicle. The trial court found cause for the police officer to believe that the defendant was reaching for a weapon. Therefore, the pat-down of defendant was reasonable since the officer had grounds to believe the defendant could be armed and dangerous.\nAm Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 74, 75, 78.\nSearch and seizure: \u201cfurtive\u201d movement or gesture as justifying police search. 45 ALR3d 581.\nPermissibility under Fourth Amendment of detention of motorist by police, following lawful stop for traffic offense, to investigate matters not related to offense. 118 ALR Fed. 567.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 1 September 1995 in Craven County Superior Court by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 1997.\nAttorney General Michael F Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. Come and Special Deputy Attorney General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.\nWilliam F. Ward, III, P.A., by William F. Ward, III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0396-01", "first_page_order": 434, "last_page_order": 439 }