{ "id": 11709512, "name": "BOBBY LEIGH MARING, Plaintiff v. HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Maring v. Hartford Casualty Insurance", "decision_date": "1997-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA96-803", "first_page": "201", "last_page": "206", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 N.C. App. 201" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "27 ALR4th 1266", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "96 ALR3d 804", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "73 ALR3d 632", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565633, 8565602, 8565539, 8565699, 8565561 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0425-04", "/nc/282/0425-03", "/nc/282/0425-01", "/nc/282/0425-05", "/nc/282/0425-02" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.C. App. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549827 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/16/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507026 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182", "parenthetical": "vehicle was being \"used\" when the insured was injured while changing a tire" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523607 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "vehicle was being \"used\" when the insured was injured while changing a tire" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506", "parenthetical": "insured trying to push the vehicle off of the road" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572733 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "insured trying to push the vehicle off of the road" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" }, { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "hunter reaching into vehicle to get a rifle" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732740 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539-40" }, { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793057, 793097, 793238, 793177, 793055 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0420-04", "/nc/341/0420-05", "/nc/341/0420-02", "/nc/341/0420-03", "/nc/341/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" }, { "page": "895", "parenthetical": "vehicle was \"used\" when the driver parked the vehicle across the street from a supermarket and the insured got out of the vehicle and began walking across the street and was struck by a car" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 533, "char_count": 10081, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.240821486062377e-08, "percentile": 0.3856908259902411 }, "sha256": "c4cb9bad6428b7c27665490108bc6046616524d2c6608dc0b9a072fed69a885b", "simhash": "1:a14b7002026e79fa", "word_count": 1668 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:14.463583+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Walker and McGee concur." ], "parties": [ "BOBBY LEIGH MARING, Plaintiff v. HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nHartford Casualty Insurance Company (defendant) appeals a judgment determining that Bobby Leigh Maring (plaintiff) was insured pursuant to the uninsured motorist (UM) coverage provided by the defendant.\nThe following findings of fact are undisputed:\n1. That on November 22, 1994, the Plaintiff was working the day shift with the Lumberton City Police Department, ....\n2. That the Lumberton City Police Department assigned a marked police vehicle to the Plaintiff for use during working hours. That said vehicle was maintained by the Plaintiff on a twenty-four hour basis and when not used for police business was kept at Plaintiffs residence. That said vehicle was insured pursuant to the [Policy].\n3. . . . After attending roll call [on 22 November 1994], the Plaintiff returned to his vehicle and started random patrol with such vehicle as required by his employer.\n4. . . . Plaintiff observed that the traffic signals located at the intersection . . . were malfunctioning.\n5. That such intersection has twenty lanes and the traffic on that particular day was very heavy. That upon seeing the malfunctioning traffic signals, the Plaintiff made appropriate radio contact and advised of the problem and requested assistance from the Department of Transportation to correct the same.\n6. That the Plaintiff then positioned his car in the intersection in a position so as not to impede the flow of traffic but so the same could be seen by vehicles approaching the intersection. Before exiting his vehicle, the Plaintiff activated all visible warning devices located on his police vehicle. . . .\n7. That the Plaintiff positioned his vehicle in the manner described and activated all visible warning devices in order to warn persons utilizing the intersection of the dangerous condition existing and to protect Plaintiff as he was directing traffic pending repair of the traffic signals.\n8. Prior to exiting the vehicle, the Plaintiff made sure that the radio utilized for communications was turned to a high volume and the window on the driver\u2019s side was completely rolled down. That this enabled the Plaintiff to hear communications which were dispatched when he was within close proximity of the police vehicle.\n9. That prior to exiting the vehicle, the Plaintiff retrieved an orange warning vest which he was to utilize while directing traffic and which was stored within the police vehicle.\n10. That when the Plaintiff exited his vehicle he left the motor running in order to allow the continued use of all visible warning devices and radio. That after exiting the vehicle and, within no longer than five minutes, the Plaintiff was struck by . . . Britt.\n12. That if the Plaintiff had not been struck as stated above, then after repair of the malfunctioning traffic signals, the Plaintiff would have returned to his vehicle and resumed required random patrol.\nThe parties stipulated that defendant issued a motor vehicle liability insurance policy (Policy), including UM coverage, to the City of Lumberton (City) beginning 1 July 1994 and continuing through 1 July 1995- and the City was the named insured on the Policy. The Policy provided UM coverage for the named insured and \u201c[a]nyone else \u2018occupying\u2019 a covered \u2018auto.\u2019 \u201d Plaintiff was directing traffic in the course and scope of his employment when he was struck by a vehicle being operated by Wendy Britt (Britt). Britt\u2019s vehicle was not insured at the time of the accident and under the terms of the Policy, Britt\u2019s vehicle fell within the definition of an \u201cuninsured vehicle.\u201d Plaintiff submitted a claim to the defendant \u201cpursuant to the [UM] coverage\u201d of the Policy and the claim was denied.\nThe trial court concluded that the definition of \u201cinsured\u201d included in the Policy (the named insured and anyone else occupying a covered auto) \u201cis contrary to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(3)b,\u201d [sic] and due to the conflict, section 20-279.21(b)(3) controls and \u201cpersons insured\u201d includes \u201cany person who uses with the consent, express or implied, of the name [sic] insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applied.\u201d Because plaintiff was \u201cusing\u201d the police car at the time he was injured, the trial court concluded that plaintiff was an \u201cinsured\u201d under the UM coverage provided by the Policy.\nThe issue is whether plaintiff was \u201cusing\u201d his police car at the time he was injured.\nDefendant contends that plaintiff is not an \u201cinsured\u201d under either N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) (1993) or the terms of the Policy, and therefore has no claim for benefits under the Policy. Plaintiff \u201cconcedes that he cannot recover under the terms of the [P]olicy limiting recovery to individuals \u2018occupying\u2019 the vehicle,\u201d but argues that he qualifies as an \u201cinsured\u201d under the statutory definition because he was using the insured vehicle at the time he was injured. We agree.\nSection 20-279.21(b)(3) provides that a \u201cperson[] insured\u201d is\nthe named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any named insured and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses with the consent, expressed or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applies ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) (emphasis added). As it related to under-insured motorist coverage, \u201cthis Court adopted the ordinary meaning of the word \u2018use.\u2019 \u201d Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 118 N.C. App. 494, 497, 455 S.E.2d 892, 894, disc. rev. denied, 341 N.C. 420, 461 S.E.2d 759 (1995). \u201cUse\u201d means to \u201cput into action or service,\u201d \u201cto carry out a purpose or action by means of,\u201d or \u201c[to] make instrumental to an end or process.\u201d Id. \u201c *[U]se\u2019 may refer to more than the actual driving or operation of a vehicle.\u201d Id. The vehicle need not be the proximate cause of the accident, but there must be some \u201ccausal connection between the use of the [vehicle] and the accident.\u201d State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 539-40, 350 S.E.2d 66, 69 (1986). Our courts have found that a vehicle was \u201cused\u201d in a variety of situations when determining insurance coverage. See State Capital Ins. Co., 318 N.C. at 540, 350 S.E.2d at 70 (hunter reaching into vehicle to get a rifle); Whisnant v. Insurance Co., 264 N.C. 303, 308, 141 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1965) (insured trying to push the vehicle off of the road); Davis, 118 N.C. App. at 498, 455 S.E.2d at 895 (vehicle was \u201cused\u201d when the driver parked the vehicle across the street from a supermarket and the insured got out of the vehicle and began walking across the street and was struck by a car); Leonard v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 104 N.C. App. 665, 672, 411 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1991) (vehicle was being \u201cused\u201d when the insured was injured while changing a tire), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 332 N.C. 656, 423 S.E.2d 71 (1992); Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co., 16 N.C. App. 194, 199, 192 S.E.2d 113, 118, (person \u201cuses\u201d a vehicle when he is loading or unloading it), cert. denied, 282 N.C. 425, 192 S.E.2d 840 (1972).\nThe record indicates that as a police officer, plaintiff was assigned a patrol vehicle by the City and authorized and required to use it in performing his duties. On this particular day, upon seeing the malfunctioning traffic light, plaintiff positioned his vehicle so as not to block the intersection and so that it could be easily seen by other motorists. He proceeded to turn on all of the warning signals that were available on the vehicle to warn others that there was a problem at the intersection and that he was directing traffic. After exiting the vehicle he left the engine running so that the warning signs on the vehicle would continue to operate while he was in the intersection. Further, plaintiff turned up the vehicle\u2019s radio so that he would be able to hear any police communications from where he was directing traffic. After getting his orange vest from his vehicle, plaintiff walked into the intersection and began directing traffic.\nThese facts reveal that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was using his vehicle to assist him in the performance of his duties as a police officer. The vehicle was actually being used to warn other motorists of the malfunctioning traffic light. In other words the vehicle was being \u201cput to service\u201d for a purpose intended by the City, the named insured. Therefore the plaintiff is among those \u201cpersons insured\u201d under the statute and entitled to UM coverage under the Policy. The order of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Walker and McGee concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Musselwhite, Musselwhite, Musselwhite & Branch, by James W. Musselwhite, for 'plaintiff-appellee.", "Hedrick & Blackwell, L.L.P., by B. Danforth Morton, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BOBBY LEIGH MARING, Plaintiff v. HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. COA96-803\n(Filed 6 May 1997)\nInsurance \u00a7 509 (NCI4th)\u2014 police officer \u2014 directing traffic\u2014 struck by uninsured motorist \u2014 use of police vehicle \u2014 right to UM coverage\nA police officer directing traffic at an intersection with a malfunctioning traffic light was \u201cusing\u201d his police car when he was struck by an uninsured motorist and was thus a \u201cperson insured\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) who was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under an automobile liability policy issued to the city where the officer left the engine running and turned on all of the warning signals on the vehicle to warn others that there was a problem at the intersection, and he turned up the vehicle radio so that he would be able to hear any police communications from where he was directing traffic.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 293 et seq.\nInsured\u2019s right to bring direct action against insurer for uninsured motorist benefits. 73 ALR3d 632.\nWho is \u201cmember\u201d or \u201cresident\u201d of same \u201cfamily\u201d or \u201chousehold,\u201d within no-fault or uninsured motorist provisions of motor vehicle insurance policy. 96 ALR3d 804.\nApplicability of uninsured motorist statutes to self-insurers. 27 ALR4th 1266.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment filed 1 February 1996 in Robeson County Superior Court by Judge Joe Freeman Britt. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 March 1997.\nMusselwhite, Musselwhite, Musselwhite & Branch, by James W. Musselwhite, for 'plaintiff-appellee.\nHedrick & Blackwell, L.L.P., by B. Danforth Morton, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0201-01", "first_page_order": 239, "last_page_order": 244 }