{ "id": 11710799, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GARY DEVON BUCKOM", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Buckom", "decision_date": "1997-06-03", "docket_number": "No. COA95-668", "first_page": "368", "last_page": "383", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 N.C. App. 368" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526491 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 765", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532268 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521405 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 ALR3d 859", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "juror's mere acquaintance with four police officers who were prospective witnesses for the State, standing alone, insufficient for challenge for cause" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "juror's mere acquaintance with four police officers who were prospective witnesses for the State, standing alone, insufficient for challenge for cause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569351, 8569311, 8569237, 8569431, 8569279 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0736-04", "/nc/295/0736-03", "/nc/295/0736-01", "/nc/295/0736-05", "/nc/295/0736-02" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552523 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28-29", "parenthetical": "conclusion of law is \"the court's statement of the law which is determinative of the matter at issue between the parties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549118 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "conclusion of law is \"the court's statement of the law which is determinative of the matter at issue between the parties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "\"to call a 'conclusion' a 'finding of fact' does not make it one\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554114 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408", "parenthetical": "\"to call a 'conclusion' a 'finding of fact' does not make it one\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 S.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549346 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733633 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "in instances of alleged improper influence on jury, \"the findings of the trial judge upon the evidence and facts are conclusive and not reviewable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615959 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "in instances of alleged improper influence on jury, \"the findings of the trial judge upon the evidence and facts are conclusive and not reviewable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573095 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 672", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "Art. I, \u00a7 19, \"law of the land\" provision \"equivalent to 'due process of law' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561482 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "Art. I, \u00a7 19, \"law of the land\" provision \"equivalent to 'due process of law' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 L. Ed. 2d 784", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "North Carolina Supreme Court \"bound by [] interpretation placed upon [] provision^] of the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 911", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6194816, 6194625, 6195241, 6194352, 6195000, 6194137 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "North Carolina Supreme Court \"bound by [] interpretation placed upon [] provision^] of the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0911-04", "/us/386/0911-03", "/us/386/0911-06", "/us/386/0911-02", "/us/386/0911-05", "/us/386/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560152 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 548", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201349 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "667" }, { "page": "556-59" }, { "page": "672-74" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "671" }, { "page": "556, 558" }, { "page": "672, 673" }, { "page": "556-57" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8860795 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/174/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 So. 2d 1187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7556925, 7556981 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/536/1187-01", "/so2d/536/1187-02" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2168799 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/288/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2174496 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "citing Thompson v. O'Rourke, 339 S.E.2d 505 (S.C. 1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/298/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Am. J. Crim. L. 733", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Am. J. Crim. L.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d. 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "rule against impeachment of jury verdict supported by \"substantial policy considerations\" including \"stability and finality of verdicts\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526974 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "rule against impeachment of jury verdict supported by \"substantial policy considerations\" including \"stability and finality of verdicts\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464", "parenthetical": "statements by prosecutor during argument \"were more in the nature of giving reason why the jury should believe the State's evidence\" than vouching for credibility of State's witnesses or of prosecutor" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2520919 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "statements by prosecutor during argument \"were more in the nature of giving reason why the jury should believe the State's evidence\" than vouching for credibility of State's witnesses or of prosecutor" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569066 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572384 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "denial of motion to dismiss proper when jury could draw reasonable inference of defendant's guilt from totality of the evidence presented" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524750 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "denial of motion to dismiss proper when jury could draw reasonable inference of defendant's guilt from totality of the evidence presented" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527019 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "pretrial show-up identifications not per se violations of defendant's due process rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736806 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "pretrial show-up identifications not per se violations of defendant's due process rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358921 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 188", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173155 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168076 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "state must show by clear and convincing evidence that in-court identification is of independent origin" }, { "page": "1166", "parenthetical": "state must show by clear and convincing evidence that in-court identification is of independent origin" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168284 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967)" }, { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967)" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573534 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565376 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 250 S.E.2d 197 (1978); State v. Orr, 260 N.C. 177, 132 S.E.2d 334 (1963)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569882 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 250 S.E.2d 197 (1978); State v. Orr, 260 N.C. 177, 132 S.E.2d 334 (1963)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561358 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570501 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561838 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558332 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2526577 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795994 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0772-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1542, "char_count": 37856, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.388516248340589e-07, "percentile": 0.8767816193144852 }, "sha256": "ae8bc194528f3e9ef510d2da777f047fa0956ed556e7cfd741b4806d3093a8e5", "simhash": "1:a76fd03a57be8d6a", "word_count": 6118 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:14.463583+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges EAGLES and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GARY DEVON BUCKOM" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendant appeals convictions of two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and contests the trial court\u2019s findings on his motion for appropriate relief originally filed with this Court. We hold no prejudicial error affected defendant\u2019s trial and affirm the denial of his motion for appropriate relief.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following: On the night of 26 January 1989, Mylon Joseph Thornton, Jr. (Thornton) was the clerk on duty at Quick Mart number one located on the corner of Jefferson and Ash Streets in Goldsboro. Between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m., defendant entered the store. Thornton observed defendant for approximately five minutes. Defendant asked Thornton for a pack of cigarettes and inquired about employment at the store. Thornton responded that no positions were available, whereupon defendant reached across the counter, grabbed Thornton, pulled out a paring knife, held it behind Thornton\u2019s neck, and ordered him to open the cash register. After Thornton unsuccessfully attempted to comply, defendant placed the knife on the counter and tried to open the register himself, pulling it off the counter with his bare hands. As defendant was doing this, the cash drawer of the register fell to the floor, whereupon defendant grabbed it, exited the store and ran down the street. The register contained $20.00 cash, $10.00 in food stamps, and a credit card in the name of Roberson, a customer who had inadvertently left it behind earlier in the day.\nThornton telephoned police and turned down the store lights. Thornton testified he described the perpetrator to the responding officers as a black male, 29 to 33 years old, over six feet tall, and wearing a blue-green sweater, faded blue-green pants, white tennis shoes, and a baseball cap with the brim pulled down nearly to his eyebrows. On cross-examination Thornton acknowledged the description he gave to police was of a black male approximately 25 years of age, 6\u20191\u201d to 6\u20193\u201d, wearing dark green work pants, a dark green pullover sweater, faded fatigues, and white tennis shoes.\nAfter hearing a radio broadcast describing the perpetrator as a black male between 25 and 30 years of age wearing a gray sweater, green pants, and boots, Officer Jeffrey Stewart (Stewart) of the Goldsboro Police Department circled the convenience store area in his patrol car. Stewart encountered defendant walking on Madison Avenue, a few blocks from the Quick Mart, and suspected defendant had committed the robbery because he fit the general description of the perpetrator. Stewart stopped defendant, and in the course of their conversation the latter asked Stewart for a ride to his mother\u2019s home. Stewart replied he would need the approval of his supervisor, Corporal James Franklin Green, Jr. (Green), who was located at the Quick Mart, and defendant voluntarily rode in Stewart\u2019s patrol car to the store. However, Stewart also took defendant to the Quick Mart for a show-up, a procedure when witnesses view a crime suspect for the purpose of identification.\nStewart parked his patrol vehicle under a canopy covering fuel islands at the Quick Mart, an area he described in his testimony as well-lighted. Stewart exited his automobile and told Green defendant was a possible suspect in the armed robbery, but pointed out the difference between the broadcast description and defendant\u2019s attire. Stewart testified Thornton came out of the store, talked with Green, stood within 10 to 15 feet of Stewart\u2019s patrol car and looked into the window of the vehicle. However, Thornton testified he approached within a foot or two of the automobile and said \u201chi\u201d to defendant who he'observed only as a shadow due to lack of illumination and darkness of the night. Because Thornton did not positively identify defendant as the robber, Stewart took defendant home.\nAt 8:30 that morning, Thornton went to the police station and viewed approximately five hundred photographs, including that of defendant, consisting of individuals arrested for serious crimes by the Goldsboro Police Department who were of the same race as well as the approximate age and height of the person who robbed the Quick Mart. Although Thornton recognized some persons portrayed in the photographs, he failed to identify any as the robber. Similarly, on 30 January 1989, he was unable to select the robber from a six photograph array. However, on 10 February 1989, Thornton identified defendant as the perpetrator in a six photograph array.\nNone of the fingerprints retrieved from the cash register and knife containing sufficient ridge detail for identification purposes were attributable to defendant.\nAt around 11:30 on 27 January 1989, Karen Benjamin (Benjamin) was working as a cashier at Quick Mart number three on the comer of Arrington Bridge Road and 117 South in Goldsboro. Defendant and another man entered and purchased gasoline and a cup of ice using a credit card in the name of Roberson. A few seconds later, defendant reentered and obtained Newport and Virginia Slims cigarettes with the same credit card. Approximately 30 minutes later, defendant again returned and purchased brake fluid with the credit card. When Benjamin opened the cash register to deposit the receipt, defendant grabbed her shirt, held a pocket knife to her throat, snatched money from the register drawer, forced her to give him $20.00 from the store safe, and fled. Approximately thirty minutes later, Benjamin described her assailant to Wayne County Sheriff\u2019s Deputy Jay Sasser (Sasser) as a black male in his early thirties over six feet tall, and wearing a navy blue shirt, ball cap and blue jeans.\nOn 8 February 1989 Sasser interviewed defendant and noted his resemblance to Benjamin\u2019s description of the robber. Sasser saw defendant write his signature that day and detected similarities to that on credit card receipts signed by the robber. On 9 February 1989 Sasser observed defendant was smoking a Virginia Slims cigarette and that he had in his possession an empty pack of Newport cigarettes. On that same date, Sasser and Sheriff\u2019s Department Sergeant Justin Heath (Heath) showed Benjamin a six-photograph line up. Benjamin selected defendant\u2019s photograph as the robber. On 10 February 1989 Benjamin went with Sasser, Heath, and Sergeant Jackson to the Mt. Olive District Court for a show-up. Benjamin identified defendant as the perpetrator from a group of more than thirty-three people; fifteen were black males, five of whom had defendant\u2019s \u201cgeneral characteristics\u201d according to Heath. At trial, Benjamin identified defendant as the individual who had robbed her the night in question.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charges \u201cfor insufficiency of the evidence\u201d, proffered at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and renewed at the close of all evidence, was denied. During closing argument, the assistant district attorney asserted:\nNow you\u2019ll just have to decide if it was the same man or not. Well, I\u2019m going to tell you it is the same man and it is that man right there.\nBy jury verdict returned 15 June 1994, defendant was found guilty of two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon.\nOn 8 December 1995 defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief with this Court, alleging deprivation of his right to an impartial jury and to the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Defendant asserted the foreperson of his jury at trial, Mr. Gene Thomas (Thomas), was guilty of material misrepresentation during jury selection. According to defendant, Thomas had been asked whether he knew a potential witness, a police officer, on any law enforcement matters. Thomas responded in the negative when in actuality he had known the witness through participation with the Goldsboro-Wayne Crimestoppers organization (Crimestoppers). By order of this Court, defendant\u2019s motion was remanded to the trial court \u201cpursuant to N.C.G.S. 15A-1418(b) for the taking of evidence.\u201d The trial court was further directed to \u201center an order in which it shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and [to] grant or deny the relief sought by defendant.\u201d Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order 6 March 1997 finding the state\u2019s witness at issue, Officer Ted McDonough (McDonough) of the Goldsboro Police Department, whom Thomas knew, \u201cwas called solely as a chain of custody witness for certain physical evidence\u201d to which defendant had stipulated and argued it was exculpatory. The court also found the primary evidence against defendant \u201cwas the identification of the defendant by two civilian victim eyewitnesses.\u201d Further, the trial court determined that while Thomas failed to provide complete and relevant information in response to proper questions during jury selection, he possessed no relevant bias against defendant during his trial. Defendant appeals.\nInitially we note defendant has failed to bring forward argument or authority in support of his assignments of error 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15 and 16. These assignments are therefore deemed abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5).\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges. Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of two counts of armed robbery. We disagree.\nThe test for sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether there is substantial evidence of all elements of the offense charged that would allow any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense. State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 785, 467 S.E.2d 685, 692, cert. denied, U.S. -, 136 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1996). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 449, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994). On appellate review, the evidence \u201cmust be viewed in a light most favorable to the State, and the State is to receive any reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence.\u201d State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 236, 451 S.E.2d 600, 617 (1994). In addition, \u201c[i]t is not the function of this Court to pass on the credibility of witnesses or to weigh the testimony.\u201d State v. Hanes, 268 N.C. 335, 339, 150 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1966).\nDefendant does not dispute that robberies by an individual possessing a dangerous weapon occurred on 26 and 27 January 1989, but rather insists the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that defendant was the perpetrator of those crimes. Defendant first maintains the identification testimony of Thornton and Benjamin was so inherently unreliable as to mandate a reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions. Citing, inter alia, Thornton\u2019s failure to identify defendant in the show-up or from the photo book maintained by the Goldsboro Police Department, as well as the lack of fingerprint evidence, defendant insists:\nevidence of defendant\u2019s identity as the person who committed the first robbery is so plagued by serious impeachment and strong disproof that those weaknesses also infect the state\u2019s proof that defendant was the person who committed the second robbery.\nDefendant is correct that identification of a criminal defendant may be so inherently impossible or in conflict with indisputable physical facts or laws of nature as to be insufficient to take that defendant\u2019s case to the jury. State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 731-32, 154 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (1967). However, in the case subjudice, the identification of defendant reflected in the testimony of Thornton and Benjamin cannot fairly be so characterized. See State v. Wilson, 293 N.C. 47, 52, 235 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1977).\nThe testimony at trial indicated the robberies occurred inside convenience stores in well lighted areas. On each occasion Thornton and Benjamin were in close proximity to the robber and had ample opportunity to observe him. Further, both Thornton and Benjamin identified defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crimes. While the fingerprint evidence failed to inculpate defendant in the crimes, this factor standing alone did not establish the identification of defendant by Thornton and Benjamin as inherently impossible or contrary to the physical facts. Further, inconsistencies in testimony addressing descriptions of defendant were to be considered in the jury\u2019s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. See State v. Turner, 305 N.C. 356, 362, 289 S.E.2d 368, 372 (1982) (citing State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 250 S.E.2d 197 (1978); State v. Orr, 260 N.C. 177, 132 S.E.2d 334 (1963)).\nDefendant also argues \u201cthe evidence was not sufficient to prove defendant\u2019s guilt on either charge\u201d because the show-up conducted with the witness Thornton following the first robbery constituted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, \u00a7 20 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nA pretrial identification procedure is constitutionally unlawful only if the totality of the circumstances reveals it to be \u201c[s]o unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to offend fundamental standards of decency, fairness and justice.\u201d State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 9, 203 S.E.2d 10, 16 (1974) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967)). Moreover, it is well established that even if a pretrial identification procedure is violative of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, a subsequent in-court identification of independent origin is admissible. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1166 (1967) (state must show by clear and convincing evidence that in-court identification is of independent origin); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972); see State v. Osborne, 83 N.C. App. 498, 350 S.E.2d 909 (1986); see also State v. Flowers, 318 N.C. 208, 347 S.E.2d 773 (1986) (pretrial show-up identifications not per se violations of defendant\u2019s due process rights). In general, the trial court determines whether an in-court identification was of an independent origin by conducting a voir dire examination of the witness. See Henderson, 285 N.C. at 12, 203 S.E.2d at 17; State v. Connally, 46 N.C. App. 43, 50, 243 S.E.2d 788, 793 (1973).\nIn the case sub judice, we note that although defendant proffered a general objection immediately prior to Thornton\u2019s in-court identification testimony, no grounds were stated for the objection. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b) (to preserve question for appellate review, party must have made timely objection \u201cstating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make\u201d). Further, defendant did not request a voir dire hearing on the issue of whether Thornton\u2019s in-court identification of defendant may have somehow been tainted by the alleged unconstitutional show-up. In addition, defendant has not now assigned as error denial of a motion to suppress the in-court identification. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(a) (scope of appellate review \u201cconfined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record\u201d). Finally, defendant\u2019s written motion to dismiss contained no argument that the in-court identification was so tainted by the show-up as to render it inadmissible, nor was this ground asserted in defendant\u2019s oral argument to the court on the dismissal motion. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b). Indeed, upon defendant\u2019s objection the trial court immediately inquired whether defendant\u2019s counsel wished to be heard. Counsel responded in the negative. Accordingly, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appeal and may not revive it in the guise of argument addressing the denial of his motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, based on the evidence adduced at trial, we conclude the in-court identification of defendant by Thornton was of independent origin and not tainted by the alleged unconstitutional show-up.\nIn sum, the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to establish defendant\u2019s guilt as to both charges, and his dismissal motion was properly rejected by the trial court. See State v. Herring, 55 N.C. App. 230, 232, 284 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1981); see also State v. Carter, 66 N.C. App. 330, 332, 311 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1984) (denial of motion to dismiss proper when jury could draw reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt from totality of the evidence presented).\nAlthough he interposed no objection at trial, defendant next maintains the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent an alleged improper statement by the prosecutor during closing argument. We do not agree.\nIn general, an attorney may not during closing statement express his personal belief regarding a criminal defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15(A)-1230 (1988); State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 65 (1978). Nevertheless, our courts have consistently held that the argument of counsel is left largely to the discretion of the trial court and \u201ccounsel must be allowed wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases.\u201d State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 515-16, 212 S.E.2d 125, 130-31 (1975).\nFor the trial court to intervene ex mero motu to prevent or remedy a prosecutor\u2019s injection of personal beliefs into a closing statement, the prosecutor\u2019s comments must be grossly improper, i.e., of such an egregious nature as to prejudice the jury. Id.; see also State v. Bunning, 338 N.C. 483, 489, 450 S.E.2d 462, 464 (1994) (statements by prosecutor during argument \u201cwere more in the nature of giving reason why the jury should believe the State\u2019s evidence\u201d than vouching for credibility of State\u2019s witnesses or of prosecutor).\nDefendant complains of the italicized portion of the following excerpt from the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument:\nKaren Benjamin said the man that robbed me was a black male, six foot to six foot three, late twenties or thirties, medium build, wearing a baseball hat, not clean shaven, short afro, wearing a navy blue T-shirt. Now you\u2019ll just have to decide if it was the same man or not. Well, I\u2019m going to tell you it is the same man and it is that man right there.\nAssuming arguendo the prosecutor\u2019s comment was improper, we conclude that, considered in context, it was not so egregious as to rise to the level of gross impropriety. See Burning, 338 N.C. at 489, 450 S.E.2d at 464. The trial court therefore did not err in failing to intervene ex mero mo tu.\nDefendant\u2019s final assertion of error involves denial of his motion for appropriate relief by the trial court upon remand by this Court for hearing. Defendant\u2019s argument is twofold. First, he asserts the misrepresentation by juror Thomas during voir dire violated defendant\u2019s right to an intelligent use of peremptory challenges. Second, defendant maintains the juror\u2019s misrepresentation indicated an implied or actual bias on the part of the juror, thereby denying defendant his right to a fair and impartial jury as guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions.\nNo decisions in North Carolina have specifically addressed the standard for awarding a new trial based upon juror misrepresentation during voir dire. In addressing this issue of first impression, we encounter competing policy considerations supporting, on the one hand, the right of an individual to a fair trial guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions and, on the other, the interest of the public and the parties in maintaining a final judgment. See State v. Lyles, 94 N.C. App. 240, 244, 380 S.E.2d. 390, 393 (1989) (rule against impeachment of jury verdict supported by \u201csubstantial policy considerations\u201d including \u201cstability and finality of verdicts\u201d).\nNearly all jurisdictions confronting the issue have established two threshold requirements that must be met prior to awarding a new trial on grounds of juror misrepresentation. See Robert G. Loewy, When Jurors Lie: Differing Standards For New Trials, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 733 (1995). First, the moving party must show the juror concealed material information, i.e., information which would have been relevant either to a peremptory challenge or to a challenge for cause. See Gray v. Bryant, 379 S.E.2d 894, 896 (S.C. 1989) (citing Thompson v. O\u2019Rourke, 339 S.E.2d 505 (S.C. 1986)). Second, the moving party must show he or she exercised due diligence during voir dire to uncover the information. See State v. McGough, 536 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1989)); Thurmond v. Board of Com\u2019rs of Hall County, 330 S.E.2d 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). However, once these two threshold requirements have been met, the legal standard for granting a new trial varies markedly among the jurisdictions, see Loewy, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. at 747-55, partly because of the multiplicity of opinions by the justices in the landmark United States Supreme Court case of McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984).\nIn McDonough, the court addressed whether a juror\u2019s failure to respond to a question during voir dire violated the plaintiffs right to a fair trial in a product\u2019s liability suit. Without discussion in the court\u2019s plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist dismissed as not protected by the Constitution a party\u2019s right to intelligent exercise of peremptory strikes when confronted with jury dishonesty during voir dire. See McDonough Power Equipment, 464 U.S. at 549, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 667. The two concurring justices likewise attached no significance to the denial of intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. See id. at 556-59, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 672-74. As to defendant\u2019s argument that the right to an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges is embodied in the right to a fair trial protected by the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, we are bound by McDonough. See State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 79, 150 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911, 17 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1967) (North Carolina Supreme Court \u201cbound by [] interpretation placed upon [] provision^] of the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States\u201d). We therefore hold denial of a party\u2019s right to exercise intelligent peremptory strikes, based solely upon juror misrepresentation during voir dire, is not protected under the United States Constitution, and that a new trial is not mandated under such circumstances. We similarly reject defendant\u2019s assertion in his motion that the right \u201cto the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges\u201d is guaranteed by Art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 19 and 24 (right to jury trial in criminal cases) of our North Carolina Constitution. See State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 364, 226 S.E.2d 353, 365 (1976) (Art. I, \u00a7 19, \u201claw of the land\u201d provision \u201cequivalent to \u2018due process of law\u2019 \u201d).\nIn McDonough the United States Supreme Court also considered whether a juror\u2019s misrepresentation during voir dire would allow for the legal conclusion that the juror demonstrated actual or implied bias entitling the prejudiced party to a new trial. Justice Rhenquist, writing for the majority, concluded the party moving for a new trial bore the burden of proving: (1) \u201ca juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir direand (2) \u201ca correct response [by the juror] would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.\u201d 464 U.S. at 556, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 671. However, both concurring opinions in McDonough stated that dishonesty of a juror was a factor to be weighed in determining whether the juror demonstrated bias. Id. at 556, 558, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 673.\nFor example, in concurrence with Justice Stevens and O\u2019Connor, Justice Blackmun urged allowing a new trial upon a post-trial showing that the juror had \u201cactual bias, or in the exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.\u201d Id. at 556-57; 78 L. Ed. 2d 672. In a separate concurrence, Justice Brennan enunciated a slightly different legal standard:\n[T]o be awarded a new trial, a litigant should be required to demonstrate that the juror incorrectly responded to a material question on voir dire, and that, under the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case, the juror was biased against the moving litigant. . . . When applying this standard, a court should recognize that \u201c[t]he bias of a prospective juror may be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact or bias conclusively presumed as [a] matter of law.\u201d ... [F]or a court to determine properly whether bias exists, it must consider at least two questions: are there any facts in the case suggesting that bias should be conclusively presumed; and, if not, is it more probable than not that the juror was actually biased against the litigant. Whether the juror answered a particular question on voir dire honestly or dishonestly, or whether an inaccurate answer was inadvertent or intentional, are simply factors to be considered in this latter determination of actual bias.\nId. at 558, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 673 (citations omitted).\nUpon analysis of the differing views in McDonough as well as those expressed by other courts, see Loewy, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. at 747-55, we believe a party moving for a new trial grounded upon misrepresentation by a juror during voir dire must show: (1) the juror concealed material information during voir dire; (2) the moving party exercised due diligence during voir dire to uncover the information; and (3) the juror demonstrated actual bias or bias implied as a matter of law that prejudiced the moving party. In light of these principles, we proceed to review the trial court\u2019s order herein.\nPreliminarily, the record reflects the pertinent facts to be as follows: During voir dire the prosecutor discovered Juror Thomas was acquainted with one of the potential state\u2019s witnesses, McDonough, who subsequently testified solely on the question of the chain of custody of certain physical evidence. Thomas indicated he was acquainted with McDonough through Thomas\u2019 work as a planner with the city of Goldsboro, but maintained he could be fair to both sides and was thereafter accepted by the State. The following colloquy subsequently took place between defense counsel and Thomas:\nQ: . . . [Y]ou mentioned in your previous employment with the city you knew Mr. McDonough?\nA: Yes.\nQ: Did you work with him on any law enforcement related matters?\nA: No.\nDuring the pendency of his appeal, defendant learned Thomas at the time of trial was an active member of the Board of Directors of Crimestoppers, and that Thomas may also have known McDonough through Thomas\u2019 association with Crimestoppers. On remand for hearing on defendant\u2019s subsequent motion for appropriate relief based upon the foregoing discovery, the trial court determined that while \u201cThomas failed to provide complete and relevant information in response to proper questions,\u201d he nonetheless \u201canswered jury voir dire questions honestly and in good faith\u201d and that \u201c[t]he failure to provide this information was not intentional or knowing.\u201d Further, the trial court concluded Thomas \u201cpossessed no relevant bias against the defendant during his trial, either actually or impliedly.\u201d\nWe first observe the trial court\u2019s order reflects an application of the proper three-part test set out above, and any challenge defendant asserts on this basis is unpersuasive.\nNonetheless, defendant vigorously contests the findings by the trial court, suggesting they are to be reviewed de novo. However, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact upon hearing of a motion for appropriate relief are binding if supported by the evidence. State v. Stevens, 305 N.C. 712, 720, 291 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1982); see also State v. Hart, 226 N.C. 200, 203, 37 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1946) (in instances of alleged improper influence on jury, \u201cthe findings of the trial judge upon the evidence and facts are conclusive and not reviewable\u201d). This standard of review applies even though the trial court may have heard conflicting testimony. Id.; see State v. Martin, 318 N.C. 648, 650, 350 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1986). Moreover, \u201c[t]he determination of the existence and effect of jury misconduct is primarily for the trial court whose decision will be given great weight on appeal.\u201d State v. Gilbert, 47 N.C. App. 316, 319, 267 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1980). A careful review of the record reveals that the trial court\u2019s factual determinations are supported by the evidence presented.\nAs to the trial court\u2019s final \u201cfinding of fact,\u201d denominated number twenty-five and providing \u201cMr. Thomas possessed no relevant bias against the defendant during his trial, either actually or impliedly,\u201d defendant argues it in actuality constitutes a conclusion of law and is thus reviewable by this Court. Assuming arguendo defendant is correct, at least as to the issue of implied bias, we conclude the trial court\u2019s determination was appropriate in view of its findings and the evidence presented. See Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 408, 179 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1971) (\u201cto call a \u2018conclusion\u2019 a \u2018finding of fact\u2019 does not make it one\u201d (citation omitted)); see also Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 157, 231 S.E.2d 26, 28-29 (1979) (conclusion of law is \u201cthe court\u2019s statement of the law which is determinative of the matter at issue between the parties\u201d).\nThe presence of bias implied as a matter of law may be determined from examination of the totality of the circumstances. This would incorporate, but not necessarily be limited to, (1) the nature of the juror\u2019s misrepresentation, including whether a reasonable juror in the same or similar circumstance could or might reasonably have responded as did the juror in question, (2) the conduct of the juror, including whether the misrepresentation was intentional or inadvertent, and (3) whether the defendant would have been entitled to a challenge for cause had the misrepresentation not been made, see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 671.\nIn regard to the challenge for cause factor, we note this Court has specifically rejected entitlement to a challenge for cause as a prospective juror of a police officer who had been exposed to some unspecified information about the case to be tried. State v. Hunt, 37 N.C. App. 315, 246 S.E.2d 159, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 736, 248 S.E.2d 865 (1978). In Hunt we observed a contrary holding\nmight well require exclusion of numerous classes of individuals solely by virtue of employment or membership in voluntary associations which were perceived as indicating some type of predisposition on the part of a prospective juror.\nId. at 319, 246 S.E.2d at 162.\nSimilarly, in the case sub judice, the mere participation by Thomas in Crimestoppers and his prior, limited association through Crimestoppers with a potential state\u2019s witness, would not suffice to merit a challenge for cause. See State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 324, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988) (juror\u2019s mere acquaintance with four police officers who were prospective witnesses for the State, standing alone, insufficient for challenge for cause). Further, the record supports the trial court\u2019s finding that the nature of Thomas\u2019 failure to provide information concerning his association with McDonough in Crimestoppers \u201cwas not intentional or knowing,\u201d and the withheld information itself fails to indicate a substantial likelihood of prejudice against defendant. The trial court therefore properly ruled that Thomas\u2019 conduct was not so egregious as to establish prejudicial bias implied as a matter of law.\nIn sum, no prejudicial error was committed by the trial court during defendant\u2019s trial, and his motion for appropriate relief originally filed with this Court was properly denied.\nNo error in part; affirmed in part.\nJudges EAGLES and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robin P. Pendergraft, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Sendor, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GARY DEVON BUCKOM\nNo. COA95-668\n(Filed 3 June 1997)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 418 (NCI4th)\u2014 assignment of error\u2014 unsupported \u2014 abandoned\nAssignments of error which were not supported by argument or authority were deemed abandoned pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nAm Jur 2d, Appellate Review \u00a7\u00a7 544, 545, 547, 550, 553-555, 557.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 637 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 identification testimony \u2014 not inherently incredible\nIdentification testimony by two robbery victims was not inherently incredible so as to mandate a reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions for two armed robberies, notwithstanding the first victim failed to identify defendant in a pretrial showup or from a police photo book, defendant\u2019s fingerprints were not found on a cash register and knife handled by the robber at the first crime scene, and there were inconsistencies in descriptions of defendant and his clothing, where the robberies occurred inside convenience stores in well lighted areas, the victims were in close proximity to the robber, and both victims identified defendant in court as the perpetrator.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1406, 1407.\n3. Appeal and Error \u00a7 150 (NCI4th); Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 425 (NCI4th)\u2014 constitutionality of showup\u2014 failure to preserve issue \u2014 independent origin of in-court identification\nDefendant failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether a pretrial showup at a robbery scene constituted an unlawful search and seizure and may not revive the issue in the guise of argument addressing the denial of his motion to dismiss where no grounds were stated for defendant\u2019s objection prior to the robbery victim\u2019s in-court identification of defendant; defendant did not request a voir dire hearing as to whether the victim\u2019s in-court identification was tainted by the alleged unconstitutional showup; defendant has not assigned as error denial of a motion to suppress the in-court identification; and defendant\u2019s written motion to dismiss and oral argument on the motion contained no contention that the in-court identification was so tainted by the showup as to render it inadmissible. Furthermore, based on the evidence adduced at trial, the victim\u2019s in-court identification was of independent origin and not tainted by the showup.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 560, 626, 627, 629.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 450 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 closing argument\u2014 defendant as perpetrator \u2014 no gross impropriety\nThe prosecutor\u2019s argument to the jury that the perpetrator described by a robbery victim \u201cis the same man and it is that man right there\u201d was not grossly improper and did not require the trial court to intervene ex mero mo tu.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7 554.\n5. Constitutional Law \u00a7 338 (NCI4th)\u2014 juror misrepresentation \u2014 intelligent peremptory strikes \u2014 no constitutional protection\nDenial of a party\u2019s right to exercise intelligent peremptory strikes, based solely upon juror misrepresentation during voir dire, is not protected under the United States or the North Carolina Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. VI; N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 19, 24.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 679, 680\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 485 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 juror misrepresentation \u2014 motion for new trial \u2014 proof required\nA party moving for a new trial grounded upon misrepresentation by a juror during voir dire must show: (1) the juror concealed material information during voir dire; (2) the moving party exercised due diligence during voir dire to uncover the information; and (3) the juror demonstrated actual bias or bias implied as a matter of law that prejudiced the moving party.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1656-1658.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 485 (NCI4th Rev.)\u2014 juror misrepresentation \u2014 implied juror bias \u2014 circumstances considered\nThe presence of juror bias implied as a matter of law may be determined from examination of the totality of the circumstances, which incorporate, but are not necessarily limited to, (1) the nature of the juror\u2019s misrepresentation, including whether a reasonable juror in the same or similar circumstances could or might have responded as did the juror in question, (2) the conduct of the juror, including whether the misrepresentation was intentional or inadvertent, and (3) whether the defendant would have been entitled to a challenge for cause had the misrepresentation not been made.\nAm Jur 2d, Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1656-1658.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 485 (NCI4tli Rev.).\u2014 juror\u2019s limited association with witness \u2014 failure to disclose \u2014 no implied bias\u2014 new trial not required\nFailure of a juror in an armed robbery trial to disclose his association with a State\u2019s chain of custody witness (a police officer) through his participation in Crimestoppers when asked on voir dire if he had worked with the witness on any law enforcement related matter was not so egregious as to establish prejudicial bias implied as a matter of law and thus did not entitle defendant to a new trial since the juror\u2019s limited association with the witness would not have merited a challenge for cause; the trial court found that the juror\u2019s conduct was not intentional; and the withheld information does not indicate a substantial likelihood of prejudice against defendant.\nAm Jur 2d, Jury \u00a7\u00a7 309, 310; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1656-1658.\nSocial or business relationship between proposed juror and nonparty witness as affecting former\u2019s qualification as juror. 11 ALR3d 859.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment and commitment entered 15 June 1994 by Judge G. K. Butterfield, Jr. in Wayne County Superior Court on remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, see State v. Buckom, 111 N.C. App. 240, 431 S.E.2d 776 (1993); affirmed per curiam, 335 N.C. 765, 440 S.E.2d 264 (1994), see State v. Buckom, 100 N.C. App. 179, 394 S.E.2d 704 (1990), and from order entered 6 March 1997 in Wayne County Superior Court by Judge G. K. Butterfield following hearing ordered 6 December 1996 by the Court of Appeals on defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief. Heard initially in the Court of Appeals 3 March 1996.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robin P. Pendergraft, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Sendor, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0368-01", "first_page_order": 406, "last_page_order": 421 }