{ "id": 11710839, "name": "HAYWOOD C. DAVIS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT SECTION, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources", "decision_date": "1997-06-03", "docket_number": "No. COA96-691", "first_page": "383", "last_page": "392", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 N.C. App. 383" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550326 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 A.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 1820314, 1820294 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/523/0103-01", "/pa/523/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 A.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 686283 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1092-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/369/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 B.R. 449", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6112559 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/31/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694693, 4700070, 4693586, 4700021, 4698716 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0378-02", "/nc/316/0378-03", "/nc/316/0378-01", "/nc/316/0378-04", "/nc/316/0378-05" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519376 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917804 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526015 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539448, 2545427, 2542900 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0098-03", "/nc/328/0098-01", "/nc/328/0098-02" ] }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527049 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "634 F. Supp. 598", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3859974 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/634/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 F. Supp. 609", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5715973 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/604/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "\"in cases of ambiguity . . . the language of the statute must be read not textually, but contextually . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610541 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "\"in cases of ambiguity . . . the language of the statute must be read not textually, but contextually . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 C.F.R. \u00a7 301.1", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "565 A.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 1820314, 1820294 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/pa/523/0103-01", "/pa/523/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 A.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 686283 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1092-1093" }, { "page": "1092", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "1091" }, { "page": "1093" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/369/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 B.R. 449", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6112559 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/br/31/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(1)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 935, "char_count": 21700, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.990144550546076e-07, "percentile": 0.8516523550214704 }, "sha256": "71049d4d549f64778393afac69471fedb6b7207d77ad4f156b7d0837d814d105", "simhash": "1:502b67575a7b6c94", "word_count": 3454 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:14.463583+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge WYNN concurs with separate opinion.", "Judge MARTIN, Mark D. concurs in part and dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "HAYWOOD C. DAVIS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT SECTION, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nAt issue in this appeal is whether an individual who has paid child support according to a court order but still owes arrears may have his federal and state tax refund intercepted by state agencies.\nThe facts in this case are undisputed. In January 1987, petitioner was adjudged to be the natural father of LaToyah Renee Davis, born 14 June 1984. He was ordered to pay $100.00 per month in child support and $10.00 per month towards the $1,391.00 in past support paid by respondent for the minor child. Petitioner had complied with this order as of the hearing date.\nOn 7 October 1993, a Notice of Intent to Intercept and Statement of Account was sent to petitioner stating that he owed $507.00 in child support arrears as of 1 July 1993. It further notified petitioner that his state and federal income tax refunds would be intercepted to pay these arrearages.\nOn 22 May 1994, petitioner sought a contested case hearing alleging that the tax intercept was improper because he had consistently made his court-ordered support payments. Respondent moved for summary judgment. An administrative law judge (\u201cAU\u201d) recommended summary judgment for petitioner. However, the final agency decision reversed the ALJ and granted summary judgment for respondent. Petitioner appealed to Cumberland County Superior Court, which affirmed the agency\u2019s ruling. Petitioner now appeals to this Court.\nOur standard of review in reviewing an agency decision depends upon the nature of the alleged error. Walker v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 498, 502, 397 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 98, 402 S.E.2d 430 (1991). If the petitioner contends, and we agree, that the agency\u2019s decision was based on an error of law, including an error in statutory interpretation, our review is de novo and we may substitute our own judgment for that of the agency. Friends of Hatteras Island v. Coastal Resources Comm., 117 N.C. App. 556, 567, 452 S.E.2d 337, 344 (1995).\nOn appeal, we find petitioner raises questions of statutory interpretation. Our review will be de novo. Petitioner contests respondent\u2019s ability to intercept his tax refunds since a court of competent jurisdiction has already determined how his arrears are to be repaid and he has faithfully followed the court\u2019s order. For this reason, he argues that respondent is not authorized to intercept his federal tax refund under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664 or his state tax refund under N.C. Gen. Stat. section 105A-3(b).\nNORTH CAROLINA STATE INCOME TAX REFUND\nWe first address the propriety of intercepting petitioner\u2019s state income tax refund. N.C. Gen. Stat. section 105A establishes a procedure by which debts owed to state agencies are deducted from state tax refunds. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105A-1 (1995). G.S. 105A specifically provides:\nAll claimant agencies shall submit, for collection under the procedure established by this Article, all debts which they are owed, except debts that they are advised by the Attorney General not to submit because ... an alternative means of collection is pending and believed to be adequate. . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105A-3(b) (1995) (emphasis added). Petitioner contends that the emphasized language imposes an \u201caffirmative duty\u201d upon respondent to prove that the existing means of collection is inadequate and to obtain the Attorney General\u2019s advice before utilizing tax interception as a method of debt collection under the statute. We disagree.\n\u201cIf the language of the statute is clear, this Court must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its terms.\u201d Roberts v. Young, 120 N.C. App. 720, 724, 464 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1995). The plain meaning of the above statutory language clearly imposes a duty upon a state agency to intercept tax refunds of all persons who owes it money except in cases where the Attorney General instructs otherwise. Despite petitioner\u2019s contentions, the current statute does not impose a duty on the part of the agency to approach the Attorney General for an exception, nor does it provide for an exception in every case where an individual is in compliance with a court-ordered payment plan, even when the amount of money at issue is quite small. This is the statute\u2019s plain meaning; if the General Assembly intends otherwise, it must amend the statute. Our job is to interpret not to legislate. E.g. Pinehurst, Inc. v. O\u2019Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 63, 338 S.E.2d 918, 925, disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896-97 (1986).\nIn the present case, it is clear that petitioner owed the state a debt. Both sides agree that the Attorney General did not except petitioner from tax refund interception. Therefore, under the terms of the statute, we must hold that respondent\u2019s interception of petitioner\u2019s state tax refund was proper, even mandated, under G.S. 105A-3(b). The trial court\u2019s ruling on this issue is affirmed.\nUNITED STATES INCOME TAX REFUND\nOn the issue of the propriety of the interception of his federal tax refund, petitioner argues that the arrears he owes do not constitute \u201cpast-due support\u201d as required before intercept by 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664. The federal and state laws are quite different. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664 defines \u201cpast-due support\u201d as \u201cthe amount of a delinquency, determined under a court order.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664(c) (1985). Petitioner maintains that he has not been delinquent in paying under the court order and therefore does not owe \u201cpast-due support.\u201d We agree.\n\u201cDelinquency\u201d is not defined in the statute. However, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines it as \u201c[fjailure, omission, violation of law or duty. Failure to make payment on debts when due. State or condition of one who has failed to perform his duty or obligation.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 428 (6th ed. 1990). When put into the context of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664, this definition necessarily requires that a supporting parent fall behind in his or her court-ordered payments before having his or her federal tax refund intercepted.\nOther courts which have interpreted the definition of \u201cpast-due support\u201d have reached the same conclusion. One court has stated, \u201cThe delinquency arises when the debtor falls behind in [the] court ordered payments.\u201d In re Biddle, 31 B.R. 449, 452 n. 3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983). Another court concluded that the federal intercept program does not apply where the supporting parent has continually complied with his court-ordered support obligation, but nonetheless owes arrears due to the retroactive effect of a modified order. Laub v. Zaslavsky, 534 A.2d 1090, 1092-93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), aff\u2019d per curiam, 565 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1989).\nAfter analyzing the dictionary definition of delinquency and decisions in other jurisdictions interpreting 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664, we conclude that interception of petitioner\u2019s federal tax refund in this case was improper. He has continually paid his court-ordered support and did not owe \u201cpast-due support\u201d as defined by the statute. The trial court\u2019s ruling on this issue is reversed.\nCROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR\nFinally, we address respondent\u2019s cross-assignment of error. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the petition for judicial review because proper service was not obtained. Respondent argues that petitioner did not serve the proper person according to Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over it. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. section 150B-46 provides: \u201cWithin 10 days after the petition is filed with the court, the party seeking the review shall serve copies of the petition . . . upon all who were parties of record to the administrative proceedings.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-46 (1995). Rule 4 provides that service upon an agency of the State should be made by serving the summons and complaint on its process agent. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(4) (1996 Cum. Supp.).\n\u201c[W]here one statute deals with a particular subject or situation in specific detail, while another statute deals with the subject in broad, general terms, the particular, specific statute will be construed as controlling, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary.\u201d Nucor Corp. v. General Bearing Corp., 333 N.C. 148, 154-55, 423 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1992). In the present case, G.S. 150B-46 deals with the service of a petition for judicial review of an agency decision, while Rule 4 applies generally to service in all civil matters. Therefore, since G.S. 150B-46 is more specific and there is no legislative intent to the contrary, its terms control. If the General Assembly had intended that petitions for judicial review be served only upon an agency\u2019s process agent, it could have put language mimicking that of Rule 4 in G.S. 150B-46. It did not. Therefore, we conclude that petitioner\u2019s service upon C. Robin Britt, Secretary of the Department of Human Resources, the person at the agency to whom the Office of Administrative Hearing sent copies of its orders during the administrative proceeding, was proper. We overrule respondent\u2019s cross-assignment of error.\nIn summary, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling approving respondent\u2019s interception of petitioner\u2019s state income tax refund and hold that summary judgment was proper for respondent on that issue. However, we reverse the trial court\u2019s conclusion that his federal refund could also be intercepted and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of petitioner on this issue.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nJudge WYNN concurs with separate opinion.\nJudge MARTIN, Mark D. concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Wynn\nconcurring:\nI concur with the majority opinion that we are bound by the plain meaning of the legislation in question. Nonetheless, I write separately to highlight the apparent inequity under the facts of this case that results from our necessary application of the plain meaning standard to the statutes in question.\nIn January 1987, following a paternity action brought by respondent against Mr. Davis, the district court adjudged him to be the father of a child born out of wedlock in 1984. The respondent next established, and the court found, that respondent had paid $1,391.00 in public assistance to the child\u2019s mother prior to the judgment of paternity in 1987. Accordingly, the court ordered Mr. Davis to pay:\n[T]he sum of $100.00 per month as child support plus the sum of $10.00 per month ($110.00 total) towards Past Public Assistance. Said payments shall commence on February 1, 1987, and shall be due and payable in cash or money order to the Clerk of Superior v. . [for] as long as . . . money continues to be owed for public assistance arrearages or cost recovery.\nThus, the district court order of 1987 established for the first time two essential elements necessary to show a debt for past child support: the legal obligation and the amount. It is undisputed that Mr. Davis timely met this court-ordered support obligation which means conclusively that this \u201calternate means\u201d of collecting the arrearage which the respondent itself sought was effective. And while it is worthy to note that the Attorney General represents the respondent before this court, the statute, as Judge Lewis points out, permits but does not require the Attorney General to except petitioner from tax refund interception. Moreover, there is no indication that the respondents sought to have the trial court modify its order to allow for an increase in the monthly payment for the arrearage or to provide an additional means of collecting the arrearages.\nOur legislature and Congress designed tax interception statutes to assist in the recovery of delinquent child support payments from irresponsible parents who failed to make child support payments. Mr. Davis made every payment in strict accordance with the child support and arrearage order and he continues to do so. Thus, on establishing his obligation and the amount owed by court order in 1987, Mr. Davis, a retired military veteran, acted as a responsible parent. With the ever increasing number of parents who irresponsibly fail to make child support payments, it would appear to me, that the resources expended by the state against responsible and timely paying parents, like Mr. Davis, could be better directed. In my opinion that represents the intent of legislation aimed at assisting in the collection of delinquent child support. However, because the statutes evidence a plain meaning on its face, we do need to examine the intent of either our legislature or Congress in enacting these statutes. As Judge Lewis astutely points out: \u201cOur job is to interpret not to legislate.\u201d\n. The record does not indicate whether during that interim period Mr. Davis made any payments directly to the mother towards the support of this child; but then, neither does the record show that either the mother or the respondent attempted to establish his paternity and more pertinent to this case, collect any amount of child support prior to the 1987 action. Indeed, the birth certificate does not even list Mr. Davis as the child\u2019s father.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Judge Wynn" }, { "text": "Judge Martin, Mark D.,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI concur in the majority\u2019s conclusion that respondent may intercept petitioner\u2019s North Carolina tax refund to satisfy a delinquent child support obligation but dissent from its anomalous conclusion that respondent may not intercept petitioner\u2019s federal tax refund to offset further the same delinquent support obligation.\nTitle 42, section 664(c)(1) of the United States Code defines \u201cpast-due support\u201d as \u201cthe amount of a delinquency, determined under a court order, . . . for support and maintenance of a child, or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664(c)(1) (emphasis added). Under the federal regulations interpreting section 664(c)(1), \u201cpast-due support\u201d is defined as \u201cthe amount of support determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process ... which has not been paid.\u201d 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 301.1 (1997).\nNotably, the majority wholly ignores the contextual definition of delinquency provided in the federal regulations, and instead relies heavily on a non-contextual definition of the term \u201cdelinquency\u201d\u2014 \u201c[s]tate or condition of one who has failed to perform his duty or obligation,\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 428 (6th ed. 1990). Despite our Supreme Court\u2019s clear mandate to construe ambiguous statutory language contextually rather than textually, see Greensboro v. Smith, 241 N.C. 363, 366, 85 S.E.2d 292, 295 (1955) (\u201cin cases of ambiguity . . . the language of the statute must be read not textually, but contextually . . . .\u201d), the majority nonetheless applies its textual definition and opines that section 664(a)(2)(A) \u201cnecessarily requires that a supporting parent fall behind in his or her court-ordered payments before having his or her federal tax refund intercepted.\u201d\nTo the contrary, on 29 January 1987 petitioner was adjudged $1,391.00 in arrears on his child support obligation. The term \u201carrear-age\u201d is unambiguous and, whether read textually or contextually, has but one definition \u2014 money owed to another which is overdue and unpaid. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary at 109. Thus, the 29 January court order, which found petitioner owed $1,391.00 in arrearages, clearly indicates petitioner was delinquent on his support obligation. Therefore, relying solely on the plain language of section 664 and the 29 January order, respondent should be entitled to offset petitioner\u2019s arrearages with his federal income tax refund.\nThe majority also relies on Laub v. Zaslavsky, 534 A.2d 1090, 1092-1093 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), aff\u2019d, 565 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1989) (per curiam), and In re Biddle, 31 B.R. 449, 452 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983), to support its interpretation of section 664.\nLaub, however, accords no support to the majority\u2019s interpretation of section 664. The Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded only that \u201cthe federal intercept program does not encompass situations where a parent has continually complied with his child support obligation, but where, nonetheless, arrearages are created as a result of the retroactive effect of [a modified] order of support.\u201d Laub, 534 A.2d at 1092 (emphasis added). In other words, the arrearages at issue in Laub, unlike here, were artificially created by operation of a procedural statute, not by expenditure of state welfare resources. Id. at 1091. Admittedly, the underlying policy of the federal intercept program, as detailed infra., supports the Laub Court\u2019s limited conclusion. Laub nonetheless remains factually inapposite to the present case because, here, petitioner\u2019s support obligation was initially covered by payments from state welfare funds. Simply put, unlike Laub, respondent is invoking the federal intercept statute to recoup expended state resources \u2014 the precise harm the intercept statute was created to alleviate, see id. at 1093.\nFurther, the majority\u2019s reliance on Biddle to support its overly narrow interpretation of section 664 is belied by the legislative history underlying creation of the federal intercept program. Specifically, the federal intercept program was created to alleviate \u201cthe growing problem of parents defaulting on their child support obligations with a consequent drain \u25a0 on limited state welfare resources.\u201d Presley v. Regan, 604 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). The program accomplishes this goal by accelerating reimbursement to \u201cstate welfare agencies for monies spent to aid families who have not received support payments from a parent obligated to make such payments.\u201d Id. at 611. Simply put, the federal intercept program is a mechanism through which a state welfare agency can recoup support payments advanced \u201cbecause [an obligor] has defaulted.\u201d Rucker v. Secretary Treasury U.S., 634 F. Supp. 598, 602 (D. Colo. 1986). See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary at 417 (\u201cdefault\u201d means \u201cthe omission or failure to perform a legal. . . duty\u201d). Thus, in the present case, the purpose of the federal intercept program is best effectuated, as evidenced by the plain language of section 664, by permitting respondent to use petitioner\u2019s federal tax refund to offset his arrearage.\nThe majority would nonetheless allow a delinquent party to reap a monetary windfall by merely complying with an interest-free payment plan. This holding clearly overlooks the economic realities of past-due support. A remedial court-ordered payment plan is only instituted where a party defaults on his or her support obligations. Such a default is often, as here, initially covered by the expenditure of state resources. Recognizing our state possesses finite welfare funds, sound public policy mandates that section 664 be liberally construed to accelerate discharge of arrearages thereby maximizing the utility of our limited welfare resources.\nAccordingly, as the majority\u2019s interpretation of section 664(c)(1) is inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the federal intercept program, I respectfully dissent.\n. Rule 1910.17(a) \u201cprovides, in pertinent part: (a) An order of support shall be effective from the date of the filing of the complaint unless the order specifies otherwise . . . .\u201d Laub, 634 A.2d at 1091 n.1. In Laub, approximately six years after entry of the original support order, the trial court modified appellant\u2019s support obligation. Id. at 1091. Thus, pursuant to Rule 1910.17(a), the modification immediately created $11,825.00 in arrearages without any actual expenditures by Pennsylvania\u2019s state welfare agency. Id.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Judge Martin, Mark D.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Reid, Lewis, Deese, Nance & Person, by Renny W. Deese, for petitioner-appellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Gerald K. Robbins, for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HAYWOOD C. DAVIS, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT SECTION, Respondent\nNo. COA96-691\n(Filed 3 June 1997)\n1. Setoffs \u00a7 7 (NCI4th)\u2014 child support assistance \u2014 arrear-age \u2014 compliance with court order \u2014 state tax refund\nA state agency which had paid support for petitioner\u2019s illegitimate child could intercept petitioner\u2019s state income tax refund to pay the arrearage pursuant to N.C.G.S. 105A-3(b) where the Attorney General had not excepted petitioner from tax refund interception even though petitioner had complied with a court order that he pay $100 per month in child support and $10 per month toward the arrearage.\nAm Jur 2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff \u00a7\u00a7 64-66.\n2. Setoffs \u00a7 7 (NCI4th)\u2014 child support assistance \u2014 arrear-age \u2014 compliance with court order \u2014 federal tax refund\nIt was error for the trial court to permit the interception of petitioner\u2019s federal tax refund to pay arrears petitioner owed to a state agency for its payment of support for petitioner\u2019s minor child since plaintiff was in compliance with a court order to repay the agency and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664 does not provide for tax refund interception for past due support unless the taxpayer was delinquent in making court ordered payments.\nAm Jur 2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff \u00a7\u00a7 64-66.\n3. Administration Law and Procedure \u00a7 62 (NCI4th)\u2014 petition for judicial review \u2014 service on Secretary of DHR\nPetitioner properly served a petition for judicial review of a DHR tax refund interception decision on the Secretary of DHR pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-46 rather than on the DHR\u2019s process agent pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(4).\nAm Jur 2d, Administrative Law 559.\nJudge Wynn concurring.\nJudge Martin, Mark D., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by petitioner from order entered 19 March 1996 by Judge W. Osmond Smith, III in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 February 1997.\nReid, Lewis, Deese, Nance & Person, by Renny W. Deese, for petitioner-appellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Gerald K. Robbins, for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0383-01", "first_page_order": 421, "last_page_order": 430 }