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  "name_abbreviation": "Lineback v. Wake County Board of Commissioners",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges LEWIS and WYNN concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "WILLIAM B. LINEBACK, Employee, Plaintiff v. WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Employer; SELF-INSURED, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, John C., Judge.\nPlaintiff, a paramedic for Wake County, filed this claim seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits for a knee injury which he sustained at work. Evidence before the Industrial Commission tended to show that on 23 July 1994, plaintiff responded to an emergency call at the Sundown Inn at approximately 3:30 a.m. Upon arriving at the scene, plaintiff exited the ambulance by first extending his left leg out of the truck. Due to the height of the vehicle, his left foot was eight to nine inches above the parking lot surface, which was uneven. When plaintiff landed on his left foot, and turned to head for the oxygen compartment, he felt a \u201cpopping and crunching sensation\u201d in his left knee. Plaintiff continued to work, but reported his knee injury to his partner before the end of their shift.\nPlaintiff sought treatment from his general practitioner, who removed him from work due to a \u201csevere knee sprain.\u201d On 26 July 1994 plaintiff went to the emergency room for further treatment and was referred to an orthopedic surgeon. That same day, plaintiff reported his injury to the Assistant Director of Emergency Medical Services who completed an Industrial Commission Form 19. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a left knee medial meniscus tear and underwent surgery. He was released to work on 7 September 1994 with a five percent permanent partial disability to the left leg.\nThe deputy commissioner denied plaintiffs claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits and plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission. By an opinion and award filed 31 July 1996, the Full Commission affirmed the decision of the deputy commissioner, finding that plaintiff injured his knee while carrying on the usual and customary duties of a paramedic in the usual and normal way and concluding that he did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. Plaintiff appeals from the opinion and award of the Full Commission.\nPlaintiff contends on appeal that the Industrial Commission erred in denying his claim for benefits because it did not consider testimony of his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Michael Comstock, regarding the cause of plaintiff\u2019s injury. Thus, plaintiff contends, the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law that he did not sustain an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d within the meaning of G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) is supported by neither sufficient findings of fact nor competent evidence.\nThe standard of appellate review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission in a workers\u2019 compensation case is whether there is any competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether these findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. Sidney v. Raleigh Paving & Patching, 109 N.C. App. 254, 426 S.E.2d 424 (1993). The findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive upon appeal when supported by competent evidence, even when there is evidence to support a contrary finding. Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981). In weighing the evidence, the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, and may reject a witness\u2019 testimony entirely if warranted by disbelief of that witness. Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 425 S.E.2d 454 (1993). However, before finding the facts, the Industrial Commission must consider and evaluate all of the evidence. Although the Commission may choose not to believe the evidence after considering it, it may not wholly disregard or ignore competent evidence. Weaver v. American National Can Corp., 123 N.C. App. 507, 473 S.E.2d 10 (1996); Harrell v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 262 S.E.2d 830, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980).\nIn the present case, the Industrial Commission made findings of fact regarding the events of 23 July 1994 as follows:\n9. On July 26, plaintiff formally reported his injury to Linwood Barham, the assistant director of defendant\u2019s emergency medical service. Mr. Barham completed the Industrial Commission Form 19 in plaintiff\u2019s presence based on information provided by plaintiff during this interview. The Form reported that the injury was caused by a \u201ctwisting motion.\u201d The plaintiff stated that the injury occurred during the emergency call while getting out of the driver\u2019s side of the ambulance. Plaintiff stated that he placed his left foot on the ground; and while completing the exit from the vehicle, he must have twisted his left knee and felt a pop in his left knee. However, plaintiff\u2019s recorded statement taken July 27, 1994 was that the motion involved while exiting his ambulance was a \u201cnormal motion, that it wasn\u2019t like I stepped out and lost my balance and violently twisted it or anything like that. It was just a normal motion.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Comstock, was qualified as an expert medical witness and rendered his opinion with respect to the cause of plaintiff\u2019s medial meniscus tear. Dr. Comstock testified:\nIt is \u2014 it is not typical for that type of injury to occur with normal, everyday walking or activities. It typically takes some type of stress with the knee in an abnormal position, such as a twist or landing awkwardly \u2014 hyperextension, hyperflexion or some type of twisting. Normal, everyday walking typically doesn\u2019t cause a meniscal tear. ... It is much more consistent with the twisting.\nDr. Comstock\u2019s testimony corroborates the information on plaintiff\u2019s Form 19 that the injury was caused by a \u201ctwisting motion\u201d when he exited the rescue vehicle. However, in finding facts, the Commission made no definitive findings to indicate that it considered or weighed Dr. Comstock\u2019s testimony with respect to causation. Thus, we must conclude that the Industrial Commission impermis-sibly disregarded Dr. Comstock\u2019s testimony, and, in doing so, committed error.\nPlaintiff also argues that the Commission\u2019s findings are not sufficient to support its conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s injury did not arise by accident. To obtain compensation under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, a claimant must prove that he sustained an \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6), (18) (Supp. 1996). An accident is an \u201cunlooked for event\u201d and implies a result produced by a \u201cfortuitous cause.\u201d Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 328 N.C. 67, 70, 399 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1991). \u201cIf an employee is injured while carrying on his usual tasks in the usual way the injury does not arise by accident.\u201d Gunter v. Dayco Corp., 317 N.C. 670, 673, 346 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1986). However, if an interruption of the work routine occurs introducing unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences, an accidental cause will be inferred. Id.\nWith respect to plaintiff\u2019s duties and the occurrence from which the injury arose, the Commission made the following findings of fact:\n1. Plaintiff is a paramedic with defendant\u2019s emergency medical service. He was employed part time by defendant beginning in 1987 and has been employed full time since 1989. His primary duties are to provide care to patients in emergency circumstances and operate and staff an ambulance for this purpose. . . .\n3. At about 3:30 a.m. on Saturday morning, July 23, 1994, plaintiff and his partner, paramedic Dwayne Smith, were awakened by an emergency call for a person who was severely bleeding at a local motel. . . .\n5. It was necessary for plaintiff to get out of the truck and turn to his left to obtain an oxygen cylinder from a compartment just behind the driver\u2019s door. Plaintiff extended his left leg to get out of the truck. Because of the particular style of the truck, plaintiff\u2019s left foot was still eight inches or so above the ground.\n6. When plaintiff shifted his weight and dropped to the ground on the left leg, while bringing the right leg out of the truck, he began pivoting on the leg to the left to get to the compartment behind him. Plaintiff felt a popping and crunching sensation in his left knee. Plaintiff, however, continued to work, to assist his partner with the emergency but felt occasional clicks or pops in his left knee. . . .\n13. Plaintiff injured his left knee while carrying on the usual and customary duties of a paramedic in the usual and normal way. The evidence does not show an injury by accident but merely shows an injury during the course and scope of employment.\nEven though the Industrial Commission describes the activities in which plaintiff was engaged when he suffered his knee injury, there are no findings of fact as to whether such activities were part of his usual and customary duties, or whether they were being performed in the usual manner. Moreover, there are no findings of fact from which it may be determined whether the occurrence which caused his injury involved an interruption of routine and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. Accordingly, the findings of fact are insufficient to support the conclusion that plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident.\nThe opinion and award is vacated, and the proceeding is remanded to the Commission to consider all the evidence, make definitive findings and proper conclusions therefrom, and enter the appropriate order.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges LEWIS and WYNN concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, John C., Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Patterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, L.L.P., by Henry N. Patterson, Jr., and Martha A. Geer, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Brooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Robert H. Stevens, Jr., Patricia Wilson Medynski, and Claire Fried Drake, for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WILLIAM B. LINEBACK, Employee, Plaintiff v. WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Employer; SELF-INSURED, Defendant\nNo. COA96-1386\n(Filed 1 July 1997)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 399 (NCI4th)\u2014 plaintiffs doctor \u2014 testimony disregarded\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation action by disregarding the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s orthopedic surgeon where plaintiff paramedic sought benefits for a knee injury sustained as he stepped from an ambulance and the surgeon testified that plaintiff\u2019s injury was not typical with normal, everyday walking or activities. The testimony corroborates the information on plaintiff\u2019s Form 19 that the injury was caused by a \u201ctwisting motion\u201d when he exited the rescue vehicle, but the Commission made no definitive findings to indicate that it considered or weighed the testimony with respect to causation. The Industrial Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but must consider and evaluate all of the evidence and may not wholly disregard or ignore competent evidence.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 607.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 406 (NCI4th)\u2014 knee injury\u2014 paramedic stepping from ambulance \u2014 no findings as to usual and customary activities \u2014 remanded\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s findings of fact were insufficient to support its conclusion in a workers\u2019 compensation action where plaintiff paramedic sought compensation for a knee injury sustained as he stepped from an ambulance and the Commission concluded that plaintiff had not suffered an injury by accident. Although the Commission described the activities in which plaintiff was engaged when he suffered his knee injury, there are no findings as to whether those activities were part of his usual and customary duties, whether they were being performed in the usual manner, or whether the occurrence which caused the injury involved an interruption of routine and the introduction of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\nAm Jur 2d, Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 615.\nAppeal by plaintiff from opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission filed 31 July 1996. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 1997.\nPatterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, L.L.P., by Henry N. Patterson, Jr., and Martha A. Geer, for plaintiff-appellant.\nBrooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Robert H. Stevens, Jr., Patricia Wilson Medynski, and Claire Fried Drake, for defendant-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0678-01",
  "first_page_order": 716,
  "last_page_order": 721
}
