{ "id": 11712830, "name": "JOSEPH F. PHELPS, Plaintiff v. PAUL G. SPIVEY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Phelps v. Spivey", "decision_date": "1997-07-01", "docket_number": "No. COA96-949", "first_page": "693", "last_page": "698", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 N.C. App. 693" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 S.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625693 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547952 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704865, 4703519 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0738-02", "/nc/316/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521955 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525419 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526662 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0211-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 10302, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.341755789137406e-08, "percentile": 0.4807710797038746 }, "sha256": "019d335d6074f06ed3f37e66db1b75180c74ca0bcbd2a4b8d8384fde0666e27f", "simhash": "1:c3ea17fa1d78629e", "word_count": 1724 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:14.463583+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, John C., and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "JOSEPH F. PHELPS, Plaintiff v. PAUL G. SPIVEY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nThe parties in this case first became acquainted in 1965. Since that time, they have participated in numerous business activities. Defendant Paul G. Spivey (\u201cSpivey\u201d) owns a printing business called \u201cPaul Spivey Services.\u201d Plaintiff Joseph F. Phelps (\u201cPhelps\u201d) was employed by Spivey at \u201cPaul Spivey Services.\u201d\nThis case arises from an alleged oral agreement between Phelps and Spivey. The agreement concerned the ownership and use of a mobile home, a Harker\u2019s Island boat and trailer, and a K-Craft boat and trailer located in the \u201cTriple \u2018S\u2019 Mobile Home Park,\u201d at Atlantic Beach, North Carolina. Phelps alleges the oral agreement was as follows. Phelps was to sign over the titles to the mobile home and the boats to Spivey. Spivey was to pay $21,000.00 and hold the mobile home and boats for the beneficial and equal use of Phelps and Spivey during the lifetime of Phelps. The parties would be entitled to equal use of all rooms, utilities, appliances and furnishings inside the mobile home. The parties would also be allowed to equally use the outside storage facilities around the mobile home and equal use of the boats. Spivey was to pay for all expenses involving the upkeep and maintenance of the mobile home and the boats. Spivey was also to have exclusive and absolute use of the mobile home and the boats after the death of Phelps.\nBoth parties agree that Phelps signed over the titles to the mobile home and the boats, as evidenced by the certificate of title and related documents for the mobile home, and the registration records and transfer of ownership documents for the boats, and copies of checks written by Spivey. From May of 1989 through 6 December 1992, Spivey and Phelps adhered without deviation to the alleged agreement. On 6 December 1992, Phelps requested a change in his work and compensation arrangement with Paul Spivey Printing. In response to this request, Phelps alleges that Spivey notified him that he was prohibited from ever using the mobile home or the boats again. Phelps also alleges that Spivey changed the locks on the mobile home and posted signs around and on the mobile home reading, \u201cKeep Out,\u201d \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d and \u201cPrivate Property.\u201d Spivey notified the manager of the Triple \u2018S\u2019 Mobile Home Park and residents of the park of the action he had taken against Phelps. Phelps alleges that Spivey gave one of the boats to the manager of the Triple \u201cS\u201d Mobile Home Park, and the whereabouts of the second boat are unknown.\nSpivey alleges that Phelps signed clear and unencumbered titles to the mobile home and both boats to Spivey, in exchange for monetary payment in the amount of $17,000.00. Spivey admits that he notified Phelps that he was no longer welcome to use Spivey\u2019s mobile home and boats. He also admits he changed the locks on the mobile home and posted two signs at the gates of the mobile home prohibiting trespassing. He also notified the manager of the mobile home park that he had changed the locks and that Phelps was no longer welcome on his property. He gave the Harker\u2019s Island boat to the manager of the mobile home park after the boat had sunk.\nPhelps brought the present action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion and punitive damages. On 22 March 1996 defendant Spivey moved for summary judgment. On 3 May 1996 the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Spivey. From this order, plaintiff Phelps appeals.\nPlaintiff Phelps argues summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of defendant Spivey because plaintiff stated claims for which relief could be granted and to which the parol evidence rule does not apply. We disagree.\nThe standard of review for whether summary judgment is proper is whether the trial court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Welch, 92 N.C. App. 211, 212, 373 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1988). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court should consider the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits. Davis v. Town of Southern Pines, 116 N.C. App. 663, 665, 449 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 648 (1995). The court must view the evidence presented by both parties in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party. Id. at 666, 449 S.E.2d at 242. Summary judgment should be granted when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1990).\nThe Statute of Frauds, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-201(1) (1995) provides:\nExcept as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.\nThe Parol Evidence Rule, codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-202 (1995) provides:\nTerms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented\n(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (G.S. 25-1-205) or by course of performance (G.S. 25-2-208); and\n(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.\nThe parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law, though it is often expressed as if it were a rule of evidence. The rule \u201cprohibits proof of certain facts, events, agreements or negotiations that occur prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of a writing intended to be the final expression of the parties\u2019 agreement.\u201d Weiss v. Woody, 80 N.C. App. 86, 91, 341 S.E.2d 103, 106, cert. denied, 316 N.C. 738, 345 S.E.2d 399 (1986); Van Harris Realty, Inc. v. Coffey, 41 N.C. App. 112, 115, 254 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1979). The substantive rule is well stated in Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 79 S.E.2d 239, 242 (1953):\n[W]here the parties have deliberately put their engagements in writing in such terms as import a legal obligation free of uncertainty, it is presumed the writing was intended by the parties to represent all their engagements as to the elements dealt with in the writing. Accordingly, all prior and contemporaneous negotiations in respect to those elements are deemed merged in the written agreement. And the rule is that, in the absence of fraud or mistake or allegation thereof, parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations inconsistent with the writing, or which tend to substitute a new and different contract from the one evidenced by the writing, is incompetent.\nId. at 77, 79 S.E.2d at 242 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\nPlaintiff Phelps concedes in his brief that the certificates of title and the checks constitute sufficient memoranda to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. These documents unequivocally reflect that Spivey holds clear and unencumbered title to the mobile home and the boats. Phelps is precluded from offering evidence of the alleged oral agreement, which tends to contradict the written memoranda. There is no genuine issue of material fact, and defendant Spivey is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court\u2019s order of summary judgment in favor of defendant Spivey is\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN, John C., and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "COZORT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Miller & Shedor, P.L.L.C., by Marty E. Miller and Peter R. Shedor, for plaintiff appellant.", "Ragsdale, Liggett & Foley, by George R. Ragsdale and Cristina I. Flores, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOSEPH F. PHELPS, Plaintiff v. PAUL G. SPIVEY, Defendant\nNo. COA96-949\n(Filed 1 July 1997)\nEvidence and Witnesses \u00a7 1994 (NCI4th)\u2014 oral agreement\u2014 use of mobile home and boats \u2014 transfer of title \u2014 parol evidence rule\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant in a case which arose from an alleged oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant concerning the ownership and use of a mobile home, boats, and trailers. Plaintiff alleged that the oral agreement was that he was to sign over the titles to the mobile home and boats to defendant, who was to pay $21,000 and hold the mobile home and boats for the beneficial and equal use of both during plaintiffs lifetime; both parties agree that plaintiff signed over the titles; plaintiff subsequently requested a change in his work and compensation arrangement with defendant\u2019s company; plaintiff alleges that defendant notified him that he was prohibited from using the mobile home or boats; and defendant alleges that plaintiff signed clear and unencumbered titles to the mobile home and both boats in exchange for a payment of $17,000. The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law, although it is often expressed as a rule of evidence. Plaintiff here concedes that the certificates of title and checks constitute sufficient memoranda to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and those documents unequivocally reflect that defendant holds clear and unencumbered title to the mobile home and boats. Plaintiff is precluded from offering evidence of the alleged oral agreement, which tends to contradict the written memo-randa, and there was no genuine issue of material fact.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 1092 et seq.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order of summary judgment entered 3 May 1996 by Judge Henry V. Barnette, Jr., in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 1997.\nMiller & Shedor, P.L.L.C., by Marty E. Miller and Peter R. Shedor, for plaintiff appellant.\nRagsdale, Liggett & Foley, by George R. Ragsdale and Cristina I. Flores, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0693-01", "first_page_order": 731, "last_page_order": 736 }