{ "id": 11797328, "name": "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. GERALD WAYNE BRILEY, JOAN S. BRILEY, JOE QUINERLY, LINDA QUINERLY, WALLACE E. BEDDARD, SR., and DONNA H. BEDDARD, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Briley", "decision_date": "1997-10-07", "docket_number": "No. COA95-1427", "first_page": "442", "last_page": "449", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 N.C. App. 442" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "146 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" }, { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "\"[w]hen an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a 'slippery' word to mark out and designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" }, { "page": "437-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 So.2d 1243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9631481 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1244", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/366/1243-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 679392 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-172" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/200/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.E. 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he maxim is, noscitur a sociis: the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words with which it is associated\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626151 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he maxim is, noscitur a sociis: the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words with which it is associated\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860", "parenthetical": "\"[n]oscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610657 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583", "parenthetical": "\"[n]oscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564714 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824-25", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "825" }, { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625751 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "clause contained in policy of insurance which is subject to two reasonable meanings, one providing for coverage and the other not, must be construed in favor of finding coverage" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732740 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576581 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537547, 2534795, 2539605, 2538618, 2539453 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0782-02", "/nc/336/0782-05", "/nc/336/0782-01", "/nc/336/0782-04", "/nc/336/0782-03" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527857 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918015 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525419 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622776 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/250/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707877 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526285 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0292-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 897, "char_count": 16336, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.301847680134437e-07, "percentile": 0.9423813898030349 }, "sha256": "c8223332ca484ef22316d00d92e6ac604c05b4a1459ded3dc5a3457bd674a19b", "simhash": "1:9754546a647dff96", "word_count": 2652 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:16.540119+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. GERALD WAYNE BRILEY, JOAN S. BRILEY, JOE QUINERLY, LINDA QUINERLY, WALLACE E. BEDDARD, SR., and DONNA H. BEDDARD, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to defendants and denial of its like motion. We affirm.\nRelevant background information is essentially undisputed and is as follows: On 11 October 1991, defendant Wallace E. Beddard Sr. (Beddard) was assisting defendant Gerald Wayne Briley (Briley) with tree trimming at the home of defendants Joe and Linda Quinerly (the Quinerlys) when Beddard was struck by a tree limb which Briley had cut. Beddard and his wife Donna H. Beddard (the Beddards) subsequently instituted a tort action against Briley, his wife Joan S. Briley and the Quinerlys for injuries Beddard suffered as a result of the accident.\nAt the time Beddard was injured, there was in effect a homeowners\u2019 insurance policy (the policy) issued by plaintiff to Briley and his wife. The couple sought coverage, but plaintiff denied liability based upon the business use exclusion contained in the policy. While appearing on behalf of Briley and wife in the underlying tort action under a reservation of rights, plaintiff sought declaratory judgment as to its obligation under the policy in the instant action filed 9 January 1995.\nFollowing depositions of Briley, Beddard and Joe Quinerly, the Beddards and plaintiff moved for summary judgment. At a subsequent hearing, the court denied plaintiff\u2019s summary judgment motion and allowed that of the Beddards in an order entered 2 October 1995. The court\u2019s order further stated \u201cthat Defendant Gerald Wayne Briley and Joan S. Briley are afforded liability insurance coverage under Plaintiffs policy.\u201d Plaintiff appeals.\nSummary judgment may be granted in a declaratory judgment action, Threatte v. Threatte, 59 N.C. App. 292, 294, 296 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1982), appeal dismissed, 308 N.C. 384, 302 S.E.2d 226 (1983), and the scope of appellate review from allowance of a summary judgment motion therein is the same as for other actions, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-258 (1996); Dickey v. Herbin, 250 N.C. 321, 325, 108 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1959). Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56 (1990); Davis v. Town of Southern Pines, 116 N.C. App. 663, 665, 449 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 648 (1995).\nPlaintiff in its brief advances the single contention that the trial court\u2019s ruling was based upon its erroneous determination that Briley\u2019s activities were not excluded from coverage by the following pertinent policy language:\nCoverage E \u2014 Personal Liability and Coverage F \u2014 Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:\nb.(l) arising out of or in connection with a business engaged in by an insured. This exclusion applies but is not limited to an act or omission, regardless of its nature or circumstance, involving a service or duty rendered, promised, owed, or implied to be provided because of the nature of the business.\nPlaintiff argues Briley\u2019s tree trimming constituted a business within the meaning of the foregoing provision. We note at the outset that the specific \u201cbusiness use\u201d exclusion language jn the policy has not been considered extensively by our courts. In Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 121 N.C. App. 477, 482, 466 S.E.2d 313, 316 (1996), this Court held the provision to be inapplicable. In that case, employees of the insured, owner of a painting company, gathered at his home. Id. at 478, 466 S.E.2d at 314. However, the insured had no work to be done that day. Id. While at the insured\u2019s home, one of the employees began operating a boom and cherry-picker used in the company\u2019s painting operation. Id. The employee was killed when the boom came in contact with a live wire. Id. Because the record in no way indicated that decedent and the insured were involved in business activity at the time of the accident, we determined the business use exclusion in the policy at issue did not apply, and did not reach the question of whether the painting company constituted a \u201cbusiness\u201d within the meaning of the exclusion. Id. at 482, 466 S.E.2d at 316.\nIn Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Nunn, 114 N.C. App. 604, 606, 442 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1994), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 782, 447 S.E.2d 426 (1994), this Court was called upon to interpret the effectiveness of a business use exclusion identical to that sub judice. In Nunn, we determined that the public bed and breakfast and reception site establishment operated by the insureds was a business under the terms of the policy in question. Id. However, the case turned on whether the injuries suffered when a guest was bitten by a dog were \u201cin connection with\u201d or \u201carose out of\u2019 that business. Id. at 607, 442 S.E.2d at 342. The issue presented herein, therefore, specifically whether part-time labor for which compensation has been received falls within the business use exclusion, is one of first impression.\nThe meaning of specific language used in an insurance policy is a question of law. Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970). When the language is clear and unambiguous, a policy provision will be accorded its plain meaning. Walsh v. Insurance Co., 265 N.C. 634, 639, 144 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1965). However, when language is subject to more than one interpretation, a policy provision is to be liberally construed so as to afford coverage whenever possible by reasonable construction. State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 538, 350 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1986).\nFurther,\n[i]t is the general rule that where a provision in a policy of insurance is susceptible of two interpretations, when considered in the light of the facts of the case, one imposing liability, the other excluding it, the provision will be construed against the insurer.\nRoach v. Insurance Co., 248 N.C. 699, 701, 104 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 (1958) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\nFinally, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that the rules of construction governing interpretation of insurance provisions extending coverage differ from those governing provisions which exclude coverage. State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 538, 350 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1986). While the latter are to be construed broadly, exclusionary provisions are not favored and will be construed against the insurer if ambiguous. Id.\nBearing the foregoing principles in mind, we examine the instant policy. Definitions contained within a policy are applied when construing its terms. Woods v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C. 500, 505-06, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978). The policy defines business to \u201cinclude[] trade, profession or occupation.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1968) indicates trade is \u201cthe business one practices or the work in which one engages regularly.\u201d Id. at 2421. Profession is \u201ca principal calling, vocation, or employment.\u201d Id. at 1811. Occupation is \u201cthe principal business of one\u2019s life: a craft, trade or other means of earning a living.\u201d Id. at 1560. All three definitions, each containing similar phraseology (\u201cthe business,\u201d \u201cprincipal calling,\u201d and \u201cthe principal business\u201d) thus signify that \u201cbusiness\u201d as defined in the policy refers to an individual\u2019s paramount means of earning a livelihood.\nNonetheless, plaintiff in essence relies upon the definition of \u201ctrade\u201d as \u201cwork in which one engages regularly\u201d to argue Briley\u2019s tree trimming activity was encompassed within the business use exclusion. Plaintiff\u2019s position is unfounded.\nWe first note that the modifier \u201cthe\" preceding \u201cwork\u201d and \u201cbusiness\u201d in the dictionary definition may likewise be reasonably interpreted as designating the primary employment in which an individual engages regularly. This interpretation of the definition is reasonable particularly when viewed in context with \u201coccupation\u201d and \u201cprofession.\u201d See State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 583, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1944) (\u201c[n]oscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments\u201d); see also Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 323, 162 S.E. 730, 731 (1932) (\u201c[t]he maxim is, noscitur a sociis: the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words with which it is associated\u201d).\nIn addition, examining the \u201cfacts of the case,\u201d Roach, 248 N.C. at 701, 104 S.E.2d at 825, we observe that uncontradicted evidence in the record reflects that Briley was a full time employee of DuPont, where he worked as a spinning operator. This position was his \u201cprimary occupation\u201d and \u201cprimary source of income.\u201d Briley considered tree trimming at best to be a sideline or hobby, and did \u201cnot consider [himself] to be engaged in any other type of trade, occupation or profession with regard to [his] tree trimming activities.\u201d He stated he began cutting trees in his own yard which \u201cgot to be something [he] enjoyed,\u201d that \u201cfrom there it was helping out at the church to get some trees down,\u201d that \u201cit just sort of grew as time went on.\u201d Briley did not always charge for a job, and when doing so presented no written bill, but simply \u201c[told customers] how much they owe[d] [him].\u201d Moreover, he neither advertised, nor listed in the white or yellow pages of the telephone directory, nor had stationery, letterhead, business cards or billing invoices.\nHowever, the record also indicates Briley engaged in tree trimming oyer several years, sometimes as much as twenty hours per week, was frequently compensated, and had earned approximately $6,000 per year from the activity in each of the three years preceding the accident.\nAssuming arguendo that a permissible interpretation of \u201ctrade\u201d would include Briley\u2019s tree trimming, therefore, the word, \u201cwhen viewed in the light of the facts of the [instant] case,\u201d Roach, 248 N.C. at 701, 104 S.E.2d at 825, remains capable of differing reasonable constructions, one favoring coverage, the other not. In such event, \u201ctrade\u201d must be construed so as to afford coverage. Id.; see also State Capitol Ins., 318 N.C. at 538, 350 S.E.2d at 68 (clause contained in policy of insurance which is subject to two reasonable meanings, one providing for coverage and the other not, must be construed in favor of finding coverage).\nThe Georgia appellate court, in a 1991 case involving similar facts, reached a like result. In United Services Auto. Ass\u2019n v. Lucas, 408 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), plaintiff insurance company denied coverage under the identical exclusionary provision at issue herein following injury to a child in the care of the insured babysitter. Id. at 171-172. The record revealed the insured had been a licensed day care operator for approximately four years, regularly took care of children, earned approximately $100 per week, and reported all income to the IRS while deducting expenses associated with her babysitting. Id. at 172. On the other hand, further evidence indicated that no more than seven children were cared for during the year of the injury, four of whom were her own grandchildren, and \u201cthat she offered her services as both a favor and a convenience to parents who lived in the neighborhood.\u201d Id. at 173. Noting that the policy contained \u201cno definition of business other than to state that it includes \u2018trade, profession, or occupation,\u2019 \u201d the court stated it was \u201cunable to conclude that the facts of this case come within the exclusion\u201d set out in the policy. Id. As in this jurisdiction, Georgia requires construction in favor of the insured if policy language is susceptible to two different constructions, and the court based its decision in part on this principle. Id.\nIn the event we should determine, as we have, that the policy definitions of \u201cbusiness\u201d refer to an individual\u2019s principal work activity, plaintiff further insists that use of the word \u201cincludes\u201d in the policy permits an alternative definition. Specifically, plaintiff urges us to adopt Black\u2019s Law Dictionary definition of \u201cbusiness\u201d as \u201c[e]mployment, occupation, profession, or commercial activity engaged in for gain or livelihood,\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 198 (6th ed. 1990). We decline to do so.\nFirst, \u201cincludes\u201d implies the existence of a comprehensive definition somewhere beyond the face of the policy. As stated above, exclusionary provisions are not favored by the law, and we believe the burden is on the insurance company to set forth clearly and unambiguously a definition of \u201cbusiness\u201d that eliminates guesswork on the part of its insured. Cf. Gaynor v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (citations omitted) (\u201c[s]ince the word \u2018includes\u2019 is a term of expansion, the definition here must be read to mean that busin\u00e9ss [as defined in the policy] includes, but is not limited to the \u2018trade, profession or occupation\u2019 of the insured\u201d; hence banker\u2019s \u201cbusiness pursuits included\u201d his operation of an apartment house, and umbrella personal liability policy containing business pursuits exclusion did not cover accident arising out of apartment house operation).\nSecond, it is well established that in construing terms of a contract of insurance,\nwords ... should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in . . . daily usage, rather than a restrictive meaning which they may have acquired in legal usage.\nInsurance Co. v. Insurance Co., 266 N.C. 430, 438, 146 S.E.2d 410, 416 (1966). Accordingly, definitions contained in \u201cstandard, nonlegal dictionaries may be a more reliable guide to the construction of an insurance contract than definitions found in law dictionaries.\u201d Id.\nFinally, plaintiff in the main controls the language set out in policies of insurance which it issues. Had it desired \u201cbusiness\u201d to be defined as provided in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, it was in a position to draft its policies of insurance accordingly. See Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co., 266 N.C. at 437-38, 146 S.E.2d at 416 (\u201c[w]hen an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a \u2018slippery\u2019 word to mark out and designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term\u201d).\nIn sum, based upon the definition of \u201cbusiness\u201d in the policy, the provision as applied to Briley\u2019s activities as a tree trimmer is ambiguous. As a result of this ambiguity, the phrase must be broadly interpreted in favor of coverage and therefore does not exclude Briley\u2019s tree trimming. Defendants thus met their burden of showing they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in the entry of its 2 October 1995 order.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Baker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, P.A:, by Ronald G. Baker and Kevin N. Lewis, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Ward and Smith, RA., by Ryal W. Tayloe, A. Charles Ellis, and Frank A. Cassiano, Jr., for defendants-appellees Wallace E. Beddard, Sr. and Donna II. Beddard.", "Gaylord, McNally, Strickland & Snyder, L.L.P., by Danny D. McNally, for defendants-appellees Gerald Wayne Briley and Joan S. Briley.", "James M. Stanley, Jr. for defendants-appellees Joe and Linda Quinerly (no brief filed)." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. GERALD WAYNE BRILEY, JOAN S. BRILEY, JOE QUINERLY, LINDA QUINERLY, WALLACE E. BEDDARD, SR., and DONNA H. BEDDARD, Defendants\nNo. COA95-1427\n(Filed 7 October 1997)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 725 (NCI4th)\u2014 homeowner\u2019s liability insurance \u2014 meaning of \u201cbusiness\u201d\nThe term \u201cbusiness\u201d as used in the liability portion of a homeowner\u2019s policy refers to an individual\u2019s paramount means of earning a livelihood.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 725 (NCI4th)\u2014 homeowner\u2019s liability insurance \u2014 injury to another during part-time work \u2014 business use exclusion inapplicable\nThe business use exclusion in the liability portion of a homeowner\u2019s policy did not apply to exclude coverage for injuries received by a person assisting the insured in his part-time tree trimming work when he was struck by a tree limb cut by the insured where the insured\u2019s primary employment was as a spinning operator at DuPont.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 2 October 1995 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 1996.\nBaker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, P.A:, by Ronald G. Baker and Kevin N. Lewis, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWard and Smith, RA., by Ryal W. Tayloe, A. Charles Ellis, and Frank A. Cassiano, Jr., for defendants-appellees Wallace E. Beddard, Sr. and Donna II. Beddard.\nGaylord, McNally, Strickland & Snyder, L.L.P., by Danny D. McNally, for defendants-appellees Gerald Wayne Briley and Joan S. Briley.\nJames M. Stanley, Jr. for defendants-appellees Joe and Linda Quinerly (no brief filed)." }, "file_name": "0442-01", "first_page_order": 478, "last_page_order": 485 }