{ "id": 11798906, "name": "DARE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, etc., Plaintiff v. ELPIS J. G. B. SAKARIA, et. al., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Dare County Board of Education v. Sakaria", "decision_date": "1997-11-04", "docket_number": "No. COA97-16", "first_page": "585", "last_page": "591", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 N.C. App. 585" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4776226, 4773993, 4779341, 4777006, 4779249 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0703-04", "/nc/317/0703-01", "/nc/317/0703-05", "/nc/317/0703-02", "/nc/317/0703-03" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520193 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "271" }, { "page": "154-55" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568173 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558756 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572527 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[i]t is well established as the law in this State that the landowner is entitled to interest from the date the condemnor acquires the right to possession, not from the date the petition is filed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565667, 8565637, 8565574, 8565547, 8565612 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[i]t is well established as the law in this State that the landowner is entitled to interest from the date the condemnor acquires the right to possession, not from the date the petition is filed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0588-05", "/nc/285/0588-04", "/nc/285/0588-02", "/nc/285/0588-01", "/nc/285/0588-03" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902", "parenthetical": "\"[i]t is well established as the law in this State that the landowner is entitled to interest from the date the condemnor acquires the right to possession, not from the date the petition is filed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556630 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "\"[i]t is well established as the law in this State that the landowner is entitled to interest from the date the condemnor acquires the right to possession, not from the date the petition is filed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/21/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559759 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 723", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554208 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "respondents entitled to interest from date petitioner \"acquired the right to possession,\" viewed as date petitioner paid to clerk of court \"the amount of damages assessed by commissioners\" and not \"the date petitioner instituted this proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560656 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "respondents entitled to interest from date petitioner \"acquired the right to possession,\" viewed as date petitioner paid to clerk of court \"the amount of damages assessed by commissioners\" and not \"the date petitioner instituted this proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" }, { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4759760 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566967 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11913460 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404-05", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551555, 2551689, 2552697, 2552187, 2550815 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0694-01", "/nc/337/0694-05", "/nc/337/0694-02", "/nc/337/0694-04", "/nc/337/0694-03" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12127010 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 638", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 U.S.L.W. 3466", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "U.S.L.W.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 U.S.L.W. 3335", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "U.S.L.W.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798848, 798770, 798893, 798846 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0128-03", "/nc/343/0128-01", "/nc/343/0128-04", "/nc/343/0128-02" ] }, { "cite": "466 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795982 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11920091 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0609-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 790, "char_count": 14919, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.698950764977039e-07, "percentile": 0.8928250257061319 }, "sha256": "659dc22636c0164530341e92c96d39fea81e953947fe677ee1eb4823ccb2c5a4", "simhash": "1:879f707f572ce554", "word_count": 2449 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:16.540119+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "DARE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, etc., Plaintiff v. ELPIS J. G. B. SAKARIA, et. al., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendants appeal the trial court\u2019s order awarding interest under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-53 (1984) in this condemnation proceeding from the date of entry of the court\u2019s corrected judgment. Defendants contend interest should have been calculated effective the date of filing by plaintiff of its condemnation complaints and the contemporaneous deposit pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-41 (1984) of the \u201csum of money estimated ... to be just compensation.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 40A-41. We disagree and affirm the trial court.\nPertinent facts and procedural information include the following: Plaintiff Dare County Board of Education initiated condemnation proceedings in Dare County Superior Court against defendants Elpis Sakaria, Raj Alexander Trust, Jera Associates and Jack and Lillian Hillman for the purpose of acquiring six lots adjacent to Cape Harteras School in Buxton on Harteras Island. The land was intended for expansion of school recreation fields under Article 3 of Chapter 40A. Condemnation complaints were filed 19 February 1993, and plaintiff deposited $21,400 with the clerk of court pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 40A-41 on that date. Defendants answered and challenged, under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-517 (1994) and the North Carolina Constitution, plaintiff\u2019s authority to take defendants\u2019 land.\nThe cases were consolidated for trial of all issues other than just compensation, and the trial court resolved those issues in favor of plaintiff. A corrected judgment w'as entered 25 May 1994 providing, inter alia:\nThat title to the properties described in the Complaint is vested in [plaintiff], and [plaintiff] is entitled to possession and ownership thereof.\nThis Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision in Dare County Bd. of Education v. Sakaria, 118 N.C. App. 609, 456 S.E.2d 842 (1995), and our Supreme Court affirmed this Court\u2019s decision per curiam, 342 N.C. 648, 466 S.E.2d 717 (1996), reh\u2019g denied, 343 N.C. 128, 468 S.E.2d 778 (1996). Defendants\u2019 subsequent appeal to the United States Supreme Court was unavailing. Sakaria v. Dare County Board of Ed., cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3335, 3341, 136 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1996); rehearing denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3466, 136 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1997).\nThe just compensation portion of the proceedings commenced in the trial court 15 April 1996. The jury returned verdicts totaling $475,000 in favor of defendants 19 April 1996. Defendants did not seek disbursement of the just compensation estimate deposit prior to the conclusion of trial. The trial court\u2019s judgment on the verdict awarded interest pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 40A-53 from 25 May 1994, the date of the corrected judgment on the issue of plaintiff\u2019s right to take. Defendants timely filed notice of appeal, contending interest should have been calculated from 19 February 1993, the date of filing of the four condemnation complaints and of plaintiff\u2019s deposit. Although plaintiff likewise entered notice of cross-appeal, it filed no brief in support of its assignments of error, and we deem its cross-appeal abandoned. N.C.R. App. R 13(c).\nThe sole issue for our resolution is the meaning of the phrase \u201cdate of taking\u201d in G.S. \u00a7 40A-53. The statute reads as follows:\nTo the amount awarded as compensation by the commissioners or a jury or judge, the judge shall add interest at a rate of six percent (6%) per annum on said amount from the date of taking to the date of judgment. Interest shall not be allowed from the date of deposit on so much thereof as shall have been paid into court as provided in this Article.\nDefendants contend \u201cdate of taking\u201d refers to the date Upon which a condemnation complaint has been filed. Plaintiff, on the other hand, interprets \u201cdate of taking\u201d to mean \u201cthe date that title vests in the Board or the date that the Board obtains the right of possession, whichever is earlier.\u201d We conclude plaintiff is correct.\nAt the outset, we note Chapter 40A does not define \u201cdate of taking\u201d either in G.S. \u00a7 40A-53 or within the definitions set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-2 (1984). We further observe that no appellate decision has been rendered by our courts addressing G.S. \u00a7 40A-53 since it became effective fifteen years ago. The issue presented thus is one of first impression.\nStatutory interpretation presents a question of law. McLeod v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 115 N.C. App. 283, 288, 444 S.E.2d 487, 490, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 694, 448 S.E.2d 528 (1994). The cardinal principle in the process is to ensure accomplishment of legislative intent. Id. To achieve this end, the court should consider \u201cthe language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.\u201d Hayes v. Fowler, 123 N.C. App. 400, 404-05, 473 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1996) (citation omitted).\nFurther, it is presumed the legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law, Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1977), and with care and deliberation, State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 658, 174 S.E.2d 793, 804 (1970). Every statute is to be interpreted \u201cin light of the .. . laws as they were understood\u201d at the time of the enactment at issue. News and Observer v. State; Co. of Wake v. State; Murphy v. State, 312 N.C. 276, 282, 322 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1984).\nFinally, when a term has obtained long-standing legal significance, we presume the legislature intended such significance to attach to its use of that term, absent indication to the contrary. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 639, 325 S.E.2d 469, 478 (1985). A complimentary rule of construction provides that when technical terms or terms of art are used in a statute, they are presumed to be used with their technical meaning in mind, likewise absent legislative intent to the contrary. Id.\nChapter 40A, the section at issue herein, was enacted in 1981, repealing and replacing Chapter 40. The latter contained no interest provision analogous to G.S. \u00a7 40A-53. However, pre-Chapter 40A case law uniformly held interest ran from the date of taking, interpreted as the date upon which the condemnor acquired the right to possession of the property. See, e.g., Light Co. v. Briggs, 268 N.C. 158, 159, 150 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1966) (respondents entitled to interest from date petitioner \u201cacquired the right to possession,\u201d viewed as date petitioner paid to clerk of court \u201cthe amount of damages assessed by commissioners\u201d and not \u201cthe date petitioner instituted this proceeding\u201d); Power Co. v. Winebarger, 42 N.C. App. 330, 336, 256 S.E.2d 723, 727-28 (1979), reversed on other grounds, 300 N.C. 57, 265 S.E.2d 227 (1980) (\u201c[i]t is true that a party is entitled to 6 per cent interest from the date of the taking .... The date the condemnor acquires the right to possession determines the date from which interest should be paid,\u201d and condemnor \u201cwas not entitled to possession until the entry of judgment\u201d vesting title in condemnor) (citations omitted); and Board of Education v. Evans, 21 N.C. App. 493, 497, 204 S.E.2d 899, 902, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 588, 206 S.E.2d 862 (1974) (\u201c[i]t is well established as the law in this State that the landowner is entitled to interest from the date the condemnor acquires the right to possession, not from the date the petition is filed\u201d).\nConversely, the law was similarly settled that, for purposes of determining the value of the property, the critical date was the \u201cdate of taking,\u201d see, e.g., Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 662, 140 S.E.2d 341, 345 (1965); City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283 N.C. 316, 322, 196 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1973), consistently interpreted as the date of commencement of condemnation proceedings. Id.\nAccordingly, the law at the time the General Assembly enacted Chapter 40A viewed \u201cdate of taking\u201d in two ways depending upon the context. Regarding valuation of condemned property, the \u201cdate of taking\u201d referred to that date upon which condemnation proceedings were begun. With respect to interest, \u201cdate of taking\u201d referred to the date upon which the condemnor obtained the right to possession of the property.\nDefendants in essence urge us to adopt a definition of \u201cdate of taking\u201d that encompasses the premise that their \u201cuse, enjoyment and benefit of ownership of their land was irreparably changed as of February 19, 1993,\u201d the date condemnation proceedings were initiated. At such point, according to defendants, any rights they had to the land, such as removal of timber, buildings, structure or fixtures on the property, as noticed to them by plaintiff pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 40A-41, were \u201cillusory.\u201d Moreover, defendants continue, any \u201copportunity to use, enjoy or benefit from owning their lots was irreparably lost by the initiation of the condemnation proceedings.\u201d\nWhile sensitive to the practical implications of defendants\u2019 argument, we conclude such concerns must be directed to the General Assembly. The case law set out above demonstrates that the term \u201cdate of taking\u201d had acquired legal significance as a term of art for purposes of computation of interest at the time Chapter 40A was enacted, and we ascertain no legislative intent to deviate from this accepted common law meaning. See Black, 312 N.C. at 639, 325 S.E.2d at 478. Had the General Assembly intended \u201cdate of taking\u201d in the context at issue to denote the date of filing of the condemnation complaint, it was within their power, and not ours, to so provide. Significantly, the General Assembly undertook to codify \u201cdate of taking\u201d regarding valuation in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-63 (1984), clearly stating \u201c[t]he day of filing of a petition or complaint shall be the date of valuation. ...\u201d However, no such action was taken concerning the calculation of interest, and we decline to infer therefrom any intent to deviate from the settled common law meaning of \u201cdate of taking.\u201d\nBoth parties cite Airport Authority v. Irvin, 306 N.C. 263, 293 S.E.2d 149 (1982), although its applicability is somewhat limited in that the condemnor therein was a private entity and the case was decided under Chapter 40. The \u201csole question\u201d before the Court in Airport Authority was the proper date for determining the value of the property for just compensation, id. at 264, 293 S.E.2d at 151, which our Supreme Court held to be the date of filing of the condemnation petition. Id. Although the new statute did not apply, the Court noted with interest the codification of this common law rule by G.S. \u00a7 40A-63. Id. at 271, 293 S.E.2d at 154-55.\nThe Court then considered the question of interest on the jury award and held \u201cthe date the condemnor acquires the right to possession is the date from which interest should be paid.\u201d Id. at 272, 293 S.E.2d at 155. The Court stated the condemnor\nacquired the right of possession at the same time title vested\u2014 upon entry of judgment by the trial court awarding damages for the taking and the payment of that amount by the [condemnor].\nId. at 273, 293 S.E.2d at 156. However, the condemnor in Airport Authority had elected not to pay the award into court as permitted by Chapter 40 and thus deprived itself of the right to actual possession. Id. The Court therefore concluded the property owners were entitled to interest from the date of filing of the commissioner\u2019s report determining the value of the property. Id. at 274, 293 S.E.2d at 156. We do not believe this case changes the meaning of \u201cdate of taking\u201d for the purpose of accrual of interest; indeed, the decision tends to support plaintiff\u2019s position herein.\nBased upon the foregoing, we hold that \u201cdate of taking\u201d in G.S. \u00a7 40A-53 connotes the date upon which the condemnor acquires the right to possession of the property involved. Defendants have failed to persuade us that, upon enactment of Chapter 40A, the General Assembly intended any deviation from the settled common law meaning of \u201cdate of taking\u201d in the context of computation of interest.\nAdditionally, in ascertaining and giving effect to legislative intent, courts are to construe a legislative act as a whole. In re Badzinski, 79 N.C. App. 250, 255, 339 S.E.2d 80, 82-83, disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 703, 347 S.E.2d 35 (1986). Bearing this rule in mind, we note that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-42 (Cum. Supp. 1996) states with precision that title and the right to immediate possession vest in certain specified circumstances, none of which are present in the case sub judice.\nSubsection (a) of G.S. 40A-42, for example, which provides for vesting of title and the right of possession \u201cupon the filing of the complaint and the making of the deposit in accordance with G.S. 40A-41,\u201d is not applicable to plaintiff School Board. Subsection (a), which sets out sixteen particular instances in which the filing of complaint and making of deposit date applies, does not include educational condemnation in its listing. The subsection thus does not apply here where plaintiff instituted the instant condemnation proceedings for purposes of acquiring land to expand recreational fields at Cape Hatteras School.\nSubsection (b) of G.S. \u00a7 40A-42 designates three events which trigger vesting of title and the right to immediate possession upon filing of a condemnation complaint and the deposit of estimated just compensation: (1) filing of an answer by the landowner requesting only determination of just compensation, (2) failure of the landowner to file a timely answer, and (3) disbursement of the deposit in accordance with the provisions of G.S. \u00a7 40A-44. None of these events occurred in the present instance. Defendants challenged the authority of plaintiff to condemn the property, answered the complaint within the 120-day time period established by G.S. \u00a7 40A-46, and obtained plaintiffs deposit only subsequent to trial.\nIn sum, under the circumstances sub judice, the trial court did not err in awarding interest calculated from the date upon which plaintiff was entitled to possession, i.e., the date of the corrected judgment.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "DeVeau & Norcross, P.A., by Ronald E. DeVeau, for plaintiff - appellee.", "Vandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, L.L.R, by Norman W. Shearin, Jr. and Robert L. O\u2019Donnell, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DARE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, etc., Plaintiff v. ELPIS J. G. B. SAKARIA, et. al., Defendants\nNo. COA97-16\n(Filed 4 November 1997)\nEminent Domain \u00a7 126 (NCI4th)\u2014 board of education \u2014 Ch. 40A condemnation \u2014 interest\u2014meaning of \u201cdate of taking\u201d\nInterest from the \u201cdate of taking\u201d allowed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-53 in a Chapter 40A condemnation proceeding refers to the date the condemnor acquires the right of possession of the property, not the date the condemnation proceeding was initiated; therefore, in a condemnation proceeding instituted by a county board of education, the landowners were properly awarded interest from the date of the corrected judgment vesting title in the board of education.\nDefendants appeal from judgment filed 7 June 1996 by Judge James E. Ragan, III in Dare County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 1997.\nDeVeau & Norcross, P.A., by Ronald E. DeVeau, for plaintiff - appellee.\nVandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, L.L.R, by Norman W. Shearin, Jr. and Robert L. O\u2019Donnell, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0585-01", "first_page_order": 621, "last_page_order": 627 }