{ "id": 11799071, "name": "RAYMOND L. BOONE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. WOODROW VINSON, JR., WILLIE ROBINSON AND ROANOKE-CHOWAN LOGGING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Boone v. Vinson", "decision_date": "1997-11-04", "docket_number": "No. COA96-1440", "first_page": "604", "last_page": "609", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 N.C. App. 604" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-19", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "153", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54136 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" }, { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-93", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790218, 790157, 790191, 790066, 790233 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0360-02", "/nc/340/0360-03", "/nc/340/0360-01", "/nc/340/0360-04", "/nc/340/0360-05" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917121 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4751333, 4759813, 4759654, 4754447, 4756432 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0492-05", "/nc/312/0492-04", "/nc/312/0492-01", "/nc/312/0492-02", "/nc/312/0492-03" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526008 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569779 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568512, 2572119, 2572624, 2569747, 2566199 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0471-05", "/nc/321/0471-02", "/nc/321/0471-01", "/nc/321/0471-04", "/nc/321/0471-03" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358680 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527480 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-19", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 576, "char_count": 11579, "ocr_confidence": 0.713, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.631984918428773e-07, "percentile": 0.8223035397044384 }, "sha256": "c381ed3ad25c73b48d692a83f0059e35e89c4fa9e8348a931a5d54472c383236", "simhash": "1:7b245424341c3ed1", "word_count": 1810 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:16.540119+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WALKER and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "RAYMOND L. BOONE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. WOODROW VINSON, JR., WILLIE ROBINSON AND ROANOKE-CHOWAN LOGGING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge.\nSummary judgment is appropriate if a defending party can establish that no claim for relief exists or that the claimant cannot overcome an affirmative defense or legal bar to the claim. Wilder v. Hobson, 101 N.C. App. 199, 201, 398 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1990). In addition, when the only issues to be decided are issues of law, summary judgment is proper. Brawley v. Brawley, 87 N.C. App. 545, 548, 361 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1987), disc. review denied, 321 N.C. 471, 364 S.E.2d 918 (1988).\nAn injured person is entitled to compensation under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (hereinafter the Act) only if he is an employee of the party from whom compensation is claimed. Richards v. Nationwide Homes, 263 N.C. 295, 301-02, 139 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1965). The central issue in this case is whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Roanoke-Chowan and plaintiff, allowing defendants to invoke the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act, which preclude plaintiff from recovering damages in tort. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-9, -10.1, -19 (1991). An employer-employee relationship at the time of the injury is a jurisdictional fact, on which this Court must make its own findings. Doud v. K & G Janitorial Service, 69 N.C. App. 205, 211, 316 S.E.2d 664, 669, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 492, 322 S.E.2d 554 (1984).\nThe Act provides that a person who might not otherwise be covered may be deemed a \u201cstatutory employee\u201d under certain circumstances, thereby subjecting him to coverage under the Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-19 (1991); Rich v. R. L. Casey, Inc., 118 N.C. App. 156, 158-59, 454 S.E.2d 666, 667, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 360, 458 S.E.2d 190 (1995). The determinative issue, then, is whether plaintiff, as a subcontractor, was a statutory employee of Roanoke-Chowan when he was injured.\nThis case requires an interpretation of G.S. \u00a7 97-19 as it existed at the time of plaintiffs injury on 21 January 1994. The statute then in effect read:\nAny principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor who shall sublet any contract for the performance of any work without requiring from such subcontractor or obtaining from the Industrial Commission a certificate, issued by a workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier, or a certificate of compliance issued by the Department of Insurance to a self-insured subcontractor, stating that such subcontractor has complied with G.S. 97-93 hereof, shall be liable, irrespective of whether such subcontractor has regularly in service less than four employees in the same business within this State, to the same extent as such subcontractor would be if he were subject to the provisions of this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits under this Article on account of the injury or death of any such subcontractor, and principal or partner of such subcontractor or any employee of such subcontractor due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the performance of the work covered by such subcontract. ... If the subcontractor has no employees and waives in writing his right to coverage under this section, the principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor subletting the contract shall not thereafter be held liable for compensation or other benefits under this Article to said subcontractor. Subcontractors who have no employees are not required to comply with G.S. 97-93.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-19 (1991) (emphasis added). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-93 (1991) provides that employers subject to the Act are required to carry insurance or prove financial ability to pay compensation. Plaintiff, as an independent subcontractor with no employees, is not required to comply with G.S. \u00a7 97-93. We also note that plaintiff did not waive in writing his right to coverage under G.S. \u00a7 97-19.\nThe General Assembly amended G.S. \u00a7 97-19, effective 5 August 1987, by inserting \u201cany such subcontractor, any principal or partner of such subcontractor or\u201d immediately preceding the phrase \u201cany employee of such contractor\u201d in the first sentence of the statute. See Southerland v. B. V. Hedrick Gravel & Sand Co., 345 N.C. 739, 743, 483 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1997). Prior to the 1987 amendment, the statute was interpreted to protect the employees of a subcontractor, not the subcontractor himself. Richards, 263 N.C. at 302, 139 S.E.2d at 650.\nThe sole question, then, is whether the Act in effect at the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury extended workers\u2019 compensation benefits to subcontractors under the same conditions as it extended coverage to employees of subcontractors. We find the case of Southerland v. B. V. Hedrick Gravel & Sand Co., 345 N.C. 739, 483 S.E.2d 150 (1997) controlling.\nIn Southerland, the plaintiff, an independent subcontractor, was injured at a construction site in December 1990 while he was performing roofing work under a subcontract with the defendant. Although he advised the defendant that he maintained workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage, the defendant did not obtain from him or any other source a certificate of insurance. The Southerland Court interpreted the \u201cclear and unambiguous\u201d language of the statute in effect at the time of the plaintiff\u2019s injury and held that \u201c[t]he 1987 amendment clearly extended the class of persons protected by this provision to include not only employees of the subcontractor but also the subcontractor himself.\u201d Id. at 744, 483 S.E.2d at 152.\nWe note that the broadened scope of liability under this statute was recently abrogated. In 1995 the General Assembly reinstated the pre-1987 language of G.S. \u00a7 97-19 by deleting \u201cany such subcontractor, any principal or partner of such subcontractor or\u201d preceding \u201cany employee of such subcontractor,\u201d effective 10 June 1996. See 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 555, \u00a7 1.\nWe agree with defendants that by virtue of the mandated coverage for subcontractors under G.S. \u00a7 97-19 at the time of plaintiffs injury, the parties are subject to and bound by the Act, and defendants are entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy provisions under G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 97-9 and -10.1. Furthermore, we have reviewed plaintiffs contentions that Roanoke-Chowan cannot avail itself of the exclusive remedy defense because it failed to comply with the Act and find them without merit.\nAs in Southerland, then, \u201c[sjince plaintiff is a member of the class of subcontractors entitled to individual coverage under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 as it existed at the time of his accident, the statute extended workers\u2019 compensation benefits to plaintiff[.]\u201d Southerland, 345 N.C. at 744, 483 S.E.2d at 153 (emphasis added).\nAccordingly, we affirm summary judgment in favor of defendants.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WALKER and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Braxton H. Bell and Mario E. Perez for plaintiff appellant.", "Battle, Winslow, Scott & Wiley, P.A., by M. Greg Grumpier, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND L. BOONE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. WOODROW VINSON, JR., WILLIE ROBINSON AND ROANOKE-CHOWAN LOGGING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellees\nNo. COA96-1440\n(Filed 4 November 1997)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u00a7 46 (NCI4th)\u2014 1994 injury to subcontractor \u2014 mandated coverage \u2014 exclusive remedy defense\nThe trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff subcontracted with defendant Roanoke-Chowan Logging Company to transport timber; he was injured at a logging site on 21 January 1994; plaintiff did not have a workers\u2019 compensation policy covering himself and had not executed a written waiver of his right to workers\u2019 compensation coverage through Roanoke-Chowan; plaintiff filed an action to recover damages for his injuries; defendants moved to dismiss based on the exclusive remedy defense; and summary judgment was granted for defendants. By virtue of the mandated coverage for subcontractors under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 at the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury, the parties are subject to and bound by the Act, and defendants are entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-9 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-10.1.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered by Judge Louis Meyer in Edgecombe County Superior'Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 August 1997.\nOn the morning of 21 January 1994 plaintiff drove his truck to the logging site of defendant Roanoke-Chowan Logging Company, Inc., to transport logs away from the site. Roanoke-Chowan was under a contract with Canal Wood Corporation to cut and transport timber, and Roanoke-Chowan had subcontracted with plaintiff to transport the timber. Defendant Woodrow Vinson, Jr., was president and manager of Roanoke-Chowan, and defendant Willie Robinson was an employee of Roanoke-Chowan.\nWhile plaintiff was sitting in his truck waiting for the logging crew to arrive, defendant Robinson started a fire on the ground with limbs and scrap wood. Once the fire had started, plaintiff watched Robinson pour part of a bucket of diesel fuel on it as an accelerant. Plaintiff then got out of his truck and walked toward the fire. When he got to within eight or ten feet of the fire, he saw flames around the bucket and was worried that the \u201cbucket might blow up.\u201d He threw a piece of wood to Robinson, and as he turned around to walk back to the truck, the fire \u201cexploded\u201d and shot flames towards him, severely burning the backs of his legs.\nAt the time of the accident Roanoke-Chowan had in force a workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy with North Carolina Forestry Association Self-Insurers\u2019 Fund, serviced by AEGIS Administrative Services. Plaintiff did not have a workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy covering himself, and prior to the accident, plaintiff did not execute a written waiver of his right to workers\u2019 compensation coverage through Roanoke-Chowan. Although Roanoke-Chowan planned to have him sign a waiver, a waiver form was not yet available before plaintiff was injured.\nRoanoke-Chowan\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier first denied benefits to plaintiff on 3 February 1995, asserting that plaintiff was an independent contractor, and the insurance policy did not provide benefits for independent contractors. Consequently, plaintiff filed a complaint and then an amended complaint in superior court against defendants to recover damages for his injuries. Defendants answered, alleging that plaintiff, as a subcontractor, was an employee of Roanoke-Chowan. Defendants moved to dismiss the case, inter alia, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the \u201cexclusive remedy defense\u201d \u2014 that plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy was under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-9, -10.1, -19 (1991).\nOn 7 August 1995 plaintiff sent copies of the pleadings to defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier, which again denied his claim on the basis that plaintiff was an independent contractor. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a Form 33 request for hearing with the Industrial Commission, and defendants\u2019 insurance carrier responded with a Form 33R, denying both an employment relationship and compens-ability under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-19 and -24(b) (1991), plaintiff waived in writing his right to workers\u2019 compensation benefits subject only to it being judicially determined that defendants are entitled to the exclusive remedy defense. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, based on depositions of plaintiff, defendant Vinson, and defendant Robinson, an affidavit of defendant Vinson, and plaintiff\u2019s responses to defendants\u2019 request for admissions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed all claims against them. Plaintiff appeals.\nBraxton H. Bell and Mario E. Perez for plaintiff appellant.\nBattle, Winslow, Scott & Wiley, P.A., by M. Greg Grumpier, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0604-01", "first_page_order": 640, "last_page_order": 645 }