{ "id": 11655480, "name": "COUNTY OF CARTERET, Plaintiff v. CURTIS L. LONG; RICHARD RICHARDSON and wife, ARLETHA RICHARDSON; THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (LIENOR), Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "County of Carteret v. Long", "decision_date": "1998-02-03", "docket_number": "No. COA97-39", "first_page": "477", "last_page": "483", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "128 N.C. App. 477" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-242", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "limiting the sale of real property under State certificate of tax liability or judgment with administrative process" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-321", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "117-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624341 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "592" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "593-94" }, { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527215 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574165 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526370 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-356", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-241", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "d" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 105-271", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 105-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793139 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12137511 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790160 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527215 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574165 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526370 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0341-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 13688, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1618190013584228e-07, "percentile": 0.7699506805223008 }, "sha256": "df6a621033aab729a393b6d730e0508c73f8ec198f13b2d5199c735248ae1ebe", "simhash": "1:afe58a6ad53f6ec4", "word_count": 2282 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:25.972365+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge MARTIN, Mark D., concurs.", "Judge GREENE dissents." ], "parties": [ "COUNTY OF CARTERET, Plaintiff v. CURTIS L. LONG; RICHARD RICHARDSON and wife, ARLETHA RICHARDSON; THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (LIENOR), Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nOn 6 February 1996, based on an ad valorem tax lien for each year from 1986 to 1995, the County of Carteret (\u201cCounty\u201d) foreclosed on real property located in Carteret County. As evidenced by a certificate of tax liability, docketed 7 December 1993, the State of North Carolina (\u201cState\u201d) placed a judgment lien on the same real property, and contends that this lien is superior to the County lien for the years 1994 and 1995. Both the State and the County filed motions for summary judgment. In granting summary judgment in favor of the County, the trial court concluded:\n[The] County\u2019s lien arising by operation of law for county ad val-orem taxes on real property for the 1986 through 1995 tax years, including specifically those arising for the 1994 and 1995 tax years are superior to the judgment lien in favor of the State of North Carolina evidenced by Certificate of Tax liability docketed in the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Carteret County on [7 December 1993] in the amount of $1,603.24 plus interest as set forth therein.\nThe State now appeals this issue to us.\nI.\nState taxes are provided for under the Revenue Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 105-1 to 105-270 (1997), while county taxes are provided for under the Machinery Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 105-271 to 105-396 (1997). Both of these acts set forth priority rules for tax liens. Section 105-241 of the Revenue Act provides in pertinent part:\n(d) Lien. \u2014 This subsection applies except when another Article of this Chapter contains contrary provisions with respect to a lien for a tax levied in that Article. The lien of a tax attaches to all real and personal property of a taxpayer on the date a tax owed by the taxpayer becomes due. The lien continues until the tax and any interest, penalty, and costs associated with the tax are paid. A tax lien is not extinguished by the sale of the taxpayer\u2019s property. A tax lien, however, is not enforceable against a bona fide purchaser for value or the holder of a duly recorded lien unless:\n(1) In the case of real property, a certificate of tax liability or a judgment was first docketed in the office of the clerk of superior court of the county in which the real property is located.\nThe priority of these claims and liens is determined by the date and time of recording, docketing, levy, or bona fide purchase.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-241 (d) (1997) (emphasis added). The pertinent part of Section 105-356 of the Machinery Act provides:\n(a) On Real Property. \u2014 The lien of taxes imposed on real and personal property shall attach to real property [every January 1st]. The priority of that lien shall be determined in accordance with the following rules:\n(1) Subject to the provisions of the Revenue Act prescribing the priority of the lien for State taxes, the lien of taxes imposed under the provisions of this Subchapter shall be superior to all other liens, assessments, charges, rights, and claims of any and every kind in and to the real property to which the lien for taxes attaches regardless of the claimant and regardless of whether acquired prior or subsequent to the attachment of the lien for taxes.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-356(a) (1997) (emphasis added).\nIt is a well-established principle of statutory construction that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, \u201c \u2018there is no room for judicial construction,\u2019 and the statute must be given effect in accordance with its plain and definite meaning.\u201d Avco Financial Services v. Isbell, 67 N.C. App. 341, 343, 312 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1984) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)). In this case, however, the general statutes are ambiguous as to which lien should have priority.\nUnder section 105-356 of the Machinery Act, the county lien is granted priority over \u201call other liens, assessments, charges, rights, and claims of any and every kind in and to the real property to which the lien for taxes attaches regardless of the claimant and regardless of whether acquired prior or subsequent to the attachment of the lien for taxes.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-356 (1997). Under this rule, the county lien would have priority. However, the statute qualifies this first priority by making it \u201c[s]ubject to the provisions of the Revenue Act prescribing the priority of the lien for State taxes.\u201d Id.\nTwo parts of section 105-241 of the Revenue Act discuss the priority of State tax liens.\nFirst, section 105-241 (d) provides that a State tax lien is enforceable against the holder of a duly recorded lien once a certificate of tax liability is filed. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-241(d) (1997). Furthermore, \u201c[t]he priority of these claims and liens is determined by the date and time of recording, docketing, levy, or bona fide purchase.\u201d Id. Therefore, because the section 105-356 lien is \u201csubject to\u201d this rule, once a certificate of tax liability has been filed, the State tax lien becomes enforceable against the county tax lien and furthermore the priority between the liens is determined chronologically.\nHowever, section 105-356 is also \u201csubject to\u201d the second part of section 105-241\u2019s priority rule \u2014 \u201c[Section 105-241] applies except when another Article of this Chapter contains contrary provisions with respect to a lien for a tax levied in that Article.\u201d Id. Section 105-356 \u2014 which provides for first priority for a municipal tax lien\u2014 therefore contains a \u201ccontrary provision.\u201d Thus, section 105-241 would not be applicable. In short, the statutory language leads to circular reasoning without resolution, and is, therefore, ambiguous.\nII.\nHaving concluded that the general statutes are ambiguous on this issue, we now undertake the well-settled practice of examining the underlying policies of the statutes in order to resolve the ambiguity.\nOur court previously addressed this question in County of Lenoir v. Moore, 114 N.C. App. 110, 441 S.E.2d 589 (1994), aff'd, 340 N.C. 104, 455 S.E.2d 158 (1995). There, we considered a statute substantially the same as the present one and held that Machinery Act liens have priority over Revenue Act liens. See id. at 119, 441 S.E.2d at 594. With one justice abstaining, our Supreme Court split evenly when it reviewed that case, and as a result Moore was affirmed without precedential value. See County of Lenoir v. Moore, 340 N.C. 104, 455 S.E.2d 158 (1995). Although we recognize that Moore is not binding authority upon our court, we find its discussion of the policy considerations behind the Machinery and Revenue acts instructive upon the question that we now consider.\nIn Moore, citing Saluda v. Polk County, 207 N.C. 180, 185, 176 S.E. 298, 301 (1934), we noted that \u201creal property ad valorem taxes are inherently public in character: they are statutorily authorized taxes that serve the need of the community as a whole. 114 N.C. App. at 116, 441 S.E.2d at 592. We also noted that the General Assembly expressly recognized the \u201cfirst lien\u201d priority of local ad valorem taxes in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-321(b). Id. at 117-18, 441 S.E.2d at 593. We found further support for our holding in the nature of ad valorem taxes, which arise by operation of law. See id. at 118-19, 441 S.E.2d at 593-94. Moore also noted the long established understanding that local taxes had priority under Chapter 105. See id. at 119-20, 441 S.E.2d at 594.\nIn addition to the factors considered in Moore, the differences in the priority systems provided by the legistature provides further support for the position taken in Moore. Under the Machinery Act, municipal liens are given priority over other liens, \u201cregardless of whether acquired prior or subsequent to the attachment of the lien for taxes.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-356(a)(1) (1997). In contrast, for liens under the Revenue Act, priority \u201cis determined by the date and time of recording, docketing, levy, or bona fide purchase.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-241(d) (1997). Additionally, the Revenue act places limitations on the ability of the State to proceed against a taxpayer\u2019s real property. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-242 (limiting the sale of real property under State certificate of tax liability or judgment with administrative process) and \u00a7 105-242(e) (protecting certain property of taxpayer, including taxpayer\u2019s principal residence, from judgment lien execution, absent special procedures). The Machinery Act does not so limit the county\u2019s foreclosure authority.\nFurthermore, counties are in a better position to purchase and remarket foreclosed land than the state. A local taxing unit can evaluate a property, value it against local market conditions, and bid more efficiently than the State can oversee land sales in one hundred counties. Placing priority with the State lien places it with the unit of government in the poorest position to evaluate and recover tax revenue from a piece of property. Finally, as the County of Carteret points out, the State has access to numerous revenue sources, while counties primarily rely on ad valorem taxes.\nIn light of these considerations, we conclude that the general assembly did not intend to allow the State to cut off local tax liens, which is a county\u2019s major recourse for collecting tax revenue, upon the filing of a certificate of tax liability. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the county\u2019s lien had priority over the state lien.\nAffirmed.\nJudge MARTIN, Mark D., concurs.\nJudge GREENE dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Greene\ndissenting.\nThe majority correctly notes the well-established principle of statutory construction that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, \u201c \u2018there is no room for judicial construction,\u2019 and the statute must be given effect in accordance with its plain and definite meaning.\u201d Avco Financial Services v. Isbell, 67 N.C. App. 341, 343, 312 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1984) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)). Unlike the majority, however, I believe that the statutory provisions relevant to this case are unambiguous. The Machinery Act\u2019s priority rules are plainly \u201c[s]ubject to the provisions of the Revenue Act prescribing the priority of the lien for State taxes . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-356(a)(1) (1997). While the Revenue Act states that it does not apply \u201cwhen another Article of this Chapter contains contrary provisions with respect to a lien for a tax levied in that Article . . . ,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 105-241(d) (1997), the Machinery Act does not contain contrary provisions because of the \u201csubject to\u201d language contained therein. By plainly subjecting the otherwise contrary provisions of the Machinery Act to the provisions of the Revenue Act, the legislature leaves no room for the majority\u2019s judicial construction. The Revenue Act therefore provides the priority rules as between state and local taxes. Under the straightforward language of the Revenue Act, state tax liens are deemed superior to local ad valorem tax liens when they are docketed in the office of the county clerk of court prior to the date the ad valorem tax liens are perfected by operation of law.\nThe majority notes, and I acknowledge, that this Court has previously held that county ad valorem tax liens have priority over state tax liens, even when the state tax lien is docketed in advance of the county lien. County of Lenoir v. Moore, 114 N.C. App. 110, 441 S.E.2d 589 (1994), aff\u2019d by an equally divided Court, 340 N.C. 104, 455 S.E.2d 158 (1995). The Moore opinion, however, was affirmed by our Supreme Court \u201cwithout precedential value\u201d and accordingly we must resolve the issue \u201cwithout regard\u201d to Moore. Elliot v. N. C. Dept. of Human Resources, 115 N.C. App. 613, 620, 446 S.E.2d 809, 813-14 (1994), aff\u2019d per curiam, 341 N.C. 191, 459 S.E.2d 273 (1995). In any event, the language of the statute at issue in this case is different from the language contained in the statute controlling the resolution of the issue presented in Moore, in that the legislature has amended the Revenue Act and has deleted some of the language relied on by the Moore majority.\nIn this case, the State docketed a Certificate of Tax Liability in the Carteret County Clerk of Superior Court\u2019s office on 7 December 1993. The County ad valorem tax liens, which arose by operation of law on 1 January 1994 and 1 January 1995, were therefore inferior to the properly docketed state lien. Accordingly, I would reverse both the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for the County and the trial court\u2019s denial of summary judgment for the State, and remand for entry of summary judgment for the State.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Greene" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General George W. Boylan, for the State.", "Beven W. Wall, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COUNTY OF CARTERET, Plaintiff v. CURTIS L. LONG; RICHARD RICHARDSON and wife, ARLETHA RICHARDSON; THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (LIENOR), Defendants\nNo. COA97-39\n(Filed 3 February 1998)\nTaxation \u00a7 208 (NCI4th)\u2014 ad valorem tax lien \u2014 priority over State tax lien\nCounty ad valorem tax liens under the Machinery Act have priority over State tax liens under the Revenue Act even when the State tax lien is docketed in advance of the county lien. Although the statutes are ambiguous as to which lien should have priority, policy considerations support the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to allow the State to cut off local tax liens, which are the county\u2019s major recourse for collecting tax revenue, upon the filing of a certificate of tax liability. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 105-241(d), 105-356(a).\nJudge Greene dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant, the State of North Carolina, from Judgment of Foreclosure on Tax Lien dated 26 September 1996 by Judge Jerry F. Waddell in Carteret County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 September 1997.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General George W. Boylan, for the State.\nBeven W. Wall, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0477-01", "first_page_order": 513, "last_page_order": 519 }