{ "id": 11648386, "name": "ELIZABETH B. ROBERTSON; HARDA A. CALLICUTT and spouse, GERALENE CALLICUTT; LOIE J. PRIDDY and spouse, NANCY C. PRIDDY; WILLIAM A. JONES and spouse, DOROTHY M. JONES; HAROLD E. YOUNG and spouse, JEWELL S. YOUNG; WILLIAM H. SWINSON and spouse, CHRISTINE N. SWINSON; BILLY S. INGRAM and spouse, SARAH C. INGRAM; JOHN C. SINQUEFIELD and spouse, NORA JANE SINQUEFIELD; DONALD R. BREWER, SR. and spouse, PAULETTE C. BREWER; THOMAS S. STEVENS, JR. and spouse, MARGARET STEVENS; MICHAEL L. NIFONG and spouse, TAMMY M. NIFONG; DONALD R. BREWER, JR. and spouse, JENNIFER G. BREWER; WALTER C. SPARING and spouse, IRENE K. SPARING; NELL L. WILLARD; KEITH A. HUTCHENS and spouse, JANET L. HUTCHENS; FRANK P. KERSEY; JOHN W. HILL and spouse, ADDLINE D. HILL; HAZEL C. KERSEY; HAROLD G. MORGAN and spouse, MARIE H. MORGAN; INA H. KERSEY, and FRANK DILLARD and J.A. KEY, Trustees of OAK GROVE BAPTIST CHURCH, and MAXINE GREEN, KEITH BAMBALIS, BILLY S. INGRAM, SR., TIM MOORE, ARNOLD BECK, MICHELLE HAMILTON, TRUSTEES, MITCHELL'S GROVE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF HIGH POINT, and WACHOVIA MORTGAGE COMPANY, NEW SALEM, INC. (Trustee), BRANCH BANKING & TRUST COMPANY, JERONE C. HERRING (Trustee), CHASE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., and 1st HOME FINANCIAL CORPORATION (Trustee), Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Robertson v. City of High Point", "decision_date": "1998-03-17", "docket_number": "No. COA97-665", "first_page": "88", "last_page": "92", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 N.C. App. 88" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525419 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558925, 2556401, 2557239, 2559480, 2556571 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0739-05", "/nc/339/0739-04", "/nc/339/0739-01", "/nc/339/0739-03", "/nc/339/0739-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524741 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527171 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(16)" }, { "page": "(16)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526229 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" }, { "page": "848" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521851 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738404, 4737929, 4740404, 4738486, 4734713 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0694-03", "/nc/318/0694-02", "/nc/318/0694-05", "/nc/318/0694-01", "/nc/318/0694-04" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358214 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0155-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 586, "char_count": 11207, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.569176040005974e-07, "percentile": 0.8861958747401876 }, "sha256": "a2387e05695eee2499986452b379083e3897ab0960b2f2968f197a01af97906c", "simhash": "1:e9381df2b27b065c", "word_count": 1828 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:14:06.814789+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge ARNOLD and Judge MARTIN, John C., concur." ], "parties": [ "ELIZABETH B. ROBERTSON; HARDA A. CALLICUTT and spouse, GERALENE CALLICUTT; LOIE J. PRIDDY and spouse, NANCY C. PRIDDY; WILLIAM A. JONES and spouse, DOROTHY M. JONES; HAROLD E. YOUNG and spouse, JEWELL S. YOUNG; WILLIAM H. SWINSON and spouse, CHRISTINE N. SWINSON; BILLY S. INGRAM and spouse, SARAH C. INGRAM; JOHN C. SINQUEFIELD and spouse, NORA JANE SINQUEFIELD; DONALD R. BREWER, SR. and spouse, PAULETTE C. BREWER; THOMAS S. STEVENS, JR. and spouse, MARGARET STEVENS; MICHAEL L. NIFONG and spouse, TAMMY M. NIFONG; DONALD R. BREWER, JR. and spouse, JENNIFER G. BREWER; WALTER C. SPARING and spouse, IRENE K. SPARING; NELL L. WILLARD; KEITH A. HUTCHENS and spouse, JANET L. HUTCHENS; FRANK P. KERSEY; JOHN W. HILL and spouse, ADDLINE D. HILL; HAZEL C. KERSEY; HAROLD G. MORGAN and spouse, MARIE H. MORGAN; INA H. KERSEY, and FRANK DILLARD and J.A. KEY, Trustees of OAK GROVE BAPTIST CHURCH, and MAXINE GREEN, KEITH BAMBALIS, BILLY S. INGRAM, SR., TIM MOORE, ARNOLD BECK, MICHELLE HAMILTON, TRUSTEES, MITCHELL\u2019S GROVE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF HIGH POINT, and WACHOVIA MORTGAGE COMPANY, NEW SALEM, INC. (Trustee), BRANCH BANKING & TRUST COMPANY, JERONE C. HERRING (Trustee), CHASE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., and 1st HOME FINANCIAL CORPORATION (Trustee), Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nPlaintiffs collectively own residential and undeveloped property adjacent to or near the Kersey Valley Landfill (\u201clandfill\u201d) which is owned and operated by the City of High Point. Plaintiffs allege that defendant began recurrent dumping of solid waste onto the 118.867-acre landfill beginning 9 October 1993 up through the date of the filing of this lawsuit on 23 December 1996.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges: (1) inverse condemnation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51 (1984); (2) nuisance; (3) negligence; (4) trespass; and (6) infringement of constitutional rights based on freedom of worship. All causes of action were dismissed by Judge Judson D. DeRamus, Jr., pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1990). Plaintiffs appeal.\nThe only issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) provides that \u201c[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted ... is addressed to whether the facts alleged in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, give rise to a claim for relief on any theory.\u201d Ford v. Peaches Entertainment Corp., 83 N.C. App. 155, 156, 349 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1986), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 694, 351 S.E.2d 746 (1987). This type of motion \u201cshould not be allowed unless the pleadings disclose the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim or some other insurmountable bar to recovery.\u201d Smith v. City of Charlotte, 79 N.C. App. 517, 528, 339 S.E.2d 844, 851 (1986).\nPlaintiffs argue their complaint was filed in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51 provides that an action for inverse condemnation must be initiated \u201cwithin 24 months of the date of the taking of the affected property or the completion of the project involving the taking, whichever shall occur later.\u201d However, since plaintiffs know when the actual taking occurred, they do not need to show their action was instituted within 24 months of the completion of a project. McAdoo v. City of Greensboro, 91 N.C. App. 570, 572, 372 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1988). The rule is that a statute of limitations on an inverse condemnation claim begins running when plaintiffs\u2019 property first suffers injury. Lea Co., 308 N.C. at 629, 304 S.E.2d at 181.\nIn the instant case, plaintiffs had reasonable opportunity to discover that their property was injured well before the running of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint states the landfill operation caused damage to their property beginning 9 October 1993. However, the complaint was filed 23 December 1996. Plaintiffs \u201coffer no explanation for their delay in filing this action, nor does it appear legally excusable . . . .\u201d See Smith, 79 N.C. App. at 523, 339 S.E.2d at 848. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to comply with the statute of limitations in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51.\nPlaintiffs allege that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51 does not preempt plaintiffs\u2019 nuisance, negligence, and trespass claims, and further, that these tort claims are not banned by the statute of limitations provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51. Instead, plaintiffs claim their nuisance, negligence and trespass claims are confined to the 36-month period prior to the date of filing of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52(3) (1996) provides that, \u201c[w]hen the trespass is a continuing one, the action shall be commenced within three years from the original trespass, and not thereafter.\u201d Additionally, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52(16) provides that an action for physical damage to claimant\u2019s property shall not accrue until it becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to claimant. The primary purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52(16) is that it is intended to apply to plaintiffs with latent injuries. Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 493, 329 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1985). However, where plaintiffs clearly know more than three years prior to bringing suit about damages, yet take no legal action until the statute of limitations has run, the fact that further damage is caused does not bring about a new cause of action. See Pembee Mfg. Corp., 313 N.C. at 494, 329 S.E.2d at 354.\nFor the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs have also failed to meet the three-year statute of limitations for these claims. The complaint states the landfill operation caused damage to their property beginning 9 October 1993, although the complaint was not filed until 23 December 1996. More than three years transpired from the time of the beginning of the claim and the filing of the complaint. Thus, these claims are barred by the statute of limitations.\nBased on our ruling that these claims would be barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations as well as the two-year statute of limitations in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51, it is unnecessary for us to address plaintiffs\u2019 argument that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51 does not preempt plaintiffs\u2019 nuisance, negligence, and trespass tort claims. The face of the complaint disclosed an insurmountable bar to recovery in that the complaint was filed after the applicable statutes of limitations had run. Small v. Britt, 64 N.C. App. 533, 535, 307 S.E.2d 771, 773 (1983).\nFinally, plaintiff Oak Grove Baptist Church (\u201cOak Grove\u201d) claims infringement of its constitutional right to freedom of religion is not preempted by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51, that Oak Grove has a direct cause of action under the state constitution. Oak Grove essentially alleges that the landfill prevents it from having full use and enjoyment of its property for outdoor worship and social events. Plaintiffs are therefore seeking equitable relief of an injunction. However, the general rule is that, if there is an adequate remedy at law, then an equitable remedy such as an injunction would be inappropriate. Peace River Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Ward Transformer Co., 116 N.C. App. 493, 508, 449 S.E.2d 202, 213 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 739, 454 S.E.2d 655 (1995).\nAnother general rule is that a direct cause of action under the state constitution i\u00e1 permitted only in the absence of an adequate state remedy. Davis v. Town of Southern Pines, 116 N.C. App. 663, 675, 449 S.E.2d 240, 247 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 648 (1995). In the instant case, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51 would have provided an adequate state remedy. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51 provides compensation for a total or partial taking of real property interests. Monetary damages would have adequately compensated the church for any alleged taking of its property. Plaintiffs cannot now claim they did not have an adequate state remedy based on their own failure to comply with the statute of limitations. Since N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 40A-51 provides an adequate state remedy, plaintiffs do not have a right to an injunction, nor do they have a direct cause of action under the state constitution.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge ARNOLD and Judge MARTIN, John C., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ben Farmer for plaintiff appellants.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Roddey M. Lig\u00f3n, Jr., and Gusti W. Frankel,for City of High Point defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ELIZABETH B. ROBERTSON; HARDA A. CALLICUTT and spouse, GERALENE CALLICUTT; LOIE J. PRIDDY and spouse, NANCY C. PRIDDY; WILLIAM A. JONES and spouse, DOROTHY M. JONES; HAROLD E. YOUNG and spouse, JEWELL S. YOUNG; WILLIAM H. SWINSON and spouse, CHRISTINE N. SWINSON; BILLY S. INGRAM and spouse, SARAH C. INGRAM; JOHN C. SINQUEFIELD and spouse, NORA JANE SINQUEFIELD; DONALD R. BREWER, SR. and spouse, PAULETTE C. BREWER; THOMAS S. STEVENS, JR. and spouse, MARGARET STEVENS; MICHAEL L. NIFONG and spouse, TAMMY M. NIFONG; DONALD R. BREWER, JR. and spouse, JENNIFER G. BREWER; WALTER C. SPARING and spouse, IRENE K. SPARING; NELL L. WILLARD; KEITH A. HUTCHENS and spouse, JANET L. HUTCHENS; FRANK P. KERSEY; JOHN W. HILL and spouse, ADDLINE D. HILL; HAZEL C. KERSEY; HAROLD G. MORGAN and spouse, MARIE H. MORGAN; INA H. KERSEY, and FRANK DILLARD and J.A. KEY, Trustees of OAK GROVE BAPTIST CHURCH, and MAXINE GREEN, KEITH BAMBALIS, BILLY S. INGRAM, SR., TIM MOORE, ARNOLD BECK, MICHELLE HAMILTON, TRUSTEES, MITCHELL\u2019S GROVE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF HIGH POINT, and WACHOVIA MORTGAGE COMPANY, NEW SALEM, INC. (Trustee), BRANCH BANKING & TRUST COMPANY, JERONE C. HERRING (Trustee), CHASE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., and 1st HOME FINANCIAL CORPORATION (Trustee), Defendants\nNo. COA97-665\n(Filed 17 March 1998)\n1. Eminent Domain \u00a7 296 (NCI4th)\u2014 landfill adjacent to plaintiffs\u2019 property \u2014 inverse condemnation \u2014 statute of limitations \u2014 accrual\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss an inverse condemnation claim arising from a landfill under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) based on the two-year statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-51. The rule is that a statute of limitations on an inverse condemnation claim begins running when the property first suffers injury; here, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that the landfill caused damage to their property beginning 9 October 1993, but the complaint was filed 23 December 1996. Plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to discover that their property was injured well before the running of the statute of limitations and offered no explanation for their delay.\n2. Limitations, Repose, and Laches \u00a7 42 (NCI4th)\u2014 landfill adjacent to plaintiffs\u2019 property \u2014 statute of limitations\u2014 accrual\nAlthough plaintiffs argued in an action arising from a landfill adjacent to their property that their claims for nuisance, negligence, and trespass were not banned by the two-year statute of limitations for inverse condemnation in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-51, they failed to meet the three-year statute of limitations where the complaint was not filed until 23 December 1996 and clearly states that the landfill operation caused damage to their property beginning 9 October 1993. Where plaintiffs clearly know about damages more than three years prior to bringing suit but take no legal action until the statute of limitations has run, the fact that further damage is caused does not bring about a new cause of action.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 119 (NCI4th)\u2014 landfill adjacent to church \u2014 inverse condemnation \u2014 adequate state remedy\u2014 running of statute of limitations \u2014 remedy not thereby inadequate\nPlaintiff church had neither a right to an injunction nor a direct cause of action under the state constitution based on the claim that an adjacent landfill prevents it from having full use and enjoyment of its property for outdoor worship and social events. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 40A-51 provides an adequate state remedy for a partial or total taking of real property interests and plaintiffs cannot claim an inadequate state remedy based on their own failure to comply with the statute of limitations.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from grant of motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) entered 7 April 1997 by Judge Judson D. DeRamus, Jr., in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 1998.\nBen Farmer for plaintiff appellants.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by Roddey M. Lig\u00f3n, Jr., and Gusti W. Frankel,for City of High Point defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0088-01", "first_page_order": 128, "last_page_order": 132 }