{ "id": 11649601, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEMETRIUS ANTOINE COFIELD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cofield", "decision_date": "1998-04-21", "docket_number": "No. COA97-609", "first_page": "268", "last_page": "282", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 N.C. App. 268" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "remanding for a presiding criminal judge to hold a Batson hearing where the trial court had erred in determining that the prima facie showing had not been made and had therefore prematurely ended the Batson inquiry" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521815 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "remanding for a presiding criminal judge to hold a Batson hearing where the trial court had erred in determining that the prima facie showing had not been made and had therefore prematurely ended the Batson inquiry" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569570, 8569636, 8569595, 8569660, 8569693 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0307-01", "/nc/305/0307-03", "/nc/305/0307-02", "/nc/305/0307-04", "/nc/305/0307-05" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527117 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695126 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4773087 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793127 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 861", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 1163", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1563776, 1564168, 1564266, 1564141, 1564185, 1564207, 1564017, 1564339, 1564245, 1563670, 1563736, 1564153, 1564058, 1563837, 1563864 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1163-04", "/us/515/1163-08", "/us/515/1163-07", "/us/515/1163-02", "/us/515/1163-03", "/us/515/1163-11", "/us/515/1163-10", "/us/515/1163-13", "/us/515/1163-14", "/us/515/1163-05", "/us/515/1163-06", "/us/515/1163-12", "/us/515/1163-15", "/us/515/1163-09", "/us/515/1163-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518053 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4699127 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 532, 342 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558792 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 532, 342 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737959 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 108, 347 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552935 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 108, 347 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561304 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Quick, 323 N.C. 675, 682, 375 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867648 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Quick, 323 N.C. 675, 682, 375 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554806 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 794", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "mere showing that State peremptorily challenged more African-American jurors than Caucasian jurors was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796135 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "mere showing that State peremptorily challenged more African-American jurors than Caucasian jurors was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is not unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more blacks from the jury.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793102 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "reaffirming Batson's \"treatment of intent to discriminate as a pure issue of fact\"" }, { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "reaffirming Batson's \"treatment of intent to discriminate as a pure issue of fact\"" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "363-64" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998 WL 125185", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 832", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 328571, 327557, 323846, 324361, 324778, 325787, 323667, 324371, 325527, 325720, 327611, 324060, 327645, 326782 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0832-07", "/us/516/0832-08", "/us/516/0832-11", "/us/516/0832-06", "/us/516/0832-12", "/us/516/0832-04", "/us/516/0832-14", "/us/516/0832-10", "/us/516/0832-13", "/us/516/0832-03", "/us/516/0832-01", "/us/516/0832-05", "/us/516/0832-02", "/us/516/0832-09" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558850, 2558601, 2557395, 2557494, 2556220 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0619-02", "/nc/339/0619-03", "/nc/339/0619-01", "/nc/339/0619-05", "/nc/339/0619-04" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556750 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "80" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53983 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491524, 2490757, 2487690, 2488241, 2492148 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0712-05", "/nc/325/0712-04", "/nc/325/0712-03", "/nc/325/0712-02", "/nc/325/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521620 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886", "parenthetical": "\"Clearly, after McCollum, a trial court is now vested with the authority to conduct [a Batson] inquiry [into peremptory challenges made by defense counsel] when the State has established a prima facie case of discrimination. \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523015 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "\"Clearly, after McCollum, a trial court is now vested with the authority to conduct [a Batson] inquiry [into peremptory challenges made by defense counsel] when the State has established a prima facie case of discrimination. \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 42", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1480976 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487604 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867634 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11319062 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1160, "char_count": 34563, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8532816868991414e-07, "percentile": 0.7238487649279939 }, "sha256": "e3e8a8c85ce70f9ac7c198560b061c0406356c61591d45be9a8ddc0c0dcfde66", "simhash": "1:87b05562637fbd52", "word_count": 5551 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:14:06.814789+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WALKER and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEMETRIUS ANTOINE COFIELD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nDemetrius Antoine Cofield (Defendant) appeals his conviction for the first-degree murder of Mohammed Suleiman Mullah (Mullah) in the perpetration of attempted armed robbery.\nDuring jury selection, defense counsel peremptorily challenged prospective jurors Anita Cooke (Cooke), James Russ (Russ), Milton Moore, Jr. (Moore), and Michael Speight (Speight) on behalf of Defendant, who is African-American. The State objected to their removal, contending that the challenges at issue were racially motivated, and noted that \u201ceach of these four jurors . . . are Caucasian, [and] have given no .. . answers that the State would feel would entitle [defense] counsel to remove them . . . .\u201d\nThe State specifically noted that Cooke had indicated that she would consider both the death penalty and life imprisonment, and had stated there was no reason she could not be fair. The State also noted that one of the accepted African-American jurors \u201chas almost the identical credentials [as Cooke, and these jurors] parallel each other consistently and entirely.\u201d As for Russ, the State contended that \u201che\u2019s heard about the incident, just like Number Two, who is black, yet the defendant is willing to let Number Two sit up there, when both Number Two and [Russ] have almost identical credentials.\u201d As for Moore, \u201che has been on a jury, just as Number Two, who is black, has been on a jury. He has said he could consider both punishments. He has given no reason .. . that the State has heard that would show that he is impartial to [Defendant] in any way.\u201d As for Speight, the State contended that he \u201chas indicated that he could consider both [life and death] punishments. He has given no indication that the State has seen that he would be impartial, or unfair to this [Defendant] in any way.\u201d\nThe Court found the following facts:\nThe Jury passed to [Defendant] consisted of four black males, two white males, two black females and four white females. . . . The challenged jurors were all white .... [T]he Court listened to the juror voir dire, which is of record, and examined juror questionnaires of the jurors passed by the State to [Defendant]; . . . that the Court adopts the objections of the State and the questions and answers of the jurors on voir dire and the information contained in the questionnaire as its findings of fact.\nThe trial court found that the State had made out a prima facie case of racially motivated peremptory challenges.\nDefense counsel then attempted to rebut the State\u2019s prima facie case with race-neutral explanations for the challenges. As for Cooke, defense counsel stated that she was formerly employed by Nash General Hospital. \u201cShe, by her own admission and own statement, indicated that she was familiar with Doctor Levy. Doctor Levy [who performed the autopsy on Mullah] is a very important witness in this case for the State . . . .\u201d Defense counsel also noted that Cooke\u2019s sister-in-law was a victim of a recent breaking and entering, and that her uncle had worked with the Rocky Mount Police Department, as did the officers involved in Defendant\u2019s case. Defense counsel explained that Russ was challenged because \u201cwhen asked as to his race, he calls himself Caucasian [rather than white],\u201d and this indicated to defense counsel \u201cthat, perhaps, this gentleman has, in his own mind, some difficulty with races.\u201d In addition, Russ had requested, and the trial court had denied, excusal from jury duty for health reasons. Furthermore, defense counsel noted that Russ had served as a pilot in the military, and \u201cwe do not need to have individuals with the propensities of a prior military record serving on a jury in this case . . . base[d] ... on the experience of counsel, both personally and also in general.\u201d Russ also \u201cis a member of the VFW, nothing finer than the VFW, but in this case we do not believe that a member of VFW should be sitting as a member in this case, on the jury panel.\u201d Finally, defense counsel stated that Russ had been challenged in part due to the fact that his facial expressions appeared to reveal some concern on his part that a family member had been raped in the past. As for Moore, defense counsel stated that he had a \u201cdom-inat[ing]\u201d attitude when he answered questions. Moore described his race as \u201cAnglo-Saxon\u201d on the jury questionnaire, and defense counsel felt that this might mean that \u201crace causes [Moore] some difficulty.\u201d Moore also had a military background, and \u201cis a member of the Rainbow Gun Club.\u201d As for Speight, defense counsel felt he \u201cvery clearly was . . . telling a lie to the Court, when the Court was asking him questions concerning how he knew [one of the witnesses], and why he didn\u2019t bring that to the Court\u2019s attention before.\u201d In addition, defense counsel \u201cjust did not like [Speight], did not like his attitude. He did not look us in the eye, he didn\u2019t look up. We thought he was being deceptive, being untruthful.\u201d\nThe State did not immediately offer any additional argument as to the four challenged jurors. The trial court removed Speight pursuant to defense counsel\u2019s peremptory challenge, but sustained the State\u2019s objections to the removal of the other three prospective jurors challenged. After additional questioning of the prospective jurors, defense counsel again peremptorily challenged Cooke, Russ, and Moore, offering the following additional reasons:\nMoore refuses to answer the questions asked and posed upon him by counsel. His answer to any questions were over and over that he didn\u2019t remember. His attitude as displayed in the courtroom was not only obnoxious, but was rude. . . .\nIn addition, [Moore] was mimicking what the Court was saying to counsel earlier about, \u201cThat\u2019s already been asked. You\u2019ve already asked that\u201d ... on at least two occasions. [Moore]... was the foreperson on a previous jury. . . .\n[Russ did not complete his answers, and] has a family member who has suffered from a rape in the past. . . .\n[Cooke] was familiar [with] and ... knew Dr. Levy, [an expert witness for the State].... [S]he only saw him once or so, or twice or so. Nevertheless, she . . . has a family member, who was a sister-in-law that was involved in a breaking and entering, and . . . she has a retired uncle from the [police department involved in this case].\nThe trial court, after hearing defense counsel\u2019s explanations for use of the Defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges, found \u201cthat [defense counsel] failed to advance race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges at issue,\u201d and \u201chad failed to rebut the prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination.\u201d\nAlthough the trial court determined that defense counsel\u2019s explanations were not facially race neutral, it nonetheless allowed the State to offer surrebuttal arguments that defense counsel\u2019s explanations were merely pretextual excuses for purposeful racial discrimination. The State noted:\n[Cooke\u2019s] relative, her uncle, she said . . . that she was \u201ca little girl\u201d when he retired [from the police department]. . . . She does not [currently] know anybody with [that police department].. . .\nAs to [Moore], Your Honor, if there had been any \u201cobnoxious\u201d attitude elicited, it\u2019s been, the State would contend, because [Moore] has been asked the same question, with all respect to counsel, at least three or four times, and each time, including the first time, he gave an articulate, intelligent answer, which the State could understand what he was saying the first time. We would say he probably feels his answer was articulate and intelligent the first time, and if he gets obnoxious [it\u2019s] because he\u2019s asked the same thing four times.\n[Russ] said [the] \u201crape [of a family member] occurred nine to ten years ago [and] was resolved to his satisfaction\u201d. .. [and] he concluded ... by saying he could consider life imprisonment.\nThe trial court noted that:\n[It had] followed the voir dire examination closely, observed the demeanor of the jurors in question, and the attorneys, observed the expressions of the jurors and their reactions to the questions asked and listened to the tone of their voices and their answers to the questions propounded; and that the Court read nothing in the questionnaires that was not later explained, heard no answer and noticed nothing in the demeanor of the three jurors or the manner in which they answered that would disqualify them from serving impartially.\nThe trial court then found \u201cthat the reason advanced by [defense counsel] for exercising the challenges was vague and merely a pretext and purposely racially discriminatory.\u201d The jury which ultimately heard Defendant\u2019s case was composed of seven African-American jurors and five Caucasian jurors, and included Cooke, Russ, and Moore.\nUndisputed evidence revealed that on the afternoon .of 6 November 1995, Mullah, the cashier of Branch Street Grocery (the Store) in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, received a fatal gunshot wound. Defendant, who was then a seventeen-year-old high school student, gave the following statement (Statement) to the police that same evening:\nI told Jimmy to give me the burner, gun. Jimmy gave me the gun. I told them I was going to the [Store]. I was wearing a blue raincoat with the hood pulled down to just above my eyes, and a bandanna over the bottom of my face to my nose.\nI went inside the [Store] and Jimmy stayed out front. Inside [I] pointed the 9-millimeter at [Mullah] and said, \u201cYo, give me your loot; give me your loot.\u201d\n[Mullah] just laughed at me. I told him again to give me the loot. He kept laughing and reached under the counter. I fired the gun and ran out.\nAn officer wrote out this Statement as Defendant gave it, and Defendant signed it. Defendant made a motion to suppress this Statement, which the trial court denied. The trial court, after concluding that \u201cDefendant purposely, freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waived each of his rights and made a [Statement],\u201d admitted it into evidence over Defendant\u2019s objection at trial.\nAt trial, Rodney Massenburg (Massenburg) testified that he saw Defendant with a gun, and then saw Defendant go into the Store alone. Massenburg heard one gunshot while Defendant was in the Store, then saw Defendant exit the Store and place the gun in his pants. When Massenburg went inside the Store to investigate, Mullah was fatally wounded and lying on the floor behind the counter where the cash register was located.\nDefendant testified in court that he was not in the Store when Mullah was shot, and that he did not attempt to rob the Store.\nDefendant made a motion to dismiss the charges against him, and in the alternative, requested jury instructions on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The trial court denied both requests. The jury found Defendant guilty of attempted robbery with a firearm and of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.\nThe issues are whether: (I) Defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges against three jurors were racially motivated; (II) there was substantial evidence that Defendant was guilty of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of attempted robbery with a firearm; and (III) the evidence supported submission of second-degree murder.\nI\nIn Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991), the United States Supreme Court established a three-step test to determine whether the State\u2019s peremptory challenges of prospective jurors are purposefully discriminatory. Under Batson, the defendant must first successfully establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88. If the prima facie case is not established, it follows that the peremptory challenges are allowed. If the prima facie case is established, however, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge at issue. Id. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88. If the prosecutor fails to rebut the prima facie case of racial discrimination with race-neutral explanations, it follows that the peremptory challenges are not allowed. If the prosecutor does rebut the prima facie case with race-neutral explanations, the defendant has a right of sur-rebuttal to show that the prosecutor\u2019s explanations were merely pre-textual. State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176, 472 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996); State v. Green, 324 N.C. 238, 240, 376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1989). If the trial court finds that the race-neutral reasons are not pretex-tual, the peremptory challenges are allowed. If the trial court finds, however, that the race-neutral explanations are pretextual, it follows that the peremptory challenges at issue are purposefully discriminatory; they are therefore not allowed.\nBatson has been expanded to prohibit not only the State, but also criminal defendants from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in their exercise of peremptory challenges. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992); State v. Austin, 111 N.C. App. 590, 597, 432 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1993) (\u201cClearly, after McCollum, a trial court is now vested with the authority to conduct [a Batson] inquiry [into peremptory challenges made by defense counsel] when the State has established a prima facie case of discrimination. \u201d).\nTo allow for appellate review, the trial court must make specific findings of fact at each stage of the Batson inquiry that it reaches. State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 500, 383 S.E.2d 409, 413, disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 712, 388 S.E.2d 470 (1989). Appellate courts must uphold the trial court\u2019s findings unless they are \u201cclearly erroneous.\u201d State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 210, 481 S.E.2d 44, 58 (quoting State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 78, 451 S.E.2d 543, 553 (1994), reconsideration denied, 339 N.C. 619, 453 S.E.2d 188, and cert. denied, 516 U.S. 832, 133 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995)), cert. denied sub nom., Chambers v. North Carolina, - U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997), and cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, - L. Ed. 2d -, 1998 WL 125185 (1998). \u201c[W]here there axe two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 412 (1991) (reaffirming Batson\u2019s \u201ctreatment of intent to discriminate as a pure issue of fact\u201d). Furthermore, this standard allows for reversal only when a \u201creviewing court on the entire evidence [is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha[s] been committed.\u201d Id.\nA. Prima Facie Showing\nTo challenge the defense counsel\u2019s exercise of the defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges, the State must first establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Barnes, 345 N.C. at 209, 481 S.E.2d at 57. A prima facie case \u201cneed only show that the relevant circumstances raise an inference that [counsel] used peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely because of their race.\u201d State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 144, 462 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1995). \u201cRelevant circumstances\u201d include:\n[T]he defendant\u2019s race, the victim\u2019s race, the race of the key witnesses, questions and statements of the [challenging attorney] which tend to support or refute an inference of discrimination, repeated use of peremptory challenges against [prospective jurors of a particular race] such that it tends to establish a pattern of strikes . . . , use of a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges to strike [prospective jurors of a particular race] in a single case, and the [challenging attorney\u2019s] acceptance rate of potential [jurors of this race].\nQuick, 341 N.C. at 145, 462 S.E.2d at 189. A showing that more jurors of one race were peremptorily challenged than jurors of another race does not, standing alone, establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 36, 463 S.E.2d 738, 755 (1995) (mere showing that State peremptorily challenged more African-American jurors than Caucasian jurors was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 134 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1996); Quick, 341 N.C. at 145, 462 S.E.2d at 189 (\u201c[I]t is not unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more blacks from the jury.\u201d).\nIn this case, Defendant is African-American. Just prior to defense counsel\u2019s exercise of Defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges, the jury consisted of six African-American jurors and six Caucasian jurors. Defense counsel peremptorily challenged no African-American jurors at this point, but did peremptorily challenge four Caucasian jurors\u2014 two-thirds of the Caucasian jurors then available. These are relevant circumstances tending to reveal a \u201cpattern of strikes\u201d against Caucasian jurors by defense counsel, as well as defense counsel\u2019s disproportionate use of peremptory challenges to strike Caucasian jurors. Furthermore, in making out its prima facie case, the State noted other relevant circumstances, including the facts that African-American jurors remaining on the jury panel \u201cparalleled] \u201d the challenged Caucasian jurors (i.e., one non-challenged African-American juror had previously heard about the case, one had previously served on a jury, and a close relative of one accepted African-American juror had been victimized in the past), that the challenged Caucasian jurors had indicated that they could consider both life imprisonment and the death penalty, and that none had demonstrated any partiality. The trial corut, in \u201cadopting] the objections of the State\u201d in its findings of fact, demonstrated its agreement on these points. These relevant circumstances in the record support the trial court\u2019s determination that a prima facie case of discrimination was shown by the State. Applying the clearly erroneous standard of review, we are not \u201cleft with the definite and firm conviction\u201d that the trial court erred in this threshold Batson determination.\nB. Race-Neutral Explanation\nAfter the State has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defense counsel to offer \u201can explanation based on something other than the race of the juror[s].\u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 406. Defense counsel\u2019s explanations need not \u201crise to the level justifying a challenge for cause,\u201d and need not be \u201cpersuasive, or even plausible.\u201d Barnes, 345 N.C. at 209, 481 S.E.2d at 57. In fact, the challenges may be based on defense counsel\u2019s \u201clegitimate hunches and past experience.\u201d Id. Defense counsel must, however, articulate \u201clegitimate race-neutral reasons that are clear, reasonably specific, and related to the particular case to be tried.\u201d Peterson, 344 N.C. at 176, 472 S.E.2d at 732. \u201cUnless a discriminatory intent is inherent in [defense counsel\u2019s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral [at this secondary stage of the inquiry].\u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 406.\nIn this case, defense counsel\u2019s explanations for peremptorily challenging Cooke included that Cooke knew one of the State\u2019s expert witnesses, that her sister was a victim of a recent breaking and entering, and that her uncle worked in the same police department as officers involved in the case. Each of these reasons is reasonably specific and related to this case, and none, on their face, are racially motivated.\nAs for Russ and Moore, defense counsel stated that they were peremptorily challenged because defense counsel felt that they appeared to have \u201csome difficulty with races.\u201d Both Russ and Moore had served in the military. Russ was a member of the VFW. Moore was a member of a gun club. Defense counsel noted that \u201con the experience of counsel,\u201d these associations were unsatisfactory to Defendant. Defense counsel was also concerned about some of Russ\u2019s facial expressions when questioned about a family member who had previously been raped. These reasons, like those given for Cooke, were reasonably specific, related to this case, facially race neutral, and based on defense counsel\u2019s \u201chunches and past experience.\u201d\nFinally, defense counsel felt that Speight had been deceptive, and would not look defense counsel \u201cin the eye.\u201d Again, these reasons are reasonably specific, related to the case, and facially race neutral.\nThe trial court found that defense counsel had \u201cfailed to advance race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges at issue,\u201d and therefore had \u201cfailed to rebut the prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination.\u201d As any facially race-neutral reason offered by the challenging attorney \u201cwill be deemed race neutral\u201d unless a discriminatory intent \u201cis inherent in the explanation,\u201d the trial court clearly erred in finding that defense counsel had failed to offer race-neutral explanations for his peremptory challenges. Contrary to the trial court\u2019s finding, defense counsel successfully rebutted the State\u2019s prima facie case of racial discrimination. Although the trial court erroneously determined that defense counsel had failed to offer race-neutral explanations, it nonetheless continued the Batson inquiry as if defense counsel had offered race-neutral explanations.\nC. Pretextual Determination\nIf defense counsel provides facially race-neutral reasons for the exercise of its peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether these reasons are merely pretextual excuses for purposeful discrimination. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363-64, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 408. At this stage, \u201cthe [State] has a right of surrebuttal to show that [defense counsel\u2019s] explanations are pretextual.\u201d Peterson, 344 N.C. at 176, 472 S.E.2d at 732. In making this determination, the trial court should consider the totality of the circumstances, Barnes, 345 N.C. at 212, 481 S.E.2d at 59, including counsel\u2019s credibility, State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 432, 407 S.E.2d 141, 148 (1991) (noting that \u201cthe best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 139 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997), and the context of the information elicited, Sanders, 95 N.C. App. at 502, 383 S.E.2d at 414. A disproportionate impact on prospective jurors of a particular race is also relevant to the trial court\u2019s decision, but is not dispositive. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 408. In addition, even if answers of a prospective juror of one race who is later peremptorily excused are similar to those of a juror of another race who is not challenged, \u201cthis state of circumstances in itself does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the reasons given by [defense counsel] were pretextual.\u201d Barnes, 345 N.C. at 212, 481 S.E.2d at 59 (citing Rouse, 339 N.C. at 80, 451 S.E.2d at 554).\nIn this case, the State noted on surrebuttal that Cooke was \u201ca little girl\u201d when her uncle retired from the police department, arguing that defense counsel\u2019s concern that Cooke had ties to the police department involved in this case was merely pretextual. The State noted that Moore was not obnoxious to defense counsel, as defense counsel had stated during his rebuttal, but was merely irritated because defense counsel had repeatedly asked Moore the same questions. The State also noted that the rape of Russ\u2019s family member, which concerned defense counsel, had occurred \u201cnine to ten years ago.\u201d The trial court noted that it had \u201cfollowed the voir dire examination closely, observed the demeanor of the jurors in question, and the attorneys, observed the expressions of the jurors and their reactions to the questions asked and listened to the tone of their voices and their answers to the questions propounded\u201d in finding that defense counsel\u2019s explanations were \u201cvague and merely a pretext.\u201d Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defense counsel\u2019s explanations were pre-textual. It follows that the State has established purposeful discrimination; the trial court therefore properly refused to allow defense counsel\u2019s peremptory challenges against Cooke, Russ, and Moore.\nII\nDefendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to submit attempted armed robbery and first-degree murder in perpetration of a felony to the jury. We disagree.\nA motion to dismiss is properly denied if substantial evidence is presented of each essential element of the offense. State v. Roseborough, 344 N.C. 121, 126, 472 S.E.2d 763, 766 (1996) (quoting State v. Quick, 323 N.C. 675, 682, 375 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1989)). In a criminal case, \u201c[substantial evidence is evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find the fact to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 389, 407 S.E.2d 200, 215 (1991) (quoting State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 108, 347 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1986)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference arising from the evidence. Quick, 323 N.C. at 682, 375 S.E.2d at 160. Where the State relies on the defendant\u2019s confession to support its case, there must be additional evidence \u201cwhich, when considered with the confession, supports the confession and permits a reasonable inference that the crime occurred.\u201d State v. Corbett, 339 N.C. 313, 334, 451 S.E.2d 252, 263 (1994) (quoting State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 532, 342 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1986)). The corroborating evidence, however, need not prove any element of the crime. Id.\nTo establish first-degree murder in the perpetration of a felony, \u201c[t]he prosecution need only prove that the killing took place while the accused was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies.\u201d State v. Bell, 338 N.C. 363, 386, 450 S.E.2d 710, 723 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1163, 132 L. Ed. 2d 861 (1995). Attempted armed robbery, an \u201cenumerated felon[y],\u201d see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17 (Supp. 1997), is defined as \u201cunlawfully . . . attempting] to take personal property from another or from any place of business\u201d with the possession, use, or threatened use of a firearm. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-87(a) (1993).\nThe evidence in the light most favorable to the State in this case includes Defendant\u2019s signed Statement, in which Defendant stated that he carried a gun into the Store with his \u201chood pulled down to just above my eyes, and a bandanna over the bottom of my face to my nose.\u201d Defendant\u2019s Statement confesses that he \u201cpointed the 9-millimeter [gun] at [Mullah] and said, \u2018Yo, give me your loot; give me your loot.\u2019 \u201d Defendant confessed that when Mullah laughed at him, \u201cI fired the gun and ran out.\u201d Defendant\u2019s Statement is supported by Massenburg\u2019s corroborating testimony that he saw Defendant enter the Store with a gun and heard a gunshot while Defendant was inside the Store, and by the fact that Mullah\u2019s fatally wounded body was found near the cash register. This additional evidence, when considered with Defendant\u2019s Statement, supports the Statement and permits a reasonable inference that Defendant, armed with a gun, shot and killed Mullah while unlawfully attempting to take cash from him in the Store. Thus there is substantial evidence in the record from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant killed Mullah in the perpetration of the felony of attempted armed robbery.\nIll\nInstructions on a lesser-included offense are required only when there is conflicting evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged, and the evidence supports the elements of the lesser-included offense. State v. Nelson, 341 N.C. 695, 697, 462 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1995); State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 417, 436, 347 S.E.2d 7, 18 (1986). A defendant\u2019s denial that he committed the offense does not constitute \u201cconflicting evidence\u201d as to an element of the offense. State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 352, 333 S.E.2d 708, 719 (1985).\nIn this case, the State\u2019s evidence, as noted in Section II, supported a jury finding of first-degree murder in the perpetration of the felony of attempted armed robbery. At trial, Defendant denied shooting Mullah; a denial, however, does not constitute conflicting evidence of an element of the State\u2019s case. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing to submit second-degree murder to the jury.\nNo error.\nJudges WALKER and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.\n. Normally our state appellate courts utilize an \u201cany competent evidence\u201d standard of review of the findings of fact entered by the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Wade, 55 N.C. App. 258, 260, 284 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1981), appeal dismissed, 305 N.C. 307, 290 S.E.2d 707 (1982). The \u201cclear error\u201d standard is a federal standard of review adopted by our courts for appellate review of the Batson inquiry. See Rouse, 339 N.C. at 78, 451 S.E.2d at 553 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 412 (1991)).\n. The procedure utilized by the trial court in this case, although not required, facilitates appellate review. In the event it is determined on appeal, as in this case, that the trial court erred in finding that race-neutral explanations were not offered by the challenging attorney, this Court can, on the record before it, review whether the explanations are pretextual without remanding for a new Batson hearing. Cf. State v. Hall, 104 N.C. App. 375, 384, 410 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1991) (remanding for a presiding criminal judge to hold a Batson hearing where the trial court had erred in determining that the prima facie showing had not been made and had therefore prematurely ended the Batson inquiry).\n. We note that although Defendant assigned error to the trial court\u2019s admission of his Statement into evidence, Defendant fails to make reference to or argue this assignment of error in his brief before this Court, and thereby abandons this assignment of error. See N.C.E. App. P. 28(b)(5) (\u201cImmediately following each question shall be a reference to the assignments of error pertinent to the question .... Assignments of error not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.", "Fountain and Goodwyn, by George A. Goodwyn, and Gibbons, Cozart, Jones, Hughes, Sallenger & Taylor, by Thomas R. Sallenger, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEMETRIUS ANTOINE COFIELD\nNo. COA97-609\n(Filed 21 April 1998)\n1. Jury \u00a7 248 (NCI4th)\u2014 peremptory challenges \u2014 Batson decision \u2014 applicability to defendants\nThe decision of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, has been expanded to prohibit not only the State, but also criminal defendants, from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.\n2. Jury \u00a7 257 (NCI4th)\u2014 peremptory challenges \u2014 racial discrimination \u2014 prima facie showing\nThe State made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in a black defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges in a capital trial where the jury consisted of six black and six white jurors just prior to defense counsel\u2019s exercise of defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges; defense counsel peremptorily challenged no black jurors at this point but did peremptorily challenge four white jurors, two-thirds of the white jurors then available; and the State noted other relevant circumstances, including the facts that black jurors remaining on the panel \u201cparalleled\u201d the challenged white jurors, that the challenged jurors had indicated that they could consider both life imprisonment and the death penalty, and that none had demonstrated any partiality.\n3. Jury \u00a7 260 (NCI4th)\u2014 peremptory challenges \u2014 racial discrimination \u2014 explanations\u2014rebuttal of prima facie case\nA black defendant\u2019s explanations for peremptorily challenging four white jurors in this capital trial successfully rebutted the State\u2019s prima facie case of racial discrimination where defendant explained that the first juror was challenged because she knew one of the State\u2019s expert witnesses, her sister was a victim of a recent breaking and entering, and her uncle worked in the same police department as officers involved in this case; the second juror was challenged because he had served in the military, appeared to have some difficulty with race, was a member of the VFW, and counsel was concerned about some of his facial expressions when questioned about a family member who had previously been raped; the third juror was challenged because he had served in the military, was a member of a gun club, and appeared to have some difficulty with race; and the fourth juror was challenged because counsel thought he had been deceptive and he would not look counsel \u201cin the eye.\u201d\n4. Jury \u00a7 260 (NCI4th)\u2014 peremptory challenges \u2014 pretextual race-neutral explanations \u2014 racial discrimination\nThe trial court did not err by finding that a black defendant\u2019s facially race-neutral explanations for peremptorily challenging three white jurors were pretextual so that the State established purposeful discrimination where the first juror was a \u201clittle girl\u201d when her uncle retired from the same police department involved in this case, the second juror was not obnoxious to defense counsel as counsel claimed but was merely irritated because counsel repeatedly asked him the same questions, and the rape of the third juror\u2019s family member, which concerned defense counsel, had occurred nine to ten years prior to this trial.\n5. Homicide \u00a7 275 (NCI4th)\u2014 felony murder \u2014 attempted armed robbery \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction for first-degree murder in the perpetration of attempted armed robbery where it tended to show that defendant signed a statement in which he admitted that he carried a gun into a store, he had a hood pulled down to just above his eyes and a bandanna over the bottom of his face, he pointed a gun at the cashier and told him to \u201cgive me your loot,\u201d and when the cashier laughed, he fired a gun and ran from the store; a witness saw defendant enter the store with a gun and heard a gunshot while defendant was inside the store; and the cashier\u2019s body was found near the cash register.\n6. Homicide \u00a7 553 (NCI4th)\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 denial of guilt \u2014 second-degree instruction not required\nA first-degree murder defendant\u2019s denial at trial that he shot the victim did not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment dated 11 October 1996 by Judge Franklin R. Brown in Edgecombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 February 1998.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.\nFountain and Goodwyn, by George A. Goodwyn, and Gibbons, Cozart, Jones, Hughes, Sallenger & Taylor, by Thomas R. Sallenger, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0268-01", "first_page_order": 308, "last_page_order": 322 }