{ "id": 11649689, "name": "SOUTH BLVD. VIDEO & NEWS, INC., Petitioner-Appellant v. CHARLOTTE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Respondent-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "South Blvd. Video & News, Inc. v. Charlotte Zoning Board of Adjustment", "decision_date": "1998-04-21", "docket_number": "No. COA97-824", "first_page": "282", "last_page": "292", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 N.C. App. 282" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-27.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697176 ], "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/91/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 S.E. 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1889, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8649165 ], "year": 1889, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/102/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527319 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(8)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656152 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "444-45", "parenthetical": "1989" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519640 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1124", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6252517, 6250630, 6250342, 6252200, 6250927, 6251921, 6251602, 6251284, 6253213, 6252831 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0929-08", "/us/447/0929-02", "/us/447/0929-01", "/us/447/0929-07", "/us/447/0929-03", "/us/447/0929-06", "/us/447/0929-05", "/us/447/0929-04", "/us/447/0929-10", "/us/447/0929-09" ] }, { "cite": "612 F.2d 821", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1411577 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/612/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656677 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 566", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178884 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" }, { "page": "614-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782877 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(1) and (6)" }, { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 879, "char_count": 23933, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.245172515742086e-07, "percentile": 0.7805798716450264 }, "sha256": "7f96f1522cd50efafb0c0f0c206d72c0cb681b3108454d94414aff3b469ec372", "simhash": "1:dfad75272d4d99d0", "word_count": 3704 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:14:06.814789+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and JOHN concur." ], "parties": [ "SOUTH BLVD. VIDEO & NEWS, INC., Petitioner-Appellant v. CHARLOTTE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Respondent-Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nPetitioner, a corporation leasing property located at 5920 South Boulevard in Charlotte, North Carolina appeals a 16 December 1996 judgment, order, and permanent injunction affirming the decision of the City of Charlotte\u2019s Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) ordering petitioner to cease operation of an adult bookstore and adult mini-motion picture theater establishment and a 24 January 1997 order finding petitioner in civil contempt of the 16 December 1996 judgment.\nIn May 1995 petitioner obtained a permit from the City of Charlotte to conduct a business for the intended use of \u201cvideo booths and retail sales.\u201d Handwritten on the permit was the notation: \u201cApproval is [given] on the basis that the preponderance of inventory/sales will be non-adult in nature. Section 12.518 applies.\u201d At the time petitioner obtained this permit, an \u201cadult establishment\u201d was defined in Section 2.201 of the Charlotte zoning ordinance (ordinance) as: \u201cAny structure or use of land which meets the definition of adult establishment as outlined in North Carolina General Statute Sec. 14-202.10.\u201d\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.10(2) (1993) defines \u201c[a]dult establishment\u201d as \u201can adult bookstore, adult motion picture theatre, adult mini motion picture theatre, adult live entertainment business, or massage business as defined in this section.\u201d The statute defines \u201cadult bookstore\u201d as a bookstore that either: (a) \u201creceives a majority of its gross income during any calendar month from the sale of [adult] publications .. .\u201d; or (b) \u201c[has] as a preponderance of its publications books, magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, as defined in this section.\u201d (Emphasis added). The statute defines \u201c[a]dult mini motion picture theater\u201d as\nan enclosed building with viewing booths designed to hold patrons which is used for presenting motion pictures, a preponderance of which are distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas as defined in this section, for observation by patrons therein.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.10(1) and (6) (1993).\nOn 18 January 1994 the City of Charlotte enacted Section 12.518 of the ordinance. In pertinent part, Section 12.518 states that:\n(a) Any structure in which an adult bookstore or adult mini motion picture theater establishment is the principal or accessory use shall be separated by a distance of at least 1500 feet from any residential district, school, church, child care center, park or playground.\nOn 19 October 1995 a zoning inspection of the petitioner\u2019s business was conducted pursuant to an administrative inspection warrant. Based on evidence discovered during the inspection, the Charlotte Zoning Enforcement Code Inspector sent a notice of zoning violation to petitioner on 10 November 1995 and a clarification of the notice on 21 November 1995. The clarification stated that petitioner was an adult bookstore and mini motion picture theater located too close to protected areas. It is undisputed that petitioner\u2019s business was not separated by 1500 feet or more from the protected areas described in Section 12.518. Petitioner appealed to the Board.\nOn 11 June 1996 the Board concluded that petitioner was operating an \u201cadult bookstore\u201d and \u201cadult mini-motion picture theater establishment\u201d at 5920 South Boulevard in violation of the ordinance. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Mecklenburg County Superior Court on 10 July 1996 and a writ of certiorari was issued on 23 July 1996. On 19 November 1996 the Board filed a motion for permanent injunction requiring petitioner to comply with the ordinance. On 2 December 1996 the trial court conducted a hearing on the Board\u2019s motion and determined that the Board had correctly concluded that petitioner was operating an \u201cadult bookstore\u201d and an \u201cadult mini-motion picture theater establishment\u201d at 5920 South Boulevard. Based on this determination, it entered a permanent injunction ordering petitioner to cease operation of and refrain from operating its current businesses (i.e. an \u201cadult bookstore\u201d and \u201cadult mini-motion picture theater establishment\u201d) at 5920 South Boulevard.\nSubsequently, respondents filed a motion to show cause asking that petitioner be held in contempt of court on 20 December 1996 on the basis that petitioner had \u201cnot ceased operation of and refrained from operating the businesses enjoined by [the] Permanent Injunction.\u201d In support of this motion, affidavits from zoning inspector David B. Barley and zoning administrator Robert Brandon were submitted. Barley stated in his affidavit that during a visit to the store the previous day, he observed changes in the store\u2019s stock and layout, including:\na. The free standing sign outside South Blvd. Video & News read \u201cSouth Blvd. Video and News Exotica.\u201d During prior observations the sign read \u201cSouth Blvd. Video and News Erotica.\u201d\nc. The racks of magazines in the front portion of the store that previously had been filled entirely with adult magazines now are stocked with approximately 50% adult magazines and 50% comic books....\ne. The racks of video tape box covers in the front portion of the store that previously had been filled entirely with box covers for adult video tapes now are stocked with approximately 50% adult video tape box covers and 50% non-adult or general circulation video tape movies. The non-adult video tape box covers did not appear to be arranged by category.\nBarley further observed that of sixteen different video titles available for viewing, eight had pornographic titles. From these observations, Barley concluded that in his opinion, \u201cSouth Blvd. Video & News was operating the same businesses on December 19, 1996 as it was operating on all [his] previous visits to the store.\u201d A notice of violation was issued to petitioner on 19 December 1996 by Charlotte\u2019s Building Standards Department for operating in violation of Section 4.101(2), Section 4.101(3) and Section 4.103 of the ordinance. On 24 January 1997 the trial court issued an order finding petitioner in civil contempt of the 16 December 1996 injunctive order. The trial court ordered petitioner to \u201c[i]mmediately cease operation of all business activity at 5920 South Boulevard[.]\u201d The court noted petitioner\u2019s \u201cefforts to change its operations and its argument that it is not the same business that had previously been found to be an illegal \u2018adult bookstore\u2019 and \u2018adult mini-motion picture theater establishment.\u2019 \u201d The trial court further noted that because it did not have the authority to issue any zoning permits, petitioner would be required to submit an application to the zoning administrator before operating a new business at 5920 South Boulevard. Petitioner appealed both the 16 December 1996 judgment, order, and permanent injunction and the 24 January 1997 order of contempt.\nI.\nPetitioner first argues that the trial court erred by affirming the Board\u2019s finding that petitioner was operating an \u201cadult bookstore\u201d and an \u201cadult mini-motion picture theater establishment\u201d in violation of Section 12.518(a) of the ordinance. Specifically, petitioner argues that the Board\u2019s decision was erroneous because it was based on an unconstitutionally vague interpretation of the term \u201cpreponderance\u201d as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.10(1) & (6).\nThe United States Supreme Court has stated \u201cthat an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.\u201d Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227 (1972). Two policy reasons for guarding against the enforcement of vague laws are: (1) to give a \u201cperson of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly[,]\u201d and (2) to \u201cprovide explicit standards for those who apply\u201d laws to prevent their \u201carbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.\u201d Id. at 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 227. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Goguen, an ordinance is not vague merely because \u201cit requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.\u201d 415 U.S. 566, 578, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605, 614-15 (1974).\nIn this case, petitioner argues that \u201cpreponderance\u201d is a quantitative term meaning greater than fifty percent. Respondent argues that \u201cthe term \u2018preponderance\u2019 is not synonymous with \u2018majority,\u2019 \u201d because \u201csuch a definition would run counter to rules of construction\u201d and ignore \u201cthe relative location, accessibility, and display of the [adult] materials in question.\u201d Recently this Court addressed this same issue in interpreting an analogous Greensboro ordinance defining \u201cadult mini motion picture theater.\u201d Fantasy World, Inc. v. Greensboro Bd. of Adjustment, 128 N.C. App. 703, 707-08, 496 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1998). This ordinance defines \u201cadult mini motion picture theater\u201d as a theater \u201cpresenting motion pictures, a preponderance of which are distinguished or characterized by an emphasis\u201d on adult-oriented materials. Id. Our Court held that the use of the standard \u201cpreponderance\u201d in the ordinance did not render it void for vagueness as \u201cthe use of the word \u2018preponderance\u2019 in the Greensboro ordinance is reasonably specific and sufficiently precise as to be readily understood and, therefore, the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on its face.\u201d Id. at 708, 496 S.E.2d at 828. The Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals also addressed this argument in Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 833 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1124 (1980), holding that the use of the word \u201cpreponderance\u201d in North Carolina\u2019s definition of \u201cadult bookstores\u201d was not void for vagueness. The Court reasoned that \u201cthese statutory definitions [were] reasonably specific and precise, bearing in mind that unavoidable imprecision is not fatal and celestial precision is not necessary.\u201d Id. We agree, as this standard is sufficiently defined to provide a person or corporate entity \u201ca reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited\u201d by the ordinance. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 227. We thus hold that the trial court did not err in upholding the Board\u2019s 11 June 1996 decision, in which the Board determined that the definition of \u201cpreponderance\u201d is satisfied if \u201cadult magazines\u201d are given a \u201cpredominant and far greater importance and .emphasis\u201d in display or location in a store. Accordingly, we hold that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. In so holding we note Black\u2019s Law Dictionary\u2019s definition of \u201cpreponderance\u201d as connoting something more than \u201cweight\u201d or quantity; but instead \u201cdenotfing] a superiority of weight\u201d which is a qualitative measurement. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1182 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).\nII.\nNext, petitioner argues that the Board\u2019s decision was \u201carbitrary and capricious and not based upon substantial evidence of the store\u2019s \u2018[h]aving as a preponderance of its publications books, magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, as defined in this section.\u2019 \u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.10(l)b. We disagree. As discussed above, the Board correctly examined not only the quantity of adult materials displayed at the store, but also the predominance and importance of these materials to the store\u2019s overall business. For this reason, we hold that the Board\u2019s decision was not arbitrary and capricious on this ground.\nIII.\nNext petitioner contends that the Board and trial court improperly considered the videotapes offered for sale and/or rental in determining whether petitioner was operating an adult bookstore. We disagree. \u201cWhen construing a municipal ordinance, \u2018the basic rule is to ascertain . . . the intent of the legislative body\u2019 that enacted the ordinance.\u201d P.A. W. v. Town of Boone Bd. of Adjustment, 95 N.C. App. 110, 112, 382 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1989) (citation omitted).\nThe legislative intent behind an ordinance should be determined according to the same rules that govern statutory construction, that is, by examining (1) the language, (2) the spirit, and (3) the goal of the ordinance. The effect of proposed interpretations also may be considered. Because a board of adjustment is vested with reasonable discretion in determining the intended meaning of an ordinance, a court may not substitute its judgment for the board\u2019s in the absence of error of law, or arbitrary, oppressive, or manifest abuse of authority.\nId. at 113, 382 S.E.2d at 444-45 (1989) (citations omitted).\nSection 2.201 of the ordinance defines \u201cadult establishment\u201d as \u201cany structure or use of land which meets the definition of adult establishment as outlined in North Carolina General Statute Sec. 14-202.10.\u201d \u201cAdult establishment\u201d is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.10 to include adult bookstores. The statute further defines \u201c [a]dult bookstore\u201d as \u201chaving as a preponderance of its publications books, magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, as defined in this section.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.10(l)(b) (emphasis added). In construing whether videotapes fall within the definition of \u201cpublications books, magazines, and other periodicals,\u201d we must examine these words in the context of the other words in the statute. See Williams v Alexander County Bd. of Educ., 128 N.C. App. 599, 603, 495 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1998). The pertinent feature that makes these publications a target for regulation is not whether they are magazines, books, or videotapes, but rather whether they are \u201cdistinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to\u201d sexual topics. Id.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.10 does not define \u201cpublications.\u201d Another statute that also restricts the use of sexually-oriented materials defines \u201c[publication\u201d to include \u201cany book, magazine, pamphlet, illustration, photograph, picture, sound recording, or a motion picture film which is offered for sale or exhibited in a coin-operated machine.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19-1.1(8) (1996). This statute further defines \u201c[m]otion picture film\u201d to include \u201c[\u00ab] ideo tape or any other medium used to electronically reproduce images on a screen.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19-l.l(5)(e) (emphasis added). It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that \u201cstatutes relating to the same subject should be construed in \\pari] materia, in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved.\u201d Whittington v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 603, 606, 398 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1990) (citation omitted).\nIn interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.10 consistent with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19-l.l(5)(e), we find it difficult, if not impossible, to construe the term \u201cpublications\u201d under Chapter 14 as not including videotapes, which are explicitly included under Chapter 19. Both statutes regulate sexually-related materials. The General Assembly is presumed to define words consistently with previously defined terms in other pre-existing statutes. Bridgers v. Taylor, 102 N.C. 86, 89, 8 S.E. 893, 894 (1889). If the General Assembly intended to define \u201cpublications\u201d in Chapter 14 differently than it did in Chapter 19, it would have explicitly defined the term. For this reason, and in light of \u201cthe law as it prevailed before the statute [and] the mischief to be remedied\u201d we hold that in upholding the zoning violation, the Board properly considered the sexually-oriented videotapes as \u201cpublications\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.10. See State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, 552 (1884).\nIV.\nPetitioner argues that the permanent injunction issued by the trial court failed to meet the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 65(d) (1990) because it was not sufficiently specific as to the conduct being enjoined. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 65(d) requires every injunction and restraining order to be specific in its terms and to describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts enjoined or restrained. Petitioner argues that because the injunction does not define what constitutes an \u201cadult book store\u201d or an \u201cadult mini motion picture theater,\u201d it does not meet N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 65(d) requirements. We disagree.\nThe injunction states that it orders petitioner to cease operation of and refrain from operating its current businesses. The trial court plainly stated that the businesses petitioner was currently operating must ce\u00e1se to operate. No reference to petitioner\u2019s complaint or any other document, nor any definition of the operating businesses is needed to understand the trial court\u2019s clear directive. We hold that the injunction was sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1.\nV.\nPetitioner next argues that the trial court erred in finding probable cause for contempt and finding petitioner to be in contempt of the permanent injunction. Petitioner contends the trial court was not sufficiently specific as to the conduct being enjoined and did not make the required finding that the conduct of petitioner was willful. We disagree. The trial court found that although the petitioner had the means to comply with the injunction, it continued to operate its business in violation of the ordinance. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that petitioner\u2019s action in continuing to operate the business constituted civil contempt. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court\u2019s finding was in effect a finding that the petitioner\u2019s conduct was willful.\nWe disagree with petitioner\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s order that the petitioner cease operations was too broad, and thus constituted a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment and due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the 16 December 1996 judgment, order and permanent injunction, the trial court initially ordered the petitioner to cease operation of an adult bookstore and adult mini motion picture establishment. Rather than complying with this order, the petitioner attempted to continue such business by disguising its operations. For instance, it changed its name from \u201cSouth Blvd. Video & News EROTICA\u201d to \u201cSouth Blvd. Video & News EXOTICA.\u201d It also placed comic books on its front magazine racks where previously only adult magazines were displayed. These efforts by petitioner to evade the effects of the permanent injunction justified the trial court\u2019s use of the civil contempt order as petitioner was engaging in efforts to circumvent the purpose of the permanent injunction. For this reason, we reject petitioner\u2019s argument.\nVI.\nFinally, petitioner contends that the administrative inspection warrant was issued without probable cause. We disagree. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-27.2(c)(l) (1983) sets forth the requirements for issuance of such a warrant. The statute specifically requires that:\nthe property to be searched or inspected is to be searched or inspected as part of a legally authorized program of inspection which naturally includes that property, or that there is probable cause for believing that there is a condition, object, activity or circumstance which legally justifies such a search or inspection of that property.\nIn this case the affidavit by the zoning enforcement officer conducting the inspection stated that he had observed\nvideo tapes and magazines that appeared to be distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to sexual activities and human genitals, pubic regions, buttocks and female breasts. In addition, merchandise such as artificial genitals and other sexual paraphernalia was displayed. To the rear of the business establishment were booths that offered video tapes or movies, including adult video tapes or movies, for viewing within the booths.\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that these facts were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that an adult business was in operation at this location. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s 16 December 1996 judgment, order, and permanent injunction and 24 January 1997 order of contempt are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and JOHN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Goodman, Carr, Nixon, Laughrun & Levine, by Miles S. Levine, and Loflin & Loflin, by Thomas F. Loflin III, for petitioner-appellant.", "Office of the City Attorney, by Robert E. Hagemann, for respondent-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTH BLVD. VIDEO & NEWS, INC., Petitioner-Appellant v. CHARLOTTE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Respondent-Appellees\nNo. COA97-824\n(Filed 21 April 1998)\n1. Zoning \u00a7 89 (NCI4th)\u2014 constitutional challenges; vagueness\nThe trial court did not err in upholding the Zoning Board of Adjustment\u2019s decision that the term \u201cpreponderance\u201d in an adult book store and mini-motion picture theater ordinance is satisfied if adult magazines are given a \u201cpredominant and far greater importance and emphasis\u201d in display or location in a store.\n2. Zoning \u00a7 88 (NCI4th)\u2014 constitutional challenges \u2014 arbitrariness, capriciousness, or reasonableness\nA zoning board of adjustment\u2019s decision that petitioner was operating an adult book store and mini-motion picture theater was not arbitrary and capricious where the ordinance referred to a preponderance of publications and the Board correctly examined not only the quantity of adult materials displayed in the store, but the predominance and importance of these materials to the store\u2019s overall business.\n3. Zoning \u00a7 75 (NCI4th)\u2014 adult book store \u2014 videotapes\u2014 within statutory definition of publication\nA zoning board of adjustment properly considered sexually oriented videotapes as \u201cpublications\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.10. The pertinent feature that makes these publications a target for regulation is not whether they are magazines, books, or videotapes, but rather whether they are distinguished or characterized by the emphasis on sexual topics.\n4. Injunctions \u00a7 39 (NCI4th)\u2014 operation of adult book store and theater \u2014 zoning violation \u2014 injunctions sufficiently specific\nAn injunction against continued operation of an adult book store and adult mini-motion picture theater is sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 65(d) where the injunction states that it orders petitioner to cease operation of and refrain from operating its current businesses and no reference to the complaint or any other document nor any definition of the operating businesses is needed to understand the trial court\u2019s clear directive.\n5. Injunctions \u00a7 50 (NCI4th)\u2014 adult zoning ordinance \u2014 permanent injunction \u2014 contempt order \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in finding petitioner to be in contempt of a permanent injunction in which the trial court ordered petitioner to cease operation of an adult book store and adult mini-motion picture theater where petitioner attempted to continue the business by disguising its operations.\n6. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 144 (NCI4th)\u2014 administrative inspection warrant \u2014 adult book store \u2014 probable cause\nThe affidavit of a zoning enforcement officer was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that an adult business was in operation at a particular location and to issue an administrative inspection warrant.\nAppeal by petitioner from judgment, order, and permanent injunction entered 16 December 1996 and order of contempt entered 24 January 1997 by Judge Julia V. Jones in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 February 1998.\nGoodman, Carr, Nixon, Laughrun & Levine, by Miles S. Levine, and Loflin & Loflin, by Thomas F. Loflin III, for petitioner-appellant.\nOffice of the City Attorney, by Robert E. Hagemann, for respondent-appellees." }, "file_name": "0282-01", "first_page_order": 322, "last_page_order": 332 }