{
  "id": 11653333,
  "name": "Orange County, ex rel., JoAnn Laws Byrd, individually and as mother and natural guardian of Jessica Nicole Byrd, minor child, Plaintiff v. Charles Allen Byrd, Defendant; Orange County, ex rel., Kimberly Jan Moore, individually and as mother and natural guardian of Jeremy Allen Byrd minor child, Plaintiff v. Charles Allen Byrd, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Orange County ex rel. Byrd v. Byrd",
  "decision_date": "1998-06-16",
  "docket_number": "No. COA97-1366; No. COA97-1367",
  "first_page": "818",
  "last_page": "822",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "129 N.C. App. 818"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-90",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "year": 1997,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "232 S.E.2d 184",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1977,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "192"
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    {
      "cite": "291 N.C. 451",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8558677
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      "year": 1977,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "465"
        }
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-185",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 5,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(b)"
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      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44-50",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44-49.1",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.10",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(d)(4)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 530,
    "char_count": 11172,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.777,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.49548390659069314
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    "sha256": "6675137ff0180c3fefc29af64ddb3a629620ff82417ccdd0a461e7072e2b365f",
    "simhash": "1:d96c7664f1d22ffc",
    "word_count": 1800
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:14:06.814789+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge WALKER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Orange County, ex rel., JoAnn Laws Byrd, individually and as mother and natural guardian of Jessica Nicole Byrd, minor child, Plaintiff v. Charles Allen Byrd, Defendant Orange County, ex rel., Kimberly Jan Moore, individually and as mother and natural guardian of Jeremy Allen Byrd minor child, Plaintiff v. Charles Allen Byrd, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HORTON, Judge.\nDefendant Charles Allen Byrd and JoAnn Laws Byrd have a minor child named Jessica. On 8 July 1993, defendant signed a Voluntary Support Agreement (VSA) in case No. 93-CVD-1144, agreeing to pay support for Jessica. Defendant and Kimberly Jan Moore have a minor child named Jeremy. On 18 May 1995, defendant signed a VSA in case No. 95-CVD-584, agreeing to pay prospective support for Jeremy, and to repay past-paid public assistance in the amount of $8,500.00.\nOn 12 July 1994, defendant was injured in a compensable accident at work, and was paid temporary total disability benefits for a period of time. He returned to his former work on 5 January 1995. As a result of his injuries, defendant was again out of work from 12 April 1996 to 16 December 1996, during which time he received temporary total disability benefits. Defendant was released to return to work on 14 December 1996. On 16 December 1996, defendant was arrested on criminal charges and could not make bail. Defendant was in custody from 16 December 1996 through 20 February 1997. Defendant hired counsel for the criminal case and promised to pay his attorneys\u2019 fees of $2,915.00 upon settlement of his workers\u2019 compensation claim. Defendant has other pending criminal matters and expects to need $1,995.00 to pay for attorneys\u2019 fees, court costs and probation fees. Defendant had a 35% permanent disability to his foot as a result of his injury by accident, and reached a full and final settlement of his workers\u2019 compensation claim in the amount of $18,000.00.\nOn 19 March 1997, plaintiff Orange County Child Support Enforcement Office (CSE) sent two notices of liens on the proceeds of defendant\u2019s settlement to North Carolina Homebuilders, the insurance carrier in defendant\u2019s compensation case. The notice in No. 93-CVD-1144, Jessica\u2019s case, reflected that defendant had a past due balance of $5,108.13 for unpaid child support. The notice in No. 95-CVD-584, Jeremy\u2019s case, stated that defendant had a past due balance of $11,402.71 for unpaid child support.\nOn 19 March 1997, defendant filed a motion to reduce his child support obligation based on a decrease in his income as the result of his injury. On 8 April 1997, defendant filed a motion that the court \u201capportion\u201d his workers\u2019 compensation proceeds. Both cases were heard on 5 May 1997, and similar orders were entered in both cases. Based on defendant\u2019s pleadings, affidavits, payment history, and reduced income, the trial court: reduced defendant\u2019s child support obligation; struck the arrears of child support which accrued between 16 December 1996 and 20 February 1997 when defendant was in custody; and determined that defendant\u2019s arrearages were $5,334.13 for No. 93-CVD-1144, and $11,104.71 for No. 95-CVD-584. The trial court then apportioned defendant\u2019s $18,000.00 workers\u2019 compensation settlement between defendant\u2019s counsel in the workers\u2019 compensation case ($4,500.00), defendant\u2019s counsel in his criminal cases for fees and costs ($4,910.00), Orange County Clerk of Court to be applied to child support arrearages ($5,000.00), and to defendant personally ($3,590.00).\nA resolution of plaintiff\u2019s appeals from the 5 May 1997 orders requires that we determine: (I) whether the trial court erred in striking defendant\u2019s child support arrearages for the period defendant was incarcerated and unable to make bail on criminal charges; and (II) whether the trial court had the authority to \u201capportion\u201d the proceeds of defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation settlement.\nI.\nIn each order, the trial court found as a fact that: defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation payments continued through 16 December 1996 when defendant was arrested for criminal charges; defendant remained in jail from 16 December 1996 through 20 February 1997 due to his inability to post bond, and he was not eligible for work release during that period of time. Based on those findings of fact and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.10(d)(4) (1995), the trial court concluded that defendant was entitled to have his child support arrearages stricken for the period he was in jail. The trial court then reduced the amount of defendant\u2019s arrearages in each case to reflect the stricken payments.\nThere is no evidence in the record on which the trial court could base its findings of fact. Defendant contends that paragraphs five and six of his verified motion provide support for the court\u2019s findings. While those paragraphs detail defendant\u2019s criminal woes and the financial costs of extricating him from them, they neither set out the dates of his incarceration nor his ineligibility for work release. We also note that defendant did not ask in either of his motions that any of his arrearages be stricken because of his incarceration. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence and, therefore, the order of the trial court must be reversed.\nII.\nThe issue of whether the trial court has the authority to \u201capportion\u201d the proceeds of a workers\u2019 compensation settlement on which there are liens for past due child support is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. As enacted by the 1995 General Assembly in Section 6(a) of Chapter 538 of the 1995 Session Laws, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44-49.1 read:\nIn the event that the Department of Human Services or any other obligee, as defined in G.S. 110-129, provides written notification to an insurance company authorized to issue policies of insurance pursuant to this Chapter that a claimant or beneficiary under a contract of insurance owes past-due child support and accompanies this information with a certified copy of the court order ordering support together with proof that the claimant or beneficiary is past due in meeting this obligation, there is created a lien upon any insurance proceeds in favor of the Department or obligee. This section shall apply only in those instances in which there is a nonrecurring payment of a lump-sum amount equal to or in excess of three thousand dollars ($3,000) or periodic payments with an aggregate amount that equals or exceeds three thousand dollars ($3,000).\nThe new section was effective 1 July 1996. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44-50 was rewritten by the same legislation to provide that the child support lien could \u201cin no case, exclusive of attorneys\u2019 fees, exceed fifty percent (50%) of the amount of moneys recovered.\u201d Section 6(b) of Chapter 538, 1995 Session Laws.\nIn 1996, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 674 of the 1995 (Regular Session, 1996) Session Laws, also effective 1 July 1996. Section 1 of Chapter 674 recodified N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44-49.1 as N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-185, the statute which is at issue in the case sub judice. Section 2 of Chapter 674 added a new section to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-185, which provides that child support liens are subordinate to liens upon insurance proceeds for personal injuries under Article 9 of Chapter 44 of the General Statutes, and to valid health care provider claims covered by health benefit plans. Significantly, Section 3 of Chapter 674 repealed Section 6(b) of Chapter 538 of the 1995 Session Laws, the section which would have limited a child support lien to fifty percent (50%) of the moneys recovered. Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-185, as it read at all times relevant to this case, did not contain a percentage limitation on the amount of the recovery subject to the child support lien.\nFurther, the legislature intentionally removed any such percentage limitation on the recovery of child support as evidenced not only by its repeal of the legislation establishing a fifty percent (50%) limit on a child support lien, but the legislative action in leaving the fifty percent (50%) limit intact as it relates to medical bills and expenses. Still further, the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-185(b) makes the child support subordinate only to \u201cliens upon insurance proceeds for personal injuries arising under Article 9 of Chapter 44 of the General Statutes and valid health care provider claims . . .\nWhile we have carefully considered defendant\u2019s arguments that such a construction is inequitable, and acknowledge the trial court\u2019s conscientious efforts to \u201capportion\u201d the recovery equitably, the equity powers of neither the trial court nor this Court extend into areas which are expressly governed by statute.\nThe General Assembly was acting deliberately in furtherance of our strong public policy favoring the collection of child support arrearages. Where there is no contention that the actions of the legislature violate constitutional safeguards, we are not free to either ignore or amend legislative enactments because when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts must give it its plain meaning. Utilities Commission v. Edmisten, Attorney General, 291 N.C. 451, 465, 232 S.E.2d 184, 192 (1977).\nWe hold, therefore, that plaintiff has a valid lien for past due child support pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-185 on defendant\u2019s $18,000.00 settlement, subject only to the amount of attorneys\u2019 fees approved by the Industrial Commission for defendant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation counsel pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-90 (Cum. Supp. 1997). Because the trial court had no authority to equitably apportion the settlement and because the trial court erred in striking a portion of defendant\u2019s child support arrearages, its order must be\nReversed.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge WALKER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HORTON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Coleman, Gledhill & Hargrave P.C., by Leigh Peek, for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Sheridan & Steffan, P.C., by Kim K. Steffan, for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Orange County, ex rel., JoAnn Laws Byrd, individually and as mother and natural guardian of Jessica Nicole Byrd, minor child, Plaintiff v. Charles Allen Byrd, Defendant Orange County, ex rel., Kimberly Jan Moore, individually and as mother and natural guardian of Jeremy Allen Byrd minor child, Plaintiff v. Charles Allen Byrd, Defendant\nNo. COA97-1366 No. COA97-1367\n(Filed 16 June 1998)\n1. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 416 (NCI4th)\u2014 child support arrearages \u2014 stricken for time in jail \u2014 insufficient findings\nDefendant was not entitled to have his child support arrear-ages stricken for the time he was in jail on criminal charges due to his inability to post bond where there was no evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings as to the dates of his incarceration and his ineligibility for work release. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.10(d)(4).\n2. Divorce and Separation \u00a7 426 (NCI4th)\u2014 compensation settlement \u2014 child support lien \u2014 apportionment not permitted\nThe trial court does not have the authority to \u201capportion\u201d the proceeds of a workers\u2019 compensation settlement on which there are liens for past due child support. Rather, the settlement is available for the entire lien for past due child support pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-3-185, subject only to the amount of attorney fees approved by the Industrial Commission for the employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation counsel pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-90.\nAppeals by plaintiff Orange County from orders entered 6 August 1997 by Judge Joe Buckner in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 May 1998.\nColeman, Gledhill & Hargrave P.C., by Leigh Peek, for plaintiff appellant.\nSheridan & Steffan, P.C., by Kim K. Steffan, for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0818-01",
  "first_page_order": 858,
  "last_page_order": 862
}