{ "id": 11653436, "name": "JOHN WILLIAMS and INEZ WILLIAMS, Petitioners-Appellants v. TOWN OF SPENCER, A Municipal Corporation, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Town of Spencer", "decision_date": "1998-06-16", "docket_number": "No. COA97-1192", "first_page": "828", "last_page": "832", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 N.C. App. 828" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Despite a denial of an application for a special use permit, no \"taking\" occurred where the County's ordinance permitted other uses of the property" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535653, 2536426, 2536398, 2533937, 2535833 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Despite a denial of an application for a special use permit, no \"taking\" occurred where the County's ordinance permitted other uses of the property" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0604-05", "/nc/336/0604-03", "/nc/336/0604-02", "/nc/336/0604-01", "/nc/336/0604-04" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183", "parenthetical": "Despite a denial of an application for a special use permit, no \"taking\" occurred where the County's ordinance permitted other uses of the property" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527022 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12", "parenthetical": "Despite a denial of an application for a special use permit, no \"taking\" occurred where the County's ordinance permitted other uses of the property" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170150 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520953 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710017 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566665 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0506-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 509, "char_count": 9396, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1589316469753309e-07, "percentile": 0.5836073840598429 }, "sha256": "c72358b0ea9f605fa94771490bbed841ad30890d74e95c359b439141dd60fd30", "simhash": "1:98f0461a60461cd1", "word_count": 1470 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:14:06.814789+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and MARTIN, John C., concur." ], "parties": [ "JOHN WILLIAMS and INEZ WILLIAMS, Petitioners-Appellants v. TOWN OF SPENCER, A Municipal Corporation, Respondent-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nPetitioners are the owners of Williams Shady Grove Mobile Home Park located within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Town of Spencer (the Town). The mobile home park consists of approximately thirty-five spaces which are typically leased by residents who own their own mobile homes. The mobile home park is located in an area zoned industrial which excludes mobile home parks; however, as the property has been continuously used as a mobile home park, it is permitted as a non-conforming use.\nUnder its zoning ordinance, the Town treats each individual lot as a separate non-conforming use. Therefore, when a resident vacates a lot, the Town refuses to issue a building permit to replace the mobile home with another. Due to this inability to obtain permits for replacement mobile homes, the park had at least eleven empty spaces at the initiation of this action.\nOn 22 July 1996, the Town\u2019s land management director denied a building permit to set up a manufactured home on one of the empty lots in the petitioners\u2019 mobile home park. By letter dated 2 August 1996, the petitioners appealed this decision to the Town\u2019s Zoning Board of Adjustment (the Board) on the grounds that \u201ca nonconforming mobile home park may not be put out of existence or reduced in size by denial of the building permits ... so long as the park as a whole continues to operate [as] such action by the municipality is an unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious taking.\u201d\nThe Board issued a decision affirming the land management director\u2019s decision to deny the building permit. The petitioners then obtained a writ of certiorari and the trial court reviewed the Board\u2019s decision. After considering the record and the Town\u2019s zoning ordinance, the trial court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision.\nThe petitioners argue that the Town\u2019s ordinance denying continuation of the existing non-conforming use (the mobile home park) is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (1) the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous; (2) the ordinance is unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious and (3) the ordinance constitutes a taking without just compensation.\nFrom the record in this case, there is evidence that the petitioners alleged, in their initial appeal of the land management directors\u2019s decision, that the portion of the Town\u2019s ordinance was arbitrary and capricious and therefore unconstitutional. Thus, we address this case on the basis that the constitutional issues are properly before this Court; however, we nonetheless find the Town\u2019s ordinance to be valid.\nWe first note the portion of the Town\u2019s zoning ordinance in question specifically addresses the circumstances here in Article IV, \u00a7 15(E) and provides:\nContinuation of manufactured home parks. Manufactured home parks that become nonconforming uses shall be permitted to continue operation subject to the following stipulations:\n\u2022 Nonconforming manufactured home parks may not be expanded or increased in size nor shall any additional spaces be added to the site;\n\u2022 When a site at a nonconforming manufactured home park is vacated, another manufactured home may not be placed on that site;\n\u2022 A nonconforming manufactured home park that is discontinued for one hundred eighty (180) days shall not be reestablished. Vacancy and/or non-use of the park, regardless of the intent of the owner, shall constitute discontinuance under this provision;\n\u2022 If any existing nonconforming manufactured home on a conforming lot is removed, it shall only be replaced with a conforming structure or building;\n\u2022 If a nonconforming manufactured home is abandoned for a period of more than one hundred eighty (180) days, the rehabi-tation of the manufactured home shall be prohibited. The date of abandonment shall be that date at which the abandonment of the manufactured home becomes evident.\n(Emphasis added).\nAlthough the petitioners do not direct us to any specific constitutional provisions or any other authority, it appears they are first arguing that the zoning ordinance is arbitrary and discriminatory in that it treats non-conforming mobile home parks differently from nonconforming apartment complexes. For example, petitioners contend that under the ordinance if less than fifty percent of the apartments in a non-conforming apartment complex were destroyed that a \u201creplacement building\u201d would be allowed whereas if a mobile home lot is vacated, a replacement mobile home is not allowed.\nIt is well established that a duly adopted zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid and the burden is on the complaining party to show it to be invalid. Heaton v. City of Charlotte, 277 N.C. 506, 513, 178 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1971).\nAssuming the petitioners\u2019 argument that the ordinance is arbitrary and discriminatory is an attempt to challenge it on equal protection grounds, we find such argument to be unpersuasive.\nOur Supreme Court in White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766-67, 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983) set out the governing principles in determining whether a legislative classification violates the equal protection clause as follows:\nWhen a governmental classification does not burden the exercise of a fundamental right or operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, the lower tier of equal protection analysis requiring that the classification be made upon a rational basis must be applied. The \u201crational basis\u201d standard merely requires that the governmental classification bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate interest of government. (Citations omitted).\nThus, as no fundamental right or suspect class is involved here, we must determine whether the portion of the ordinance which disallows the replacement of a mobile home on a vacated site of a nonconforming mobile home park is \u201crationally related\u201d to a legitimate governmental interest.\nIn CG & T Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wilmington, 105 N.C. App. 32, 411 S.E.2d 655 (1992), this Court set out the following \u201cimportant policy\u201d:\nNon-conforming uses are not favored by the law. Most zoning schemes foresee elimination of non-conforming uses either by amortization, or attrition or other means. In accordance with this policy, zoning ordinances are strictly construed against indefinite continuation of non-conforming uses.\nId. at 39, 411 S.E.2d at 659-60 (citing Appalachian Poster Advertising Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 52 N.C. App. 266, 274, 278 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1981)). Based on this policy, we find that the Town had a legitimate governmental interest in providing in its ordinance that non-conforming uses, such as mobile home parks, will eventually become conforming uses within particularly zoned properties. Moreover, it is clear that the portion of the ordinance at issue is rationally related to this interest. However, even under the Town\u2019s existing ordinance, the mobile home park can continue indefinitely. Only when a mobile home is removed from a lot is replacement of that home precluded.\nPetitioners next contend that if the ordinance is not found to be discriminatory, it is at least \u201can unlawful taking without just compensation.\u201d We have carefully considered the petitioners\u2019 argument and find it to be without merit. See Guilford Co. Dept. of Emer. Serv. v. Seaboard Chemical Corp., 114 N.C. App. 1, 12, 441 S.E.2d 177, 183, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 604, 447 S.E.2d 340 (1994) (Despite a denial of an application for a special use permit, no \u201ctaking\u201d occurred where the County\u2019s ordinance permitted other uses of the property). Here, the petitioners are not deprived of \u201call economically beneficial or productive use\u201d of their land as it can be used for any of the uses allowed in an industrial zoned area.\nThe order of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and MARTIN, John C., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kluttz, Reamer, Blankenship, Hayes & Randolph, L.L.P., by Malcolm B. Blankenship, Jr., for petitioners-appellants.", "The Brough Law Firm, by Michael B. Brough; and Woodson, Ford, Sayers, Lawther, Short, Parrott & Hudson, by F. Rivers Lawther, for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN WILLIAMS and INEZ WILLIAMS, Petitioners-Appellants v. TOWN OF SPENCER, A Municipal Corporation, Respondent-Appellee\nNo. COA97-1192\n(Filed 16 June 1998)\n1. Zoning \u00a7 51 (NCI4th)\u2014 nonconforming mobile home park \u2014 disallowance of mobile home replacement \u2014 not equal protection violation\nA town\u2019s zoning ordinance that disallows the replacement of a mobile home on a vacated site of a nonconforming mobile home park is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and does not violate equal protection since the town has a legitimate interest in providing in its ordinance that nonconforming uses, such as mobile home parks, will eventually become conforming uses within particularly zoned properties.\n2. Zoning \u00a7 51 (NCI4th)\u2014 nonconforming mobile home park \u2014 disallowance of mobile home replacement \u2014 not taking without compensation\nA town\u2019s zoning ordinance that disallows the replacement of a mobile home on a vacated site of a nonconforming mobile home park does not constitute an unlawful taking without just compensation since the owners are not deprived of all economically beneficial or productive use of their land as it can be used for any uses allowed in an industrial zoned area.\nAppeal by petitioners from order entered 8 July 1997 by Judge Henry E. Frye, Jr. in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 April 1998.\nKluttz, Reamer, Blankenship, Hayes & Randolph, L.L.P., by Malcolm B. Blankenship, Jr., for petitioners-appellants.\nThe Brough Law Firm, by Michael B. Brough; and Woodson, Ford, Sayers, Lawther, Short, Parrott & Hudson, by F. Rivers Lawther, for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0828-01", "first_page_order": 868, "last_page_order": 872 }