{ "id": 8549801, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JULIUS STEWART SUMMRELL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Summrell", "decision_date": "1971-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 713SC744", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "10", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "13 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "33 S.E. 2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597595 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 N.C. App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552517 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/1/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S.E. 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653249 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/139/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 N.C. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552437 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/4/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575701 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568800, 8568902, 8568713, 8568686, 8568859, 8568764 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0396-04", "/nc/279/0396-06", "/nc/279/0396-02", "/nc/279/0396-01", "/nc/279/0396-05", "/nc/279/0396-03" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555803 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561733 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E. 2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562301 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559163 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 364905 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560350 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 S.E. 2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613303 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2146982 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/261/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632425 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626433 ], "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.E. 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 N.C. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662535 ], "year": 1915, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/170/0745-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 862, "char_count": 20854, "ocr_confidence": 0.541, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8451403686756425e-08, "percentile": 0.3630736772684431 }, "sha256": "c30eabcce7e8ebcd001b05141c5cf65cc5eba9dd22fce1c55c4da87023c9a323", "simhash": "1:1e22c42207cad8eb", "word_count": 3550 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:15.024983+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Mallard and Judge Graham concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JULIUS STEWART SUMMRELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nIn the cases charging resisting arrest and assault on an officer, the defendant assigns as error the court\u2019s denial of his motions to require the solicitor to elect, to quash the warrants, and to arrest the judgments. The defendant\u2019s motion made before the introduction of any evidence to require the solicitor to elect whether he would prosecute the defendant on the charge of resisting arrest or assault on an officer was properly denied. State v. Stephens, 170 N.C. 745, 87 S.E. 131 (1915) ; State v. Smith, 201 N.C. 494, 160 S.E. 577 (1931) ; State v. Hall, 214 N.C. 639, 200 S.E. 2d 375 (1939). A motion to quash challenges the sufficiency of a bill of indictment or warrant. 4 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Indictment and Warrant, \u00a7 14, pp. 359-60. \u201c \u2018A motion in arrest of judgment is one made after verdict and to prevent entry of judgment, and is based upon the insufficiency of the indictment or some other fatal defect appearing on the face of the record.\u2019 State v. McCollum, 216 N.C. 737, 6 S.E. 2d 503.\u201d State v. Kirby, 276 N.C. 123, 171 S.E. 2d 416 (1970). The defendant was charged in separate warrants with resisting arrest, in violation of G.S. 14-223, and with assault on an officer, in violation of G.S. 14-33 (b) (6). The warrants charge the separate offenses in the language of the statute, no defect appears on the face of the warrants, and the face of the record proper discloses no fatal defect. The court properly denied the defendant\u2019s motions.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the court erred in failing to quash the warrant charging disorderly conduct. He contends that G.S. 14-288.4 (2) is \u201cunconstitutionally vague and overbroad.\u201d The pertinent portions of G.S. 14-288.4 are as follows:\n\u201cDisorderly conduct is a public disturbance caused by any person who:\nt- * t-\n(2) Makes any offensively coarse utterance, gesture, or display or uses abusive language, in such a manner as to alarm or disturb any person present or as to provoke a breach of the peace.\u201d\n\u201cIt is settled law that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty. . . . Even so, impossible standards of statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 91 L. ed. 1877, 67 S.Ct. 1538.\u201d In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E. 2d 879 (1969) ; State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E. 2d 897 (1970).\nThe statute provides an adequate warning of the conduct condemned and is sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to apply uniformly, and the court did not commit error by denying defendant\u2019s motion to quash the warrant which charged the offense in the language of the statute. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his third assignment of error, the defendant contends that the court committed error by denying his motion \u201cto see any and all exculpatory statements which the state had.\u201d \u201cPursuant to G.S. 15-155.4, the solicitor in a criminal trial is obligated to furnish certain specifically identified exhibits to the defendant to better enable him to prepare his defense. State v. Macon, 276 N.C. 466, 173 S.E. 2d 286 (1970).\u201d State v. McDonald, 11 N.C. App. 497, 181 S.E. 2d 744 (1971), cert. den. 279 N.C. 396 (1971).\nThere is nothing in this record to indicate that the State had any \u201cexculpatory statements\u201d in its possession, nor is there anything in the record to show that the defendant made any request for such statements or exhibits in accordance with the statute. Moreover, the record discloses that the defendant was given full opportunity to examine all of the State\u2019s witnesses prior to the trial. This assignment of error has no merit.\nThe defendant\u2019s fourth assignment of error relates to the admission and exclusion of evidence. First, the defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by allowing Officer Phillips to testify over defendant\u2019s objection that the defendant was \u201ctalking very loud and boisterous,\u201d and \u201cusing very loud and boisterous language.\u201d \u201cAn observer may testify to common appearances, facts and conditions in language which is descriptive of facts observed so as to enable one not an eyewitness to form an accurate judgment in regard thereto.\u201d State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509, 160 S.E. 2d 469 (1968). The record discloses that the officer was merely describing the manner in which the defendant was conducting himself in the emergency room. This exception has no merit.\nNext, the defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by allowing over defendant\u2019s objections (1) the solicitor to ask a leading question, (2) a witness to give an answer which was not responsive to a question, (3) to go back over areas already covered, (4) to make a self-serving declaration, (5) to testify to facts not within her knowledge, and (6) to state conclusions. We have carefully examined each exception in the record upon which this contention is based and we find and hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in the conduct of the trial with respect to the admission and exclusion of the evidence challenged by these exceptions.\nThe defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by sustaining the State\u2019s objections to questions on cross-examination of Officer Phillips regarding (1) whether the witness had been involved in a scuffle at the jail with a prisoner two or three weeks prior to the incident at the hospital, (2) how many times the witness had been married, and (3) whether the witness had sometime prior to this event visited the mental health clinic. Clearly, these questions call for irrelevant and immaterial testimony and the solicitor\u2019s objections were properly sustained. We have carefully considered each exception embraced in the defendant\u2019s fourth assignment of error, and we find no prejudicial error in the court\u2019s admission and exclusion of testimony.\nThe defendant urges as error the court\u2019s denial of his motion for judgment as of nonsuit made at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and renewed at the close of defendant\u2019s evidence. He grounds this assignment of error on the assertion in his brief: \u201cThe evidence shows that the defendant exerted his constitutional rights to resist an unlawful arrest.\u201d G.S. 15-41(1) provides: \u201cA peace officer may without warrant arrest a person: (1) When the person to be arrested has committed a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of the officer, or when the officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony or misdemeanor in his presence.\u201d\nIn State v. Cooper, 4 N.C. App. 210, 166 S.E. 2d 509 (1969), Chief Judge Mallard wrote:\n\u201cWhen a person has been lawfully arrested by a lawful officer and understands that he is under arrest, it is his duty to submit peacefully to the arrest. State v. Horner, 139 N.C. 603, 52 S.E. 136. The words \u2018submit peacefully to arrest\u2019 imply the yielding to the authority of a lawful officer, after being lawfully arrested.\u201d\nWhen the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, we hold it is sufficient to require the submission of these cases to the jury. There is evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant resisted, delayed, and obstructed Barley Phillips, a Police Officer of the City of Green-ville, when the officer arrested him for disorderly conduct, by fighting, striking, and kicking the officer and by forcibly leaving the hospital, and by not submitting peaceably to a lawful arrest after he had been advised and understood that he was under arrest for disorderly conduct. There is also evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant assaulted the officer by striking and kicking him when the officer was undertaking to discharge the duties of his office. There is ample evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did create a public disturbance by engaging in fighting and violent and threatening behavior and by using vulgar, profane and abusive language in such a manner as to so arouse the average person as to create a breach of the peace. This assignment of error is overruled.\nThe defendant has brought forward several exceptions to the court\u2019s charge to the jury. A careful review of the charge in its entirety does not reveal any prejudicial error.\nThe defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the disorderly conduct warrant during the court\u2019s charge to the jury. The record reveals that before any evidence was taken in the three cases, the defendant moved to quash the disorderly conduct warrant on the grounds that the statute, G.S. 14-288.4, was unconstitutional. In denying the defendant\u2019s motion, the court announced that it would interpret Section (2) of the statute as follows: \u201cMakes any offensive coarse utterance, gesture or displays or uses abusive language in such manner as to so arouse the average person as to create a breach of the peace.\u201d The court then instructed the solicitor that he could amend the warrant in view of the court\u2019s interpretation of the statute. The record reveals the amendment was written into the warrant by the solicitor in the absence of the jury after the State and the defendant had rested. The superior court has discretion to allow a warrant to be amended as to form and substance before or after verdict, provided the amendment does not change the nature of the offense intended to be charged in the original warrant. State v. Williams, 1 N.C. App. 312, 161 S.E. 2d 198 (1968); State v. Brown, 225 N.C. 22, 33 S.E. 2d 121 (1945). In the instant case the amendment did not change the nature of the offense charged in the original warrant, and the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the solicitor to amend.\nWe have carefully considered the remaining assignments of error based on the defendant\u2019s exceptions to the court\u2019s denial of his motions for mistrial, to set aside the verdict and in arrest of judgment, and we find that they are all without merit.\nThe defendant had a fair trial in the superior court free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge Mallard and Judge Graham concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney James E. Magner for the State.", "Chambers, Stein, Ferguson and Lanning by Charles L. Becton; and Paul and Keenan by Jerry Paul for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JULIUS STEWART SUMMRELL\nNo. 713SC744\n(Filed 15 December 1971)\n1. Indictment and Warrant \u00a7 8\u2014 resisting arrest \u2014 assault on an officer \u2014 election by solicitor\nThe trial court did not err in the denial of defendant\u2019s motions made before the introduction of any evidence to require the solicitor to elect whether he would prosecute defendant on the charge resisting arrest or on the charge of assault on an officer.\n2. Arrest and Bail \u00a7 6; Assault and Battery \u00a7 11\u2014 resisting arrest \u2014 assault on an officer \u2014 motion to quash \u2014 motion in arrest of judgment\nThe trial court did not err in the denial of defendant\u2019s motions to quash the warrants and to arrest the judgments in this prosecution for resisting arrest and assault on an officer.\n3. Disorderly Conduct and Public Drunkenness \u00a7 1\u2014 disorderly conduct statute \u2014 constitutionality\nThe statute defining the crime of disorderly conduct, G.S. 14-288.4, is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 42, 77\u2014 motion to see exculpatory statements\nThe trial court did not err in the denial of defendant\u2019s motion \u201cto see any and all exculpatory statements which the state had,\u201d where there is nothing in the record to indicate that the State had any \u201cexculpatory statements\u201d in its possession or that defendant made any request for such statements or exhibits in acocrdance with G.S. 15-155.4.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 71\u2014 testimony that defendant was talking \u201cloud and boisterous\u201d\nIn this prosecution for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest and assault on an officer, the trial court did not err in allowing a police officer to testify that defendant was \u201ctalking very loud and boisterous\u201d and \u201cusing very loud and boisterous language,\u201d since an observer may testify to common appearances, facts and conditions in language which is descriptive of facts observed so as to enable one not an eyewitness to form an accurate judgment in regard thereto.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 88\u2014 cross-examination of arresting officer \u2014 irrelevant testimony\nIn a prosecution for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest and assault on an officer, the trial court did not err in sustaining the solicitor\u2019s objections to questions asked the arresting officer on cross-examination as to whether he had been involved in a scuffle at the jail with a prisoner, how many times he had been married, and whether he had visited the mental health clinic prior to the incident leading to the charges against defendant, the questions having called for irrelevant and immaterial testimony.\n7. Arrest and Bail \u00a7 6; Assault and Battery \u00a7 14\u2014 resisting arrest \u2014 assault on an officer \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury on issues of defendant\u2019s guilt of resisting arrest and assault on an officer where it tended to show that when the officer arrested defendant at a hospital for disorderly conduct, defendant failed to submit peacefully to the lawful arrest after he had been advised and understood he was under arrest for disorderly conduct, and that defendant fought, struck and kicked the officer and forcibly left the hospital. G.S. 14-223; G.S. 14-33 (b)(6).\n8. Disorderly Conduct and Public Drunkenness \u00a7 2\u2014 disorderly conduct \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of disorderly conduct where it tended to show that defendant created a public disturbance at a hospital by engaging in fighting and violent and threatening behavior and by using vulgar, profane and abusive language in such manner as to so arouse the average person as to create a breach of the peace.\n9. Indictment and Warrant \u00a7 12\u2014 amendment of warrant after defendant\u2019s evidence\nThe trial court did not err in allowing the solicitor to amend a warrant charging disorderly conduct after the State and defendant had rested, where the amendment did not change the nature of the offense charged in the original warrant.\nAppeal by defendant from Martin (Robert M.), Judge. 10 May 1971 Session of Superior Court held in Pitt County.\nThe defendant Julius Stewart Summrell was charged in valid warrants with disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assault on an officer, in violation of G.S. 14-288.4, 14-223, and 14-33 (b) (6). The defendant was found guilty of each of the three charges in the District Court of Pitt County. He was sentenced on the charges of assault and resisting arrest to six months imprisonment and on the charge of disorderly conduct to thirty days to begin at the expiration of the first sentence. From the judgments of the District Court, the defendant appealed to the Superior Court.\nUpon defendant\u2019s pleas of not guilty in the Superior Court, evidence was offered tending to show that at approximately 5:00 p.m. on 6 July 1970 the defendant Julius Stewart Summrell, a black male, twenty-two years of age, was brought into the emergency room of Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Greenville, North Carolina. The defendant refused to give the nurse in attendance any information other than his name. After being called by the nurse, Dr. Vick, a member of the hospital staff who was on surgical call, came in to see the defendant; Summ-rell refused to be seen by Dr. Vick. He wanted to see Dr. Best, a black doctor. The nurse testified that she called Dr. Best at his office and residence and learned that he was not in. She testified: \u201cI went back and explained to Mr. Summrell that I had called Dr. Best\u2019s office; that I could not reach him at the moment but I would keep trying. He got real indignant. He was cussing and saying he was in a lot of pain and he couldn\u2019t get any attention. At that time Officer \u2014 At the time I said he said he couldn\u2019t get any attention, Dr. Vick had been there prior to that time. At that time Officer Phillips was in the room with me and he told me to get out of the room, which I did. Mr. Summrell told me to get out.\u201d\nWhen Officer Barley F. Phillips, a patrolman with the Greenville Police Department, arrived at the hospital emergency room to further his investigation of the auto accident in which the defendant was injured, the officer first obtained permission from Dr. Vick, the physician in charge, to talk to the injured parties.\nAfter the nurse explained to the defendant what was being done to reach Dr. Best, Patrolman Phillips began his investigation with Mr. Wooten, the operator of one of the vehicles involved in the accident who was in a cubicle lying on a treatment bed about four to five feet from the. defendant. Patrolman Phillips testified that the defendant \u201cwas talking very loud and boisterous \u2014 using profane language\u201d; that the defendant said to Miss Shaw, \u201cget out of my face white woman\u201d; and that although he continued to try to talk to Mr. Wooten and get a statement from him, he could not. The officer testified:\n\u201cI turned to Mr. Summrell and asked him to quiet down so I could finish my investigation and he, I advised him that if he didn\u2019t quiet down I would have to arrest him for disorderly conduct and carry him downtown after he was treated and he advised me I wasn\u2019t going to carry him any, I wasn\u2019t going to carry him any God damn where.\u201d\nAnother person in the waiting room testified that when Officer Phillips went into the defendant\u2019s room and began questioning him about the accident, the defendant said, \u201c T am not going to tell you a damn thing and don\u2019t nobody else tell him nothing.\u2019 . . . [H]e was talking in an unusually loud voice at that time.\u201d\nThe witness testified: \u201cHe still had a boisterous voice and was making loud noises. ...\u201d When Dr. Vick went in the defendant\u2019s room Summrell said: \u201cI want a black doctor; I don\u2019t want a white doctor; I want Dr. Best. I want a doctor, you white folks don\u2019t care a thing about us negroes.\u201d\nThe officer got permission to move Mr. Wooten from the cubicle to a room across the hall where he could continue his investigation. The defendant\u2019s mother told the defendant to be quiet and the defendant replied, \u201cthat\u2019s the damn trouble now. We\u2019ve been quiet too long.\u201d The defendant then got up from his bed and went out in the hall, stating that he was going to get out of \u201cthis damn hospital and go home or go somewhere.\u201d The officer told the defendant he was under arrest and that he did not have permission to leave the hospital. The defendant then advanced on the officer who grabbed his arm and they began to tussle. In the ensuing fight the defendant struck the officer with his fists and took his blackjack. The officer drew his revolver, stepped back, and told the defendant to put the blackjack down or he would fire; whereupon, the defendant threw the blackjack which struck the officer and knocked him to the floor.\nThe defendant again started to leave the hospital and the officer told him he was under arrest and could not leave. Officer Phillips tried to keep the defendant in custody while the defendant made his way to the main parking area in front of the hospital where he got in the rear seat of a car. When Phillips attempted to close the car door, the defendant threw the car door open, and in trying to avoid the door, Phillips tripped and fell. The defendant then grabbed him and tried to get the officer\u2019s gun. During the fight, the defendant was yelling, \u201cget his gun; we\u2019ll kill the son-of-a-bitch; get his gun.\u201d Phillips testified: \u201c . . . I was knocked to the ground and I was kicked. I was kicked from the waist up and from the waist, I was kicked on my whole right side. I kept receiving blows to the head and to my neck and chest area and I could feel myself getting weak. I knew I was weak then. ... My vision was blurred and I looked, and I saw Mr. Summrell with his fist clinched up and he started back towards me. . . .\n\u201c . . . I was hurting from my, my whole body was aching. ...\u201d In the ensuing fight, the defendant was shot by the officer.\nThe defendant offered testimony wherein he admitted he was upset but that his words were due to the pain of the injuries suffered in the accident. He denied that he had been disorderly, that he had been placed under arrest, that he had resisted arrest, or that he committed any assault.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assault on an officer. From a judgment imposing a prison sentence of six months, the defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney James E. Magner for the State.\nChambers, Stein, Ferguson and Lanning by Charles L. Becton; and Paul and Keenan by Jerry Paul for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 25, "last_page_order": 34 }