{
  "id": 8552189,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM CANNADY",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cannady",
  "decision_date": "1971-12-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 717SC682",
  "first_page": "240",
  "last_page": "241",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "13 N.C. App. 240"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 671",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "279 N.C. 413",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8569338
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/279/0413-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 561",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "279 N.C. 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8565516
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/279/0001-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 256,
    "char_count": 3408,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.537,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "7cf22609eb0ab232cf7814530367a8016dca43630ec2f8ea46dd97547f57141e",
    "simhash": "1:3756108575f75c78",
    "word_count": 574
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:15.024983+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Brock and Britt concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM CANNADY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nAlthough this case was tried before the decision in State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E. 2d 561, which interpreted portions of Article 36 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes, its disposition is controlled by that case.\nAs a result of information received at the scene of the crime an extensive search was instituted for the defendant by the law enforcement officers. While the search by the officers of the police and sheriff departments was in progress, the defendant came to the sheriff\u2019s office and surrendered. Before officers would talk to defendant, they fully advised him of his rights under Miranda and defendant stated that he understood his rights. Had the defendant then voluntarily proceeded to give a narrative statement, under Lynch such a statement could have been properly admitted into evidence. Instead the record discloses that the only information given was during an interrogation by one of the officers. Defendant was asked if he shot Joe Nathan Moore. His response was \u201cyes.\u201d Defendant was asked \u2019.what weapon he used. His response was \u201ca sawed-off shotgun.\u201d At that point defendant refused to answer additional questions, and the interrogation was terminated. Although the court\u2019s conclusions as to the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statement was fully supported by the record, there must be a new trial by reason of admission of defendant\u2019s statement as evidence. Upon voir dire no inquiry was made as to whether defendant was indigent on 5 December 1970, the date he made the statement, and there are no findings in this regard. If, on that date, he was indigent within the meaning of the statute, he was entitled to the services of counsel at the interrogation. G.S. 7A-457.\nWe cannot say that the admission of the statement was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt as was the case in State v. Doss, 279 N.C. 413, 183 S.E. 2d 671. The thrust of defendant\u2019s defense at trial was that he did not shoot the deceased but that he struck at deceased with the gun and it \u201cjust went off.\u201d Evidence that the defendant was guilty of the crime of which he was convicted was plenary. For the reasons stated, however, there must be a new trial. If, at the new trial, defendant\u2019s statement to the officers is offered, the trial court must follow the procedure set out in State v. Lynch, supra.\nNew trial.\nJudges Brock and Britt concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "VAUGHN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Robert Morgan by Assistant Attorney General Richard N. League for the State.",
      "Farris and Thomas by Robert A. Farris for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM CANNADY\nNo. 717SC682\n(Filed 15 December 1971)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 75\u2014 in-custody statements \u2014 written waiver of counsel \u2014 findings on indigency\nThe trial court erred in the admission of incriminating statements made by defendant without counsel on 5 December 1970, where defendant did not sign a written waiver of counsel and the trial court made no finding as to whether defendant was an indigent on that date. G.S. 7A-457.\nAppeal by defendant from Cooper, Judge, May 1971 Criminal Session of Superior Court held in Wilson County.\nDefendant was indicted for murder. When the case was called for trial the solicitor announced that he would not seek a verdict of murder in the first degree but would seek a verdict of murder in the second degree or manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan by Assistant Attorney General Richard N. League for the State.\nFarris and Thomas by Robert A. Farris for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0240-01",
  "first_page_order": 264,
  "last_page_order": 265
}