{
  "id": 8554809,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID McNEIL TURNER",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Turner",
  "decision_date": "1972-02-23",
  "docket_number": "No. 7219SC72",
  "first_page": "603",
  "last_page": "606",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 152",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "280 N.C. 137",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8570137
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:15.024983+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Britt and Vaughn concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID McNEIL TURNER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BROCK, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error that the trial judge allowed the following question and answer by the State\u2019s witness, Patrolman McAbee:\n\u201cQ. They were communicating in some manner with one another?\nA. Yes sir.\u201d\nIt seems that the State\u2019s case would have been equally as strong had the question not been asked; however, we fail to see how the question and answer could be prejudicial to defendant. Immediately preceding the question and answer, the witness testified:\n\u201cThe Corvette and the Pontiac were sitting side by side at the light, and there was some hollering between the occupants of the vehicles going on while they were sitting at the red light. I could not understand or make out what they were saying, but they were hollering back and forth at one another.\u201d\nThis assignment of error was overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error that the trial judge failed to define for the jury the word \u201cwillfully\u201d and the phrase \u201cspeed competition.\u201d The word \u201cwillfully\u201d is generally understood and has no special definition when applied to the law; it requires no definition by the judge. The phrase \u201cspeed competition,\u201d as used in the statute under which defendant was tried [G.S. 20-141.3(b)], is perfectly clear and requires no further definition. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant assigns as error that the trial judge in the Superior Court \u201cprovided for a sharply increased sentence over that imposed in Cabarrus County Recorder\u2019s Court.\u201d Upon trial de novo the Superior Court may impose sentence in excess of that imposed in the court from which the appeal to Superior Court was taken. State v. Speights, 280 N.C. 137, 185 S.E. 2d 152. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant assigns as error that the trial judge denied his motion to arrest judgment. Defendant moved to arrest judgment contending that the allegation upon which he was tried did not state an offense. The portion of the \u201cNorth Carolina Uniform Traffic Ticket\u201d of which defendant complains reads as follows:\n\u201cThe affiant being duly sworn, says that the above-named defendant, on or about the above-stated violation date in the above-named county, did unlawfully and willfully operate the above-described motor vehicle on a street or highway: (x) Did unlawfully & willfully race on a N.C. Public Highway GS 20-141.3 (B)\u201d\nDefendant argues that the word \u201crace\u201d is not the equivalent of \u201cspeed competition with another motor vehicle\u201d as condemned by the statute. It is advisable to charge in the words of the statute whenever possible; and where the blank space is limited on the uniform traffic ticket, a separate and more specific warrant should be issued. Nevertheless, we hold that defendant was adequately advised of the specific charge against him and the allegations are sufficient to support a later plea of former jeopardy. Inherent in the word \u201crace\u201d is speed competition of some type, and when used in conjunction with the operation of a motor vehicle on the highway, it leaves no doubt that the word describes \u201cspeed competition with another motor vehicle.\u201d This assignment of error is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges Britt and Vaughn concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BROCK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney Lloyd, for the State.",
      "Davis, Koontz & Horton, by Clarence E. Horton, Jr., for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID McNEIL TURNER\nNo. 7219SC72\n(Filed 23 February 1972)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 139; Appeal and Error \u00a7 48\u2014 speed competition \u2014 communication between occupants of the two vehicles\nIn a prosecution for wilfully engaging in speed competition on a public highway, defendant was not prejudiced by the solicitor\u2019s question, \u201cThey were communicating in some manner with one another?\u201d and the witness\u2019 answer, \u201cYes sir,\u201d where the witness had previously testified without objection that \u201cthere was some hollering between the occupants of the vehicle going on while they were sitting at the red light.\u201d\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 139\u2014 speed competition on highway \u2014 failure to define \u201cwilfully\u201d and \u201cspeed competition\u201d\nIn a prosecution for wilfully engaging in speed competition on a public highway, the trial court did not err in failing to define for the jury the word \u201cwilfully\u201d and the phrase \u201cspeed competition.\u201d\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 138\u2014 trial de novo in superior court \u2014 increased sentence\nUpon trial de novo the superior court may impose a sentence in excess of that imposed in the court from which the appeal was taken.\n4. Automobiles \u00a7 139\u2014 race competition on public highway \u2014 warrant \u2014 use of word \u201crace\u201d\nUniform Traffic Ticket charging that defendant \u201cdid unlawfully and willfully operate the above-described motor vehicle on a street or highway: (x) Did unlawfully & willfully race on a N. C. Public Highway,\u201d held sufficient to charge a violation of G.S. 20-141.3 (b), since the word \u201crace,\u201d when used in conjunction with the operation of a motor vehicle on the highway, describes \u201cspeed competition with another motor vehicle.\u201d\nAppeal by defendant from Thornburg, Judge, 9 August 1971 Session of Superior Court held in Cabarrus County.\nDefendant was tried and convicted under G.S. 20-141.3 (b) which provides in pertinent part: \u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle on a street or highway wilfully in speed competition with another motor vehicle.\u201d The offense is alleged to have been committed on 29 January 1970. Defendant was tried and convicted in the Recorder\u2019s Court, Concord, North Carolina, on 23 April 1970, and was sentenced to confinement for a period of twelve months. It was provided that this sentence would be suspended on certain conditions, but defendant appealed to the Superior Court.\nIn the Superior Court, defendant was tried de novo upon the original charge as contained in the \u201cNorth Carolina Uniform Traffic Ticket\u201d issued at the time of the alleged offense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and defendant was sentenced to confinement for a period of nine months. He now has appealed to this court.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following. At approximately one o\u2019clock in the morning of 29 January 1970, Highway Patrolman McAbee was seated in his patrol car observing the intersection of Highway 29 and Davidson Drive. He was parked in the parking lot of a business establishment at the intersection. Defendant was driving a Chevrolet Corvette in a southerly direction on Highway 29. A Pontiac Firebird, operated by David Edwin Perry, was also traveling in a southerly direction on Highway 29. Both vehicles slowed and stopped, side by side, at the intersection in obedience to an electrically operated traffic control signal. Patrolman McAbee could not understand what they were saying, \u201cbut they were hollering back and forth at one another.\u201d When the traffic control light turned green, both vehicles accelerated hard. \u201cThey took off real fast side by side.\u201d Patrolman McAbee immediately began pursuing them. The two automobiles remained side by side for approximately a tenth of a mile, and then the Corvette began pulling away from the Firebird. The highest speed the two vehicles attained was ninety miles per hour. Patrolman McAbee was able to apprehend the defendant as he slowed to turn into the parking lot of a restaurant about a mile south of the intersection where he was first observed. The defendant offered no evidence.\nAttorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney Lloyd, for the State.\nDavis, Koontz & Horton, by Clarence E. Horton, Jr., for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0603-01",
  "first_page_order": 627,
  "last_page_order": 630
}