{ "id": 11465738, "name": "DEBORAH BRYANT, Employee, Plaintiff v. WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, Employer; SELF-INSURED, Carrier; Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Bryant v. Weyerhaeuser Co.", "decision_date": "1998-07-07", "docket_number": "No. COA97-1370", "first_page": "135", "last_page": "140", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 N.C. App. 135" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600", "parenthetical": "\"We do not imply that a trial court must make exhaustive findings regarding the evidence presented at the hearing; rather 'the trial court should . . . limit[] the findings of fact to ultimate, rather than evidentiary facts.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515756 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405-06", "parenthetical": "\"We do not imply that a trial court must make exhaustive findings regarding the evidence presented at the hearing; rather 'the trial court should . . . limit[] the findings of fact to ultimate, rather than evidentiary facts.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712737 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560289, 8560267, 8560333, 8560306, 8560243 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0196-03", "/nc/300/0196-02", "/nc/300/0196-05", "/nc/300/0196-04", "/nc/300/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548032 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313785 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716956 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135-36" }, { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0127-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 510, "char_count": 11830, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.81353102852408e-07, "percentile": 0.9316253573084763 }, "sha256": "d43ed0a9e28b52dfaa4d7f8bb40e7cb7ca8395641fa150f7f98fe55235c6a1e8", "simhash": "1:3d0593b250748a57", "word_count": 1752 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:27.441929+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, John C. and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "DEBORAH BRYANT, Employee, Plaintiff v. WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, Employer; SELF-INSURED, Carrier; Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nWeyerhaeuser Company (Weyerhaeuser) appeals from the Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (Full Commission) in favor of Deborah Bryant (Plaintiff).\nOn 25 April 1992, Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident while working as a \u201cstacker operator\u201d for defendant. Following a hearing on 28 April 1994, Deputy Commissioner Lawrence B. Shuping, Jr. (Deputy Commissioner Shuping) filed an Opinion and Award in which he concluded that Plaintiff remained totally disabled by permanent right leg and left foot injuries, but determined that if Weyerhaeuser sought to renew vocational rehabilitation efforts, \u201cPlaintiff [was] obligated to cooperate in any reasonable vocational rehabilitation efforts or to have her compensation benefits suspended until she does.\u201d Neither Plaintiff nor Weyerhaeuser appear from the record to have sought review of this order by the Full Commission.\nWeyerhaeuser subsequently sought to renew rehabilitation efforts, but Plaintiff failed to attend scheduled meetings with Craven Evaluation Training Center (the Center). An informal hearing was held by telephone with Special Deputy Commissioner W. Bain Jones, Jr. (Special Commissioner Jones), who allowed Weyerhaeuser to suspend payment of compensation to Plaintiff on 11 May 1996 until she completed a vocational assessment at the Center. Plaintiff subsequently requested a formal hearing on this issue, and Deputy Commissioner William C. Bost (Deputy Commissioner Bost) filed an Opinion and Award on 5 November 1996 in which he concluded that Plaintiff had been incapable of completing the vocational rehabilitation programs at the previously scheduled times and was still incapable of participating in the program due to her total disability, and therefore ordered Weyerhaeuser to pay both accrued compensation and continuing compensation to Plaintiff. Weyerhaeuser appealed Deputy Commissioner Bost\u2019s reinstatement of Plaintiff\u2019s benefits to the Full Commission.\nThe Full Commission reviewed the evidence, including the deposition of Paul P. Alston, Ph.D. (Dr. Alston). Dr. Alston, after watching videotapes of Plaintiff, testified that his opinion was that Plaintiff was \u201cmalingering,\u201d which he described as \u201ca behavior in which a person essentially exaggerates the level of symptoms that are present for the purpose of manipulating other people\u2019s opinions and that they do so with knowledge of what they are doing; that is, it\u2019s a deliberate act that they are doing.\u201d Dr. Alston further testified that the videotapes were \u201ca limited observation. So based on that, I wouldn\u2019t absolutely say that she is not depressed based on that limited amount of information. It may be that she\u2019s not, but I\u2019m not comfortable saying that just from watching videotapes.\u201d Based on Dr. Alston\u2019s deposition testimony, the Full Commission found that while the \u201cvideo segments showed an increased level of activity by Plaintiff,... Dr. Alston could not say after viewing the tape[s], that she was not depressed.\u201d\nThe Full Commission found and concluded:\nPlaintiff was incapable of successfully completing the vocational rehabilitation programs scheduled for her in January, March and June 1995 due to her continuing total disability and the depression that resulted from her work-related injuries, and Plaintiff is still incapable of participating in a vocational rehabilitation program at this time due to her total disability.\nIn its award, the Full Commission directed Weyerhaeuser to reinstate Plaintiff\u2019s compensation payments and to pay the accrued compensation. The Full Commission then vacated Special Deputy Commissioner Jones\u2019 suspension of Plaintiff\u2019s benefits and directed that compensation benefits \u201ccontinu[e] until further order of the Industrial Commission.\u201d From the Full Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award, Weyerhaeuser appeals.\nThe issues are whether: (I) res judicata barred a conclusion by the Full Commission that Plaintiff was incapable of participating in a vocational rehabilitation program; and (II) the Full Commission made sufficient definitive findings to determine the critical issues raised.\nSection 97-18.1 of the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides for informal hearings by telephone to determine whether previously awarded benefits should be suspended. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-18.1(d) (Supp. 1997). The employee may request a formal hearing de novo if benefits are suspended following the informal hearing by telephone. Id.\nIn this case, Special Deputy Commissioner Jones conducted an informal hearing by telephone and suspended Plaintiff\u2019s benefits. Plaintiff requested and received a formal hearing, at which Deputy Commissioner Bost, on de novo review, reinstated Plaintiff\u2019s benefits after finding and concluding that Plaintiff was \u201cincapable of participating in a vocational rehabilitation program at this time due to her total disability.\u201d The Full Commission, on review, agreed that Plaintiff was incapable of participating in a vocational rehabilitation program at this time, vacated the suspension order of Special Deputy Commissioner Jones, and reinstated Plaintiffs benefits.\nI\nWeyerhaeuser contends that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the Full Commission from concluding that Plaintiff is incapable of complying with vocational rehabilitation in light of Deputy Commissioner Shuping\u2019s initial award (which was not appealed to the Full Commission) that Plaintiff \u201ccooperate in any reasonable vocational rehabilitation efforts.\u201d We disagree.\nThe doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of final orders of the Full Commission and orders of a deputy commissioner which have not been appealed to the Full Commission. Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 135-36, 337 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1985). The essential elements of res judicata are: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) an identity of the cause of action in the prior suit and the present suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in both suits. Id. at 135, 337 S.E.2d at 482.\nIn this case, Deputy Commissioner Shuping\u2019s initial order was a final adjudication on the merits (because it was not appealed) of Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim against Weyerhaeuser. That order required Plaintiff to comply with \u201creasonable\u201d vocational rehabilitation. The issue of whether Plaintiff must comply with \u201creasonable\u201d vocational rehabilitation, therefore, cannot be relitigated, even before the Full Commission.\nIn this case, the Full Commission did not relitigate whether Plaintiff must comply with \u201creasonable\u201d vocational rehabilitation, but merely determined that Plaintiff was incapable of complying with the available vocational rehabilitation program. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata is not implicated.\nWeyerhaeuser argues in the alternative that the vocational rehabilitation offered was reasonable. We disagree. Vocational rehabilitation with which Plaintiff is \u201cincapable\u201d of complying is not reasonable vocational rehabilitation.\nII\nWeyerhaeuser contends that the Full Commission failed to take Dr. Alston\u2019s testimony into account because it did not make specific findings of fact noting the statements of Dr. Alston which supported Weyerhaeuser\u2019s position that Plaintiff was not depressed.\n\u201c[T]he authority to find facts necessary for a worker\u2019s compensation award is vested exclusively with the [Commission], and . . . such findings must be upheld on appeal if supported by any competent evidence, even in the face of evidence to the contrary.\u201d Errante v. Cumberland County Solid Waste Management, 106 N.C. App. 114, 118, 415 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1992). The Full Commission must make \u201cdefinitive findings to determine the critical issues raised by the evidence,\u201d Harrell v. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980), and in doing so must indicate in its findings that it has \u201cconsidered or weighed\u201d all testimony with respect to the critical issuer in the case, Lineback v. Wake County Board of Commissioners, 126 N.C. App. 678, 681, 486 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1997). It is not, however, necessary that the Full Commission make exhaustive findings as to each statement made by any given witness or make findings rejecting specific evidence that may be contrary to the evidence accepted by the Full Commission. See id.; cf. Armstong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 405-06, 368 S.E.2d 595, 600 (1988) (\u201cWe do not imply that a trial court must make exhaustive findings regarding the evidence presented at the hearing; rather \u2018the trial court should . . . limit[] the findings of fact to ultimate, rather than evidentiary facts.\u2019 \u201d).\nIn this case, the Full Commission made the definitive finding that Plaintiff was depressed in determining the critical issue of whether she was incapable of complying with the vocational rehabilitation offered. The findings indicate that the Full Commission, in reaching its determination, considered the expert testimony of Dr. Alston. We acknowledge that the evidence does reveal some testimony from Dr. Alston that would support a finding that Plaintiff was not depressed. We further acknowledge that the Full Commission did not specifically find that it was rejecting the evidence that would support a finding that Plaintiff was not depressed. Such \u201cnegative\u201d findings are not required. Because the Full Commission\u2019s findings on the critical issues in this case are supported by some competent evidence in the record, this Court is bound by those findings.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN, John C. and SMITH concur.\n. The Full Commission has the inherent power, \u201canalogous to that conferred on courts by Rule 60(b)(6),\u201d to set aside or modify its own orders, including final orders of the deputy commissioners, Hogan, 315 N.C. at 129; however, this inherent power is not implicated in this case because the Full Commission did not set aside or modify Deputy Commissioner Shuping\u2019s order.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Resnick & Abraham, L.L.C., by Gary M. Janis, for 'plaintiff appellee.", "Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.R, by Robert C. Kemer, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DEBORAH BRYANT, Employee, Plaintiff v. WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, Employer; SELF-INSURED, Carrier; Defendant\nNo. COA97-1370\n(Filed 7 July 1998)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 res judicata \u2014 compliance with vocational rehabilitation\nThe doctrine of res judicata was not implicated where an initial workers\u2019 compensation order was a final adjudication on the merits because it was not appealed, that order required plaintiff to comply with reasonable vocational rehabilitation, and the Commission subsequently concluded that plaintiff was incapable of complying with vocational rehabilitation. The Commission merely determined here that plaintiff was incapable of complying with the available vocational rehabilitation program and did not relitigate whether plaintiff must comply with reasonable vocational rehabilitation. Furthermore, vocational rehabilitation with which plaintiff is incapable of complying is not reasonable.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 findings \u2014 conflicting evidence\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s findings on critical issues in a workers\u2019 compensation case were supported by competent evidence in the record and the findings indicate that the Commission considered expert testimony which supported defendant\u2019s position, even though the Commission did not specifically find that it was rejecting that evidence. Such negative findings are not required; it is not necessary that the Commission make exhaustive findings as to each statement made by any given witness or make findings rejecting specific evidence that may be contrary to the evidence accepted by the Commission.\nAppeal by defendant from Opinion and Award filed 15 August 1997 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 June 1998.\nResnick & Abraham, L.L.C., by Gary M. Janis, for 'plaintiff appellee.\nTeague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.R, by Robert C. Kemer, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0135-01", "first_page_order": 167, "last_page_order": 172 }