{ "id": 11466647, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES MICHAEL McDONALD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McDonald", "decision_date": "1998-07-21", "docket_number": "No. COA97-564", "first_page": "263", "last_page": "271", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 N.C. App. 263" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560673 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cross, 284 N.C. 174, 200 S.E.2d 27 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569847 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cross, 284 N.C. 174, 200 S.E.2d 27 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4775661 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395265 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559740 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197", "parenthetical": "holding that statements by prosecutor that State's case was \"uncontradicted,\" that there was \"nothing else from this witness stand to show otherwise,\" and that jury should consider absence of alibi witnesses did not constitute impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4777865 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567535 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790210, 790099, 790235, 790109, 790206 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0262-05", "/nc/340/0262-04", "/nc/340/0262-01", "/nc/340/0262-02", "/nc/340/0262-03" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916386 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Thompson, 118 N.C. App. 33, 39, 454 S.E.2d 271, 275, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 262, 456 S.E.2d 837 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11653744 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Thompson, 118 N.C. App. 33, 39, 454 S.E.2d 271, 275, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 262, 456 S.E.2d 837 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 S.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551360, 551397, 551211, 551276, 551317 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0406-05", "/nc/347/0406-01", "/nc/347/0406-02", "/nc/347/0406-03", "/nc/347/0406-04" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527271 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11792010 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988)" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523656 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 1006", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11781535, 11781394, 11781462, 11781595, 11781343 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/1006-04", "/us/402/1006-02", "/us/402/1006-03", "/us/402/1006-05", "/us/402/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566982 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 928", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6433633, 6433892, 6434117, 6434215, 6433225, 6433418, 6433326, 6433776, 6433043, 6433111, 6433529, 6434333, 6434014 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0928-07", "/us/434/0928-09", "/us/434/0928-11", "/us/434/0928-12", "/us/434/0928-03", "/us/434/0928-05", "/us/434/0928-04", "/us/434/0928-08", "/us/434/0928-01", "/us/434/0928-02", "/us/434/0928-06", "/us/434/0928-13", "/us/434/0928-10" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572442 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "citing State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E.2d 178, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928, 54 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1977)" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "citing State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E.2d 178, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928, 54 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1977)" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4772378 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522592 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 L. Ed. 2d 912", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 1036", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13312, 13445, 13287, 13545, 13740, 13965, 13233, 14131, 13397, 13238, 13399, 13750, 13849, 13725 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/1036-05", "/us/485/1036-12", "/us/485/1036-11", "/us/485/1036-04", "/us/485/1036-06", "/us/485/1036-14", "/us/485/1036-08", "/us/485/1036-10", "/us/485/1036-01", "/us/485/1036-02", "/us/485/1036-13", "/us/485/1036-03", "/us/485/1036-09", "/us/485/1036-07" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569839 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790203 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 921, "char_count": 20209, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1455130107968474e-07, "percentile": 0.7677573094029806 }, "sha256": "a09146d9fa15546549f10c6594d9f0bf6001e294117c6b02f61bc4b8323ce3c7", "simhash": "1:8309d43a1f0fbbf4", "word_count": 3294 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:27.441929+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES MICHAEL McDONALD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nDefendant Charles Michael McDonald appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict convicting him of robbery with a firearm. The relevant facts follow.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that at approximately 9:30 p.m. on the night of 28 March 1996, defendant went to Joyce Covington\u2019s house and asked one of her guests if he could \u201csee her reefer.\u201d Covington testified that defendant appeared to be \u201chigh on something,\u201d and that when the guest showed defendant the marijuana in her possession, he took it, put it in his pocket, said \u201cI gots to get mines,\u201d and stood up to leave. Covington, who had been standing in front of the door since defendant\u2019s arrival, refused to move when defendant started toward the door, and she scolded him for taking what was not his. Defendant became angry and told Covington\u2019s boyfriend, who was also present, to \u201chave [his] girl to open the door before she get hurt.\u201d Covington did not move, so defendant repeated his demand. However, when she refused a second time, defendant reached into his pocket, pulled out a silver handgun, and threatened to shoot her. Covington took defendant\u2019s threat seriously and moved aside to open the door. Defendant, then, grabbed thirty-one dollars off of her television set and left the house.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant made a motion for nonsuit, which the trial court denied. Defendant did not put on any evidence, and the case, upon appropriate instructions, was submitted to the jury. The jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. From the judgment of conviction, defendant appeals.\nDefendant presents four assignments of error on appeal. He contends that the trial court erred (1) in allowing evidence of a prior breaking and entering in which defendant allegedly participated, (2) in allowing statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments which defendant contends impliedly referred to his failure to testify, (3) in denying defendant\u2019s motion for nonsuit at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, and (4) in allowing testimony regarding a post-arrest statement made by defendant. For the reasons stated in the following analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not err.\nDefendant argues first that the trial court improperly allowed evidence of a prior breaking and entering, which he contends had no relevant purpose other than to attribute to him a criminal disposition. We hold that by allowing this evidence, the trial court committed no prejudicial error.\nRule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence contains the following pertinent provisions:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.R. Evid. 404(b). This rule permitting evidence of other crimes or wrongs is a general rule, \u201c \u2018subject to but one exception requiring [exclusion of the evidence] if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u2019 \u201d State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 284, 457 S.E.2d 841, 852 (1995) (quoting State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990)). The list of permissible purposes contained in Rule 404(b) is not exclusive. Id. at 284, 457 S.E.2d at 852-53 (citing State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 362 S.E.2d 244 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988)). Evidence of \u201cother crimes\u201d is \u201cadmissible as long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the defendant\u2019s propensity to commit the crime.\u201d Id. However, \u201c[t]he connection between the evidence and its permissible purpose should be clear, and the issue on which the evidence of other crimes is said to bear should be the subject of genuine controversy.\u201d State v. McKoy, 78 N.C. App. 531, 537, 337 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1985), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 317 N.C. 519, 347 S.E.2d 374 (1986).\nIn the present case, defendant filed a Motion in Limine to exclude all testimony regarding his alleged participation in an earlier breaking and entering of a dwelling owned and previously occupied by Covington. The trial court sustained the objection set forth in the motion, subject to an offer of proof by the State as to the relevancy of the testimony. The State proffered the following evidence to show Covington\u2019s state of mind at the time of the robbery: Sometime between December 1995 and the night of the robbery, Covington arrived at her house on Brewer Street, which she was in the process of vacating, and witnessed defendant and several other individuals running out of the house. She noticed that the back door window was broken, and it appeared that the trespassers had broken the window to gain entry into the house. When Covington notified the police of the break-in, she identified defendant as one of the individuals she saw fleeing from the scene. Days later, Covington encountered defendant unexpectedly at a neighbor\u2019s house, and when he saw her, he threatened to do her bodily harm for telling the police that he was one of the men who had committed the break-in. Covington testified that this threat caused her to fear defendant.\nThe State argued that these incidents were relevant to show that Covington was afraid of defendant and, thus, did not willingly invite him into her home or consent when he took her money on the night of the robbery. Defendant, however, elicited evidence on cross-examination of Covington showing that she borrowed money from him on the day of the robbery. Defendant argued that this evidence proved that Covington had no cause to fear him when he came to her house later that night. Based on the State\u2019s proffer, the trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection and allowed the challenged testimony. The trial court gave the following limiting instruction after the evidence was presented:\nLadies and gentleman of the jury, I think it\u2019ll be appropriate to instruct you at this time that this event involving the alleged breaking and entering of her house on an earlier occasion is not conduct with which this Defendant is charged but I am allowing it for the purpose of explaining the relationship between this Defendant and Ms. Covington and her alleged fear of him, to explain that, her mental state.\nDefendant contends that despite this instruction, the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. Defendant argues that whether Covington feared him was irrelevant, as fear is not an essential element of the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon. We disagree.\nUnder section 14-87 of the North Carolina General Statutes, armed robbery is the nonconsensual taking of another\u2019s personal property in her presence or from her person by endangering or threatening her life with a firearm, where the taker knows that he is not entitled to the property and intends to permanently deprive the property from its owner. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 102, 261 S.E.2d 114, 119 (1980) (citing State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E.2d 178, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928, 54 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1977)). \u201cThe gist of the offense is not the taking but the taking by force or putting in fear.\u201d Id. (citing State v. Swaney, 277 N.C. 602, 178 S.E.2d 399, appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 1006, 29 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1971)). Thus, fear or intimidation is a material fact in issue regarding the offense of armed robbery, and we conclude that the trial correctly determined that the victim\u2019s state of mind \u2014 whether she feared defendant \u2014 was relevant in this case.\nStill, relevant evidence may be excluded \u201cif its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice.\u201d State v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 680, 411 S.E.2d 376, 381 (1991) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988)). Whether evidence should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. (citation omitted). Hence, the trial court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed, unless it \u201cis manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). In light of the court\u2019s limiting instruction, we cannot find that the trial court\u2019s decision permitting the State to introduce evidence of the earlier breaking and entering was an unreasoned one. We discern no error.\nAssuming, as defendant urges, that Covington\u2019s state of mind was not relevant to the robbery in this case, we, nevertheless, conclude that admitting evidence of the prior break-in was not prejudicial error. The court\u2019s failure to exclude inadmissible evidence will not result in a new trial, unless defendant establishes \u201c \u2018a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial had the error not been committed.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hurst, 127 N.C. App. 54, 61, 487 S.E.2d 846, 852 (quoting State v. Brown, 101 N.C. App. 71, 80, 398 S.E.2d 905, 910 (1990)), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 347 N.C. 406, 494 S.E.2d 427, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 140 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1998). In the instant case, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence that he broke into Covington\u2019s Brewer Street house. There was undisputed evidence that defendant brandished a silver handgun and threatened to shoot Covington if she did not move away from the door. Then, after she moved aside and opened the door, defendant took money she had laying on the nearby television set and left the house. This evidence, alone, establishes the trespassory taking of personal property from the presence of another by the threatened use of a firearm. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87 (1993). Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing a reasonable possibility that a different result would have followed absent the alleged error.\nTangentially, defendant argues that the prosecutor was permitted to elicit irrelevant details about the condition of the house after the break-in. In particular, Covington was allowed to testify that there were empty beer cans and bottles in the living room and that there were used condoms in her son\u2019s bedroom. Defendant, however, failed to specifically object to this testimony; therefore, this argument is waived. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Accordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s first assignment of error.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting statements by the prosecutor during closing argument which defendant contends implicated his right to refrain from testifying in his own defense. Defendant takes issue with the following statement made by the prosecutor during her closing argument: \u201cYou have heard no other evidence to conflict with [Covington\u2019s] testimony.\u201d Defendant contends that this statement, although not a direct reference, drew attention to his failure to testify, because \u201cthe only person present in court who could refute [Covington\u2019s] side of the story was [defendant].\u201d We are not persuaded.\nTo be sure, a defendant in a criminal case may not be compelled to testify, and any comment by the prosecutor concerning the defendant\u2019s failure to testify is strictly prohibited, as violative of the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Riley, 128 N.C. App. 265, 269, 495 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1998) (citing State v. Thompson, 118 N.C. App. 33, 39, 454 S.E.2d 271, 275, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 262, 456 S.E.2d 837 (1995)). This notwithstanding, \u201cthe defendant\u2019s failure to produce exculpatory evidence or to contradict evidence presented by the State may properly be brought to the jury\u2019s attention by the State in its closing argument.\u201d State v. Jordan, 305 N.C. 274, 280, 287 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1982).\nIn the instant case, defendant elected not to present any evidence, and the prosecutor\u2019s comment was aimed at defendant\u2019s failure to present evidence to rebut the State\u2019s case, not at his failure to take the stand. Thus, the challenged statement was not an impermissible reference to defendant\u2019s failure to testify. See State v. Mason, 317 N.C. 283, 287, 345 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1986) (holding that statements by prosecutor that State\u2019s case was \u201cuncontradicted,\u201d that there was \u201cnothing else from this witness stand to show otherwise,\u201d and that jury should consider absence of alibi witnesses did not constitute impermissible comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify). We, therefore, reject defendant\u2019s second assignment of error.\nDefendant next challenges the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion for nonsuit at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, alleging that the evidence aroused no more than a mere suspicion as to defendant\u2019s guilt. Again, we disagree.\nThe question presented by a motion for nonsuit is whether substantial evidence exists to submit the case to the jury and to justify a guilty verdict on the offense charged. State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 41, 47, 265 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1980) (citations omitted). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). Additionally, in considering a motion for non-suit, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, allowing the State every reasonable inference and intendment to be drawn from the evidence. Powell, 299 N.C. at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117.\nDefendant does not deny the fact that he brandished the gun and threatened to shoot Covington. Instead, he maintains that because \u201cit is not clear from [Covington\u2019s] testimony at what point in time [he] returned the silver gun to his coat pocket,\u201d the State failed to show that defendant\u2019s threatened use of force induced Covington to part with her property. Defendant cites our Supreme Court\u2019s holding in State v. Hope, 317 N.C. 302, 345 S.E.2d 361 (1986), as support for this proposition. In Hope, the Supreme Court, indeed, stated that \u201cthe use of force or violence must be such as to induce the victim to part with his or her property.\u201d Id. at 305, 345 S.E.2d at 363. The Court, however, further held as follows:\nIn this jurisdiction to be found guilty of armed robbery, the defendant\u2019s use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon must precede or be concomitant with the taking, or be so joined with it in a continuous transaction by time and circumstance as to be inseparable.\nId. at 306, 345 S.E.2d at 364 (citations omitted).\nApplying the preceding principles, we determine that the State produced sufficient evidence in the present case to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the offense of armed robbery. The State\u2019s evidence tended to establish a continuous transaction, with the threatened use of a firearm so connected in time and circumstance with the actual taking \u201cas to be inseparable.\u201d See id. Defendant took marijuana from Covington\u2019s guest, put it in his pocket, and stood up to leave. When Covington refused to move away from the door, defendant reached into his pocket, pulled out a silver handgun, and threatened to shoot her. Covington opened the door, and defendant grabbed thirty-one dollars off of her television set and left. This evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that defendant\u2019s threat to shoot Covington was inseparable from the taking of her money and that the threatened use of force induced Covington to part with her money. Defendant\u2019s third assignment of error, then, fails.\nLastly defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Thompson to testify that after defendant was arrested, he made the following statement regarding a plastic bag found in his shoe: \u201cThat\u2019s a baggie I bit off that had powdered coke in it I did earlier.\u201d Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to exclude this testimony. The trial court, however, overruled the motion, on the ground that it corroborated Covington\u2019s testimony that defendant was acting \u201chigh.\u201d Defendant argues that this ruling was improper, because whether defendant was under the influence on the night of 28 March 1996 did not bear upon any of the elements of armed robbery. Assuming, without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, defendant has, again, failed to show prejudice.\nAs previously noted, \u201cthe erroneous admission of . . . evidence^ is not always so prejudicial as to require a new trial.\u201d State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 470, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986). \u201c \u2018[T]he appellant must show error positive and tangible, that has affected his rights substantially and not merely theoretically, and that a different result would have likely ensued.\u2019 \u201d State v. Billups, 301 N.C. 607, 616, 272 S.E.2d 842, 849 (1981) (quoting State v. Cross, 284 N.C. 174, 200 S.E.2d 27 (1973)).\nNotwithstanding Detective Thompson\u2019s testimony regarding defendant\u2019s post-arrest statement, there was ample evidence to support defendant\u2019s conviction of armed robbery, i.e., that defendant took thirty-one dollars from Covington after threatening to shoot her. Contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, the jury did not need evidence that defendant used an illegal narcotic to infer that he could have committed the robbery. Therefore, admission of the challenged evidence was not prejudicial, and defendant\u2019s final assignment of error is overruled.\nIn light of all of the foregoing, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges GREENE and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Steven B. Corley, for the State.", "Geoffrey W. Hosford for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES MICHAEL McDONALD\nNo. COA97-564\n(Filed 21 July 1998)\n1. Evidence\u2014 other crimes \u2014 relevant to victim\u2019s state of mind\nThere was no prejudicial error in an armed robbery prosecution from the admission of evidence of a prior breaking and entering of this victim\u2019s house where defendant had subsequently threatened the victim for telling the police that he was one of the men who had committed the break-in. Fear or intimidation is a material fact in issue regarding armed robbery and the trial court correctly determined that the victim\u2019s state of mind was relevant in this case. In light of the court\u2019s limiting instruction, it could not be found that the court\u2019s decision that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial was unreasoned. However, assuming error, defendant failed to show prejudice because the undisputed evidence alone established the trespassory taking of personal property from the presence of another by the threatened use of a firearm.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 defense failure to present evidence\nThere was no error in an armed robbery prosecution where the prosecutor argued that the jury had heard no evidence to conflict with the prosecuting witness\u2019s testimony. The prosecutor\u2019s comment was aimed at defendant\u2019s failure to present evidence to rebut the State\u2019s case, not at his failure to take the stand.\n3. Robbery\u2014 continuous transaction \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence in an armed robbery prosecution tended to establish a continuous transaction even though defendant contended that the State failed to show that defendant\u2019s threatened use of force induced the victim to part with her property. There was sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to find that defendant\u2019s threat to shoot the victim was inseparable from the taking of her money and that the threatened use of force induced the victim to part with her money.\n4. Evidence\u2014 armed robbery \u2014 consumption of narcotics\u2014 not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudicial error in an armed robbery prosecution from the admission of defendant\u2019s post-arrest statement indicating that he had consumed cocaine where there was ample other evidence to support defendant\u2019s conviction.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 February 1996 by Judge E. Lynn Johnson in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 February 1998.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Steven B. Corley, for the State.\nGeoffrey W. Hosford for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0263-01", "first_page_order": 295, "last_page_order": 303 }