{ "id": 11468330, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH WAYNE VAUGHN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Vaughn", "decision_date": "1998-08-04", "docket_number": "No. COA97-1177", "first_page": "456", "last_page": "461", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 N.C. App. 456" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569971 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314169 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694937 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-71.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "listing as an essential element of possession of stolen goods knowledge or reasonable grounds to know that the goods were stolen" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 519, "char_count": 11595, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.4268625019724137e-07, "percentile": 0.878924408334231 }, "sha256": "003f85ecaad0d0be657cb48c188ba7761d13480aa22d59c6f057495b8498b589", "simhash": "1:e30bcbab5a294d94", "word_count": 1963 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:27.441929+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN, John C. and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH WAYNE VAUGHN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nOn 5 June 1996, Carla Lynn Hardy returned from work and parked her red 1993 Mazda Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 in front of her apartment in Greensboro. The car was worth approximately $9,000.00. The next morning, it was gone. Hardy reported the car as stolen. She recalled that several days earlier, when her brother was working on the car, she had left a spare ignition key in the glove compartment.\nOn 6 June 1996, Officer R.B. Edwards of the Greensboro Police Department was working off-duty as a uniformed security officer for the Carolina Circle Mall. About 7:30 that evening, an employee of the Dillard\u2019s department store at the mall directed Officer Edwards\u2019 attention to a red Mazda Prot\u00e9g\u00e9. The Mazda was parked outside Dillard\u2019s, which had closed at 7:00 p.m. Defendant was sitting in the front seat.\nOfficer Edwards roused defendant, who was apparently asleep, and asked him to step outside the car. Officer Edwards testified that defendant said his name was \u201cAlbert Kinney\u201d or \u201cCurtis Albert Kinney.\u201d Defendant also said that the vehicle belonged to his friend or girlfriend. Officer Edwards ran a license check on the Mazda, and when he was notified that the car was stolen he asked the police department to dispatch an on-duty police officer to the scene. He then handcuffed defendant.\nA few minutes later, on-duty Officer M.J. Fratterigo arrived. Officer Fratterigo confirmed that the vehicle was stolen and placed defendant under arrest for possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant told Officer Fratterigo his name was \u201cCurtis Albert Kinney.\u201d When Officer Fratterigo searched the car, he found a key in the ignition and several other items including coins and dollar bills, a radio/tape player, tapes in tape cases, a purple backpack, a box containing jewelry, and assorted men\u2019s clothing. None of these items belonged to the owner of the Mazda, Ms. Hardy. In fact, several items that Hardy had left in the car were later found in a dumpster. Hardy testified that she did not know defendant and had never given him permission to use her Mazda.\nDefendant was convicted of possession of stolen goods, a Class H felony, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-71.1 (1993). Defendant was also found to be an habitual felon at the time he possessed the stolen Mazda. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.1 (1993). He was sentenced as a Class C, Level V felon.\nDefendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court should have dismissed his case because there was insufficient evidence that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the car in which he was found had been stolen. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-71.1 (1993) (listing as an essential element of possession of stolen goods knowledge or reasonable grounds to know that the goods were stolen). We disagree. Defendant was found sleeping in a stolen car with a key in the ignition. The car was strewn with items not belonging to the car\u2019s owner. When questioned by the police, defendant lied about his name and falsely stated that the car belonged to a friend of his. Under these circumstances, defendant\u2019s conduct was sufficiently incriminating to support a finding that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the car was stolen. See State v. Parker, 316 N.C. 295, 303-04, 341 S.E.2d 555, 560 (1986); State v. Wilson, 106 N.C. App. 342, 347-48, 416 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1992).\nDefendant\u2019s second assignment of error pertains to the trial court\u2019s determination of his sentence. As noted above, defendant was convicted of violating G.S. 14-71.1, a Class H felony. He was also found to be an habitual felon, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.1 (1993), at the time he violated G.S. 14-71.1 in 1996. Defendant\u2019s punishment was then determined in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.6 (Cum. Supp. 1997), which reads,\nWhen an habitual felon as defined in this Article commits aftv felony under the laws of the State of North Carolina. the felon must, upon conviction or plea of guilty under indictment as provided in this Article (except where the felon has been sentenced as a Class A, Bl, or B2 felon) be sentenced as a Class C felon. In determining the prior record level, convictions used to establish a person\u2019s status as an habitual felon shall not be used. Sentences imposed under this Article shall run consecutively with and shall commence at the expiration of any sentence being served by the person sentenced under this section.\n(emphasis added). In this case, the trial court correctly sentenced defendant as a Class C felon.\nDefendant disagrees with the trial court\u2019s determination of his prior record level. The State presented evidence that in 1984, in case number 84 CRS 18181, defendant was convicted of felonious breaking and entering. In an ancillary proceeding, defendant was also convicted of being an habitual felon. Under the statutes then in effect, felonious breaking and entering was classified as a Class H felony, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(a) (1981), and the jury\u2019s finding that defendant was an habitual felon at the time of the offense required that he be \u201csentenced as a Class C felon,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.6 (1981).\nWhen it calculated defendant\u2019s prior record level, the trial court treated defendant\u2019s 1984 conviction of breaking and entering not as a Class H conviction but as a Class C conviction. Defendant\u2019s total \u201cpoints\u201d for prior offenses thus totaled 16, and his prior record level was determined to be Level V. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(c)(5) (1997). Defendant argues that his 1984 conviction of breaking and entering should have been treated as a Class H conviction, not a Class C conviction, and that his prior record level is therefore Level IV. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 16A-1340.14(c)(4) (1997).\nThis case requires us to interpret the term \u201cprior felony Class C conviction\u201d as it is used in section 15A-1340.14 of the Criminal Procedure Act. That statute provides that a felony offender\u2019s prior record level is to be determined \u201cby calculating the sum of the points assigned to each of the offender\u2019s prior convictions.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(a) (1997). Subsection (b) discusses \u201cPoints\u201d:\n(b) . . . Points are assigned as follows:\n(1) For each prior felony Class A conviction, 10 points.\n(la) For each prior felony Class B1 conviction, 9 points.\n(2) For each prior felony Class B2, C, or D conviction, 6 points.\n(3) For each prior felony Class E, F, or G conviction, 4 points.\n(4) For each prior felony Class H or I conviction, 2 points.\n(5) For each prior Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor conviction or prior impaired driving conviction under G.S. 20-138.1, 1 point....\nSubsection (c) lists the six prior record levels (I through VI) and their corresponding point totals; Level IV is defined as \u201c[a]t least 9, but not more than 14 points,\u201d while Level V is \u201c[a]t least 15, but not more than 18 points.\u201d Subsection (c) further states, \u201cIn determining the prior record level, the classification of a prior offense is the classification assigned to that offense at the time the offense for which the offender is being sentenced is committed.\u201d\nThe issue is whether defendant\u2019s conviction of felonious breaking and entering in 1984 is a \u201cprior felony Class . . . C . . . conviction.\u201d Before answering that question, we note that defendant\u2019s 1984 conviction of being an habitual felon at the time he committed the crime of breaking and entering is not a \u201cprior felony Class C conviction.\u201d Being an habitual felon is not a felony. It is, rather, \u201ca status the attaining of which subjects a person thereafter convicted of a crime to an increased punishment for that crime. The status itself, standing alone, will not support a criminal sentence.\u201d State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431, 435, 233 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1977).\nTwo sections of the Criminal Procedure Act guide our analysis. The first, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.11(7) (1997), states in relevant part that \u201c[a] person has a prior conviction when, on the date a criminal judgment is entered, the person being sentenced has previously been convicted of a crime . . . [i]n the superior court.\u201d The second, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331(b) (1997), provides, \u201cFor the purpose of imposing sentence, a person has been convicted when he has been adjudged guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or no contest.\u201d This latter statute plainly treats the imposition of a criminal sentence as distinct from a criminal conviction. As set forth in section 15A-1331(b), the term \u201cconviction\u201d refers only to the adjudication of guilt or the entry of a plea of guilty or no contest. The term \u201cconviction\u201d does not refer to sentencing.\nAccordingly, when section 15A-1340.14 uses the term \u201cprior felony conviction,\u201d it refers only to a prior adjudication of the defendant\u2019s guilt or to a prior entry of a plea of guilty or no contest by the defendant. The term \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d does not refer to the sentence imposed for committing the prior felony. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331(b) (1997).\nIn this case, when defendant was convicted of felonious breaking and entering in 1984, he was convicted of a Class H felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(a) (1981). His contemporaneous conviction of being an habitual felon did not reclassify the offense of breaking and entering as a Class C felony. Rather, the habitual felon conviction required that defendant be \u201csentenced as a Class C felon.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.6 (1981) (emphasis added).\nDefendant\u2019s 1984 conviction of breaking and entering was not, therefore, a \u201cprior felony Class C conviction.\u201d It was a prior felony Class H conviction. The trial court erred by assigning six points to the 1984 conviction rather than two. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(b)(4) (1997).\nNo error in the trial; remanded for resentencing.\nJudges MARTIN, John C. and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General H. Alan Pell, for the State.", "Assistant Public Defender Delton L. Green for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH WAYNE VAUGHN\nNo. COA97-1177\n(Filed 4 August 1998)\n1. Crimes, Other\u2014 possession of stolen property \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 grounds to believe car stolen\nThe trial court did not err by not dismissing a charge of possession of stolen goods for insufficient evidence that defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the car in which he was found had been stolen where he was found sleeping in the stolen car with the key in the ignition, the car was strewn with items not belonging to the car\u2019s owner, and he lied about his name and falsely stated that the car belonged to a friend.\n2. Sentencing \u2014 prior record level\nThe trial court erred when sentencing defendant for possession of a stolen car by treating a 1984 conviction of breaking and entering as a Class C conviction where defendant was also found in 1984 to be an habitual felon and was therefore sentenced as a Class C rather than Class H felon. When N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.14 uses the term \u201cprior felony conviction,\u201d it refers only to a prior adjudication of the defendant\u2019s guilt or to a prior entry of a plea of guilty or no contest by the defendant; the term \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d does not refer to the sentence imposed for committing the prior felony. Defendant\u2019s contemporaneous conviction of being an habitual felon did not reclassify the offense of breaking and entering as a Class C felony and was not therefore a \u201cprior felony Class C conviction\u201d for this sentencing determination.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 March 1997 by Judge W. Osmond Smith, III in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 1998.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General H. Alan Pell, for the State.\nAssistant Public Defender Delton L. Green for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0456-01", "first_page_order": 488, "last_page_order": 493 }