{ "id": 11469445, "name": "RUGBY GRANT HODGKINS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant v. NORTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Hodgkins v. North Carolina Real Estate Commission", "decision_date": "1998-09-01", "docket_number": "No. COA97-1356", "first_page": "626", "last_page": "635", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 N.C. App. 626" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918" }, { "page": "919-20" }, { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566826 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888386 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48", "parenthetical": "\"courts may, and often do, resort to dictionaries for assistance in determining the common and ordinary meaning of words and phrases\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 N.C. App. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551467 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533", "parenthetical": "\"courts may, and often do, resort to dictionaries for assistance in determining the common and ordinary meaning of words and phrases\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/7/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the real estate business affects a substantial public interest and may be regulated for the purpose of protecting and promoting the general welfare of the people\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625444 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the real estate business affects a substantial public interest and may be regulated for the purpose of protecting and promoting the general welfare of the people\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569893 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 685", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6483937, 6484419, 6484263, 6483786, 6483629, 6484494, 6484047, 6483856, 6484178, 6483507, 6483574, 6483414, 6483711 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0995-08", "/us/464/0995-12", "/us/464/0995-11", "/us/464/0995-06", "/us/464/0995-04", "/us/464/0995-13", "/us/464/0995-09", "/us/464/0995-07", "/us/464/0995-10", "/us/464/0995-02", "/us/464/0995-03", "/us/464/0995-01", "/us/464/0995-05" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4706179, 4705223 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0681-02", "/nc/308/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4706315 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11795195 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "392" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53839 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0699-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 791, "char_count": 20776, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.24062831462374834 }, "sha256": "73a325e8bb2f890288dc2766548f111573dcb89fd32770905cd61bc29c6103d8", "simhash": "1:2fcfd8ac758d2c50", "word_count": 3290 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:27.441929+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHN and HORTON concur." ], "parties": [ "RUGBY GRANT HODGKINS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant v. NORTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nRugby Grant Hodgkins, Jr. (petitioner) applied to the North Carolina Real Estate Commission (Commission) on 20 November 1995 for licensure as a real estate salesman. Petitioner took the real estate licensing examination and was informed on 29 December 1995 that he had passed the examination. The Commission notified petitioner pursuant to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act that a hearing would be held on the question of whether petitioner \u201cpossessed] the requisite character for licen-sure.\u201d The Commission required this hearing based upon information in petitioner\u2019s application that the Commission said tended to show that:\n(2) [Petitioner] disclosed that on or about May 29, 1991, in the District Court of Buncombe County, North Carolina, [petitioner] pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, the criminal offense of soliciting a crime against nature. As a result of his conviction, [petitioner] was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years which was suspended for three years\u2019 unsupervised probation. [Petitioner] was ordered to pay a fine of $250.00 and to stay away from the North Carolina Arboretum and from a location known as Sandy Bottom.\nThe notice of hearing stated that information before the Commission tended to show that petitioner:\n[did] not possess the requisite trustworthiness, honesty, and integrity to engage in the business of a real estate salesman or otherwise hold the position of public trust and confidence which licensure as a real estate broker demands.\nThe notice further stated that petitioner had a \u201cright to a hearing before the Commission to demonstrate why . . . [petitioner] possesses] the requisite character for licensure.\u201d\nAt the hearing petitioner submitted three letters of reference, none of which were sworn affidavits. He also presented testimony from Louis Vernon Lee, a real estate broker who testified he had known petitioner for six months and had offered petitioner a position in his firm contingent on petitioner\u2019s obtaining a license.\nPetitioner testified at the hearing that he had gone to a park area in Asheville and met a man he talked with briefly. Petitioner further testified that he and the man:\nagreed on a sexual incident and walked on to . . . another part of the area. There, immediately when we had gotten to this area, I reached out to touch the gentleman\u2019s shirt, and immediately he pulled out a gun and showed me his badge, identifying himself as a police vice squad officer.\nPetitioner testified that he was then \u201cphotographed, booked and given a misdemeanor ticket[.]\u201d Subsequently petitioner pled guilty to solicitation of crime against nature. He was given a suspended two-year sentence, fined $250.00, placed on unsupervised probation for three years, and ordered to stay away from the park. Petitioner complied with these terms.\nIn its order entered on 8 July 1996, the North Carolina Real Estate Commission found as fact that the petitioner had \u201capproached a man who until that time was unknown to him\u201d at Sandy Bottom Park and \u201cinquired of the man if he were a police officer and the man replied that he was not.\u201d The Commission further found that petitioner \u201cinvited the man to engage with him in a sex act\u201d and accompanied the man to another public park \u201cfor the purpose of performing the sexual act.\u201d In addition to finding that the petitioner was convicted of the criminal offense of soliciting a crime against nature on 29 May 1991, the Commission found that \u201c[a]t the time of the offense; [petitioner] knew Sandy Bottom as a place where men went to \u00e1rrange sexual encounters with other men\u201d and \u201chad used the park for that purpose prior to the offense in question,\u201d even though he was \u201caware that Sandy Bottom and the North Carolina Arboretum were public places and were used by the general public for hiking and bicycle riding.\u201d '\nBased on these and other findings, the Commission concluded that petitioner \u201chas failed to affirmatively demonstrate pursuant to 21 NCAC [N.C. Administrative Code] 58A.0501 that hfe possesses the integrity which licensure as a real estate salesman demands. [Petitioner] does not possess the requisite integrity for licensure as a real estate salesman under G.S. 93A-4(b).\u201d Based on this conclusion the Commission denied petitioner\u2019s application.^\nPetitioner filed a petition for judicial review to the Buncombe County Superior Court alleging, in part, that:\n(a) the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law that Petitioner [did] not possess the requisite character for licensure [was] not supported by its findings of fact, and [was] erroneous as a matter of law.\n(b) The Commission\u2019s order fail[ed] to find as fact numerous relevant matters which [were] supported by substantial, material and competent evidence in view of the entire record. . . .\n(d) The Commission\u2019s decision [was] arbitrary and capricious[.]\nAfter conducting a hearing on 1 May 1997, the trial court ruled:\n(1) The findings of fact contained in the Commission\u2019s final decision are fully supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as a whole. The Commission\u2019s findings of fact are comprehensive and sufficiently contemplate those matters relevant to Petitioner\u2019s application for licensure which are supported by substantial evidence contained in the whole record. No further findings are required. . . .\n(2) ... [T]he Commission\u2019s decision is not affected by any error of law prejudicial to the rights of Petitioner. From the record before it and pursuant to its authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 93A-4(b) and 21 NCAC 58A .0501, the Commission could properly conclude as a matter of law that Petitioner failed to affirmatively demonstrate that he possesses the integrity which real estate licensure demands and that Petitioner does not possess the requisite integrity for licensure. . . .\n(3) . . . The Commission committed no error when it considered Petitioner\u2019s conviction of solicitation to commit crime against nature when the Commission passed upon his moral character. . . .\n(4) It is within the discretion of the Commission to decide the case of Petitioner\u2019s integrity, character and fitness for licen-sure on its own merits. . . . The Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioner\u2019s application for a real estate license. The Commission\u2019s decision is not arbitrary and capricious and no substantial right of Petitioner has been violated.\nBased on these conclusions of the Commission, the trial court affirmed the Commission\u2019s decision in its entirety in an order entered 10 June 1997. Petitioner appeals from the order of the trial court.\nI.\nAppellate review of a superior court order of an agency governed by the Administrative Procedure Act requires the appellate court to examine the trial court\u2019s order for errors of law. ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission for Health Services, 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997). \u201cThe process has been described as a twofold task: (1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly.\u201d Id.\nPetitioner argues that the Commission erroneously concluded that he did not possess the requisite character or integrity for licen-sure as a real estate salesman. Petitioner contends this conclusion is not supported by the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and is erroneous as a matter of law.\nThe proper standard for the superior court\u2019s judicial review \u201cdepends upon the particular issues presented on appeal.\u201d When the petitioner \u201cquestions (1) whether the agency\u2019s decision was supported by the evidence or (2) whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious, then the reviewing court must apply the \u2018whole record\u2019 test.\u201d\nId. (citations omitted). \u201cJudicial review of whether an agency decision was based on an error of law requires a de novo review.\u201d Dew v. State ex rel. N.C. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 127 N.C. App. 309, 310, 488 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1997).\nWe thus divide our discussion of petitioner\u2019s argument into two parts. First, we must conduct a de novo review of the superior court\u2019s order regarding its agency review for errors of law. Second, we must determine whether the trial court properly decided that the Commission\u2019s findings were supported by sufficient evidence.\nII.\nPetitioner argues that the trial court erred in ruling that \u201c[t]he Commission committed no error when it considered Petitioner\u2019s conviction of solicitation to commit crime against nature\u201d to determine whether he possessed sufficient integrity to be licensed as a real estate agent. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 93A-4 (1994) governs the application procedures for persons \u201cdesiring to enter into business of and obtain a license as a real estate broker or real estate salesman[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 93A-4(b) requires:\nAny person who files such application to the Commission in proper manner for a license as real estate broker or a license as real estate salesman shall be required to take an oral or written examination to determine his qualifications with due regard to the paramount interests of the public as to the honesty, truthfulness, integrity and competency of the applicant.\n(Emphasis added).\nThis statute also authorizes the Commission to \u201cmake such investigation as it deems necessary into the ethical background of the applicant\u201d and to deny an applicant a license if the Commission finds that the results of the examination and investigation are unsatisfactory to the Commission. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 93A-4(b). The Commission has promulgated a regulation which states that \u201c[w]hen the moral character of an applicant is in question, action by the Commission will be deferred until the applicant has affirmatively demonstrated that he possesses the requisite truthfulness, honesty and integrity.\u201d 21 N.C.A.C. 58A.0501.\nIn In re Elkins, 308 N.C. 317, 323, 302 S.E.2d 215, 218, reh\u2019g denied, 308 N.C. 681, 311 S.E.2d 590, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995, 78 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1983), an applicant seeking to be licensed to practice law contended that \u201cthe [Board of Law Examiners] erred by using evidence of his criminal convictions\u201d to determine if the applicant possessed the sufficient moral character for licensure. Our Supreme Court held that \u201cevidence of criminal convictions has long been properly admitted and considered in hearings before boards of law examiners in this and other jurisdictions to determine an applicant\u2019s moral character.\u201d Id. See also In re Moore, 301 N.C. 634, 272 S.E.2d 826 (1981). We hold this evidence is properly considered by the North Carolina Real Estate Commission in reviewing applications, as \u201c[t]here is involved in the relation of real estate broker and client a measure of trust analogous to that of an attorney at law to his client . . . .\u201d State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 695, 114 S.E.2d 660, 665 (1960) (noting that \u201cthe real estate business affects a substantial public interest and may be regulated for the purpose of protecting and promoting the general welfare of the people\u201d) (citations omitted).\nIn this case the Commission concluded as a matter of law that petitioner did \u201cnot possess the requisite integrity for licensure as a real estate salesman under G.S. 93A-4(b).\u201d (Emphasis added). As the statute does not define \u201cintegrity,\u201d we are guided by the definition found in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary. State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 533, 173 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1970) (\u201ccourts may, and often do, resort to dictionaries for assistance in determining the common and ordinary meaning of words and phrases\u201d). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cintegrity\u201d as synonymous with \u201csoundness of moral principle and character, as shown by one person dealing with others in the making and performance of contracts . . . .\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 809 (6th ed. 1990).\nIn this case, there is evidence of petitioner\u2019s intentional violation of the law. A person\u2019s tendency to abide by the law of the society in which he lives is a fair measure of that person\u2019s trustworthiness and honesty. Such proof of petitioner\u2019s failure to be a law-abiding citizen is therefore relevant to determine whether or not he possesses the character and integrity sufficient to be entrusted to \u201chold the position of public trust and confidence which licensure as a real estate broker demands.\u201d\nWe cannot agree with petitioner\u2019s arguments that: (1) his misdemeanor conviction pertained solely to his personal morals and not to anything involving his honesty or trustworthiness, and (2) that his conviction should not be considered by the Commission as relevant to his integrity or character. When such activity is conducted in public, in direct contravention of the law, resulting in a conviction for soliciting a crime against nature, such conduct becomes relevant to determine an applicant\u2019s integrity as it reflects on his willingness and ability to abide by the law. For these reasons, the Commission did not err by considering petitioner\u2019s previous criminal conviction in determining whether the petitioner \u201cpossess [ed] the requisite integrity for licensure as a real estate salesman under G.S. 93A-4(b).\u201d Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that \u201cthe Commission could properly conclude as a matter of law that Petitioner . . . does not possess the requisite integrity for licensure.\u201d\nIII.\nPetitioner argues that his single conviction was insufficient by itself to support the denial of his application. Specifically, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in its finding that \u201c[t]he Commission\u2019s findings of fact are comprehensive and sufficiently contemplate those matters relevant to Petitioner\u2019s application\u201d such that \u201c[n]o further findings are required\u201d to support the denial of petitioner\u2019s application for licensure. We disagree. As petitioner is questioning whether the Commission\u2019s decision was supported by evidence, we must apply the \u201cwhole record test.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 (1995); ACT-UP Triangle at 706, 483 S.E.2d at 392. \u201cThe \u2018whole record\u2019 test requires the reviewing court to examine all competent evidence ... in order to determine whether the agency decision is supported by \u2018substantial evidence.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citation omitted). \u201cThe evidence is substantial if, when considered as a whole, it is such that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a con-elusion.\u201d N.C. State Bar v. Maggiolo, 124 N.C. App. 22, 26, 475 S.E.2d 727, 730 (1996). \u201cThe whole record test does not permit a reviewing court to replace the [Commission\u2019s] judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the Court may have justifiably reached a different decision.\u201d Id.\nIn this case, the trial court stated in its order that \u201cin view of the entire record as a whole\u201d the Commission\u2019s findings \u201care supported by substantial evidence contained in the whole record.\u201d Thus, we conclude that the trial court applied the \u201cwhole record test,\u201d the correct standard of review to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. We must now determine whether the scope of this review was exercised properly.\nOur Supreme Court in Elkins, 308 N.C. at 321, 302 S.E.2d at 217, held that \u201c[t]he applicant has the initial burden of proving his good character\u201d in hearings before the Board of Law Examiners. Id. \u201cIf the Board relies on specific acts of misconduct to rebut this prima facie showing, and such acts are denied by the applicant, then the Board must establish the specific acts by the greater weight of the evidence.\u201d Id. In arguing that the Commission\u2019s findings were supported by insufficient evidence, petitioner erroneously relies on In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 58, 253 S.E.2d 912, 918 (1979), wherein the Court stated that \u201c[wjhether a person is of good moral character is seldom subject to proof by reference to one or two incidents.\u201d The Court\u2019s determination that the Board of Law Examiners had not conducted an adequate investigation was based on the Court\u2019s finding that the Board had not made any findings as to whether the applicant had committed the acts of which he was accused. Id. at 59-60, 253 S.E.2d at 919-20. The Rogers Court stated that the \u201cBoard could have found that Rogers had not shown his good moral character only if it believed he had done these [fraudulent] acts\u201d and it was error for the Board to deny his application without first finding that he had committed the acts. Id. at 60, 253 S.E.2d at 920. In the case before us, the Commission made adequate findings as to whether the petitioner committed the acts leading to his conviction. Moreover, petitioner admitted he committed the acts in question. For this reason, Rogers does not apply in this case.\nIt was petitioner\u2019s burden, which he does not challenge on appeal, to demonstrate to the Commission \u201cwhy [he] possess [ed] the requisite character for licensure.\u201d However, in support of his application, petitioner only submitted three brief unsworn letters of reference, the testimony of his potential employer based upon the latter\u2019s six months\u2019 acquaintance with petitioner, and petitioner\u2019s own testimony, inter alia, that he had been convicted of a criminal offense. The Commission\u2019s conclusions that: (1) petitioner failed to \u201caffirmatively\u201d meet his burden of demonstrating that he possessed the requisite integrity, and (2) that petitioner thereby lacked a prerequisite for licensure, are supported by the record.\nPetitioner also contends that his case should be remanded for the trial court to consider \u201cthe evidence detracting from the Commission\u2019s position.\u201d We assume that the evidence to which petitioner refers was contained in the three reference letters or the sworn testimony of Lee, his potential employer. Initially, we note that these letters were not sworn affidavits. However, assuming that they were properly admitted into evidence, we hold that the trial court did not err by its failure to require that the Commission make findings as to the content of these letters or Lee\u2019s testimony. The Commission\u2019s order denying petitioner\u2019s application clearly focused on the facts leading to petitioner\u2019s criminal conviction. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the denial of the application was based on any other questions the Commission had in regard to petitioner\u2019s character. Factors such as petitioner\u2019s \u201clicensure as a pharmacist, [evidence of] no civil judgments or liens, and [absence of a] criminal record save for one misdemeanor\u201d may be relevant in the determination of an individual\u2019s character; however, the Commission\u2019s focus on the conviction did not constitute an abuse of the Commission\u2019s discretion, nor was the decision arbitrary and capricious.\nWe thus hold that the trial court did not err by affirming the Commission\u2019s decision denying petitioner\u2019s application.\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHN and HORTON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Harry H. Harkins, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas R. Miller, for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RUGBY GRANT HODGKINS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant v. NORTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee\nNo. COA97-1356\n(1 September 1998)\n1. Brokers\u2014 real estate license \u2014 integrity\u2014solicitation of crime against nature\nThe Real Estate Commission could properly consider an applicant\u2019s conviction of solicitation to commit a crime against nature in determining whether he possessed sufficient integrity to be licensed as a real estate salesman. The applicant\u2019s solicitation of a crime against nature in a public park and his resultant conviction for a misdemeanor was relevant to determine the applicant\u2019s integrity as it reflects upon his willingness and ability to abide by the law.\n2. Brokers\u2014 real estate license \u2014 integrity\u2014solicitation of crime against nature\nThe Real Estate Commission\u2019s decision that an applicant did not possess the requisite integrity for licensure as a real estate salesman based upon his conviction of solicitation to commit a crime against nature was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole where the Commission made findings that the applicant committed the acts leading to his conviction and the applicant admitted that he committed the acts in question. The Commission did not err by concluding that the applicant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he possessed the requisite integrity where the applicant only submitted three brief unsworn letters of reference, the testimony of a potential employer based upon a six-month acquaintance with the applicant, and the applicant\u2019s own testimony in which he admitted that he had been convicted of a criminal offense of solicitation of a crime against nature.\nAppeal by petitioner from order entered 10 June 1997 by Judge Stafford G. Bullock in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 1998.\nHarry H. Harkins, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas R. Miller, for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0626-01", "first_page_order": 658, "last_page_order": 667 }