{ "id": 11198692, "name": "FIRST ATLANTIC MANAGEMENT, CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. DUNLEA REALTY, CO., H. STEVEN HARRIS, and JEFFREY L. DUNLEA, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "First Atlantic Management, Corp. v. Dunlea Realty, Co.", "decision_date": "1998-11-03", "docket_number": "COA 97-540", "first_page": "242", "last_page": "257", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "131 N.C. App. 242" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "328 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540625, 2545140, 2542964, 2542137, 2541311 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"that defendants may have made misrepresentations negligently and in good faith, in ignorance of their falsity, and without intent to mislead, affords no defense\" in actions under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0089-05", "/nc/328/0089-04", "/nc/328/0089-02", "/nc/328/0089-03", "/nc/328/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "failure to disclose information may be tantamount to misrepresentation and thus constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546032, 2546066, 2547899 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "failure to disclose information may be tantamount to misrepresentation and thus constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0168-03", "/nc/333/0168-01", "/nc/333/0168-02" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "failure to disclose information may be tantamount to misrepresentation and thus constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527560 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "failure to disclose information may be tantamount to misrepresentation and thus constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "plaintiff allowed to elect remedy between punitive damages or treble damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 after jury verdict" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736775, 4740168, 4739944, 4736235, 4733980 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "plaintiff allowed to elect remedy between punitive damages or treble damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 after jury verdict" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0283-02", "/nc/318/0283-05", "/nc/318/0283-04", "/nc/318/0283-01", "/nc/318/0283-03" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "plaintiff allowed to elect remedy between punitive damages or treble damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 after jury verdict" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523445 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "plaintiff allowed to elect remedy between punitive damages or treble damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 after jury verdict" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 F.3d 767", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10515099 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772, 775-76", "parenthetical": "plaintiff filing action seeking damages based upon G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, or alternatively recission, not entitled to trebling of award since plaintiff later elected restitution and district court instructed jury upon same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/5/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305276 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572488, 8572467, 8572446 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0619-03", "/nc/289/0619-02", "/nc/289/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" }, { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529224 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"that defendants may have made misrepresentations negligently and in good faith, in ignorance of their falsity, and without intent to mislead, affords no defense\" in actions under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524249 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568140 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 F. Supp. 1041", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1462122 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 to a bulk sale of business' assets" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/485/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549607 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527466 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548545, 2548257, 2547983, 2548689, 2546900 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0344-03", "/nc/333/0344-04", "/nc/333/0344-05", "/nc/333/0344-01", "/nc/333/0344-02" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527849 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2565485 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561020 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917470 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858" }, { "page": "858" }, { "page": "858" }, { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512874 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342-43" }, { "page": "342-43" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "342-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861-62", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs allegations supportive of finding of fraud as well as finding of unfair and deceptive trade practices; thus she had \"a substantial right to have [each cause] tried at the same time by the same judge and jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168682 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs allegations supportive of finding of fraud as well as finding of unfair and deceptive trade practices; thus she had \"a substantial right to have [each cause] tried at the same time by the same judge and jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795986 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" }, { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521850 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442-43", "parenthetical": "proof of fraud necessarily constitutes violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541708 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "proof of fraud necessarily constitutes violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572803 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357716 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572343 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408", "parenthetical": "quoting Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571111 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "quoting Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505409, 2504968, 2504747, 2505141, 2504699 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0345-01", "/nc/332/0345-02", "/nc/332/0345-05", "/nc/332/0345-04", "/nc/332/0345-03" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313291 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659776, 1659845, 1659883, 1659694, 1659889 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"statutes relating to the same subject should be construed in \\pari\\ materia, in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0501-01", "/nc/348/0501-02", "/nc/348/0501-04", "/nc/348/0501-03", "/nc/348/0501-05" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "\"statutes relating to the same subject should be construed in \\pari\\ materia, in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11649689 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"statutes relating to the same subject should be construed in \\pari\\ materia, in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917", "parenthetical": "trial court's detailing of the facts upon which it based its decision facilitated judicial review" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566826 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "trial court's detailing of the facts upon which it based its decision facilitated judicial review" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no substantial right affected and interlocutory appeal \"not immediately appeal-able, even if the trial court has attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2544832, 2540705, 2539189, 2543193, 2543230 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no substantial right affected and interlocutory appeal \"not immediately appeal-able, even if the trial court has attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0731-03", "/nc/328/0731-04", "/nc/328/0731-02", "/nc/328/0731-05", "/nc/328/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "no substantial right affected and interlocutory appeal \"not immediately appeal-able, even if the trial court has attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b)\"" }, { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527593 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "no substantial right affected and interlocutory appeal \"not immediately appeal-able, even if the trial court has attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b)\"" }, { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interlocutory appeal dismissed which did not \"affect [appellant's] substantial rights,\" notwithstanding trial court's Rule 54(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714861, 4717589, 4718136, 4718201, 4717178 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interlocutory appeal dismissed which did not \"affect [appellant's] substantial rights,\" notwithstanding trial court's Rule 54(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0183-03", "/nc/315/0183-05", "/nc/315/0183-02", "/nc/315/0183-04", "/nc/315/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "interlocutory appeal dismissed which did not \"affect [appellant's] substantial rights,\" notwithstanding trial court's Rule 54(b" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526659 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "interlocutory appeal dismissed which did not \"affect [appellant's] substantial rights,\" notwithstanding trial court's Rule 54(b" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926", "parenthetical": "no substantial right \"likely to be impaired or seriously imperiled\" by denial of motion to strike allegations in motion before the court which \"merely raises questions of fact for the judge to decide\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628180 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "no substantial right \"likely to be impaired or seriously imperiled\" by denial of motion to strike allegations in motion before the court which \"merely raises questions of fact for the judge to decide\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551863 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708418 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520808 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 335, 299 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718630, 4716810, 4717521, 4716884, 4714901 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 335, 299 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0389-01", "/nc/315/0389-05", "/nc/315/0389-04", "/nc/315/0389-03", "/nc/315/0389-02" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521255 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562211, 8562157, 8562127, 8562066, 8562100 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0092-05", "/nc/301/0092-04", "/nc/301/0092-03", "/nc/301/0092-01", "/nc/301/0092-02" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549625 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Rule 54(b) certification \"is not dispositional when the order appealed from is interlocutory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532486, 2528043, 2530031, 2531637, 2526327 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Rule 54(b) certification \"is not dispositional when the order appealed from is interlocutory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0557-02", "/nc/335/0557-04", "/nc/335/0557-03", "/nc/335/0557-01", "/nc/335/0557-05" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521644 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" }, { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524317 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659725 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54080, 54180, 54223, 53970, 53909 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0340-02", "/nc/345/0340-03", "/nc/345/0340-05", "/nc/345/0340-04", "/nc/345/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889996 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "order which does not completely dispose of case, such as order granting or denying motion for partial summary judgment, is interlocutory" }, { "page": "677" }, { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520479 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "order which does not completely dispose of case, such as order granting or denying motion for partial summary judgment, is interlocutory" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "final judgment \"disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court\"" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "661-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624256 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "\"if an appealing party has no right of appeal, an appellate court on its own motion should dismiss the appeal even though the question of appealability has not been raised by the parties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564716 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "\"if an appealing party has no right of appeal, an appellate court on its own motion should dismiss the appeal even though the question of appealability has not been raised by the parties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0205-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1349, "char_count": 33911, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.446185847315389e-07, "percentile": 0.980743085793805 }, "sha256": "848e17862950ec28b743f23b977ea82887e876d7f33e522c919bdb526bedde7b", "simhash": "1:53a15464046f1cfa", "word_count": 5436 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:28.584435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and MARTIN, M., concur." ], "parties": [ "FIRST ATLANTIC MANAGEMENT, CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. DUNLEA REALTY, CO., H. STEVEN HARRIS, and JEFFREY L. DUNLEA, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of its motion for partial summary judgment and allowance of defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Defendants appeal denial of their motion for partial summary judgment alleging res judicata, and denial of their motion to strike certain affidavits offered by plaintiff. We reverse the trial court\u2019s grant of partial summary judgment to defendants and dismiss the remaining appeals.\nPertinent facts and procedural history include the following: In October 1994, James A. Holmes, III (Holmes) and F. Spruill Thompson (Thompson), officers and directors of plaintiff First Atlantic Management Corporation (First Atlantic), began negotiations with defendant Dunlea Realty Company (Dunlea Realty), acting through defendant H. Steven Harris (Harris), for the purchase of certain Dunlea Realty assets. The latter comprised property management accounts (the accounts) consisting of the right to receive payment from owners of rental property in exchange for management services.\nOn 23 February 1995, First Atlantic and Dunlea Realty entered into an Offer to Purchase and Contract regarding the accounts. Although a 28 February 1995 closing date was originally agreed upon, closing in actuality took place 4 April 1995. At that time, an Acquisition Agreement (Agreement) was executed, which included a listing of the accounts being sold to First Atlantic.\nHowever, shortly before 4 April 1995, Harris was contacted by Ed Taylor (Taylor), president of Property Management Incorporated (PMI), a competitor of Dunlea Realty. During a 3 April 1995 telephone conversation, Taylor informed Harris that certain of the accounts desired to engage the services of PMI. Harris requested that information concerning the affected accounts be telefaxed to his office. However, Harris did not reveal to representatives of First Atlantic that some of the accounts involved in the asset sale were seeking to secure other property management services.\nSeveral hours following conclusion of the closing on 4 April 1995 and after receiving a telefax list of accounts transferring to PMI, Harris went to plaintiff\u2019s offices and disclosed the pending loss of certain accounts including, according to plaintiff, \u201cthe Abee Account which . . . represented a substantial amount of the monthly revenues of the entire property management accounts.\u201d\nOn 3 May 1995, plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation and nondisclosure, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Plaintiff thereafter moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of unfair and deceptive trade practices. The trial court denied the motion, and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its action without prejudice on 3 April 1996.\nPlaintiff reinstituted suit 25 April 1996 alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation and nondisclosure, and unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 (1994). Plaintiff again moved for partial summary judgment on its claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Defendants in turn moved for summary judgment on the issue of unfair and deceptive trade practices, sought summary judgment predicated upon res judicata, and moved to strike certain affidavits relied upon by plaintiff in its motion.\nIn an order filed 6 March 1997, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion as well as that of defendants predicated upon res judicata, and further denied defendants\u2019 motion to strike. However, the court granted defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices.\nThe court\u2019s order further provided that, upon plaintiff\u2019s motion, \u201cthis Order is hereby . . . certified for immediate appeal\u201d pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1990) (Rule 54(b) certification). Plaintiff and defendants thereafter filed timely appeals to this Court on 12 March 1997 and 18 March 1997 respectively.\nI.\nAlthough the parties do not raise the issue, we must first consider sua sponte whether the parties\u2019 appeals are properly before this Court. See Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 208, 270 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1980) (\u201cif an appealing party has no right of appeal, an appellate court on its own motion should dismiss the appeal even though the question of appealability has not been raised by the parties\u201d). We do so in the spirit of attempting \u201cto eliminate the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary appeals.\u201d Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951). As our Supreme Court has observed,\n[t]here is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders.\nVeazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 363, 57 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1950).\nThe trial court\u2019s order fails to resolve all issues between all parties and thus is not a final judgment, id. at 361-62, 57 S.E.2d at 381 (final judgment \u201cdisposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court\u201d), but rather is interlocutory. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(a) (1990); Liggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 23, 437 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1993) (order which does not completely dispose of case, such as order granting or denying motion for partial summary judgment, is interlocutory).\nInterlocutory orders are ordinarily not directly appealable, see Liggett, 113 N.C. App. at 23, 437 S.E.2d at 677, but may be so in two instances:\n[f]irst, an interlocutory order can be immediately appealed if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims .. . and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal [pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b)]. Second, an interlocutory order can be immediately appealed under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(a) (1983) and 7A-27(d)(l) (1995) \u201cif the trial court\u2019s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review.\u201d\nBartlett v. Jacobs, 124 N.C. App. 521, 524, 477 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 340, 483 S.E.2d 161 (1997) (citations omitted).\nRule 54(b) certification by the trial court is reviewable by this Court on appeal in the first instance because the trial court\u2019s denomination of its decree \u201ca final . . . judgment does not make it so,\u201d Industries, Inc. v. Insurance Co., 296 N.C. 486, 491, 251 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1979), if it is not such a judgment. Similarly, the trial court\u2019s determination that there is no just reason to delay the appeal, while accorded great deference, see DKH Corp. v. Rankin-Patterson Oil Co., Inc., 348 N.C. 583, 500 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1998), cannot bind the appellate courts because \u201cruling on the interlocutory nature of appeals is properly a matter for the appellate division, not the trial court.\u201d See Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 640, 321 S.E.2d 240, 249 (1984), and McNeil v. Hicks, 111 N.C. App. 262, 264, 431 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1993), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 557, 441 S.E.2d 118 (1994) (Rule 54(b) certification \u201cis not dispositional when the order appealed from is interlocutory\u201d).\nFurther,\ndenial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is generally (unless affecting a \u201csubstantial right\u201d) not immediately appealable, even if the trial court has attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b).\nCagle v. Teachy, 111 N.C. App. 244, 247, 431 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1993) (citations omitted). Accordingly, denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable unless a substantial right of one of the parties would be prejudiced should the appeal not be heard prior to final judgment. See Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 164, 265 S.E.2d 240, 242, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 92, - S.E.2d - (1980).\nSimilarly, denial of a motion to strike is interlocutory and not a final judgment. See Veazy, 231 N.C. at 661-62, 57 S.E.2d at 381, and Liggett, 113 N.C. App. at 23, 437 S.E.2d at 677. Denial of such motion thus is properly appealable only if it \u201cdeprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review.\u201d Bartlett, 124 N.C. App. at 524, 477 S.E.2d at 695. A right is substantial \u201conly when it \u2018will clearly be lost or irremediably adversely affected if the order is not reviewable before final judgment.\u2019 \u201d Brown v. Brown, 77 N.C. App. 206, 208, 334 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1985), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 389, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1986) (quoting Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 335, 299 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1983)).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiff and defendants have each appealed the trial court\u2019s denial of their respective summary judgment motions. Defendants likewise have appealed the denial of their motion to strike certain affidavits from plaintiffs summary judgment motion. In each instance, the order appealed from is interlocutory and the trial court\u2019s Rule 54(b) certification is ineffective as to each because it cannot by certification make its decree \u201cimmediately appealable [if] it is not a final judgment.\u201d Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 425, 302 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1983); see also Industries, 296 N.C. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447. These appeals thus are not properly before this Court unless a substantial right has been affected. See Cagle, 111 N.C. App. at 247, 431 S.E.2d at 803.\nAs to denial of the parties\u2019 summary judgment motions, our thorough examination and consideration of the record reveals no substantial right which \u201ccould not be corrected upon appeal from final judgment.\u201d Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 573, 253 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1979). We thereby dismiss as interlocutory the appeals of plaintiff and defendants regarding denial of their respective summary judgment motions.\nConcerning denial of defendants\u2019 motion to strike, we note the trial court rejected plaintiff\u2019s summary judgment motion, notwithstanding its refusal to strike consideration of certain affidavits in ruling thereon. In addition, this Court hereinabove has dismissed plaintiff\u2019s appeal of denial of its summary judgment motion. Suffice it to state we perceive no right, and certainly no \u201csubstantial\u201d right, of defendants subject to being lost absent immediate appeal, see id., of denial of their motion to strike. See also Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 53, 51 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1949) (no substantial right \u201clikely to be impaired or seriously imperiled\u201d by denial of motion to strike allegations in motion before the court which \u201cmerely raises questions of fact for the judge to decide\u201d). Accordingly, that appeal is likewise dismissed.\nHowever, the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff\u2019s claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices is dispositive of that claim. While interlocutory in that other claims remain outstanding among the parties, the partial summary judgment order thus is immediately appealable provided 1) the trial court certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) that \u201cthere [wa]s no just reason to delay the appeal,\u201d Bartlett, 124 N.C. App. at 524, 477 S.E.2d at 695; see also DKH Corp., 348 N.C. at 585, 500 S.E.2d at 668, and 2) this Court con-eludes such certification was appropriate. See McNeil, 111 N.C. App. at 264, 431 S.E.2d at 869 (Rule 54(b) \u201ccertification is not dispositional when the order appealed from is interlocutory\u201d); see also Fraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 655, 331 S.E.2d 217, 218, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985) (interlocutory appeal dismissed which did not \u201caffect [appellant\u2019s] substantial rights,\u201d notwithstanding trial court\u2019s Rule 54(b) certification, because court\u2019s finding \u201cmust be construed [by this Court] in light of G.S. \u00a7 7A-27 and . . . well-settled case law concerning interlocutory appeals\u201d), and Henderson v. LeBauer, 101 N.C. App. 255, 264, 399 S.E.2d 142, 147, disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 731, 404 S.E.2d 868 (1991) (no substantial right affected and interlocutory appeal \u201cnot immediately appeal-able, even if the trial court has attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b)\u201d).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court certified there was \u201cno just reason [to] delay\u201d plaintiff\u2019s appeal because \u201cof the finality of [the trial court\u2019s order] with respect to the plaintiff\u2019s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim for relief, an integral part of the plaintiff\u2019s case_\u201d We therefore consider the propriety of the trial court\u2019s certification.\nInitially, we note with approval that the trial court\u2019s order sets forth the basis upon which it determined there existed \u201cno just reason to delay,\u201d thus facilitating appellate review. See In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 56, 253 S.E.2d 912, 917 (1979) (trial court\u2019s detailing of the facts upon which it based its decision facilitated judicial review).\nIn effect, the trial court concluded a substantial right of defendants would be adversely affected absent immediate appeal. While perhaps not the sole consideration, we hold application of the substantial right analysis was prerequisite to the court\u2019s decision regarding Rule 54(b) certification that there existed \u201cno just reason to delay the appeal.\u201d See Fraser, 75 N.C. App. at 655, 331 S.E.2d at 218 (interlocutory appeal which did not \u201caffect [appellant\u2019s] substantial rights\u201d dismissed notwithstanding trial court\u2019s Rule 54(b) certification), and Henderson, 101 N.C. App. at 264, 399 S.E.2d at 147; see also South Blvd. Video & News v. Charlotte Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 129 N.C. App. 282, 498 S.E.2d 623, 628, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 348 N.C. 501, - S.E.2d -(1998) (\u201cstatutes relating to the same subject should be construed in \\pari\\ materia, in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved\u201d) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial court properly integrated this consideration into its order.\nThe sole issue which remains is whether the court correctly concluded a substantial right of defendants would be significantly impaired absent immediate appeal. Whether or not a substantial right will be prejudiced by delay of an interlocutory appeal generally must be decided on \u201ca case by case basis.\u201d Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 401, 417 S.E.2d 269, 272, disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992). In addition,\n[i]t is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which the appeal is sought is entered.\nBernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 439, 293 S.E.2d 405, 408 (1982) (quoting Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978)).\nThe determination of appealability under the substantial right exception is a two step process. Hoots, 106 N.C. App. at 401, 417 S.E.2d at 272. First, the right in question must qualify as \u201csubstantial,\u201d and second, enforcement of that right, absent immediate appeal, must be \u201clost, prejudiced or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.\u201d Id. (quoting J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 6, 362 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987)).\nThe avoidance of \u201cone trial on the disputed issues is not normally a substantial right that would allow an interlocutory appeal.\u201d Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 606, 290 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1982) (citations omitted). Further,\nthe possibility of undergoing a second trial affects a substantial right only when the same issues are present in both trials, creating the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue.\nId. at 608, 290 S.E.2d at 596.\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiff\u2019s claims of \u201cFraudulent Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure\u201d and of \u201cUnfair and Deceptive Trade Practices\u201d rest upon nearly identical factual allegations. Moreover, in order for plaintiff to prevail on these claims, a jury would be required to render essentially identical factual determinations in plaintiffs favor. See Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243, 400 S.E.2d 440, 442-43 (1991) (proof of fraud necessarily constitutes violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts). While a decision as to whether the conduct of defendants constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice would be for the court, see Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 554, 383 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1989), overruled on other grounds, 342 N.C. 133, 463 S.E.2d 199 (1995), the underlying conduct supporting that claim and plaintiffs claim of fraud would remain virtually the same. Hence, dismissal herein of plaintiffs appeal of the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs unfair and deceptive trade practice claim would \u201craise the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in later proceedings.\u201d Hoots, 106 N.C. App. at 402, 417 S.E.2d at 273.\nFor example, it is conceivable that at trial on plaintiffs fraud claim, a jury could find defendants failed to commit the misrepresentations alleged. If, on appeal from that verdict, plaintiff was to renew its appeal regarding the grant of summary judgment on the unfair and deceptive trade practices claim and we determined the latter to have been error, a second trial would be required against defendants on the selfsame facts, at which trial a second jury conceivably could reach a verdict inconsistent with the first. See id.; see also Webb v. Triad Appraisal and Adjustment Service, Inc., 84 N.C. App. 446, 449, 352 S.E.2d 859, 861-62 (1987) (plaintiffs allegations supportive of finding of fraud as well as finding of unfair and deceptive trade practices; thus she had \u201ca substantial right to have [each cause] tried at the same time by the same judge and jury\u201d).\nIn short, the trial court correctly determined a substantial right of plaintiff might be affected by delaying its appeal of the grant of defendants\u2019 partial summary judgment motion until adjudication of all claims herein. The court thus properly certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) that there was \u201cno just reason to delay\u201d plaintiff\u2019s appeal. We therefore affirm that determination of the trial court and address plaintiff\u2019s appeal on its merits.\nII.\nSummary judgment is appropriately granted if:\nthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\nN.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c). A summary judgment movant bears the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue, and may do so by:\nproving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim.... All inferences of fact from the proofs offered at the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion.\nBoudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 342-43, 368 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1988). We hold defendants have failed to meet their burden.\nChapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes prohibits unfair and deceptive acts which undermine ethical standards and good faith dealings between parties engaged in business transactions. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 75-1.1 through 75-89 (1994); Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 650, 657, 464 S.E.2d 47, 54 (1995). A trade practice is unfair if it \u201cis immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.\u201d Johnson v. Insurance Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988). Further, a trade practice is deceptive if it \u201cpossessefs] the tendency or capacity to mislead, or create[s] the likelihood of deception.\u201d Forsyth Memorial Hospital v. Contreras, 107 N.C. App. 611, 614, 421 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1992), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 344, 426 S.E.2d 705 (1993) (citations omitted).\nTo prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) that plaintiff was injured thereby. See Canady v. Mann, 107 N.C. App. 252, 260, 419 S.E.2d 597, 602 (1992); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 (1994). The plaintiff must also establish it \u201csuffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants\u2019 misrepresentations\u201d or unfair conduct. See Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 184, 268 S.E.2d 271, 273-74 (1980); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.16 (1994). Once the plaintiff has presented evidence in support of each of these elements, the question whether defendants committed the alleged acts \u201cis a question [of fact] for the jury;\u201d the court must then determine as a matter of law whether the \u201cproven facts constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.\u201d See Love, 95 N.C. App. at 554, 383 S.E.2d at 677.\nThe parties do not dispute that sale of property management accounts would fall within the purview of G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 as being \u201cin or affecting commerce.\u201d See, e.g., United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (applying G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 to a bulk sale of business\u2019 assets). Nor is there any argument that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of causation regarding damages. Neither is it argued that the actions of Harris would not be attributable to the other defendants. Rather, defendants vigorously contend plaintiff failed to present evidence that the conduct of Harris constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice.\nIn his affidavit, Thompson stated:\nAt the closing, various documents were executed which included the Acquisition Agreement. At no time during the closing or prior to the closing did the Defendants or anyone else inform me or any representative acting on behalf of the Plaintiff that the Defendant Harris was aware prior to the closing that owners of property management accounts which were to be sold to the Plaintiff were going to transfer those accounts to a competitor known as PMI. During the closing, I specifically asked Harris if there was any information about the status of the accounts which we needed to know. In response to this question, Harris stated that we knew everything that he knew. . . .\nIf I had been informed prior to or at the closing of the information which Harris knew ... I would not have agreed to close the transaction and would certainly not have paid the purchase price to the corporate Defendant.. . .\nI knew that, as a result of a loss of [the accounts], the Plaintiff would have a substantial negative monthly cash flow. In fact, that has occurred, and the Plaintiff has continued to lose money on a monthly basis.\nIn addition, the deposition of Harris contained the following:\nQ: Well, [PMI] told you during that conversation that there would be some accounts leaving Dunlea Realty and going to his business; Is that Correct?\nA: He said there were a couple of accounts that wanted to transfer.\nQ: Did you say, \u201c[PMI], how many accounts are you talking about?\u201d\nA: I can tell you what I said if you\u2019d like. I said, \u201c[PMI], fax over some paper work, and I\u2019ll look at it\u201d....\nQ: But you did not inform [First Atlantic] of the April 3 conversation; Right?\nA: Right.\nQ: Had you alerted anyone at Dunlea\u2019s Office that you had told [PMI] to fax you that information?\nA: No.\nQ: Had you told anyone associated with Dunlea on the morning of April 4,1995, and prior to the closing of your conversation with [PMI]?\nA: No.\nA misrepresentation may constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, see Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 311, 218 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1975), but deliberate acts of deceit or bad faith need not be shown. Contreras, 107 N.C. App. at 614, 421 S.E.2d at 170. Rather, a party\u2019s words or conduct must possess the \u201ctendency or capacity to mislead\u201d or create the \u201clikelihood of deception.\u201d Id.\nViewing all inferences of fact against defendants, see Boudreau, 322 N.C. at 342-43, 368 S.E.2d at 858, we conclude the statements of Harris to Thompson concerning the status of the accounts may properly be considered deceptive in view of evidence that Harris knew the list of the accounts attached to the Agreement did not accurately represent the accounts which plaintiff believed it was purchasing. See Kron Medical Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Associates, 107 N.C. App. 331, 339, 420 S.E.2d 192, 196, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 168, 424 S.E.2d 910 (1992) (failure to disclose information may be tantamount to misrepresentation and thus constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice). Thus, assuming for purposes of summary judgment that Harris made the alleged representations to plaintiff, those statements of Harris \u201ccreat[ed] the likelihood of deception\u201d and constituted sufficient evidence of an unfair and deceptive trade practice. See Contreras, 107 N.C. App. at 614, 421 S.E.2d at 170.\nAlthough Harris asserted in his deposition that he \u201cdidn\u2019t take [PMI] seriously on the account transfers,\u201d it is immaterial whether he misrepresented the status of the accounts out of negligence and in good faith, or without intent to mislead. See, e.g., Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 601, 394 S.E.2d 643, 651 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991) (\u201cthat defendants may have made misrepresentations negligently and in good faith, in ignorance of their falsity, and without intent to mislead, affords no defense\u201d in actions under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1).\nNotwithstanding, defendants maintain Harris may not be chargeable with a misrepresentation on 4 April 1995 since \u201call of the documents, including the Acquisition Agreement, the Bill of Sale, the Assignment of Rights . . . were expressly made effective April 1, 1995.\u201d More specifically, defendants contend that in order for Harris to have misled plaintiff, his failure to disclose on 4 April 1995 would of necessity have to be applied to the earlier date \u201cwhen the contract was created and the obligations of the parties established.\u201d This argument is unfounded.\nThe Agreement was not actually \u201ccreated\u201d or executed until closing of the transaction on 4 April 1995. It is undisputed that the closing documents were executed only after the accounts were identified and verified on 4 April 1995. Hence, the very documents upon which defendants rely to assert the 1 April 1995 effective date were procured, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Boudreau, 322 N.C. at 343, 368 S.E.2d at 858, by Harris\u2019 wilful nondisclosure at closing of the pending transfer of certain of the accounts.\nLikewise, defendants\u2019 arguments relying upon the Uniform Commercial Code (the U.C.C.) are inapposite because property management accounts do not constitute \u201cgoods\u201d within the meaning of Article 2 of the U.C.C. (See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 25-2-105 (1995)). Article 2 is therefore inapplicable to the sale of the accounts.\nFinally, defendants assert plaintiff \u201celected as its principal relief the remedy of rescission,\u201d and that, as a consequence, it cannot sue for damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 because these remedies are \u201cinconsistent.\u201d See United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 335 N.C. 183, 190-91, 437 S.E.2d 374, 378-79 (1993).\nDefendant is correct that it is well established in our jurisprudence that\n[w]hen a person discovers that he has been fraudulently induced to purchase property he must choose between two inconsistent remedies. He may repudiate the contract of sale, tender a return of the property, and recover the value of the consideration with which he parted; or, he may affirm the contract, retain the property, and recover the difference between its real and its represented value. He may not do both. Once made, the election is final....\nTaylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 711, 717, 220 S.E.2d 806, 811 (1975), disc. review denied, 289 N.C. 619, 223 S.E.2d 396 (1976) (citations omitted).\nIn a fraud case, damage is the amount of loss caused by the difference between what was received and what was promised through a false representation. See River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 130, 388 S.E.2d 538, 556 (1990). The remedy of rescission, as opposed to the notion of damage, seeks to undo the transaction and return the parties to their original status. Triangle Porsche-Audi, 27 N.C. App. at 717, 220 S.E.2d at 811.\nPlaintiffs complaint reveals it seeks damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, relying upon rescission in the alternative. However, North Carolina law does not support defendants\u2019 contention that election between remedies must be made at the time of filing a complaint. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 8(e) (1990) (\u201cparty may set forth two or more statements of a claim . . . alternatively or hypothetically\u201d).\nThe more recent trend in Chapter 75 cases has been to require election of remedies prior to instruction of the jury, see Winant v. Bostic, 5 F.3d 767, 772, 775-76 (4th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff filing action seeking damages based upon G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1, or alternatively recission, not entitled to trebling of award since plaintiff later elected restitution and district court instructed jury upon same), or after return of the jury verdict, see Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 421, 427, 344 S.E.2d 297, 301, disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 464 (1986) (plaintiff allowed to elect remedy between punitive damages or treble damages under G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 after jury verdict). Accordingly, entry of summary judgment against plaintiff on its unfair and deceptive trade practices claim would be inappropriate on the basis of inconsistent remedies.\nTo summarize, plaintiffs appeal of the denial of its motion for partial summary judgment, and defendants\u2019 appeals of the denial of their motions to strike and for partial summary judgment are each dismissed. However, defendants failed to overcome plaintiffs prima facie showing of an unfair and deceptive trade practice, see Boudreau, 322 N.C. at 342-43, 368 S.E.2d at 858, and the trial court\u2019s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff\u2019s claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices is reversed.\nDismissed in part; reversed in part.\nJudges GREENE and MARTIN, M., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ward and Smith, P.A., by Shelli Stoker Stillerman and John M. Martin, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Shanklin & McDaniel, L.L.P., by Kenneth A. Shanklin and Susan McDaniel, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FIRST ATLANTIC MANAGEMENT, CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. DUNLEA REALTY, CO., H. STEVEN HARRIS, and JEFFREY L. DUNLEA, Defendants\nCOA 97-540\n(Filed 3 November 1998)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of summary judgments and motion to strike affidavits \u2014 interlocutory\nAppeals from the denial of summary judgment motions by both parties and defendant\u2019s motion to strike certain affidavits were dismissed as interlocutory where there was no substantial right which could not be corrected upon appeal from final judgment.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 partial summary judgment \u2014 possibility of inconsistent verdicts\nThe trial court correctly determined that a substantial right of plaintiff might be affected by delaying appeal of the grant of defendant\u2019s partial summary judgment on an unfair trade practices claim where plaintiffs claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and unfair trade practices rest upon nearly identical factual allegations and a jury would be required to render essentially identical factual determinations in order for plaintiff to prevail. Dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s appeal would raise the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.\n3. Unfair Trade Practices\u2014 misrepresentation \u2014 sale of real estate management accounts\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendants on an unfair trade practices claim arising from the sale of real estate management accounts where, viewing all inferences against defendants, the statements of defendant Harris concerning the status of the accounts may properly be considered deceptive in view of evidence that he knew the list of accounts attached to the Acquisition Agreement did not accurately represent the accounts which plaintiff believed it was purchasing. It is immaterial whether Harris misrepresented the status of the accounts out of negligence and in good faith or without intent to mislead. Although defendants contend that all of the documents were made effective on 1 April, before any misrepresentations, the agreement was not actually created until the closing on April 4, when the accounts were identified and verified.\n4. Uniform Commercial Code\u2014 property management accounts \u2014 not goods under Article 2\nArticle 2 of the UCC was not applicable to the sale of property management accounts because those accounts are not \u201cgoods\u201d within the meaning of Article 2.\n5. Unfair Trade Practices\u2014 election of remedies \u2014 before instructions or after verdict\nThe trial court erred by entering summary judgment for defendants on an unfair trade practices claim arising from the sale of real estate management accounts where defendants contended that plaintiff had elected rescission as its principal relief and could not sue for inconsistent remedies. Although plaintiff\u2019s complaint sought damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 and relied upon rescission in the alternative, N.C. law does not support the contention that election between remedies must be made at the filing of a complaint. The more recent trend in Chapter 75 cases is the election of remedies prior to the instruction of the jury or after the return of the jury verdict.\nAppeal by plaintiff and cross appeal by defendants from order entered 6 March 1997 by Judge James R. Strickland in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 January 1998.\nWard and Smith, P.A., by Shelli Stoker Stillerman and John M. Martin, for plaintiff-appellant.\nShanklin & McDaniel, L.L.P., by Kenneth A. Shanklin and Susan McDaniel, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0242-01", "first_page_order": 276, "last_page_order": 291 }