{
  "id": 11199402,
  "name": "INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MONTGOMERY MOTORS, INC., JOSEPH BURGESS HARRIS, and PAUL RAY BRANSON, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Integon Indemnity Corp. v. Federated Mutual Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1998-11-03",
  "docket_number": "No. COA98-117",
  "first_page": "323",
  "last_page": "326",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "131 N.C. App. 323"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "448 S.E.2d 528",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "\"In the absence of policy definitions,\" the court should use a term in accordance with ordinary speech and is \"encouraged to use 'standard, nonlegal dictionaries' as a guide.\""
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      "cite": "337 N.C. App. 694",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "\"In the absence of policy definitions,\" the court should use a term in accordance with ordinary speech and is \"encouraged to use 'standard, nonlegal dictionaries' as a guide.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "444 S.E.2d 487",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "491-92",
          "parenthetical": "\"In the absence of policy definitions,\" the court should use a term in accordance with ordinary speech and is \"encouraged to use 'standard, nonlegal dictionaries' as a guide.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "115 N.C. App. 283",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        12127010
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      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "290",
          "parenthetical": "\"In the absence of policy definitions,\" the court should use a term in accordance with ordinary speech and is \"encouraged to use 'standard, nonlegal dictionaries' as a guide.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/115/0283-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:28.584435+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges LEWIS and HUNTER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MONTGOMERY MOTORS, INC., JOSEPH BURGESS HARRIS, and PAUL RAY BRANSON, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nWe first consider whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an employee getting his car repaired by his employer was a \u201ccustomer\u201d or an \u201cemployee\u201d under the terms of the insurance policy at issue. Plaintiff argues that Branson was covered under the Federated policy if, at the time of the accident, he was an \u201cemployee\u201d of Montgomery Motors and was using an auto owned by Montgomery Motors.\nDefendants contend that Integon provides sole coverage because the Federated policy excludes \u201ccustomers\u201d from its definition of who is an \u201cinsured.\u201d Defendants contend that the policy further provides that the term \u201ccustomers\u201d includes \u201cyour employees . . . who pay for [repair] services performed.\u201d Defendants contend that the record and exhibits clearly demonstrate that Branson was a \u201ccustomer\u201d of Montgomery Motors when he was provided with the vehicle. Defendants cite the testimony of both Branson and Harold S. Asbill, the owner of Montgomery Motors, who testified that Branson received the vehicle because he was a \u201ccustomer.\u201d Accordingly, defendants argue that Branson was not an \u201cinsured\u201d under the Federated policy.\nAfter careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of the parties, we affirm. The Federated policy states that \u201c[w]e will pay all sums an \u2018insured\u2019 legally must pay as damages because of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 to which this insurance applies, caused by an \u2018accident\u2019 and resulting from \u2018garage operations\u2019 involving the ownership, maintenance or use of covered \u2018autos.\u2019 \u201d It is undisputed that the automobile driven by Branson was a \u201ccovered auto\u201d under the terms of the policy because the vehicle was owned by Montgomery Motors. Additionally, the \u201cgarage operations\u201d definition was satisfied because of the \u201cuse\u201d of a \u201ccovered auto.\u201d However, under the terms of the policy, Branson was not an insured because he was a \u201ccustomer,\u201d and \u201ccustomers\u201d are excluded from coverage.\nThe term \u201ccustomer\u201d is not defined anywhere in the policy. While the section determining whether an auto is a \u201ccovered auto\u201d states that \u201ccustomers\u201d include \u201cyour employees . . . who pay for [repair] services performed,\u201d this definition applies solely for the determination of whether an automobile left by an employee for service is a \u201ccovered auto\u201d under the policy, and not whether the employee is a \u201ccustomer\u201d under the terms of the policy. Accordingly, since \u201ccustomer\u201d is not defined in the policy, the term \u201ccustomer\u201d should be defined by its ordinary meaning. See McLeod v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 115 N.C. App. 283, 290, 444 S.E.2d 487, 491-92, disc. rev. denied, 337 N.C. App. 694, 448 S.E.2d 528 (1994) (\u201cIn the absence of policy definitions,\u201d the court should use a term in accordance with ordinary speech and is \u201cencouraged to use \u2018standard, nonlegal dictionaries\u2019 as a guide.\u201d). Webster\u2019s Dictionary defines \u201ccustomer\u201d as \u201cone that purchases a commodity or service.\u201d Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 318 (1985). Branson was billed almost $800.00 for repairs made by Montgomery Motors during the time Branson had the loaner car. Both Branson and Asbill testified that Branson received the vehicle because he was a \u201ccustomer\u201d and not because he was an \u201cemployee.\u201d Accordingly, we hold that on this record Branson was a \u201ccustomer\u201d under the Federated policy. The assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next consider whether the trial court erred by failing to find as a matter of law that the terms of the policy were ambiguous with regard to coverage for employees who also were customers. Plaintiff argues that the Federated, policy contains conflicting provisions which provide an exception precluding coverage for \u201ccustomers,\u201d while at the same time providing coverage for \u201cemployees\u201d using covered vehicles with permission. Plaintiff contends that because of this ambiguity the policy must be interpreted to find coverage for the individual employee/customer. Additionally, plaintiff contends that the policy is ambiguous because there are no policy provisions requiring that an individual who is both a \u201ccustomer\u201d and an \u201cemployee\u201d be treated as a \u201ccustomer\u201d only for the purposes of limiting coverage. Plaintiff argues that once the Federated policy conflict is resolved in favor of finding coverage for Branson, the terms of the Integon and Federated policies indicate that Federated provides primary coverage.\nDefendants contend that there was no ambiguity and that the key provisions of the Federated policy are not in conflict. Defendants argue that although Branson was an \u201cemployee,\u201d he was a \u201ccustomer\u201d on this occasion. Defendants assert that there is no reason that a \u201ccustomer,\u201d who happens to work for Montgomery Motors, should not fall within the \u201ccustomer\u201d exclusion.\nWe hold that the Federated policy is not ambiguous. Nothing in the policy requires that an \u201cemployee\u201d cannot be considered a \u201ccustomer\u201d for purposes of determining insurance coverage. The policy clearly excludes coverage for \u201ccustomers.\u201d Accordingly, because Branson acquired the car on loan because his own car was being repaired by Montgomery Motors, he was therefore a \u201ccustomer\u201d and not an \u201cinsured\u201d under the Federated policy. The assignment of error is overruled and summary judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges LEWIS and HUNTER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Dunn, Dunn, Stoller & Pittman, LLP, by Anne D. Edwards, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Robert H. Sasser, III and Mark A. Davis, for defendant-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MONTGOMERY MOTORS, INC., JOSEPH BURGESS HARRIS, and PAUL RAY BRANSON, Defendants\nNo. COA98-117\n(Filed 3 November 1998)\n1. Insurance\u2014 coverage \u2014 automobile loaned by garage\u2014 driver both customer and employee \u2014 summary judgment for garage insurer\nIn a declaratory judgment action to determine insurance coverage arising from an auto accident involving a Montgomery Motors employee driving a loaner while his car was being repaired, summary judgment was properly granted for Montgomery Motors and Federated, its insurer, and against the insurer of an employee, Integon, where the Federated policy covered employees but excluded customers. The employee was billed for repairs to his vehicle and there was testimony that he received the loaner because he was a customer; on the record, he was a \u201ccustomer\u201d under the Federated policy.\n2. Insurance\u2014 automobile \u2014 loaner vehicle \u2014 driver both employee and customer \u2014 policy not ambiguous\nThe trial court did not err by not finding as a matter of law that an insurance policy was ambiguous where defendant Montgomery Motors had loaned an auto to an employee while Montgomery was performing repairs on the employee\u2019s auto, for which the employee paid; the employee became involved in an accident while driving the loaner; and Montgomery\u2019s policy covered employees but not customers. Nothing in the policy requires that an employee cannot be considered a customer for purposes of determining insurance coverage.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 18 July 1997 by Judge William C. Griffin, Jr. in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 October 1998.\nOn 20 August 1994, defendant Paul Ray Branson was in an automobile accident with defendant Joseph Burgess Harris in Greenville, North Carolina. At the time of the accident, Branson was driving a used car owned by his employer, defendant Montgomery Motors, Inc. (\u201cMontgomery Motors\u201d). Branson\u2019s personal car was in the Montgomery Motors repair shop and Montgomery Motors provided Branson the Montgomery Motors\u2019 automobile on loan for his personal use. Montgomery Motors had a policy of loaning \u201cvehicles without charge to good customers who need a vehicle for their personal use while their car is being serviced or repaired\u201d in their shop. On the date of the accident, Branson had a personal automobile insurance policy with plaintiff Integon Indemnity Corporation (\u201cIntegon\u201d). Defendant Montgomery Motors also had an automobile liability insurance policy in force and effect with defendant Federated Mutual Insurance Company (\u201cFederated\u201d).\nOn 2 May 1995, defendant Burgess filed a tort action against defendant Branson seeking monetary damages for injuries sustained in the 20 August 1994 accident. That action is being defended on behalf of Branson by counsel employed by Integon under a reservation of rights pursuant to the terms of the Integon policy.\nOn 28 September 1995 Integon filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to determine whether it was required to provide Branson coverage for claims arising out of the 20 August 1994 accident. Defendants Federated and Montgomery Motors moved for summary judgment on 17 April 1997. Plaintiff Integon moved for summary judgment on 6 June 1997. On 18 July 1997 an order was entered granting Federated\u2019s and Montgomery Motors\u2019 motions for summary judgment and denying Integon\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.\nDunn, Dunn, Stoller & Pittman, LLP, by Anne D. Edwards, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Robert H. Sasser, III and Mark A. Davis, for defendant-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0323-01",
  "first_page_order": 357,
  "last_page_order": 360
}