{ "id": 11200649, "name": "GWENDOLYN S. ROWE, Plaintiff v. O. REAGAN ROWE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Rowe v. Rowe", "decision_date": "1998-11-17", "docket_number": "No. COA97-1574", "first_page": "409", "last_page": "411", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "131 N.C. App. 409" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527082 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing the same reasoning to eliminate summary judgment of punitive damage claims as immediately appealable" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131407 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing the same reasoning to eliminate summary judgment of punitive damage claims as immediately appealable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917406 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527082 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0250-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 368, "char_count": 5825, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.531222345190937e-07, "percentile": 0.8125021960739796 }, "sha256": "8fce89e8a6471201a4376757839ae1353f055189c5a4d4d58d281515be4a6ad2", "simhash": "1:210166ad4cef24fc", "word_count": 926 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:28.584435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge MARTIN, John C., concur." ], "parties": [ "GWENDOLYN S. ROWE, Plaintiff v. O. REAGAN ROWE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WALKER, Judge.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 18 June 1950 and separated on 16 June 1996. On 21 October 1996, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking postseparation support, alimony, attorneys\u2019 fees, and equitable distribution. A hearing was held for determination of post-separation support on 9 and 10 June 1997. At the hearings, plaintiff established monthly financial needs and expenses of approximately $5,000. Plaintiff offered the affidavit of Thomas Randolph Witt, a certified public accountant who professed to be knowledgeable of the tax laws, and he determined that plaintiff would need $8,300 per month as postseparation support to meet her tax liability.\nOn 25 July 1997, the trial court ruled that plaintiff\u2019s reasonable needs and expenses per month were $4,950.81 rounded up to $5,000, and after taking into consideration the tax consequences of postsep-aration support, ordered defendant to pay $8,300 per month until the equitable distribution issues were resolved.\nOn 20 August 1997, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 for relief from the order and also filed a notice of appeal. In his motion, defendant alleged that the trial court erred in determining that a monthly payment of $8,300 was necessary in order to meet plaintiff\u2019s reasonable monthly needs and expenses of $5,000. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the payment of postseparation support that was in excess of plaintiff\u2019s needs because her tax liability was incorrectly calculated. Plaintiff contends that an order awarding postseparation support is interlocutory and not immediately appealable.\nAn order is interlocutory if it is made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but leaves further matters to be judicially determined between the parties at the trial court level. Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh\u2019g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). However, an interlocutory order may be appealed by one of two avenues. First, an appeal is permitted if there is an order or judgment which is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies the case for appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b). N.C. Dept. of Transportation v. Page, 119 N.C. App. 730, 734, 460 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1995). Second, an appeal is permitted if it affects a substantial right that will be lost if not reviewed immediately. Id.\nPrior to 1995, there was no action in North Carolina for \u201cpostsep-aration support\u201d instead the statute defined support prior to a divorce as \u201calimony pendente lite.\u201d In 1981, this Court held that alimony pen-dente lite awards were interlocutory and were not immediately appealable because they did not affect a substantial right. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981). Prior to Stephenson, this Court had allowed alimony pendente lite awards to be immediately appealable. However, we noted that due to the increase in the number of appeals to be heard by this Court, a final hearing frequently could be held in the trial court before the case even reached this Court. Id. at 251, 285 S.E.2d at 282. It was also noted that some appeals were merely pursued for the purpose of delay rather than to accelerate the determination of a party\u2019s rights. Id. Therefore, it was determined that in \u201cconsideration of fairness to the parties and as a matter of public policy,\u201d alimony pendente lite awards would no longer be immediately appealable. Id. at 252, 285 S.E.2d at 282.\nIn 1995, the legislature modified the statutes dealing with domestic issues and replaced alimony pendente lite with postseparation support. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1A (1995) defines postseparation support as \u201cspousal support to be paid until the earlier of either the date specified in the order of postseparation support, or an order awarding or denying alimony.\u201d The differences between alimony pendente lite and postseparation support in the statutes are irrelevant to the issue before this Court.\nThe conditions this Court addressed in Stephenson are still valid today. See Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, 115 N.C. App. 423, 444 S.E.2d 694 (1994) (citing the same reasoning to eliminat\u00e9 summary judgment of punitive damage claims as immediately appealable). Postseparation support is only intended to be temporary and ceases when an award of alimony is either allowed or denied by the trial court. Therefore, it remains likely that the trial court would make a final determination on alimony before this Court could render an opinion pursuant to an appeal from a postseparation support order.\nTherefore, since a postseparation support order is a temporary measure, it is interlocutory, it does not affect a substantial right, and it is not appealable.\nDismissed.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge MARTIN, John C., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by G. Russell Komegay, III and Katherine Line Thompson Kelly, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Casstevens, Hanner, Gunter & Conrad, PA., by Nelson M. Casstevens, Jr. and Teresa L. Conrad for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GWENDOLYN S. ROWE, Plaintiff v. O. REAGAN ROWE, Defendant\nNo. COA97-1574\n(Filed 17 November 1998)\nDivorce\u2014 postseparation support \u2014 appeal interlocutory\nAn appeal from a postseparation support order was dismissed as interlocutory. Although the legislature has replaced alimony pendente lite with postseparation support, the considerations in Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, for holding that alimony pendente lite awards were interlocutory and not immediately appealable are still valid.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 25 July 1997 and 19 November 1997 by Judge Yvonne Mims Evans in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 September 1998.\nJames, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by G. Russell Komegay, III and Katherine Line Thompson Kelly, for plaintiff-appellee.\nCasstevens, Hanner, Gunter & Conrad, PA., by Nelson M. Casstevens, Jr. and Teresa L. Conrad for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0409-01", "first_page_order": 443, "last_page_order": 445 }