{ "id": 11201666, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONNIE SMALL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Small", "decision_date": "1998-12-01", "docket_number": "No. COA97-1607", "first_page": "488", "last_page": "495", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "131 N.C. App. 488" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485509 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567653 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306142 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565526 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737959 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4698534, 4694631, 4701740, 4694394, 4702783 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0556-05", "/nc/316/0556-04", "/nc/316/0556-03", "/nc/316/0556-01", "/nc/316/0556-02" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" }, { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521942 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "543-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552812 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569961 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383-84" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554275 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/1/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 33, 305 S.E.2d 703, 710 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867700 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 33, 305 S.E.2d 703, 710 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562282 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549276 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205331 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 746, "char_count": 16236, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1346377406354014e-07, "percentile": 0.5770033310822369 }, "sha256": "aefeca49b984a2a5cea0ba7af95781e3d8edb4b2c12501a162a824e39998e10a", "simhash": "1:876b357c266a95e2", "word_count": 2615 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:28.584435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GREENE and WALKER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONNIE SMALL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SMITH, Judge.\nDefendant was charged with the 12 May 1994 robbery of William Wright, d/b/a Texaco Food Mart in Dunn, North Carolina, and the murder of Wayne Joseph Newbold, the clerk on duty. A duly empaneled jury found defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant appeals.\nI.\nDefendant first contends the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant argues that the State was in possession of exculpatory evidence that was not disclosed to defendant in a timely manner. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding no prejudice to defendant.\nBrady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), is the law of the land on the issue of suppression of evidence. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that \u201cthe suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.\u201d Id. at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 218. Evidence is \u201cmaterial\u201d only when \u201cthere is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A \u2018reasonable probability\u2019 is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985). Defendant bears the burden of showing that evidence not disclosed was material and affected the outcome of the trial. See State v. Smith, 337 N.C. 658, 664, 447 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1994); State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 337, 298 S.E.2d 631, 642 (1983).\nIn this case, the record reveals that the statement in question was not actually given to the district attorney until January 1996, at which time a copy was provided to defendant. Although the State was aware of the substance of the statement as early as July 1994 and did not relay its knowledge of the information to defendant until May 1995, defendant knew of the statement prior to the district attorney obtaining the same. Because of this, the trial court found \u201c[t]he failure to provide the information to the defendant[] is not prejudicial to the defendant!] since the [defendant\u2019s] attorneyf] [was] aware of the information... prior to Assistant District Attorney Caron Stewart discovering the information.\u201d\nOur Supreme Court has held \u201cthat due process and Brady are satisfied by the disclosure of the evidence at trial, so long as disclosure is made in time for the defendants to make effective use of the evidence.\u201d State v. Taylor, 344 N.C. 31, 50, 473 S.E.2d 596, 607 (1996) (citing State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 33, 305 S.E.2d 703, 710 (1983)). In this case, defendant had knowledge of the statement before the district attorney became aware of it, was provided with the written statement many months prior to trial, and was able to fully use the statement and the defense theory it presented during trial. Still, defendant argues that because of the State\u2019s delay in providing the information, defendant was unable to investigate the statement, thus leaving possible exculpatory evidence undiscovered. This argument is unpersuasive as it is based on nothing more than mere speculation. Furthermore, defendant was aware of the information prior to the district attorney obtaining the evidence and could have followed up on the statement at that point. The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Defendant was not prejudiced by the State\u2019s failure to disclose the evidence.\nII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the out-of-court identification by Hector McNeill of defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes in question. Defendant asserts the testimony of McNeill \u201cis so grossly incorrect regarding these facts that it draws into question whether he was actually in a position to observe anything at all.\u201d\nIn this case, McNeill testified that he saw defendant in the Texaco store at approximately 10:30 pm, defendant was carrying a \u201cchrome plated semi-automatic handgun,\u201d and as McNeill left the store, he heard three gunshots. The undisputed facts are contrary to McNeill\u2019s testimony. The murder occurred sometime after 2:00 am according to register tapes; the murder weapon was a black steel, snub-nose .38 revolver with a brown handle; and only one shot was fired. Because of the inconsistency between McNeill\u2019s statement and the undisputed facts surrounding the murder, defendant argues that \u201cMcNeill\u2019s . . . testimony at trial [was] so unreliable so as to have no probative weight and therefore inadmissible.\u201d We disagree. Any uncertainties in the identification goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. Thus, the trial court committed no error in allowing the testimony.\nIII.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s introduction of hearsay evidence during rebuttal. He argues that, by allowing the evidence to come in, defendant\u2019s confrontation clause rights were violated as he was unable to cross-examine the declarant.\nDuring trial, defendant filed a Notice of Intent to Offer Statements of Anthony Devon Coxum. In support, defendant showed that Coxum made inculpatory statements regarding his own involvement in the crimes and exculpating defendant of the crimes. The trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion, making the following findings of fact:\n1. Proper notice had been given of the intent to offer hearsay evidence under G.S. 8C-1, Rules 803(24) and (804)(5) [sic];\n2. The statements of Anthony Devon Coxum were not specifically covered by any of the other hearsay exceptions;\n3. The hearsay statements of Anthony Devon Coxum possessed certain circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;\n4. The evidence is material to the case at bar;\n5. The evidence is more probative on an issue than any other evidence procurable through reasonable efforts;\nDuring the hearings and arguments by the parties on the defendant\u2019s motion the State notified the defendant of the State\u2019s intention pursuant to G.S. 8C-1, Rule 806, during rebuttal to introduce a contradictory hearsay statement made by Anthony Devon Coxum to a law enforcement officer.\nBased on the aforementioned findings, the court concluded \u201c[w]hen a hearsay statement has been admitted into evidence the credibility of the declarant may be attacked.\u201d Accordingly, during trial defendant offered Coxum\u2019s hearsay statement through the testimony of Antoine Myles. The State cross-examined Myles regarding Coxum\u2019s statements and then called Detective Ronnie Radcliff in rebuttal, who testified that Coxum had made an inconsistent statement to him in which he implicated defendant in the crimes. It is this rebuttal testimony that defendant contends violated his confrontation clause rights. Defendant argues that because the two hearsay statements occurred at different times and to different people, the court should have made new findings regarding the trustworthiness of the State\u2019s rebuttal evidence. This argument is unpersuasive.\nIn State v. Stalnaker, 1 N.C. App. 524, 162 S.E.2d 76 (1968) this Court responded to a similar argument. In that case, defendant argued that the state\u2019s rebuttal evidence failed to qualify as a dying declaration, and thus should not have been admitted into evidence. This Court stated, \u201cwhether the State\u2019s evidence of a declaration qualified as a dying declaration is immaterial, because in either event it was admissible to impeach or contradict defendant\u2019s evidence of a declaration.\u201d Id. at 527, 162 S.E.2d at 78. Thereafter, in 1983, the North Carolina legislature enacted Chapter 8C, North Carolina General Statutes, which set forth the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 806 codified what the courts, such as the Stalnaker court, had consistently held \u2014 that an out-of-court declarant is subject to impeachment just like any other declarant.\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 806 is unambiguous.\nWhen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 806 (1992) (emphasis added). Rule 806 provides that inconsistent statements of a hearsay declarant are admissible. In effect, this rule treats the out-of-court declarant the same as a live witness for purposes of impeachment. There is no question that if Coxum had testified as a witness, any inconsistent-statements he made would be admissible to attack his credibility. Because the testimony could have come in had Coxum been on the stand, Rule 806 allows its admission to impeach his credibility even in his absence. Thus, regardless of whether the State\u2019s evidence was admissible hearsay or not, the evidence was still admissible to impeach or contradict defendant\u2019s hearsay evidence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 806 (1992); Stalnaker, 1 N.C. App. 524, 162 S.E.2d 76. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s third assignment of error is overruled.\nIV.\nAs defendant\u2019s last assignments of error, he argues that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence and defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdict. Defendant states in his brief, \u201cthere was insufficient evidence at the close of not only the State\u2019s case in chief, but at the close of all the evidence to warrant a dismissal.\u201d\nWith regard to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, the rule has been stated by our Supreme Court.\n[T]here must be substantial evidence of all material elements of the offense to withstand the motion to dismiss. It is immaterial whether the substantial evidence is circumstantial or direct, or both.. .. Substantial evidence of guilt is required before the court can send the case to the jury.\nState v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 383-84, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956). When considering such motions, the trial court should concern itself only with the sufficiency of the evidence and not with its weight. See State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). If the evidence presented is purely circumstantial, \u201cthe question for the court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. If so, it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.\u201d State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1965). Thus, the trial court must submit the case to the jury if there is substantial evidence of all material elements of the offense charged and that defendant perpetrated the crime. See State v. Cotten, 2 N.C. App. 305, 309, 163 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1968). \u201cSubstantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. McCullough, 79 N.C. App. 541, 544, 340 S.E.2d 132, 135 (citing Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114), cert. denied, 316 N.C. 556, 344 S.E.2d 13 (1986).\nWhen measuring the sufficiency of evidence, it is well settled that the trial court \u201cmust view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, making all reasonable inferences in the State\u2019s favor.\u201d McCullough, 79 N.C. App. at 543-44, 340 S.E.2d at 134. The trial court must consider all evidence admitted by the court, whether competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the state. See State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 107, 347 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1986). \u201cThis is especially necessary in a case . . . when the proof offered is circumstantial, for rarely will one bit of such evidence be sufficient, in itself, to point to a defendant\u2019s guilt. If a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt can be drawn from a combination of the circumstances, defendant\u2019s motion is properly denied.\u201d State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236, 245, 250 S.E.2d 204, 209 (1978).\nWhen a case comes to this Court for review of denial of a motion to dismiss, we apply the same rule as that used in the trial court. That is, \u201c[t]aking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, if the record here discloses substantial evidence of all material elements constituting the offense for which the accused was tried, then this court must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion.\u201d Stephens, 244 N.C. at 383, 93 S.E.2d at 433. Thus, considering the evidence presented to us in the record, and viewing it in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that the circumstantial evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to submit the case to the jury.\nLikewise, defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict (motion for appropriate relief) pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1411 (1997). \u201cA motion for appropriate relief is a post-verdict motion (or a post-sentencing motion where there is no verdict) made to correct errors occurring prior to, during, and after a criminal trial.\u201d State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 535, 391 S.E.2d 159, 160-61 (1990). Such motion is addressed to the trial court\u2019s discretion and \u201cits ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Gilley, 306 N.C. 125, 131, 291 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1982), overruled on other grounds, State v. Barnes, 324 N.C. 539, 380 S.E.2d 118 (1989). Defendant has made no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion. Therefore, we find defendant\u2019s assignment of error to be without merit.\nAfter addressing each of defendant\u2019s assignments of error, we conclude\nNo Error.\nJudges GREENE and WALKER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SMITH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by H. Alan Pell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Michael L. Yopp for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONNIE SMALL\nNo. COA97-1607\n(Filed 1 December 1998)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutorial misconduct \u2014 exculpatory statement \u2014 known to defendant\nThe trial court did not err in a robbery and murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct based on the State\u2019s untimely disclosure of exculpatory material where defendant had knowledge of the statement in question before the district attorney, was provided with the written statement many months prior to trial, and was able to fully use the statement and the defense theory it presented during trial.\n2. Evidence\u2014 identification testimony \u2014 inaccurate as to facts \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for robbery and murder by allowing testimony identifying defendant as the perpetrator where the testimony was inaccurate as to the facts. Any uncertainties in the identification go to the weight and not admissibility.\n3. Evidence\u2014 impeachment of hearsay declarant \u2014 inconsistent hearsay statements \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for robbery and murder by allowing the State to introduce hearsay testimony implicating defendant in rebuttal of defendant\u2019s introduction of exculpatory hearsay testimony from the same declarant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 806 provides that inconsistent statements of a hearsay declarant are admissible, in effect treating the out-of-court declarant the same as a live witness for purposes of impeachment.\n4. Criminal Law\u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 circumstantial evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a robbery and murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss for insufficient evidence and for appropriate relief. If the evidence presented is purely circumstantial, the question is whether a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 January 1997 by Judge Wiley F. Bowen in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 October 1998.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by H. Alan Pell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMichael L. Yopp for defendant." }, "file_name": "0488-01", "first_page_order": 522, "last_page_order": 529 }