{
  "id": 11202742,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TREMAYNE SAUNDERS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Saunders",
  "decision_date": "1998-12-01",
  "docket_number": "No. COA97-1489",
  "first_page": "551",
  "last_page": "553",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "131 N.C. App. 551"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "410 S.E.2d 393",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "394-395",
          "parenthetical": "citation omitted"
        }
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    {
      "cite": "104 N.C. App. 274",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8521252
      ],
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "276-277",
          "parenthetical": "citation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 6,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(h)(5)"
        },
        {
          "page": "(h)(5)"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "h"
        },
        {
          "page": "(h)(5)"
        },
        {
          "page": "(h)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:28.584435+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judge McGEE concurs.",
      "Judge WYNN concurred in result prior to 1 October 1998."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TREMAYNE SAUNDERS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nDefendant was charged with trafficking in four hundred grams or more of cocaine by transportation and by possession and entered a plea of guilty at his arraignment. The State prayed judgment on 3 April 1997 and, after making a finding of substantial assistance, the trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of 38 months and a maximum of 50 months. The defendant gave notice of appeal on 8 April 1997.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether, based on a finding of substantial assistance, the trial court\u2019s discretion in departing from minimum sentencing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(5) is limited by the structured sentencing minimum in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.17 for an offense of the same class. The question of whether the defendant provided substantial assistance in this case is not at issue. The State stipulated that substantial assistance was given and the trial court entered a finding to that effect when judgment was rendered.\nBased on a finding of substantial assistance, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that:\n[t]he sentencing judge may reduce the fine, or impose a prison term less than the applicable minimum prison term provided by this subsection, or suspend the prison term imposed and place a person on probation when such person has, to the best of his knowledge, provided substantial assistance in the identification, arrest or conviction of any accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators, or principles if the sentencing judge enters in the record a finding that the person to be sentenced has rendered such substantial assistance.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95 (h)(5) (1997). The statutory language makes clear that the trial court is given broad discretion in sentencing after substantial assistance is found. Whether or not to give a \u201creduction of the sentence is also in the judge\u2019s discretion, even if the judge finds substantial assistance was given.\u201d State v. Wells, 104 N.C. App. 274, 276-277, 410 S.E.2d 393, 394-395 (1991) (citation omitted). The statutory language does not limit the trial court\u2019s discretion to the boundaries of structured sentencing. In fact, language within structured sentencing, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.13(b), states that the range set by its sentencing grid controls the minimum term of imprisonment \u201cunless applicable statutes require or authorize another minimum sentence of imprisonment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.13(b) (1997).\nAt the defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing for this case, defense counsel stated that her understanding was \u201conce substantial assistance has been established ... the Court is free to depart in any manner.\u201d The trial court responded:\nI don\u2019t agree with that, and I\u2019ll tell you why. ... I think you then have to go back to the grid and you can treat it as a straight structured sentencing case if I find substantial assistance .... But I think that\u2019s as far as I can go, and what I can do under structured sentencing, I can do, but if I can\u2019t do it under structured sentencing, I can\u2019t do it.\nThe punishment range set out in structured sentencing, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.17, does not control the minimum sentence when an applicable statute, such as N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95 in this case, requires or authorizes another minimum sentence. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(5) specifically authorizes \u201c[t]he sentencing judge [to] reduce the fine, or impose a prison term less than the applicable minimum prison term provided by [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)], or suspend the prison term imposed and place a person on probation ...\u201d once the trial court has made a finding that the defendant has rendered substantial assistance. The trial court made such a finding of substantial assistance in this case and was, therefore, not limited by structured sentencing\u2019s minimum sentencing requirements. The case is\nRemanded for resentencing.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge WYNN concurred in result prior to 1 October 1998.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HUNTER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robin P. Pendergraft, for the State.",
      "Aguirre Law Office, by Bridgett Britt Aguirre for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TREMAYNE SAUNDERS\nNo. COA97-1489\n(Filed 1 December 1998)\nSentencing\u2014 noncapital \u2014 substantial assistance \u2014 term less than structured minimum \u2014 permissible\nA cocaine trafficking case was remanded for resentencing where the court found substantial assistance but stated that it was limited by structured sentencing minimum requirements. The punishment range set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17 does not control the minimum sentence when an applicable statute requires or authorizes another minimum sentence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(5) specifically authorizes the sentencing judge to reduce the fine or impose a less than minimum prison term once the court has made a finding of substantial assistance.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 3 April 1997 by Judge Henry V. Barnette, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 September 1998.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robin P. Pendergraft, for the State.\nAguirre Law Office, by Bridgett Britt Aguirre for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0551-01",
  "first_page_order": 585,
  "last_page_order": 587
}