{
  "id": 11206988,
  "name": "VIRGINIA WALL, Employee, Plaintiff v. MACFIELD/UNIFI, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wall v. Macfield/Unifi",
  "decision_date": "1998-12-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and SMITH concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "VIRGINIA WALL, Employee, Plaintiff v. MACFIELD/UNIFI, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nFirst we consider whether the Full Commission erred in reversing the deputy commissioner\u2019s award to plaintiff and concluding that plaintiff\u2019s claim was time barred under G.S. 97-24. Plaintiff argues that the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim until the employer has filed an accident report with the Commission. After careful review, we disagree.\nG.S. 97-24 states that \u201c[t]he right to compensation under this Article shall be forever barred unless the claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within two years after the accident.\u201d North Carolina General Statute 97-24\u2019s requirement of filing a claim within two years of the accident is not a statute of limitation, but a condition precedent to the right to compensation. Reinhardt v. Women\u2019s Pavilion, 102 N.C. App. 83, 86, 401 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1991). Here, the plaintiff was injured in August 1991 and did not file her claim until October 1995. Accordingly, the Full Commission appropriately determined that plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred by G.S. 97-24.\nNext, the plaintiff argues that the defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the jurisdictional bar in G.S. 97-24. We disagree. Generally, a jurisdictional bar cannot be overcome by consent, waiver or estoppel. Weston v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 65 N.C. App. 309, 312, 309 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1983); disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 407, 319 S.E.2d 281 (1984).\nHowever, our decisions have also acknowledged that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act \u201crequires liberal construction to accomplish the legislative purpose of providing compensation for injured employees.\u201d See, e.g., Belfield v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 77 N.C. App. 332, 335, 335 S.E.2d 44, 46 (1985) (citation omitted). In addition, we have enunciated a rule to the effect that, in an attempt to achieve the overriding legislative purpose, \u201cequitable estoppel may [be used to] prevent a party from raising the time limitation of G.S. 97-24 to bar a claim.\u201d Id. at 337, 336 S.E.2d at 47; see also Parker, 100 N.C. App. at 369-72, 396 S.E.2d at 628-30. In Belfield, we quoted with approval the following language from a respected treatise:\nThe commonest type of case is that in which a claimant, typically not highly educated, contends that he was lulled into a sense of security by statements of employer or carrier representatives that \u201che will be taken care of\u2019 or that his claim has been filed for him or that a claim will not be necessary because he would be paid compensation benefits in any event. When such facts are established by the evidence, the lateness of the claim has ordinarily been excused.\nBelfield, 77 N.C. App. at 336, 335 S.E.2d at 47 (quoting 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 78.45, at 15-302 through 15-305 (1983)).\nCraver v. Dixie Furniture Co., 115 N.C. App. 570, 578, 447 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1994).\nHere the Full Commission found that plaintiff had been told by her supervisor that the claim would be denied because she did not immediately report her accident. The Full Commission went on to conclude that\n[t]here were no facts of record that would enable plaintiff to make an estoppel claim. Plaintiff did not rely on any indication that her worker\u2019s [sic] compensation claim was being taken care of. To the contrary, plaintiff was told that she did not have a claim.\nThe defendants were not estopped from asserting a jurisdictional bar because plaintiff was not lulled into a false sense of security. Defendant employer never told plaintiff that they would file her workers\u2019 compensation claim; in fact, plaintiff was told that they would deny any claim she filed. Accordingly, the defendants were not estopped from asserting the jurisdictional bar in G.S. 97-24. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, plaintiff argues that the Full Commission erred in reversing the deputy commissioner\u2019s finding that the defendants waived their defenses under G.S. 97-18(d). Because the Industrial Commission lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim pursuant to G.S. 97-24, the Full Commission appropriately did not reach this issue. This assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirm.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and SMITH concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gray, Newell & Johnson, L.L.P., by Angela Newell Gray, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLG, by Clayton M. Custer and Lawrence B. Somers, for defendant-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "VIRGINIA WALL, Employee, Plaintiff v. MACFIELD/UNIFI, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nCOA98-285\n(Filed 29 December 1998)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 claim \u2014 time for filing\nThe Industrial Commission appropriately determined that a workers\u2019 compensation claim was barred by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-24 where plaintiff was injured in August 1991 and did not file her claim until October 1995. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-24\u2019s requirement of filing a claim within two years of the accident is not a statute of limitation, but a condition precedent to the right to compensation.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 estoppel \u2014 jurisdictional bar\nDefendants in a workers\u2019 compensation action were not equitably estopped from asserting the jurisdictional bar in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-24 where defendant employer never told plaintiff that it would file her workers\u2019 compensation claim and, in fact, told her that it would deny any claim she filed. Although a jurisdictional bar generally cannot be overcome by consent, waiver, or estoppel, plaintiff here was not lulled into a false sense of security.\nAppeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 9 January 1998 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 October 1998.\nPlaintiff worked for defendant, Macfield, as a texturing operator from 1980 until 1 November 1993. In 1985, plaintiff injured her back at work. Plaintiff injured her back again in 1987 and'in August 1991. During August 1991, plaintiff was \u201cdoffing\u201d a machine at work, bent over to pick up a package and felt a sharp pain in her back. Plaintiff claimed she called her supervisor at work the next day and reported the incident; however, her supervisor denied that plaintiff ever notified him of her injury. Ms. Roberson, the plant nurse, testified that plaintiff never reported to her that she injured herself at work at anytime in 1991. Ms. Roberson reviewed plaintiffs personnel file and although it contained several completed accident reports for prior incidents, there was no evidence that plaintiff ever reported a work injury at any time in 1991.\nPlaintiff claimed she went to see Dr. Knowlton, the Unifi company doctor, the day after her 1991 injury and that he treated her. However, Dr. Knowlton\u2019s office records only show that he saw plaintiff in 1984 and 1985, not in 1991.\nThe office notes of Dr. Harkins, an orthopedic doctor, establish that he saw plaintiff on 14 June 1991 (before her alleged injury at work in August 1991) for back, buttock, hip and leg pain that she had experienced for a week. Moreover, on 27 August 1991, plaintiff went to Cobb Chiropractic Clinic for back pain. On the \u201cPatient Case History\u201d form, plaintiff checked that her back pain was not \u201can Industrial Accident Case\u201d and plaintiff stated that she had been experiencing back pain for about two months.\nPlaintiff applied for and received $3,119.99 in disability benefits under Unifi\u2019s group disability policy. Ms. Becky Martin, Unifi\u2019s health care plan representative who filed plaintiff\u2019s disability claim, testified that there was no indication in plaintiff\u2019s medical records or in conversations with plaintiff that her injury was work related. Plaintiff\u2019s disability benefits were terminated in 1995 after Dr. Borkto, Aetna\u2019s doctor, indicated that she would be able to do some type of sedentary work.\nIn October 1995, plaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim using a Form 18 which gave defendant employer notice of plaintiff\u2019s back injury. Plaintiff conceded that her Form 18 was the first written notice that plaintiff had given defendant about her injury. The defendant denied the claim on 20 February 1996.\nThe deputy commissioner awarded plaintiff benefits. The Full Commission reversed the deputy commissioner and found that plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred by G.S. 97-24. Plaintiff appeals.\nGray, Newell & Johnson, L.L.P., by Angela Newell Gray, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLG, by Clayton M. Custer and Lawrence B. Somers, for defendant-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0863-01",
  "first_page_order": 897,
  "last_page_order": 901
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