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  "name": "FALK INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGIES, INC., d/b/a SSA SOUTHEAST, Plaintiff v. LINDA STACK, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Falk Integrated Technologies, Inc. v. Stack",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges GREENE and HUNTER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "FALK INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGIES, INC., d/b/a SSA SOUTHEAST, Plaintiff v. LINDA STACK, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff Falk Integrated Technologies, Inc., d/b/a SSA Southeast appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff also contends the court erred by denying plaintiffs \u201cMotion to Reconsider, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial or for Relief from Judgment.\u201d We reverse the trial court.\nPertinent facts and procedural history as alleged in plaintiffs complaint include the following: Plaintiff is a \u201cdeveloper and integrator of information systems for manufacturing and supply-chain management.\u201d On 5 February 1996, plaintiff employed defendant as an at-will employee. Defendant was to be paid for days actually worked at a rate of $4,333.33 per month. Due to an error in plaintiffs payment practices, however, defendant was overpaid a total of $5,421.43 in the months of December 1996 and January 1997.\nDefendant subsequently declined plaintiffs request to return the overpayments. Plaintiff thereupon filed two claims in the Small Claims Court Division of District Court in Forsyth County, seeking to recover the December overpayment of $2,269.80 in the first, and the January overpayment of $3,000.00 in the second.\nPrior to the presentation of evidence, the magistrate\u2019s court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claims with prejudice, noting \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s action file nos. 97 CVM 5114 and 97 CVM 5115 arise from the same cause [and] exceeds jurisdiction.\u201d Although the section is not specifically referenced, the parties do not dispute that the court was referring to the three thousand dollar ($3,000.00) jurisdictional amount provided in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-210 (1995).\nOn 18 August 1997, plaintiff instituted an action in Forsyth County District Court consolidating the two claims against defendant. The latter thereupon moved for summary judgment pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56 (1995), asserting:\nthe same causes of action alleged in the complaint herein have previously been dismissed \u201cWith Prejudice\u201d by a North Carolina Court of competent jurisdiction . . . and Plaintiff herein filed no appeal from these prior adverse decisions within the time allowed.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion by order filed 7 October 1997. Following subsequent denial of its \u201cMotion to Reconsider,\u201d plaintiff filed timely notice of appeal.\nSummary judgment is appropriately granted if\nthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\nN.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c). A summary judgment movant bears the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue, and may do so by\nproving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim .... All inferences of fact from the proofs offered at the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion.\nBoudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 342-43, 368 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1988) (citations omitted). Alleged errors of law are subject to de novo review on.appeal. See Va. Electric Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 N.C. App. 383, 385, 343 S.E.2d 188, 191, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 715, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986).\nPlaintiff first contends N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-212 (1995) does not \u201capply to [plaintiff\u2019s] district court action\u201d and therefore \u201cd[oes] not mandate dismissal and/or judgment in favor of [defendant.\u201d We agree.\nG.S. \u00a7 7A-212 provides in relevant portion:\nNo judgment of the district court rendered by a magistrate in a civil action assigned to him by the chief district judge is void, voidable, or irregular for the reason that the action is not one properly assignable to the magistrate under this article. The sole remedy for improper assignment is appeal for trial de novo before a district judge in the manner provided in [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-228 (1995)].\nG.S. \u00a7 7A-212.\nThe plain language of G.S. \u00a7 7A-212 thus indicates it is directed at those circumstances wherein a party asserts \u201cthat the action\u201d taken by the magistrate is \u201cvoid, voidable, or irregular for the reason that the action is not properly assignable to the magistrate.\u201d Id.\nThe assignment of small claims to magistrates is governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-211 (1995), which states in pertinent part:\nIn the interest of speedy and convenient determination, the chief district judge may, in his discretion, by specific order or general rule, assign to any magistrate of his district any small claim action pending....\nId.\nRead in pari materia, therefore, the statutes prohibit a party from asserting improper assignment by a chief district judge as a basis for attacking a magistrate\u2019s ruling, and require instead a de novo proceeding by \u201can aggrieved party . . . before a district court judge or a jury.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-228(a) (1995).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiffs district court action did not challenge assignment of its claim to the magistrate court. Rather, in the words of plaintiff,\n[plaintiff] bowed to the [magistrate's judgment and refiled [since] . . . the [magistrate evidently believed that [plaintiff] should have originally filed the consolidated action.\nAccordingly, G.S. \u00a7 7A-212 is inapplicable to the instant case and the trial court\u2019s dismissal can not be sustained upon this ground.\nPlaintiff next argues the trial court erred \u201cin determining that the principals of res judicata barred [plaintiff\u2019s action].\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s contention in this regard is likewise well founded.\nThe magistrate court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s consolidated claims as arising from the same cause of action and thus exceeding the court\u2019s jurisdictional amount. \u201cA universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity.\u201d Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964). Thus, \u201c[w]hen a court decides a matter without. . . jurisdiction, then the whole proceeding is ... as if it had never happened.\u201d Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 169, 174 S.E.2d 103, 108 (1970). As the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs total claim, that court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiffs consolidated claim is \u201cas if it had never happened,\u201d id,., and cannot operate to bar plaintiffs district court action under the principle of res judicata. The \u201cwith prejudice\u201d phraseology relied upon heavily by defendant constituted in the present instance mere surplusage. See Symons Corp. v. Quality Concrete Construction, 108 N.C. App. 17, 21, 422 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1992) (language stating \u201cthis action shall be tried on the issue of damages only\u201d in trial court\u2019s partial summary judgment on liability issue \u201cwas mere surplusage\u201d where summary judgment motion \u201cspecifically limited the court\u2019s consideration to the issue of liability and preserved the issue of damages for later determination\u201d).\nHaving found error in entry of summary judgment for defendant, we decline to address plaintiff\u2019s final assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying its \u201cMotion to Reconsider.\u201d\nReversed.\nJudges GREENE and HUNTER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JOHN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Brooks, Pierce, Mclendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by David W. Sar, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Linda Stack pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "FALK INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGIES, INC., d/b/a SSA SOUTHEAST, Plaintiff v. LINDA STACK, Defendant\nNo. COA98-451\n(Filed 6 April 1999)\n1. Jurisdiction\u2014 matter exceeding magistrate\u2019s dollar amount \u2014 district court dismissal\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff had originally filed two claims in small claims court seeking to recover overpayments and the magistrate dismissed the claims with prejudice, noting that they arose from the same cause and exceeded jurisdiction, plaintiff instituted an action in district court, and defendant moved for summary judgment because the causes of action had previously been dismissed with prejudice. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-212 is directed at circumstances wherein a party asserts that the action taken by a magistrate is void for the reason that the action was not properly assignable to the magistrate; in this case, plaintiff\u2019s district court action did not challenge assignment of its claim to the magistrate court and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-212 is inapplicable.\n2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 res judicata \u2014 dismissal in small claims court \u2014 action in district court\nThe trial court erred by determining that a dismissal in small claims court barred an action in district court under res judicata where plaintiff filed two claims in small claims court to recover overpayments and the magistrate dismissed the claims with prejudice, noting that they arose from the same cause and exceeded jurisdiction. As the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs total claim, that court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s consolidated claim is as if it had never happened and cannot bar plaintiff\u2019s district court action under res judicata. The \u201cwith prejudice\u201d phraseology relied upon by defendant was mere surplusage.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 7 October 1997 by Judge Chester C. Davis in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 1999.\nBrooks, Pierce, Mclendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by David W. Sar, for plaintiff-appellant.\nLinda Stack pro se."
  },
  "file_name": "0807-01",
  "first_page_order": 841,
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