{
  "id": 11237763,
  "name": "MARGARET VANASEK, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY VANASEK, and MARGARET VANASEK, Plaintiff v. DUKE POWER COMPANY, CITY OF CHARLOTTE, J.M. BUTLER, R.C. STAHNKE, UNKNOWN OFFICER #1, UNKNOWN FIREMAN #1, and UNKNOWN FIREMAN #2, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Vanasek v. Duke Power Co.",
  "decision_date": "1999-02-16",
  "docket_number": "No. COA98-607",
  "first_page": "335",
  "last_page": "341",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "132 N.C. App. 335"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "481 S.E.2d 85",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "noting that this Court is bound by the holdings of our Supreme Court"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "345 N.C. 631",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        53841
      ],
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "noting that this Court is bound by the holdings of our Supreme Court"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/345/0631-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "468 S.E.2d 279",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1996,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "281"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "122 N.C. App. 150",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11916055
      ],
      "year": 1996,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "153"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/122/0150-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "293 S.E.2d 235",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "58 N.C. App. 170",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8523871
      ],
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/58/0170-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "117 S.E.2d 838",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1961,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "253 N.C. 732",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8626989
      ],
      "year": 1961,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/253/0732-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "422 U.S. 66",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        9468
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1975,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "78",
          "parenthetical": "listing relevant factors for determining \"whether a private remedy is implicit in a [federal] statute not expressly providing one\""
        },
        {
          "page": "36",
          "parenthetical": "listing relevant factors for determining \"whether a private remedy is implicit in a [federal] statute not expressly providing one\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/422/0066-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "444 U.S. 11",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        11304469
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "15-16",
          "parenthetical": "\"The question whether a [federal] statute creates a [private] cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction.\""
        },
        {
          "page": "152",
          "parenthetical": "\"The question whether a [federal] statute creates a [private] cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/444/0011-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "429 S.E.2d 570",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1993,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "333 N.C. 574",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2548849,
        2548625,
        2547510,
        2549370,
        2548670
      ],
      "year": 1993,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/333/0574-02",
        "/nc/333/0574-01",
        "/nc/333/0574-05",
        "/nc/333/0574-03",
        "/nc/333/0574-04"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "424 S.E.2d 691",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "108 N.C. App. 616",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8525173
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/108/0616-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "331 S.E.2d 677",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1985,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "holding that \"Chapter 95 . . . contains no right of private action\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "314 N.C. 90",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4696461
      ],
      "year": 1985,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "holding that \"Chapter 95 . . . contains no right of private action\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/314/0090-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "454 S.E.2d 225",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "holding that section 42-25.9, which provides that \"in any action brought by a tenant. . . under this Article, the landlord shall be liable to the tenant,\" allows a private cause of action"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "339 N.C. 717",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2557296
      ],
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "holding that section 42-25.9, which provides that \"in any action brought by a tenant. . . under this Article, the landlord shall be liable to the tenant,\" allows a private cause of action"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/339/0717-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "214 N.W.2d 346",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        314173
      ],
      "year": 1974,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "349",
          "parenthetical": "\"inherently dangerous condition\" exception"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/minn/298/0205-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "611 A.2d 845",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "A.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        7939041
      ],
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "849",
          "parenthetical": "\"egregious conduct\" exception"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/a2d/611/0845-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "502 S.E.2d 836",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "holding that breach of a statutory duty requiring workplace inspections does not give rise to a cause of action against the municipality where the statute does not provide a private cause of action"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "348 N.C. 79",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1659814
      ],
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "holding that breach of a statutory duty requiring workplace inspections does not give rise to a cause of action against the municipality where the statute does not provide a private cause of action"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/348/0079-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "495 S.E.2d 711",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "714",
          "parenthetical": "holding that breach of a statutory duty requiring workplace inspections does not give rise to a cause of action against the municipality where the statute does not provide a private cause of action"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "347 N.C. 473",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        551270
      ],
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "482"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/347/0473-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "499 S.E.2d 747",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "751"
        },
        {
          "page": "75, n.2",
          "parenthetical": "noting that most jurisdictions refer to either \"special duty\" or \"special relationship\" as one exception"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "348 N.C. 192",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1659768
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "199"
        },
        {
          "page": "197, n.2"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/348/0192-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "412 S.E.2d 72",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1991,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "330 N.C. 441",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2510175,
        2511623,
        2511756,
        2510714,
        2509663
      ],
      "year": 1991,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/330/0441-04",
        "/nc/330/0441-03",
        "/nc/330/0441-02",
        "/nc/330/0441-01",
        "/nc/330/0441-05"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "407 S.E.2d 611",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "616"
        },
        {
          "page": "616"
        },
        {
          "page": "616",
          "parenthetical": "holding, without specifically addressing the evident high risk, that even where the police department allegedly had \"actual knowledge of imminent danger from an identified individual at an identified location,\" the public duty doctrine required dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligence claims"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "104 N.C. App. 29",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8519999
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "37"
        },
        {
          "page": "38"
        },
        {
          "page": "38-39"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/104/0029-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "462 S.E.2d 508",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1995,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "341 N.C. 647",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        793231,
        793236,
        793046,
        793239,
        793240
      ],
      "year": 1995,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/341/0647-03",
        "/nc/341/0647-01",
        "/nc/341/0647-02",
        "/nc/341/0647-05",
        "/nc/341/0647-04"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "457 S.E.2d 902",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "909"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "119 N.C. App. 44",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11913553
      ],
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "56"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/119/0044-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "348 N.C. 695",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1659852,
        1659916,
        1659953,
        1659893,
        1659769
      ],
      "year": 1998,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/348/0695-04",
        "/nc/348/0695-01",
        "/nc/348/0695-03",
        "/nc/348/0695-05",
        "/nc/348/0695-02"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "502 S.E.2d 1",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "5"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "129 N.C. App. 576",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11651636
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "584"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/129/0576-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "413 S.E.2d 550",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1992,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "330 N.C. 854",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2508528
      ],
      "year": 1992,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/330/0854-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "240 N.E.2d 860",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1968,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "860-61"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "410 S.E.2d 897",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "901-02",
          "parenthetical": "holding that sheriff had no liability for failure to furnish police protection to plaintiff"
        },
        {
          "page": "902"
        },
        {
          "page": "902"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "330 N.C. 363",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2509910
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "371",
          "parenthetical": "holding that sheriff had no liability for failure to furnish police protection to plaintiff"
        },
        {
          "page": "371"
        },
        {
          "page": "371"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/330/0363-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "447 S.E.2d 387",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1994,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "336 N.C. 603",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2534058,
        2535023,
        2535157,
        2538871,
        2539514
      ],
      "year": 1994,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/336/0603-05",
        "/nc/336/0603-04",
        "/nc/336/0603-02",
        "/nc/336/0603-03",
        "/nc/336/0603-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "442 S.E.2d 75",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "79"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "114 N.C. App. 400",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8527625
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "406"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/114/0400-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "463 S.E.2d 242",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1995,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "342 N.C. 194",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        796110,
        795921,
        796084,
        796057,
        795899
      ],
      "year": 1995,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/342/0194-04",
        "/nc/342/0194-05",
        "/nc/342/0194-01",
        "/nc/342/0194-03",
        "/nc/342/0194-02"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "459 S.E.2d 71",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "73"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "119 N.C. App. 515",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11916250
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "518"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/119/0515-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 827,
    "char_count": 15226,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.773,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.008408835727498e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9060783080403529
    },
    "sha256": "f3bdbca22299465a019f7bfb710f3cbe6ea3370fbb3ad6bfe7b3c8d942197b22",
    "simhash": "1:05349c7934a93c5e",
    "word_count": 2435
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:15.604309+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges JOHN and HUNTER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "MARGARET VANASEK, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY VANASEK, and MARGARET VANASEK, Plaintiff v. DUKE POWER COMPANY, CITY OF CHARLOTTE, J.M. BUTLER, R.C. STAHNKE, UNKNOWN OFFICER #1, UNKNOWN FIREMAN #1, and UNKNOWN FIREMAN #2, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nMargaret Vanasek (Plaintiff), both individually and as the admin-istratrix of the estate of Jeffrey Vanasek (Decedent), appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders dismissing her complaint against the City of Charlotte, J.M. Butler, R.C. Stahnke, Unknown Officer #1, Unknown Fireman #1, and Unknown Fireman #2 (collectively, City Defendants).\nIn April of 1997, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Duke Power Company (Duke Power) and City Defendants, alleging that a power line located at 809 McAlway Road, Charlotte, North Carolina, snapped during an ice storm on Friday, 2 February 1996, leaving a broken line charged with over 7000 volts of electricity dangling a few feet above the ground. Nearby homeowners contacted Charlotte\u2019s police department, and two officers \u201cwere dispatched to the scene and located the broken wire.\u201d The officers had the dispatcher notify Duke Power that the lines were down at that location, and left the scene \u201cwithout providing any type of barrier or visible warning around or near the live wire to protect unsuspecting citizens from accidentally touching the wire.\u201d The fire department responded as well, and two firemen allegedly \u201clocated the downed power line but also left the premises without providing any type of barrier or visible warning around or near the live wire to protect unsuspecting citizens from accidentally touching the wire.\u201d Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that on Monday, 5 February 1996, Decedent, an employee of Time Warner, drove to 809 McAlway Road to repair the cable television lines in that area. Decedent parked his truck near the downed electrical line and while \u201capparently walking to the back of his truck to retrieve his tools, his hand brushed against the wire sending a high voltage electrical current through his body killing him.\u201d\nIn Count I of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that City Defendants negligently failed to properly train its officers and firemen, negligently failed to provide warnings to the public of the downed power line, and negligently abandoned a \u201clive\u201d downed power line. In Count II of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that City Defendants are negligent per se under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-296, a statute requiring municipalities to keep their streets free from dangerous obstructions. Count III of Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the acts of City Defendants were \u201cwillful or wanton or done in total disregard for the rights and safety of others.\u201d\nPursuant to motions filed by City Defendants, the trial court dismissed Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff subsequently voluntarily dismissed her claims against Duke Power and appealed from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of her claims against City Defendants.\nThe issue is whether the public duty doctrine requires the dismissal of Plaintiffs negligence, gross negligence, and/or negligence per se claims.\nThe public duty doctrine provides that a municipality ordinarily acts for the benefit of the general public when exercising its police powers, and therefore cannot be held liable for negligence or gross negligence in performing or failing to perform its duties. Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App. 515, 518, 459 S.E.2d 71, 73 (holding that the municipality and its agents had no liability for allegedly negligent inspections conducted pursuant to the building code), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 194, 463 S.E.2d 242 (1995); Clark v. Red Bird Cab Co., 114 N.C. App. 400, 406, 442 S.E.2d 75, 79 (holding that the public duty doctrine bars claims of gross negligence, recklessness, and wilful and wanton conduct, and only ceases to apply \u201cwhere the conduct complained of rises to the level of an intentional tort\u201d), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 603, 447 S.E.2d 387 (1994). The public duty doctrine is based on the following premise:\nThe amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed. For the courts to proclaim a . . . general duty of protection in the law of tort... could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources ... should be allocated ....\nBraswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 371, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901-02 (1991) (holding that sheriff had no liability for failure to furnish police protection to plaintiff) (quoting Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61 (N.Y. 1968)), reh\u2019g denied, 330 N.C. 854, 413 S.E.2d 550 (1992). If a negligence claim survives application of the public duty doctrine, the municipality may nonetheless be insulated from liability by virtue of governmental immunity. See Stafford v. Barker, 129 N.C. App. 576, 584, 502 S.E.2d 1, 5 (holding that a municipality\u2019s waiver of governmental immunity does not affect the public duty doctrine inquiry), disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 695, - S.E.2d -(1998).\nOur courts recognize a \u201cnarrowly applied\u201d exception to the public duty doctrine where there is a \u201cspecial duty\u201d between the municipality and \u201ca particular individual.\u201d Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 56, 457 S.E.2d 902, 909, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 647, 462 S.E.2d 508 (1995). A \u201cspecial duty\u201d exists where the municipality \u201c \u2018promises] protection to an individual, the protection is not forthcoming, and the individual\u2019s reliance on the promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902); see Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App. 29, 37, 407 S.E.2d 611, 616 (holding that the public duty doctrine barred claims for negligence where \u201cneither the sheriff nor the deputies gave any advice to the victims on which they relied to their detriment but instead misinformed relatives of the perpetrator of the crimes\u201d (emphasis added)), disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991). A \u201cspecial duty\u201d may also exist by virtue of a \u201cspecial relationship,\u201d such as that between \u201ca state\u2019s witness or informant . . . [and] law enforcement officers.\u201d Hunt v. N.C. Dept. of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 199, 499 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1998). A \u201cspecial relationship\u201d depends on \u201crepresentations or conduct by the police which cause the victim(s) to detrimentally rely on the police such that the risk of harm as the result of police negligence is something more than that to which the victim was already exposed.\u201d Hull, 104 N.C. App. at 38, 407 S.E.2d at 616. Finally, a \u201cspecial duty\u201d may be created by statute; provided there is an express statutory provision vesting individual claimants with a private cause of action for violations of the statute. See Stone v. N.C. Dept. of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 482, 495 S.E.2d 711, 714, reh\u2019g denied, 348 N.C. 79, 502 S.E.2d 836, and cert. denied, U.S. -, - L. Ed. 2d \u2014 (1998) (holding that breach of a statutory duty requiring workplace inspections does not give rise to a cause of action against the municipality where the statute does not provide a private cause of action); Hunt, 348 N.C. 192, 499 S.E.2d 747 (holding that breach of a regulatory duty requiring go-kart inspections does not give rise to a cause of action against the municipality where the regulation does not provide a private cause of action).\nWe note that a minority of jurisdictions have created an additional exception to the public duty doctrine for \u201chigh risk\u201d situations, allowing a negligence claim to proceed where the plaintiff shows that \u201clocal government officials knew or should have known the plaintiff or members of his class would be exposed to an unusually high risk if care was not taken by local government personnel, even without proof of reliance by the plaintiff.\u201d 2 Sandra M. Stevenson, Antieau on Local Government Law \u00a7 35.06[3] (2d ed. 1998); see, e.g., Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992) (\u201cegregious conduct\u201d exception); Hansen v. City of St. Paul, 214 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 1974) (\u201cinherently dangerous condition\u201d exception). North Carolina courts, however, have not excepted \u201chigh risk\u201d situations from the public duty doctrine. See Hull, 104 N.C. App. at 38-39, 407 S.E.2d at 616 (holding, without specifically addressing the evident high risk, that even where the police department allegedly had \u201cactual knowledge of imminent danger from an identified individual at an identified location,\u201d the public duty doctrine required dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims). Indeed, the creation of any public duty doctrine exceptions beyond those specifically recognized by our Supreme Court is a matter better left to that Court or to our General Assembly.\nIn this case, Plaintiffs allegations involve the exercise of City Defendants\u2019 police powers; therefore, the public duty doctrine is implicated. Plaintiff does not allege any intentional misconduct on the part of City Defendants which would survive application of the public duty doctrine. Instead, Plaintiff contends that her negligence claims fall within the exception to the public duty doctrine because City Defendants owed Decedent a \u201cspecial duty.\u201d We disagree.\nThere is no allegation in the complaint that City Defendants made a promise to Decedent on which he relied, or that Decedent had any \u201cspecial relationship\u201d with City Defendants. Plaintiffs contention that the downed power line constituted an \u201cultrahazardous circumstance\u201d is immaterial, because North Carolina does not recognize a \u201chigh risk\u201d exception to the public duty doctrine. Although Plaintiff is correct that cities have a statutorily imposed \u201cduty to keep the public streets, sidewalks, alleys, and bridges open for travel and free from unnecessary obstructions,\u201d see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-296(a)(2) (1994), fire chiefs have a statutorily imposed duty to \u201cseek out and have corrected all places and conditions dangerous to the safety of the city and its citizens from fire,\u201d see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-292 (1994), and Charlotte\u2019s ordinances impose a duty on Charlotte\u2019s fire department to carry out its \u201cmission [of] minimizing] the risk of fire and other hazards to the life and property of the citizens of Charlotte . . . [by] providing] effective fire prevention,\u201d see Charlotte, N.C., Code \u00a7 8-1 (1998), these provisions do not impose a \u201cspecial duty\u201d on City Defendants. Even assuming City Defendants breached these provisions, each imposes a general duty to the public at large and none provide a private cause of action for individual claimants. We must therefore conclude that City Defendants owed Decedent no \u201cspecial duty.\u201d\nAccordingly, as Plaintiffs allegations do not bring her claims of negligence, gross negligence, or negligence per se within the recognized \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception to the public duty doctrine, the trial court properly dismissed Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiffs complaint.\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHN and HUNTER concur.\n. Although our cases have discussed a \u201cspecial relationship\u201d as a separate exception to the public duty doctrine, see Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902, the \u201cspecial relationship\u201d exception is actually a subset of the \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception, 2 Sandra M. Stevenson, Antieau on Local Government Law \u00a7 35.06[3] (2d ed. 1998) (listing \u201cspecial relationship\u201d as a subcategory of the \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception). In other words, a \u201cspecial relationship\u201d is one basis for showing the existence of a \u201cspecial duty.\u201d See Hunt, 348 N.C. at 197, n.2, 499 S.E.2d at 75, n.2 (noting that most jurisdictions refer to either \u201cspecial duty\u201d or \u201cspecial relationship\u201d as one exception).\n. Our caselaw generally holds that a statute allows for a private cause of action only where the legislature has expressly provided a private cause of action within the statute. See, e.g., Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 454 S.E.2d 225 (1995) (holding that section 42-25.9, which provides that \u201cin any action brought by a tenant. . . under this Article, the landlord shall be liable to the tenant,\u201d allows a private cause of action); Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985) (holding that \u201cChapter 95 . . . contains no right of private action\u201d); Clinton v. Wake County Bd. of Education, 108 N.C. App. 616, 424 S.E.2d 691 (holding that section 115C-326(b) \u201conly. contemplates the possibility of a suit against an employee\u201d and therefore contains \u201cno independent right of action against a school board\u201d), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 574, 429 S.E.2d 570 (1993). Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 62 L. Ed. 2d 146, 152 (1979) (\u201cThe question whether a [federal] statute creates a [private] cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction.\u201d); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26, 36 (1975) (listing relevant factors for determining \u201cwhether a private remedy is implicit in a [federal] statute not expressly providing one\u201d).\n. We acknowledge the existence of a long line of cases allowing individual plaintiffs to proceed with negligence suits against a municipality pursuant to section 160A-296(a)(2). See, e.g., Clark v. Scheld, 253 N.C. 732, 117 S.E.2d 838 (1961); Cooper v. Town of Southern Pines, 58 N.C. App. 170, 293 S.E.2d 235 (1982). The public duty doctrine was neither raised nor addressed in those cases, however, and, in any event, we are bound by the Supreme Court\u2019s recent holding in Stone. See Mahoney v. Ronnie\u2019s Road Service, 122 N.C. App. 150, 153, 468 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1996), aff\u2019d per curiam, 345 N.C. 631, 481 S.E.2d 85 (1997) (noting that this Court is bound by the holdings of our Supreme Court).\n. We do not address Plaintiff\u2019s additional contention that any \u201cspecial duty\u201d owed to the homeowners who called the police department would also provide an exception for guests of those homeowners, because Plaintiff\u2019s complaint does not allege that Decedent was a guest of anyone to whom a \u201cspecial duty\u201d may have been owed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GREENE, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "DeVore, Acton, & Stafford, PA, by Fred W. DeVore, III, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by F. Lane Williamson, for defendant-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MARGARET VANASEK, Administratrix of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY VANASEK, and MARGARET VANASEK, Plaintiff v. DUKE POWER COMPANY, CITY OF CHARLOTTE, J.M. BUTLER, R.C. STAHNKE, UNKNOWN OFFICER #1, UNKNOWN FIREMAN #1, and UNKNOWN FIREMAN #2, Defendants\nNo. COA98-607\n(Filed 16 February 1999)\nCities and Towns\u2014 public duty doctrine \u2014 dangling power line \u2014 police and fire officers \u2014 no special duty\nThe trial court properly granted a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and summary judgment for the City of Charlotte and its police officers and firemen on the public duty doctrine in a negligence action arising from a dangling live power line after an ice storm. There is no allegation in the complaint that the City defendants made a promise to decedent on which he relied, or that decedent had any special relationship with the City defendants. Plaintiff\u2019s contention that the downed power line constituted an ultrahazardous circumstance is immaterial, because North Carolina does not recognize a high risk exception to the public duty doctrine.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order filed 30 June 1997 by Judge Ronald K. Payne and from order filed 8 January 1998 by Judge Raymond A. Warren in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 1999.\nDeVore, Acton, & Stafford, PA, by Fred W. DeVore, III, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by F. Lane Williamson, for defendant-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0335-01",
  "first_page_order": 369,
  "last_page_order": 375
}
