{ "id": 11236803, "name": "GLORIA ANN EVANS, Plaintiff v. JUDITH R. COWAN, Individually and in her official capacity as Director of Student Health Services, UNC-CH; BRUCE VUKOSON, Individually and in his official capacity as Director of the AfterHours Program at Student Health Services, UNC-CH; and JANE M. HOGAN, Individually and in her official capacity as Associate Director of Student Health Services, UNC-CH; Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Evans v. Cowan", "decision_date": "1999-01-05", "docket_number": "No. COA97-781", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "11", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505409, 2504968, 2504747, 2505141, 2504699 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0345-01", "/nc/332/0345-02", "/nc/332/0345-05", "/nc/332/0345-04", "/nc/332/0345-03" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-282, 284" }, { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "\"the causal nexus between protected activity and retaliatory discharge must be something more than speculation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314074 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501-02, 507-09" }, { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "959 F. Supp. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 883378 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "plaintiffs comments to supervisors at public academy concerning alleged race and sex discrimination in discharge of certain cadets did not constitute protected speech when plaintiff simply approached supervisors with verbal complaints" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/959/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "no violation of First Amendment rights where plaintiffs \"criticism not based on public-spirited concern but more narrowly focused on his own personal work and personal displeasure with internal policies\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520920 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02", "parenthetical": "no violation of First Amendment rights where plaintiffs \"criticism not based on public-spirited concern but more narrowly focused on his own personal work and personal displeasure with internal policies\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736704, 4734882, 4738767, 4739771, 4732061 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0507-03", "/nc/318/0507-02", "/nc/318/0507-01", "/nc/318/0507-05", "/nc/318/0507-04" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523825 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 F.2d 687", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10548138 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "\"matters of public concern [for First Amendment] purposes must relate to wrongdoing or a breach of trust, not ordinary matters of internal . . . policy\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/801/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 F.2d 868", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 593075 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877-78" }, { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "report dealing with police department released by employee not matter of public concern because content of report did not involve or allege illegal activity, corruption, abuse of power, waste or discrimination" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/745/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522673 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525-26" }, { "page": "525-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 U.S. 138", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11298262 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "147-48" }, { "page": "720" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "720" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/461/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 985", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12035616, 12035130, 12035173, 12035238, 12035081, 12035561, 12035342, 12034992, 12035285, 12035509, 12035449, 12035034, 12035391 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0985-13", "/us/506/0985-04", "/us/506/0985-05", "/us/506/0985-06", "/us/506/0985-03", "/us/506/0985-12", "/us/506/0985-08", "/us/506/0985-01", "/us/506/0985-07", "/us/506/0985-11", "/us/506/0985-10", "/us/506/0985-02", "/us/506/0985-09" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "291" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" }, { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739", "parenthetical": "\"[plaintiffs failure to accept a tentative offer of employment elsewhere in return for defendant's gratuitous offer of continued employment for an indefinite period was ... not sufficient additional consideration\" to create implied contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524183 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57-58", "parenthetical": "\"[plaintiffs failure to accept a tentative offer of employment elsewhere in return for defendant's gratuitous offer of continued employment for an indefinite period was ... not sufficient additional consideration\" to create implied contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499683, 2502026, 2498378, 2501299, 2501692 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0119-05", "/nc/331/0119-03", "/nc/331/0119-01", "/nc/331/0119-04", "/nc/331/0119-02" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101", "parenthetical": "no additional consideration where plaintiff failed to show assurances containing \"specific terms or conditions, as in Sides\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523555 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659", "parenthetical": "no additional consideration where plaintiff failed to show assurances containing \"specific terms or conditions, as in Sides\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "change of residence exception to employment-at-will doctrine disapproved, and \"employer's assurances of continued employment [held not to] remove an employment relationship from the at-will presumption\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551232 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "change of residence exception to employment-at-will doctrine disapproved, and \"employer's assurances of continued employment [held not to] remove an employment relationship from the at-will presumption\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allegations (1) that plaintiff was assured by employer \"she could only be discharged for incompetence, [(2) and that] these assurances induced her to move here from Michigan in order to accept the job offer, and [(3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allegations (1) that plaintiff was assured by employer \"she could only be discharged for incompetence, [(2) and that] these assurances induced her to move here from Michigan in order to accept the job offer, and [(3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "allegations (1) that plaintiff was assured by employer \"she could only be discharged for incompetence, [(2) and that] these assurances induced her to move here from Michigan in order to accept the job offer, and [(3" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "allegations (1) that plaintiff was assured by employer \"she could only be discharged for incompetence, [(2" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313316 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "plaintiff's argument failed \"because plaintiff simply had no property right in the position of which he could be constitutionally deprived - under either the North Carolina or federal constitutions\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890238 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "plaintiff's argument failed \"because plaintiff simply had no property right in the position of which he could be constitutionally deprived - under either the North Carolina or federal constitutions\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on Article I, \u00a7 19 claim affirmed where \"plaintiff did not possess a cognizable property interest in continued employment protected by the North Carolina Constitution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11866624 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on Article I, \u00a7 19 claim affirmed where \"plaintiff did not possess a cognizable property interest in continued employment protected by the North Carolina Constitution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "\"plaintiffs complaint fails to state a valid claim under the Law of the Land Clause . . . [because] [h]e simply lacks the requisite property interest in continued employment to trigger the protections afforded by our State Constitution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11799643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" }, { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4748509 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867561 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914135 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525419 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53933 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"an independent determination of plaintiff's constitutional rights under the state constitution is required\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916259 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"an independent determination of plaintiff's constitutional rights under the state constitution is required\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0181-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1235, "char_count": 25313, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6353664158571225e-07, "percentile": 0.8893410388018761 }, "sha256": "80eeaa640482d1fc60f3b22d3359a859e14c955d0eb960a2114c652e44121ec7", "simhash": "1:8911495ecfabe647", "word_count": 3932 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:15.604309+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "GLORIA ANN EVANS, Plaintiff v. JUDITH R. COWAN, Individually and in her official capacity as Director of Student Health Services, UNC-CH; BRUCE VUKOSON, Individually and in his official capacity as Director of the AfterHours Program at Student Health Services, UNC-CH; and JANE M. HOGAN, Individually and in her official capacity as Associate Director of Student Health Services, UNC-CH; Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nPlaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. We affirm the trial court.\nPertinent factual and procedural information includes the following: Defendant Jane Hogan (Dr. Hogan) was awarded a Ph.D. degree in health care administration in 1991 by the University of Pennsylvania. In 1990, she served as a volunteer consultant at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) Student Health Services (SHS). In that capacity, Dr. Hogan contacted plaintiff and suggested employment at SHS to plaintiff. The latter had under consideration a tenure track faculty position at the University of South Carolina School of Nursing, but instead agreed 9 April 1990 to become Associate Director of the AfterHours Program (AfterHours) at SHS. AfterHours provided health services to UNC-CH students during evenings, weekends and holidays.\nPlaintiff joined a task force comprised of defendant Dr. Bruce Vokoson (Dr. Vokoson), Director of AfterHours; Dr. Hogan; defendant Dr. Judith Cowan (Dr. Cowan), Director of SHS; and Jaclyn Jones (Jones), Acting Director of Nursing. The task force was seeking methods of improving the efficiency of SHS. In addition, plaintiffs duties included clinical responsibilities and the task of recruiting and supervising physician extenders, i.e., physician assistants attached to a physician\u2019s medical license, employed in AfterHours.\nThe AfterHours task force met regularly for several months. In December 1990, plaintiff suggested that SHS change its practice of paying \u201cmoonlighting\u201d physicians to provide AfterHours medical care. In plaintiff\u2019s opinion, that service could be more efficiently and economically furnished by full-time nurse practitioners. According to plaintiff, this suggestion made Dr. Vukoson \u201cvisibly angry.\u201d\nIn task force meetings, plaintiff also sought implementation of a comprehensive alcohol policy for SHS, noting \u201cmost of our patients\u2019 problems [are] alcohol-related.\u201d At one meeting, plaintiff also expressed concern that Dr. Hogan had acted as the second R.N. covering a SHS night shift. Plaintiff noted Dr. Hogan was a non-employee acting in a medical capacity at a state institution.\nIn April 1991, Dr. Cowan informed plaintiff that her job responsibilities would be strictly clinical as of 1 July 1991. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff developed pleural pericarditis, an inflammation of the lung tissue and heart covering. Plaintiff informed Jones, her supervisor, that she expected to return to work the week of 5 May 1991. However, because her sick leave was exhausted, plaintiff actually resumed her duties 29 April 1991. On 30 April 1991, Dr. Vukoson telephoned plaintiff\u2019s cardiologist to ascertain if plaintiff was working contrary to her physician\u2019s instructions.\nPlaintiff subsequently received a letter dated 6 May 1991, signed by Jones and Drs. Vukoson and Cowan, described therein as a \u201cFinal Written Warning for personal conduct.\u201d Noting plaintiff\u2019s earlier than anticipated return to work, the correspondence asserted plaintiff\u2019s \u201cinconsistent communications\u201d had resulted in 1) the waste of administrative time expended in procuring coverage for her shifts, 2) inconvenience to staff who had agreed to provide coverage, and 3) dimin-ishment in supervisory and employee relations as a result of the confusion. In addition, plaintiff was relieved of responsibility for the AfterHours schedule. According to plaintiff, the warning communicated by the letter was rescinded 30 August 1991.\nIn May 1991, plaintiff learned at a nursing staff meeting that SHS planned to use \u201cFellows,\u201d physicians who were current recipients of a fellowship in a graduate medical education program, as back-up supervision for nurse practitioners in AfterHours. To be approved to practice in North Carolina, nurse practitioners must work continuously under the supervision of a primary supervising physician (PSP). Believing this new policy would directly conflict with 21 N.C.A.C. 32M.0009(5)(a), plaintiff approached Jones and Dr. Cowan with her concerns. Dr. Cowan contacted the Board of Medical Examiners (the Board) to request clarification of the regulation and obtain advice regarding the proposed practice. Dr. Cowan was informed the physicians in question could properly serve as back-up supervisors. This response was consistent with information Dr. Hogan had sought and received from the Board.\nPlaintiff\u2019s re-certification with the Board as a nurse practitioner came due in June 1991. Dr. Vukoson, as plaintiffs PSP, was required to sign her application for reapproval to practice, and despite some reluctance, he did so. However, by copy of a letter to the Board dated 18 October 1991, Dr. Vukoson advised plaintiff he intended to withdraw as her PSP effective 1 January 1992. Dr. Vukoson indicated this decision was based on his increasing lack of trust in plaintiff and what he perceived as her lack of respect for his medical license.\nIn her deposition, Dr. Cowan related that Dr. Vukoson had communicated to her two instances of plaintiffs failure to follow established protocol in treating students. The first concerned a student with a history of suicide, and the second involved a prescription to a student of a drug not in the treatment protocol and allowing that student to leave SHS while \u201ccomplaining of what could have been a serious reaction with the [drug].\u201d Dr. Cowan also indicated she was aware of a \u201cprofound communication difficulty, such a profound difference in perceptions\u201d between plaintiff and Dr. Vukoson.\nOn 14 November 1991, the UNC-CH Medical Staff (the Staff) passed a resolution (the resolution) under which only physicians serving as full-time employees of the Staff and working in the same section as a physician extender were permitted to serve as the latter\u2019s PSP. This rule in effect prevented any physician other than Dr. Vukoson from acting as plaintiff\u2019s PSP.\nAs a result of the resolution, plaintiff was unable to maintain the necessary medical credentials for her position and was notified she would be discharged as of 6 May 1992. Plaintiff received a pre-termination hearing 24 April 1992 and appealed through the highest available grievance procedure levels. Ultimately, UNC-CH Chancellor Paul Hardin upheld plaintiffs discharge for failure to maintain credentials.\nOn 16 November 1993, plaintiff filed the instant action in Orange County Superior Court, alleging slander, violation of her federal constitutional rights and violation of her rights under Article I, \u00a7\u00a7 1, 12, 14 and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Following removal of the case , by defendants to the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, defendants moved for summary judgment. In an order filed 6 January 1995, the federal court granted summary judgment on the federal constitutional and slander claims and remanded the state constitutional claims brought against defendants in their official capacities to Orange County Superior Court.\nOn 14 February 1995, defendants sought summary judgment from the trial court on plaintiffs state constitutional claims, arguing each was barred by res judicata as being \u201cidentical in all respects to the federal constitutional claims already adjudicated.\u201d Defendants\u2019 motion was allowed, and plaintiff filed timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, this Court reversed the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment and remanded. See Evans v. Cowan, 122 N.C. App. 181, 468 S.E.2d 575 (1996) (\u201can independent determination of plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights under the state constitution is required\u201d). Upon review by our Supreme Court, the ruling of this Court was affirmed per curiam. Evans v. Cowan, 345 N.C. 177, 477 S.E.2d 926 (1996).\nFollowing remand to Orange County Superior Court, defendants again moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted in an order filed 16 April 1997. Plaintiff appeals.\nSummary judgment is properly entered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56; Davis v. Town of Southern Pines, 116 N.C. App. 663, 665, 449 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 648 (1995). The burden is on the movant to show:\n(1) an essential element of plaintiff\u2019s claim is nonexistent; (2)' plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of its claim; or (3) plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense raised in bar of its claim.\nLyles v. City of Charlotte, 120 N.C. App. 96, 99, 461 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 344 N.C. 676, 477 S.E.2d 150 (1996). In assessing whether this burden is met, all inferences are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 319 N.C. 274, 281, 354 S.E.2d 459, 464 (1987).\nBearing these general principles in mind, we first consider plaintiff\u2019s assertion that her termination violated Article I, \u00a7 19 of the North Carolina Constitution (the Law of the Land Clause). The Law of the Land Clause provides that \u201c[n]o person shall be ... in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land,\u201d N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 19, and has generally been held to be equivalent to the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Lorbacher v. Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh, 127 N.C. App. 663, 675, 493 S.E.2d 74, 81 (1997). Given the similarities, a decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Due Process Clause is persuasive, though not controlling, authority for interpretation of the Law of the Land Clause. Id.\nDefendants argue plaintiff was an employee at will with no vested property right in continued employment, and thus failed to show the threshold element of a due process analysis. Plaintiff, apparently recognizing that the weight of authority supports defendants\u2019 position, see, e.g., Lorbacher, 127 N.C. App. at 675, 493 S.E.2d at 81 (\u201cplaintiffs complaint fails to state a valid claim under the Law of the Land Clause . . . [because] [h]e simply lacks the requisite property interest in continued employment to trigger the protections afforded by our State Constitution\u201d); Woods v. City of Wilmington, 125 N.C. App. 226, 234, 480 S.E.2d 429, 434 (1997) (trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to defendant on Article I, \u00a7 19 claim affirmed where \u201cplaintiff did not possess a cognizable property interest in continued employment protected by the North Carolina Constitution\u201d); and Ware v. Fort, 124 N.C. App. 613, 617, 478 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1996) (plaintiff\u2019s argument failed \u201cbecause plaintiff simply had no property right in the position of which he could be constitutionally deprived \u2014 under either the North Carolina or federal constitutions\u201d), nonetheless urges us to\ntake an independent approach to the unique fact situation here, informed by the particularities of North Carolina constitutional jurisprudence, reflecting the unique language, history and policy of the North Carolina Constitution.\nHowever, plaintiff is unable to point us to a case supporting her position, and we agree with defendants that plaintiff must possess a property interest in the employment at issue before the Law of the Land Clause analysis may be undertaken.\nWe consider then whether the requisite property interest is present in the case sub judice. This jurisdiction has long adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine, i.e. \u201c[w]here a contract of employment does not fix a definite term, it is terminable at the will of either party, with or without cause.\u201d Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990) (citations omitted). An employee at will has no property interest by virtue of her employment, though an enforceable interest in continued employment may \u201cbe created by [statute], or by an implied contract.\u201d Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1992) (citations omitted).\nPlaintiff, having accumulated but twenty-five months of service, makes no claim of statutory \u201cpermanent employee status\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-5(c)(l) prior to 1 July 1993. See also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 126-15.1 (1995) (\u201cprobationary employee\u201d is one exempt from state Personnel Act because not \u201ccontinuously employed for the period of time required by G.S. 126-5(c)). However, plaintiff asserts an implied employment contract in that\n[she] was heavily recruited for the position at SHS and lured away from a better paying tenure track position at the University of South Carolina; was promised that she would be able to continue to conduct her research; given a joint appointment for a time certain with the School of Nursing; and assured that while she would be accepting a position as a PE II, her position would be quickly upgraded to a PE III.\nThis Court has previously held that an implied employment contract may arise out of representations and additional consideration proffered at the time of hiring. See Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 345, 328 S.E.2d 818, 828, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985) (allegations (1) that plaintiff was assured by employer \u201cshe could only be discharged for incompetence, [(2) and that] these assurances induced her to move here from Michigan in order to accept the job offer, and [(3)] were part of her employment contract,\u201d sufficient \u201cto remove plaintiffs employment contract from the terminable-at-will rule\u201d for purposes of surviving motion to dismiss breach of contract claim pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1990) for failure to state a claim). However, our Supreme Court has recently cast doubt upon the Sides holding. See Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 334, 493 S.E.2d 420, 424 (1997) (change of residence exception to employment-at-will doctrine disapproved, and \u201cemployer\u2019s assurances of continued employment [held not to] remove an employment relationship from the at-will presumption\u201d).\nIn addition, Sides is readily distinguishable from the instant case. In Sides, the plaintiff was assured individuals in her position could be discharged only for incompetence. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828. Nothing in the record indicates plaintiff herein received any analogous promise. Moreover, the Sides plaintiff moved from Michigan to North Carolina to accept employment. On the other hand, plaintiff acknowledged \u201cthere were some good reasons why it might be convenient\u201d to remain in Chapel Hill as opposed to relocating to South Carolina, because her data set was located in Chapel Hill.\nWe therefore conclude that plaintiff\u2019s assertions she fell outside the category of an at-will employee are unfounded. See Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 659, 412 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1991) (no additional consideration where plaintiff failed to show assurances containing \u201cspecific terms or conditions, as in Sides\u201d), cert. denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992); see also McMurry v. Cochrane Furniture Co., 109 N.C. App. 52, 57-58, 425 S.E.2d 735, 739 (1993) (\u201c[plaintiffs failure to accept a tentative offer of employment elsewhere in return for defendant\u2019s gratuitous offer of continued employment for an indefinite period was ... not sufficient additional consideration\u201d to create implied contract). Accordingly, because plaintiff lacked a property interest in continued employment, the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion on plaintiff\u2019s Law of the Land Clause claim is affirmed.\nTurning to plaintiff\u2019s freedom of speech claim, we note that the North Carolina Constitution proclaims that \u201c[fjreedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained . . . .\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 14. Our Supreme Court has deemed the foregoing section \u201ca direct personal g\u00faarantee of each citizen\u2019s right of freedom of speech.\u201d Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 781, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992). Nonetheless, a citizen asserting abridgement of her state constitutional rights may assert a direct claim thereunder only absent an adequate state remedy. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. The judiciary \u201cmust bow to established claims and remedies where these provide an alternative to the extraordinary exercise of its inherent constitutional power.\u201d Id. at 784, 413 S.E.2d at 291.\nArguing that plaintiff possessed an adequate state remedy precluding her direct constitutional claim, defendants point to what is referred to as our \u201cWhistleblower Act,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 126-84 through 126-88 (1995). In her complaint, plaintiff alleged she was discharged in retaliation for her \u201cgood faith and truthful communications about important health and administrative issues at the Student Health Services,\u201d speech protected by the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiff maintains the Whistleblower Act did not afford an adequate state remedy for this claim. Assuming arguendo plaintiff is correct, we nonetheless hold summary judgment was proper on her freedom of speech claim.\nFor such a claim to be properly advanced, the speech at issue first must involve a matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708, 719 (1983). Second, \u201csuch protected speech or activity [must have been] the \u2018motivating\u2019 or \u2018but for\u2019 cause for [the plaintiff\u2019s] discharge or demotion.\u201d Warren v. New Hanover County Bd. of Education, 104 N.C. App. 522, 525-26, 410 S.E.2d 232, 234 (quoting Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 877-78 (4th Cir. 1984)). Resolution of these issues is a matter of law for the court. Id.\nAs to the question of public concern, the court must look to the content, form and context of the speech involved. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 720; see also Corum, 330 N.C. at 775, 413 S.E.2d at 285. The test is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen about matters of public concern, or as an employee on matters of personal interest. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 720. Moreover, complaints about conditions of employment or internal office affairs generally concern an employee\u2019s self-interest rather than public concern, even though a governmental office may be involved:\nTo presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are public concern would mean that virtually every remark \u2014 and certainly every criticism directed at a public official \u2014 would plant the seed of a constitutional case.... [T]he First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.\nId. at 149, L. Ed. 2d at 721; see also Daniels v. Quinn, 801 F.2d 687, 690 (4th Cir. 1986) (\u201cmatters of public concern [for First Amendment] purposes must relate to wrongdoing or a breach of trust, not ordinary matters of internal . . . policy\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 871 (report dealing with police department released by employee not matter of public concern because content of report did not involve or allege illegal activity, corruption, abuse of power, waste or discrimination); Leiphart v. N. C. School of the Arts, 80 N.C. App. 339, 354, 342 S.E.2d 914, 925 (no violation of First Amendment rights where \u201c[petitioner's speech, his criticism of [department head], was not based on public-spirited concern. Instead, it focused on his own personal displeasure with . . . internal policies\u201d), cert. denied, 318 N.C. 507, 349 S.E.2d 862 (1986); and Pressman v. UNC-Charlotte, 78 N.C. App. 296, 301-02, 337 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1985) (no violation of First Amendment rights where plaintiffs \u201ccriticism not based on public-spirited concern but more narrowly focused on his own personal work and personal displeasure with internal policies\u201d).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiff has asserted her termination was occasioned in retaliation for statements uttered regarding four main topics: (1) her proposal to employ nurse practitioners rather than moonlighting physicians in the AfterHours program; (2) her reservations regarding the use of Fellows as back-up supervisors; (3) her concern directed at Dr. Hogan\u2019s volunteer status and its concomitant liability implications for SHS; and (4) her expression of the need for establishing a protocol for alcohol-related student health issues. Upon careful review of the record, we conclude each of the foregoing related to internal policies and office administration of SHS and did not rise to the level of public concern.\nWe note, for example, that no evidence in the record indicates plaintiff ever voiced her concerns publicly outside the employment setting, which would tend to indicate a public concern. See Godon v. N.C. Crime Control & Public Safety, 959 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (plaintiffs comments to supervisors at public academy concerning alleged race and sex discrimination in discharge of certain cadets did not constitute protected speech when plaintiff simply approached supervisors with verbal complaints); cf. Lenzer v. Flaherty, 106 N.C. App. 496, 501-02, 507-09, 418 S.E.2d 276, 279-282, 284 (plaintiffs speech protected where she reported perceived laxity of employer\u2019s investigation into possible patient mistreatment to State Bureau of Investigation, and where evidence indicated plaintiff\u2019s concerns had some basis in fact and employer sought to keep allegations from being exposed), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 348 (1992). In addition, regarding the use of Fellows as back-up supervisors, all the evidence indicates, plaintiff\u2019s expressed concerns notwithstanding, that the practice was not illegal and was indeed permitted under the applicable regulations. Thus not only was the matter merely indicative of plaintiff\u2019s private concern, but plaintiff\u2019s concerns proved to be unjustified.\nMost significantly, however, assuming arguendo the substance of plaintiff\u2019s comments touched upon public concern, we are unable to conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff\u2019s statements were the motivating, or substantial, factor behind her termination. See Warren, 104 N.C. App. at 525-26, 410 S.E.2d at 234. Dr. Vukoson testified he removed plaintiff from his license because she did not give his license the proper respect. Dr. Cowan related two instances wherein plaintiff failed to follow established protocol in treating students. Dr. Cowan also referenced plaintiffs inability to communicate with Dr. Vukoson and Jones, her supervisors. By contrast, while plaintiffs complaint alleged she was discharged in retaliation for protected speech, there was no forecast of evidence showing her statements were either the motivating or a substantial factor underlying her dismissal. Indeed, in her lengthy deposition, plaintiff simply reiterated her \u201cbelief\u2019 she was terminated in retaliation for expressing her concerns. See Lenzer, 106 N.C. App. at 510, 418 S.E.2d at 284 (\u201cthe causal nexus between protected activity and retaliatory discharge must be something more than speculation\u201d). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing summary judgment against plaintiff on her free speech claim.\nIn sum, for the reasons set forth herein, the order of the trial court granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment is in all respects affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "McSurely Dorosin & Osment, by Alan McSurely, Mark Dorosin and Ashley Osment, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Thomas J. Ziko and Celia Grasty Jones, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GLORIA ANN EVANS, Plaintiff v. JUDITH R. COWAN, Individually and in her official capacity as Director of Student Health Services, UNC-CH; BRUCE VUKOSON, Individually and in his official capacity as Director of the AfterHours Program at Student Health Services, UNC-CH; and JANE M. HOGAN, Individually and in her official capacity as Associate Director of Student Health Services, UNC-CH; Defendants\nNo. COA97-781\n(Filed 5 January 1999)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 State \u2014 Law of the Land Clause\u2014 employment interest \u2014 employment at will\nThe trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendant on a claim under Art. I, \u00a7 19 of the North Carolina Constitution (the Law of the Land Clause) arising from the termination of plaintiff\u2019s employment. Plaintiff must possess a property interest in the employment before the Law of the Land analysis may be undertaken and plaintiffs assertions that she fell outside the category of an at-will employee are unfounded.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 State \u2014 freedom of speech \u2014 public concern \u2014 reason for discharge\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant on plaintiffs free speech claim under the North Carolina Constitution arising from the termination of her employment where, assuming that the Whistleblower Act did not afford an adequate state remedy, plaintiffs statements related to internal policies and office administration and there was no forecast of evidence showing that her statements were either the motivating or a substantial factor underlying her dismissal.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order filed 16 April 1997 by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 February 1998.\nMcSurely Dorosin & Osment, by Alan McSurely, Mark Dorosin and Ashley Osment, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Thomas J. Ziko and Celia Grasty Jones, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 35, "last_page_order": 45 }