{
  "id": 11239042,
  "name": "MARILY S. FLOYD, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. FIRST CITIZENS BANK, Employer, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Floyd v. First Citizens Bank",
  "decision_date": "1999-03-02",
  "docket_number": "No. COA98-560",
  "first_page": "527",
  "last_page": "530",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "132 N.C. App. 527"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "262 S.E.2d 347",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "45 N.C. App. 13",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8547082
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/45/0013-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "225 S.E.2d 336",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "338",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "29 N.C. App. 735",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8557158
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "737-38",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/29/0735-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "312 S.E.2d 651",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "310 N.C. 308",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2403756,
        2395921,
        2403313,
        2394261,
        2401497
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/310/0308-03",
        "/nc/310/0308-01",
        "/nc/310/0308-04",
        "/nc/310/0308-05",
        "/nc/310/0308-02"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "308 S.E.2d 335",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "336",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "64 N.C. App. 695",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8527561
      ],
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "697",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/64/0695-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "345 S.E.2d 374",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "379",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "317 N.C. 179",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4779801
      ],
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "186",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/317/0179-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 403,
    "char_count": 7301,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.762,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.318106840827791e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7891776702039386
    },
    "sha256": "7efe612d26bcf1abdb8c7445087bea6b8b1a061b0a4dec83abc7cc66d40a547a",
    "simhash": "1:64b74d4c3202ac4c",
    "word_count": 1135
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:15.604309+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges EAGLES and MARTIN concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "MARILY S. FLOYD, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. FIRST CITIZENS BANK, Employer, Defendant-Appellant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nPlaintiff was employed by defendant in December 1993 when she slipped and fell while buying bagels for an office Christmas breakfast that her boss had instructed her to coordinate for defendant\u2019s entire city office, including all department heads. Plaintiff suffered a serious back injury as a result of the fall. The Industrial Commission (Commission) found as a fact that plaintiffs injury caused her to be disabled. The Commission concluded as a matter of law that plaintiffs injury arose within the course of her employment and that she was entitled to workers\u2019 compensation disability benefits. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant assigns error to the Commission\u2019s finding of fact that plaintiff\u2019s supervisor instructed her to coordinate the Christmas breakfast. Defendant also assigns error to the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law that plaintiff\u2019s injury arose in the course of her employment and that plaintiff is entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nIn considering an appeal from an award of the Commission,\n[t]he reviewing court\u2019s inquiry is limited to two issues: whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are justified by its findings of fact. When the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, they are binding on the reviewing court in spite of the existence of evidence supporting contrary findings.\nHendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986) (citations omitted).\n\u201cThe Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u201d Thus, the Commission may assign more weight and credibility to certain testimony than other. Moreover, if the evidence before the Commission is capable of supporting two contrary findings, the determination of the Commission is conclusive on appeal.\nDolbow v. Holland Industrial, 64 N.C. App. 695, 697, 308 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1983) (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 651 (1984).\nThe Commission found as a fact that plaintiff \u201cwas instructed\u201d by her supervisor to coordinate the breakfast. Defendant disputes this finding, saying that \u201ccompetent evidence does not exist\u201d to support the finding. We disagree. The transcript of the Commission hearing includes plaintiffs testimony stating, \u201cI was asked to coordinate the breakfast for the main office[.]\u201d Plaintiff testified that because she had been asked to coordinate the event, her attendance was \u201cabsolutely\u201d mandatory. Plaintiff further testified, \u201c[I]t was ... my job to coordinate it and do the breakfast, so I went and got the bagels for the breakfast.\u201d She also stated, \u201c [I]t was my job to coordinate and do this breakfast[.]\u201d Plaintiff testified that her supervisor \u201casked me to coordinate this, and so I followed through with coordinating it and making sure everything was there, and part of that was getting the bagels to the breakfast.\u201d Furthermore, plaintiff\u2019s supervisor, Paul Ford, testified regarding the breakfast that plaintiff \u201cwas asked to do it... to coordinate this event[.]\u201d The Commission had ample competent evidence upon which to base its finding that plaintiffs supervisor instructed her to coordinate the Christmas breakfast.\nDefendant also assigns error to the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law that plaintiff\u2019s injury arose in the course of employment. In Stewart v. Dept. of Corrections, 29 N.C. App. 735, 737-38, 225 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1976) (citations omitted), our Court stated that:\nTo be compensable an accident must arise out of the course and scope of employment. Where the fruit of certain labor accrues either directly or indirectly to the benefit of an employer, employees injured in the course of such work are entitled to compensation under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\nThis result obtains especially where an employee is called to action by some person superior in authority to him.... It appears clear that when a superior directs a subordinate employee to go on an errand or to perform some duty beyond his normal duties, the scope of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act expands to encompass injuries sustained in the course of such labor. Were the rule otherwise, employees would be compelled to determine in each instance and, no doubt at their peril, whether a requested activity was beyond the ambit of the act.\nThe order or request need not be couched in the imperative. It is sufficient for compensation purposes that the suggestion, request or even the employee\u2019s mere perception of what is expected of him under his job classification, serves to motivate undertaking an injury producing activity. So long as ordered to perform by a superior, acts beneficial to the employer which result in injury to performing employees are within the ambit of the act.\nIn the case before us, plaintiff\u2019s injury occurred while plaintiff was engaged in activity directly related to defendant\u2019s request that she coordinate the Christmas breakfast. The Commission did not err in concluding that plaintiff\u2019s injury arose in the course of plaintiff\u2019s employment.\nDefendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits because the facts of this case do not meet the standard set out in Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 22.23 and adopted by this Court in Chilton v. School of Medicine, 45 N.C. App. 13, 262 S.E.2d 347 (1980). Defendant is correct that the facts before us do not meet the standard set out in Chilton. In fact, the two cases are entirely distinguishable, and Chilton is not controlling in this case. In Chilton, the plaintiff, a medical school faculty member, attended a departmental picnic and was injured while playing volleyball. Nothing in Chilton suggests that the plaintiff had been asked to organize the picnic. Here, plaintiff was injured while carrying out a specific request by her supervisor.\nWe have reviewed defendant\u2019s other assignments of error and find them to be without merit.\nAffirmed.\nJudges EAGLES and MARTIN concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "McGEE, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Carruthers & Roth, RA., by Kenneth L. Jones, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Brooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Daniel C. Pope, Jr., and Bambee N. Booher, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MARILY S. FLOYD, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. FIRST CITIZENS BANK, Employer, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA98-560\n(Filed 2 March 1999)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 findings of fact \u2014 evidence sufficient\nIn a workers\u2019 compensation action arising from a back injury suffered when plaintiff fell while buying bagels for an office Christmas breakfast, the Industrial Commission had ample competent evidence upon which to base its finding that plaintiff\u2019s supervisor had instructed her to coordinate the breakfast.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 course of employment \u2014 coordinating Christmas breakfast\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation action by concluding that plaintiffs injury arose in the course of her employment where she fell and injured her back while buying bagels for an office Christmas breakfast. Plaintiff was engaged in an activity directly related to her supervisor\u2019s request that she coordinate the breakfast.\nAppeal by defendant from opinion and award entered 19 February 1998 by the N.C. Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 January 1999.\nCarruthers & Roth, RA., by Kenneth L. Jones, for plaintiff-appellee.\nBrooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Daniel C. Pope, Jr., and Bambee N. Booher, for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0527-01",
  "first_page_order": 561,
  "last_page_order": 564
}
