{ "id": 11239125, "name": "CITY-WIDE ASPHALT PAVING, INC., Plaintiff v. ALAMANCE COUNTY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County", "decision_date": "1999-03-16", "docket_number": "No. COA98-573", "first_page": "533", "last_page": "542", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 N.C. App. 533" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2166877 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/286/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758734 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561018 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567186 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566925 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718547 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566779 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796131, 795974, 795947, 795925, 795897 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0190-03", "/nc/342/0190-01", "/nc/342/0190-05", "/nc/342/0190-02", "/nc/342/0190-04" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d. 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917378 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 795", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549696, 2549262, 2548312, 2548187, 2550014 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0795-04", "/nc/333/0795-05", "/nc/333/0795-01", "/nc/333/0795-02", "/nc/333/0795-03" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525532 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313926 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 U.S. 480", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 333701 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "laches within the term of the statute of limitation is not a defense to action at law" }, { "page": "1565", "parenthetical": "laches within the term of the statute of limitation is not a defense to action at law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/295/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627373 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699-700", "parenthetical": "citing G.S. 1-52(3) (1983); Coppersmith v. Upton, 228 N.C. 545, 548, 46 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1948); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489, 79 L.Ed. 1559, 1565 (1935) (laches within the term of the statute of limitation is not a defense to action at law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525374 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688", "parenthetical": "citing G.S. 1-52(3) (1983); Coppersmith v. Upton, 228 N.C. 545, 548, 46 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1948); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489, 79 L.Ed. 1559, 1565 (1935) (laches within the term of the statute of limitation is not a defense to action at law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53933 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916259 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0181-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 797, "char_count": 20974, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8174648150339744e-07, "percentile": 0.8380894021234443 }, "sha256": "a3f28edd4ac81f387871fa3c31b4dfd5f702fe385dc399e1c406853b8d852361", "simhash": "1:1b4ed2f22429862c", "word_count": 3210 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:15.604309+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and McGEE concur." ], "parties": [ "CITY-WIDE ASPHALT PAVING, INC., Plaintiff v. ALAMANCE COUNTY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nIn its order granting summary judgment, the trial court noted that it had reviewed defendant\u2019s motion and had considered the briefs, pleadings, depositions and affidavits filed by the parties, and having heard argument, had determined that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. On appeal, plaintiff submits arguments on the issues of (I) res judicata and collateral estoppel; (II) laches; (III) the right to bring a private right of action pursuant to G.S. 143-129.2; (IV) sovereign immunity as to plaintiff\u2019s constitutional claims; and (V) arguments based on violation of plaintiff\u2019s state constitutional rights to (A) substantive due process and (B) equal protection. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment because there were disputed issues of material fact and defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nI\nWe first consider whether plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Plaintiff argues that res judicata does not apply because plaintiff\u2019s claims were based on the North Carolina Constitution and the federal court decision was based upon the United States Constitution. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that identical issues were not involved, litigated or determined. Plaintiff asserts that federal due process claims are not identical to state due process claims. Evans v. Cowan, 122 N.C. App. 181, 468 S.E.2d 575, aff\u2019d per curiam, 345 N.C. 177, 477 S.E.2d 926 (1996). Plaintiff also argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because the standard of review for the state constitutional claims is different from the standard of review for the federal constitutional claims.\nDefendant contends that plaintiff\u2019s claim alleging violation of state constitutional rights is barred by collateral estoppel. Defendant argues that Article I, Section 19, the law of the land provision of the North Carolina Constitution, is deemed the same as the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, defendant argues that identical issues here were litigated and determined by the federal court.\nAfter careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of both parties, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s claims are not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. The federal court expressly stated that it \u201cdecline [d] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff\u2019s state law claims,\u201d and dismissed them without prejudice. While the federal court did review federal due process and equal protection claims, this Court has stated that \u201c[o]ur courts . . . when construing provisions of the North Carolina Constitution, are not bound by the opinions of the federal courts \u2018construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of the United States . . .\u2019 \u201d and that \u201can independent determination of plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights under the state constitution is required.\u201d Evans, 122 N.C. App. at 183-84, 468 S.E.2d at 577 (citations omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s state constitutional claims have not been determined and they are not barred by res judi-cata or collateral estoppel.\nII.\nWe next consider whether plaintiffs claims are barred by laches. Plaintiff argues that the laches defense is not available here because it is only available as a defense to an equitable claim and defendant has sought no equitable relief. Plaintiff additionally argues that even if laches was available, the defendant has failed to carry its burden of showing that any alleged delay was unreasonable and prejudicial.\nDefendant argues that this Court can apply laches to bar plaintiff\u2019s action. Defendant contends that while laches was originally an equitable remedy, equity is no longer \u201ca separate field of study\u201d with \u201cseparate chancellors to apply the doctrine\u201d and \u201csuch a rule would be an anachronism now.\u201d Accordingly, defendant argues that laches is a permissible defense to all actions, whether equitable or legal in nature. Defendant asserts that plaintiffs two year delay in filing suit has worked to the prejudice and disadvantage of defendant and there was no excuse for the delay. Due to the length of time and financial loss defendant argues that laches should bar plaintiffs claim.\nLaches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law. Rudisail v. Allison, 108 N.C. App. 684, 688, 424 S.E.2d 696, 699-700 (1993) (citing G.S. 1-52(3) (1983); Coppersmith v. Upton, 228 N.C. 545, 548, 46 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1948); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489, 79 L.Ed. 1559, 1565 (1935) (laches within the term of the statute of limitation is not a defense to action at law); 30A C.J.S. Equity \u00a7 128, at 351-52 (1992)). Plaintiffs claims are legal in nature, not equitable. Accordingly, the defense of laches cannot support summary judgment for defendant.\nIll\nWe next consider whether plaintiff has a private right of action under G.S. 143-129.2. Plaintiff contends that defendant violated G.S. 143-129.2 when it failed to award the contract to plaintiff as the lowest bidder. Plaintiff argues that while the statute does allow a local government to make a contract award to someone other than the lowest bidder, it is allowed only \u201c[u]pon the determination that the selected proposal is more responsive to the Request for Proposals.\u201d Plaintiff argues that defendant has failed to prove that Mace\u2019s proposal was more responsive than plaintiff\u2019s proposal.\nDefendant contends that G.S. 143-129.2 does not provide for a civil cause of action for damages. Additionally, defendant argues that sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine bar plaintiffs claim.\nWhile our research discloses no case law discussing whether there is a private right of action under G.S. 143-129.2, this Court has allowed a similar action under a related statute, G.S. 143-128(b). Kinsey Contracting Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 106 N.C. App. 383, 416 S.E.2d 607 (1992). In Kinsey, this Court affirmed a trial court\u2019s order denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, dissolving plaintiffs temporary restraining order and finding that the award of a contract to build a pumping station to a party who was not the lowest responsible bidder was not an abuse of discretion. Id. However, it is not readily apparent on the face of Kinsey whether the plaintiff in Kinsey sued for damages. Only equitable remedies are mentioned. Therefore, Kinsey is not dispositive on whether a private right of action for damages lies under G.S. 143-129.2.\nHere, plaintiff did not allege that Alamance County had waived its sovereign immunity. \u201cAs required by law, if the plaintiff fails to allege a waiver of immunity . . ., the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against a governmental unit or employee.\u201d Whitaker v. Clark, 109 N.C. App. 379, 384, 427 S.E.2d 142, 145, disc. review denied, cert. denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 31 (1993). Accordingly, we hold that as a matter of law sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs claims for damages asserted for violation of G.S. 143-129.2.\nIV\nWe next consider whether defendant has sovereign immunity as to plaintiffs constitutional claims. Plaintiff relies on Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992) and argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be asserted against a party seeking to remedy violations of its constitutional rights.\nDefendant argues that plaintiffs claim for damages from the alleged violation of the state constitution is barred because plaintiff had an adequate remedy in state law, and in such a situation a direct constitutional claim is not warranted. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289; Barnett v. Karpinos, 119 N.C. App. 719, 728, 460 S.E.2d. 208, 213, disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 190, 463 S.E.2d 232 (1995). Here, defendant contends that if the bid process and awarding of the contract to Mace was illegal, plaintiff could have immediately sued in state court to have the contract declared void or to enjoin performance.\nWe hold that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar plaintiffs equal protection and due process claims. Defendant suggests that plaintiff should have filed suit to enjoin the contract or have it declared void. However, these remedies are equitable in nature and do not provide plaintiff with an avenue to pursue money damages. Plaintiffs direct action against defendant pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution provides plaintiffs only adequate legal remedy. Plaintiffs direct constitutional action against defendant \u201ccompletes his remedies.\u201d Corum, 330 N.C. at 789, 330 S.E.2d at 294. Accordingly, plaintiff is not precluded from pursuing an action directly under the North Carolina Constitution.\nV\nWe next consider plaintiffs state constitutional claims on their merits. Plaintiff contends that violations of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution are measured by the arbitrary and capricious standard. Plaintiff contends that there was an issue of fact as to whether the defendant acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Plaintiff cites the testimony of State Representative Cary Allred, a former Alamance County Commissioner, that defendant was looking for reasons to reject plaintiffs bid and that the whole bid process was \u201ca farce.\u201d Plaintiff argues that this testimony, coupled with the evidence of long time preferential treatment afforded to Mace, raised a factual question of arbitrariness and capriciousness. Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that the defendant\u2019s rejection of the low bid was very unusual, and defendant\u2019s own purchasing director recommended that the bid be accepted. Plaintiff additionally disputes the defendant\u2019s reasons for the bid\u2019s rejection, arguing that defendant was \u201carbitrarily fishing for reasons to deny the contract to plaintiff.\u201d Accordingly, plaintiff argues that there is a contested issue of fact on the issue of whether defendant acted arbitrarily or capriciously and that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nA\nDefendant argues that the traditional test to judge whether government action violated substantive due process is to determine whether the challenged action had \u201ca rational relation to a valid state objective.\u201d In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 101, 221 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1976). Defendant contends that there is no violation of substantive due process \u201cunless [defendant\u2019s] actions were so bad they were not even debatable.\u201d Accordingly, defendant argues that plaintiffs due process claim must fail.\nAfter careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of both parties, we affirm. In regard to plaintiffs state due process allegations, our Supreme Court has stated that it \u201creserve [s] the right to grant relief against unreasonable and arbitrary\u201d government action under the North Carolina Constitution. Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 462, 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985). Whether government action \u201cviolates the law of the land clause \u2018is a question of degree and reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result from it.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting In re Hospital, 282 N.C. 542, 550, 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (1973) (emphasis added)).\nDefendant argues that \u201cwhen the government\u2019s objectives are to guard the health and safety of the citizens and the protection of the environment, the choosing of an agent that is shown to be competent and qualified and financially able to implement the objective is an act related to this objective.\u201d In rejecting plaintiff\u2019s bid, defendant set forth the following specific reasons for denying the contract to plaintiff: (1) Informal investigation had revealed that Carl Buckland, the majority shareholder and operator of plaintiff, had a poor credit rating; (2) plaintiff did not have the employees, equipment or experience necessary to operate the landfill; and (3) Mr. Buckland\u2019s demeanor and conduct at prior Board Meetings raised a concern about his ability to conduct himself in a businesslike manner and with candor on behalf of City-Wide in negotiating and communicating with the Board and other county officials. There is evidence in the record to support the defendant\u2019s concerns. Accordingly, we hold that defendant\u2019s reasons for rejecting plaintiff\u2019s bid, namely concern about whether plaintiff was \u201ccompetent and qualified and financially able\u201d to operate the landfill, were reasonable in relation to the government\u2019s objective to protect the health and safety of its citizens, and its decision to reject plaintiff\u2019s bid was not arbitrary or capricious.\nB\nDefendant next contends that plaintiff\u2019s claim of equal protection must be analyzed \u201caccording to a two-tiered method of analysis.\u201d First, defendant argues that the plaintiff must show that defendant\u2019s action was motivated by an \u201cintentional, purposeful discrimination.\u201d Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 662, 178 S.E.2d 382, 386 (1971) (citations omitted). Defendant argues that plaintiff did not carry its burden of proving \u201cintentional, purposeful discrimination.\u201d Defendant further argues that plaintiff has neither been placed in a suspect class nor claimed infringement of a fundamental right. Accordingly, defendant asserts that the second-tier of analysis applies, and the challenged action must \u201cbear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate government interest.\u201d Texfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980). Defendant argues that \u201cthe proper operation of a landfill has a direct relation to the health of the public and the protection of the environment, and that it is a purpose of government to guard the health of its citizens and to protect the environment. The determination of the [defendant] to choose a properly qualified and adequately financed company to implement its duty to the public is a governmental purpose.\u201d Defendant also contends that it had unlimited discretion in selecting bids and specifically reserved that right in its Request for Proposals.\nWe agree with defendant and hold that since plaintiff has neither been placed in a suspect class nor alleged \u201cintentional, purposeful discrimination,\u201d and the awarding of the contract was not an infringement of a fundamental right, the defendant\u2019s actions pass muster if they have a reasonable basis and are rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 413, 322 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1984). The determination of defendant to choose a properly qualified company to maintain the landfill is a legitimate government purpose. The defendant had concerns about plaintiff\u2019s ability to operate the landfill, concerns supported by evidence in the record. Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s decision to reject plaintiff\u2019s bid bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Plaintiff\u2019s claim of violation of equal protection of the law guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution fails.\nIn conclusion, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s claim for damages based upon G.S. 143-129.2 fails as a matter of law because plaintiff has failed to show that defendant waived its sovereign immunity. We also hold that summary judgment was properly granted for defendant on plaintiff\u2019s state constitutional claim based on substantive due process because defendant\u2019s rejection of plaintiff\u2019s bid was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Finally, we hold that summary judgment was properly granted for defendant on plaintiff\u2019s state constitutional claim based on equal protection of the law because the defendant\u2019s actions were rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN and McGEE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.P., by J. David James, for plaintiff-appellant.", "David I. Smith, Alamance County Attorney, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CITY-WIDE ASPHALT PAVING, INC., Plaintiff v. ALAMANCE COUNTY, Defendant\nNo. COA98-573\n(Filed 16 March 1999)\n1. Judgments\u2014 res judicata \u2014 collateral estoppel \u2014 federal constitutional claims \u2014 federal court decision \u2014 state constitutional claims\nPlaintiff low bidder\u2019s state constitutional claims against defendant county arising from defendant\u2019s award of a landfill contract to another bidder were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel where a federal court decided plaintiff\u2019s federal constitutional claims but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.\n2. Laches\u2014 state constitutional claims \u2014 unavailable defense\nLaches is an equitable defense and is not available as a defense to plaintiff low bidder\u2019s claim that defendant county\u2019s award of a landfill contract to another bidder violated plaintiff\u2019s state due process and equal protection rights.\n3. Public Works\u2014 sovereign immunity \u2014 low bidder \u2014 contract awarded to another \u2014 statutory claim\nSovereign immunity barred plaintiff\u2019s claim against defendant county for damages asserted under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-129.2 based upon defendant\u2019s failure to award a landfill contract to plaintiff as the lowest bidder.\n4. Counties\u2014 sovereign immunity \u2014 state constitutional claims\nSovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff low bidder\u2019s state due process and equal protection claims for money damages against defendant county arising from its award of a landfill contract to a higher bidder.\n5. Public Works\u2014 county\u2019s rejection of low bid \u2014 due process\nDefendant county\u2019s rejection of plaintiffs low bid on a landfill contract was not arbitrary and capricious and did not violate plaintiffs substantive due process rights where defendant\u2019s concerns about whether plaintiff was competent, qualified and financially able to operate the landfill were reasonable in relation to defendant\u2019s objective to protect the health and safety of its citizens.\n6. Public Works\u2014 county\u2019s rejection of low bid \u2014 equal protection\nDefendant county\u2019s rejection of plaintiff\u2019s low bid on a landfill contract did not violate plaintiff\u2019s state equal protection rights because defendant had concerns supported by the evidence about defendant\u2019s ability to operate the landfill, and the decision to reject plaintiffs bid bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 13 March 1998 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 1999.\nThe plaintiff, City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. (\u201cCity-Wide\u201d), is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Alamance County, North Carolina. On 8 October 1993 the defendant, Alamance County, issued a Request for Proposals (\u201cRFP\u201d) to maintain and operate the Alamance County landfill. Plaintiff submitted a proposal on 5 November 1993. Two other companies, Triangle Paving, Inc. (\u201cTriangle\u201d) and Mace Grading Company, Inc. (\u201cMace\u201d), also submitted proposals. Plaintiff\u2019s bid was the only bid in compliance with the RFP. Defendant rejected all of the proposals and on 19 November 1993 issued a new RFP which was virtually identical to the 8 October 1993 RFP.\nOn 13 December 1993 plaintiff submitted a new bid at a reduced price. Triangle and Mace also submitted new proposals, but plaintiff\u2019s proposal was the lowest bid. Wayne Church, defendant\u2019s purchasing agent, recommended to the defendant that plaintiff\u2019s proposal be accepted. However, on 3 January 1994, the Alamance County Board of Commissioners voted to award the contract to Mace.\nOn 14 November 1996 plaintiff filed the complaint in this action alleging that defendant had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in awarding the contract to Mace, depriving plaintiff of its right to substantive due process of law and denying plaintiff equal protection of the laws under the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiff also alleged that \u201c[defendant violated the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-129.2 in awarding the contract to Mace\u201d because \u201c[t]he proposal submitted by Mace was not more responsive to the defendant\u2019s Request for Proposals than was the proposal submitted by plaintiff, and therefore defendant should have awarded the contract to plaintiff rather than Mace.\u201d\nThe action was stayed by the Alamance County Superior Court pending the resolution of City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, No. 2:96CV0066 in federal court by a consent order dated 9 December 1996. Plaintiff had filed the federal action 23 January 1996 alleging claims based on defendant\u2019s award of the contract to operate the landfill to Mace. Defendant alleged violation of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions as well as a violation of G.S. 143-129.2. On 25 March 1997 summary judgment was granted to defendant in the federal action. However, the federal court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s state law claims without prejudice. On 16 May 1997 plaintiff moved to lift the stay in this action. On 20 May 1997 an order lifting the stay was entered with defendant\u2019s consent.\nOn 22 January 1998 defendant moved for summary judgment. On 13 March 1998 the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.\nSmith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.P., by J. David James, for plaintiff-appellant.\nDavid I. Smith, Alamance County Attorney, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0533-01", "first_page_order": 567, "last_page_order": 576 }