{ "id": 11239308, "name": "RICKY ADAM RIDENHOUR, Plaintiff-Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION and CHET GURSKI, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Ridenhour v. International Business Machines Corp.", "decision_date": "1999-03-16", "docket_number": "No. COA98-361", "first_page": "563", "last_page": "569", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 N.C. App. 563" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524570 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651968 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139651, 139476, 139417, 139579, 139454 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0547-02", "/nc/346/0547-01", "/nc/346/0547-03", "/nc/346/0547-05", "/nc/346/0547-04" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710155 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discharging an employee for refusing to falsify driver records to show compliance with federal transportation regulations offends public policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488329 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discharging an employee for refusing to falsify driver records to show compliance with federal transportation regulations offends public policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12112", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "Americans with Disabilities Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 623", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "Age Discrimination Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551075, 551197 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0586-02", "/nc/347/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551232 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917804 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545924, 2545002, 2547716, 2545701 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0348-02", "/nc/333/0348-01", "/nc/333/0348-04", "/nc/333/0348-03" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527872 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "defendant son took advantage of relationship of trust to obtain deed to property from his mother" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599905 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "defendant son took advantage of relationship of trust to obtain deed to property from his mother" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704", "parenthetical": "defendant husband took advantage of relationship with wife to obtain shares of stock as part of a separation agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559944 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "defendant husband took advantage of relationship with wife to obtain shares of stock as part of a separation agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678-79", "parenthetical": "defendant used position of trust and confidence to take advantage of his ill brother and purchase his business at a price below market value" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563828 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84", "parenthetical": "defendant used position of trust and confidence to take advantage of his ill brother and purchase his business at a price below market value" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "224" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139442 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521231 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570116 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0451-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 786, "char_count": 15630, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.369558948233056e-07, "percentile": 0.8757358054465724 }, "sha256": "e9a4f4991951f2eeabf7733fdc7a72bd0e92f077c0da9cc3d37cea8c5ab75803", "simhash": "1:4fa174a86c6daedd", "word_count": 2458 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:15.604309+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and SMITH concur." ], "parties": [ "RICKY ADAM RIDENHOUR, Plaintiff-Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION and CHET GURSKI, Defendants-Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nPlaintiff was employed as a machinist with International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) at its facility in Charlotte, North Carolina from December 1989 until December 4, 1991. In March 1990, plaintiff learned that IBM was renegotiating their contract with Atlantic Design Company (ADC), a company where plaintiff had previously worked. Plaintiff informed his manager that he had sensitive information that would be helpful to IBM in their negotiations. He asked for anonymity and was given assurances that his identity would be kept confidential. Plaintiff disclosed that ADC had contracted to manufacture cards for IBM by hand, was actually manufacturing the cards by machine on off shifts, and was billing IBM as if the cards were done by hand. Plaintiff referred to the jobs as \u201ccheat jobs\u201d and stated they involved millions of dollars in fraud.\nPlaintiff related the same information to numerous IBM officials and requested anonymity from each, explaining that the ADC managers involved in the fraud were unsavory characters and he feared for his safety. At one point during the investigation, plaintiff met with a representative of ADC\u2019s parent company and was introduced to him by name by an IBM manager. Plaintiff claims this was a breach of the manager\u2019s promise to maintain his anonymity and after the introduction plaintiff became fearful for his life, became nervous, could not eat, and developed severe stomach and back pains.\nAs a result of plaintiffs information regarding the fraud of ADC, IBM recovered $1,250,000.00 from ADC. Plaintiff applied for IBM\u2019s national suggestion award and on 15 June 1991, he received the maximum award of $150,000.00. The award was presented in the presence of four IBM managers, an act which plaintiff contends also breached IBM\u2019s commitment to confidentiality. However, defendants claim the application for the award made clear that such an application and award could not be kept confidential.\nPlaintiff further claims he experienced on-the-job retaliation after he received the suggestion award. Retaliatory acts included being removed from his regular job and used as an extra, being assigned to the worst machines to assure a decrease in production numbers, being given bad appraisals and bypassed for promotion, and ultimately being terminated on 4 December 1991. Defendants claim that IBM terminated plaintiff\u2019s employment after plaintiff left work on 23 November 1991 without permission, had six days of unexcused absences, failed to follow IBM\u2019s call-in procedures, and failed to respond to his supervisor\u2019s requests for an explanation for his absence.\nOn 15 December 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint against IBM and several IBM employees including Chet Gurski, IBM\u2019s plant manager, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. An amended complaint added the claim of constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty. During discovery, two defendants were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and one was dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The remaining defendants\u2019 (Gurski and IBM) motion for summary judgment was denied and the case was tried before a jury on 27 January 1997. After the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to all claims against Gurski and as to the constructive fraud claim against IBM. A jury rendered a verdict against the plaintiff on his remaining claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against IBM. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff first contends the trial court committed reversible error in granting defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff\u2019s claim for constructive fraud based on a breach of fiduciary duty. Upon defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Farmer v. Chaney, 292 N.C. 451, 452, 233 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1977). However, if plaintiff fails to present evidence of each element of his claim for relief, the claim will not survive a directed verdict motion. Felts v. Liberty Emergency Service, 97 N.C. App. 381, 383, 388 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1990).\nIn order to withstand defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict, plaintiff had the burden of presenting evidence to support each element of his constructive fraud claim. In stating a cause of action for constructive fraud, plaintiff must allege facts and circumstances which created the relation of trust and confidence and \u201cwhich led up to and surrounded the consummation of the transaction in which defendant is alleged to have taken advantage of his position of trust to the hurt of plaintiff.\u201d Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 346 N.C. 650, 666, 488 S.E.2d 215, 224 (1997) (citation omitted). \u201cImplicit in the requirement that a defendant \u2018[take] advantage of his position of trust to the hurt of plaintiff is the notion that the defendant must seek his own advantage in the transaction; that is, the defendant must seek to benefit himself.\u201d Id. \u201cThe requirement of a benefit to defendant follows logically from the requirement that a defendant harm a plaintiff by taking advantage of their relationship of trust and confidence . . . [and is] implicit throughout the cases allowing constructive fraud claims.\u201d Id. at 667, 488 S.E.2d at 224. See, e.g., Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 84, 273 S.E.2d 674, 678-79 (1981) (defendant used position of trust and confidence to take advantage of his ill brother and purchase his business at a price below market value); Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 193, 179 S.E.2d 697, 704 (1971) (defendant husband took advantage of relationship with wife to obtain shares of stock as part of a separation agreement); Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 115, 63 S.E.2d 202, 207 (1951) (defendant son took advantage of relationship of trust to obtain deed to property from his mother).\nThe parties dispute whether plaintiffs forecast of evidence tends to show there was a relationship of trust and confidence between defendants and plaintiff sufficient to support a claim for constructive fraud. We need not decide this issue, however, because we find that although plaintiff claims IBM benefitted from a breach of its fiduciary duty, the benefits plaintiff claims were received are insufficient to support a claim of constructive fraud. Plaintiff first claims that IBM received the monetary benefit of $1,250,000.00 recouped from ADC. However, this money was recovered because of the fraud by ADC and there is no evidence the recovery of the funds relates to any breach of a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff by IBM. Plaintiff also claims that IBM benefitted by having a continued business relationship with ADC. Again, we fail to see how this continued relationship was predicated on a breach of fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff. In addition, our Supreme Court has stated that the benefit of a continued relationship \u201cis insufficient to establish the benefit required for a claim of constructive fraud.\u201d Barger, 346 N.C. at 667, 488 S.E.2d at 224.\nThe final benefit plaintiff claims IBM received is the retaliatory firing of plaintiff. It has been held that \u201c[e]ither party to an employment-at-will contract can terminate the contract at will for no reason at all, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason.\u201d Tompkins v. Allen, 107 N.C. App. 620, 622, 421 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1992), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 348, 426 S.E.2d 713 (1993) (citation omitted). \u201cHowever, this doctrine is not without limits and a valid claim for relief exists for wrongful discharge of an employee at will if the contract is terminated for an unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes public policy.\u201d Id. (citations omitted). The jury either found that plaintiff\u2019s conduct of reporting the fraud by ADC was not protected by law or that plaintiffs conduct was not a substantial factor in IBM\u2019s decision to terminate plaintiff. The benefit of the right to terminate plaintiff without cause was a right IBM already possessed, and therefore IBM could not have received that benefit from breaching a fiduciary duty. We find the trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict on plaintiff\u2019s claim for constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty.\nPlaintiff next contends the trial court committed reversible error in its instructions to the jury on plaintiff\u2019s claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and in failing to give plaintiff\u2019s proposed special jury instructions regarding that claim. Plaintiff requested the trial court to instruct the jury, in part, that no employee may be terminated from his employment in violation of public policy. The court denied plaintiff\u2019s request and, instead, instructed the jury from the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions \u2014 Civil 640.20 (1991). \u201cIt is well settled [that] the trial court must give the instructions requested, at least in substance, if they are proper and supported by evidence. However, the trial court may exercise discretion to refuse instructions based on erroneous statements of the law.\u201d Roberts v. Young, 120 N.C. App. 720, 726, 464 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1995) (citation omitted).\nHere, the trial court determined, in its discretion, that the evidence did not support plaintiff\u2019s allegation that he was discharged for a purpose contravening public policy and instructed the jury to determine whether the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged for \u201chis participation in conduct protected by law.\u201d The jury rejected this remaining contention.\nAs previously stated, North Carolina is an employment-at-will state. Our Supreme Court \u201chas repeatedly held that in the absence of a contractual agreement between an employer and an employee establishing a definite term of employment, the relationship is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance of either party.\u201d Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997), reh\u2019g denied, 347 N.C. 586, 502 S.E.2d 594 (1998). Limited exceptions have been adopted to this bright-line rule.\nFirst, as stated above, parties can remove the at-will presumption by specifying a definite period of employment contractually. Second, federal and state statutes have created exceptions prohibiting employers from discharging employees based on impermissible considerations such as the employee\u2019s age, race, sex, religion, national origin, or disability, or in retaliation for filing certain claims against the employer. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 623(a) (1988) (Age Discrimination Act); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-2a (1988) (Equal Employment Opportunities Act); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12112(a) (Supp. 1988) (Americans with Disabilities Act); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-241 (1993) (prohibiting discharge in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation, OSHA, and similar claims). Finally, this Court has recognized a public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. See . . . Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989) (discharging an employee for refusing to falsify driver records to show compliance with federal transportation regulations offends public policy).\nId. at 331-32, 493 S.E.2d at 422.\nPublic policy is defined as \u201cthe principle of law that holds no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.\u201d Johnson v. Mayo Yarns, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 292, 296, 484 S.E.2d 840, 842-43, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 547, 488 S.E.2d 802 (1997). There is no specific list of what actions constitute a violation of public policy. Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors Inc., 129 N.C. App. 624, 628, 501 S.E.2d 83, 86 (1998). However, wrongful discharge claims have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1) for refusing to violate the law at the employers request, see Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985), (2) for engaging in a legally protected activity, or (3) based on some activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy, see Garner, supra.\nViewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it appears, as a matter of law, that plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of wrongful discharge under any of these recognized public policy exceptions. First, plaintiffs employer was not engaged in unlawful activity and plaintiffs evidence shows no indication he was asked by his employer to violate any federal or state law or to perform any activity \u201cinjurious to the public or against the public good.\u201d Rather, defendant, IBM, was actually the victim of unlawful activity. Plaintiff, of his own accord, reported the fraudulent activity to IBM and saved his employer well over $1 million dollars for which he was awarded $150,000.00. Second, uncontraverted evidence introduced at trial tended to show that plaintiff was discharged immediately following a lengthy unexcused and unexplained absence from work. Based on the above, we find no violation of public policy. The trial court was justified in refusing to instruct the jury on the public policy exception to North Carolina\u2019s employment-at-will doctrine.\nAs a result of our holdings above, we find it unnecessary to address plaintiffs remaining assignment of error.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN and SMITH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, L.L.P., by Harold L. Kennedy, III, Harvey L. Kennedy, and Annie Brown Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, by Charles E. Johnson and R. Rand Thicker, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICKY ADAM RIDENHOUR, Plaintiff-Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION and CHET GURSKI, Defendants-Appellees\nNo. COA98-361\n(Filed 16 March 1999)\n1. Fraud\u2014 constructive fraud \u2014 breach of fiduciary duty\u2014 failure to show benefit\nIn plaintiff\u2019s action against his former employer and its plant manager for constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty after defendants failed to keep confidential defendant\u2019s identity as the person who gave the employer information about a supplier\u2019s fraud, benefits plaintiff claims were allegedly received by defendants from the breach of fiduciary duty were insufficient to support a claim of constructive fraud since (1) the employer\u2019s recovery of more than one million dollars from the supplier for fraud as a result of the information supplied by plaintiff did not relate to any breach of fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff; (2) the employer\u2019s continued business relationship with the supplier was not predicated on a breach of fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff; and (3) the employer\u2019s right to terminate plaintiff\u2019s at-will employment without cause was a right the employer already possessed and did not result from a breach of fiduciary duty to plaintiff.\n2. Employer and Employee\u2014 wrongful discharge \u2014 violation of public policy \u2014 insufficient evidence\nPlaintiff former employee failed as a matter of law to establish a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where plaintiff\u2019s evidence failed to show that defendant employer was engaged in illegal activity or that plaintiff was asked by defendant to violate any state or federal law or to perform any activity injurious to the public, and uncontroverted evidence at trial tended to show that plaintiff was discharged immediately following a lengthy unexcused and unexplained absence from work.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 12 March 1997 by Judge Ronald E. Bogle in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November 1998.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, L.L.P., by Harold L. Kennedy, III, Harvey L. Kennedy, and Annie Brown Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.\nKilpatrick Stockton LLP, by Charles E. Johnson and R. Rand Thicker, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0563-01", "first_page_order": 597, "last_page_order": 603 }