{ "id": 11215376, "name": "WANDA J. CHOATE, Employee, Plaintiff v. SARA LEE PRODUCTS, Employer; SELF/CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICES, Carrier; Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Choate v. Sara Lee Products", "decision_date": "1999-04-20", "docket_number": "No. COA98-397", "first_page": "14", "last_page": "23", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 N.C. App. 14" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "employee's disobedience of the prohibition against running was not sufficient to break causal connection between injury and employment when employee slipped and fell en route to canteen to get a pack of chewing gum" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524723 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "employee's disobedience of the prohibition against running was not sufficient to break causal connection between injury and employment when employee slipped and fell en route to canteen to get a pack of chewing gum" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" }, { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560920 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521716 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625377 ], "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" }, { "page": "599-600" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612018 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3672546 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/232/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E. 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631149 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/205/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625464 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568137 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 N.C. App. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553835, 8553878 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/1/0448-01", "/nc-app/1/0448-02" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914912 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665-66", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566948 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521774 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560169 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566796 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796139, 796140, 795983, 796016, 795895 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0651-01", "/nc/342/0651-04", "/nc/342/0651-03", "/nc/342/0651-02", "/nc/342/0651-05" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 783", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918192 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914018 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11800056 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230-31", "parenthetical": "injury arose out of the employment where an insurance agent was injured while assisting one of his policyholders whose vehicle was stranded on the side of the road" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551434 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250-51", "parenthetical": "injury arose out of the employment where an insurance agent was injured while assisting one of his policyholders whose vehicle was stranded on the side of the road" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612018 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" }, { "page": "422-23" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566796 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "356-57" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0350-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 987, "char_count": 21725, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.105381725994484e-07, "percentile": 0.7623873052058248 }, "sha256": "3b9ac733ad94f7b36aa014c2485d49ce0e9c6510d7f9c0ae72e7260acbe94562", "simhash": "1:09843c70e007a15c", "word_count": 3618 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:41:36.377256+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge JOHN concurs.", "Judge GREENE dissents." ], "parties": [ "WANDA J. CHOATE, Employee, Plaintiff v. SARA LEE PRODUCTS, Employer; SELF/CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICES, Carrier; Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nWanda J. Choate (plaintiff) appeals from the Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (Commission) which denied plaintiffs claim for benefits under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act). The Commission found as a fact that plaintiff fell in the employer\u2019s parking lot on 27 January 1994. The issue on appeal is whether that fall arose out of and during the course of plaintiff\u2019s employment.\nEvidence before the Commission tended to show that at the time of the incident, plaintiff had worked for defendant for twenty-seven and one-half years as a seamstress. Plaintiff worked with several other workers in a production team, and her pay was based on productivity. On 27 January 1994, plaintiff was informed by a distraught co-worker, Shelly Bright (Bright), who is married to plaintiff\u2019s nephew, that plaintiff\u2019s nephew had just been in an automobile accident and that Bright was leaving work in order to check on him. Bright left the plant, and plaintiff asked her teammate in front of her in the production line if she (plaintiff) could go outside to see if Bright needed assistance. Plaintiff\u2019s teammate replied in the affirmative. Plaintiff informed members of her team and went to Bright in the parking lot. While in the parking lot, plaintiff fell due to icy conditions. As she was falling, plaintiff grabbed Bright\u2019s car door with her left hand and fell on her back. After her fall, plaintiff offered to accompany Bright and inquired if there was anything she could do to help Bright in her distressed situation. After being informed that Bright did not need plaintiff to do anything else, plaintiff encouraged Bright to be careful due to her condition and inclement weather. Plaintiff then returned to her work station.\nPlaintiff did not immediately report her fall; however, sometime before lunch, she informed her supervisor Carol Bottomly (Bottomly) about the fall and reported that her shoulder was hurting. Bottomly completed an accident report while plaintiff worked at her sewing machine. Plaintiff also reported her injury to the plant nurse at 5:30 p.m. Due to continued pain, plaintiff consulted several physicians, including an orthopedist and a neurologist.\nPlaintiff contends that the Commission erred in finding that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The Commission made findings of fact, among others, that \u201c[c]ompany policy prohibits personnel in the parking lot except at authorized times unless the employee has the permission of a supervisor\u201d and \u201c[p]laintiffs presence in the parking lot was not related to her employment, but was a direct result of an automobile accident involving her nephew.\u201d The Commission made specific conclusions that plaintiffs fall did not arise out of her employment, that her location in the parking lot at the time of her fall was not calculated to further the employer\u2019s business either directly or indirectly, and that plaintiffs decision to check on her. niece did not bear a reasonable relationship to her employment nor was it related to her job duties. For those reasons, the Commission found that plaintiffs claim is not com-pensable under the provisions of the Act. We disagree.\nThe standard of appellate review of an opinion and award of the Commission is limited to a determination of (1) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence in the record; and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s findings justify its legal conclusions. Aaron v. New Fortis Homes, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 711, 714, 493 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1997). Even if there is conflicting evidence; the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is any competent evidence to support them. Weaver v. American National Can Corp., 123 N.C. App. 507, 509-10, 473 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1996). \u201c[T]his Court is \u2018not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside the findings . . . simply because other . . . conclusions might have been reached.\u2019 . . . \u2018This is so, notwithstanding [that] the evidence upon the entire record might support a contrary finding.\u2019 \u201d Baker v. City of Sanford, 120 N.C. App. 783, 787, 463 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1995), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 651, 467 S.E.2d 703 (1996).\nAn injury is compensable under the Act only if the injury (1) is an \u201caccident\u201d and (2) \u201caris[es] out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 321 N.C. 350, 354, 364 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (1991). When an employee is injured while going to or from his place of work, is upon premises owned or controlled by his employer, and the employee\u2019s act involves no unreasonable delay, then the injury is generally deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 128 S.E.2d 570 (1962). Plaintiff contends that the rule from Bass applies in the present case because her act of entering the parking lot was certainly no more personal and no less related to her work than leaving at the end of the day would have been. Plaintiff went to the parking lot to check on her co-worker and contemplated leaving work if her co-worker needed assistance. Plaintiff did not injure herself while leaving work; therefore the rule enunciated in Bass, while persuasive, does not control our decision in the present case.\nThe words \u201carising out of the employment\u201d refer to the origin or cause of the accidental injury, and the words \u201cin the course of employment\u201d refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which an accidental injury occurs. Roberts, 321 N.C. at 354, 364 S.E.2d at 420. There must be some causal relationship between the injury and the employment before the resulting disability or disablement can be said to \u201carise out of the employment.\u201d Pittman v. Twin City Laundry, 61 N.C. App. 468, 472, 300 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1983). An accident arises out of and in the course of the employment when it occurs while the employee is engaged in some activity or duty which he is authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer\u2019s business. Perry v. Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 136 S.E.2d 643 (1964). According to the general rule, \u201c[w]here any reasonable relationship to the employment exists, or employment is a contributory cause, the court is justified in upholding the award as \u2018arising out of employment.\u2019 \u201d Smallwood v. Eason, 123 N.C. App. 661, 665-66, 474 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1996) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (injuries sustained by employees as result of vehicular collision with forklift driven by co-employee on road adjacent to employer\u2019s facility arose out of and in the course of employees\u2019 employment for workers\u2019 compensation purposes). Where the evidence shows that the injury occurred during the hours of employment, at the place of employment, and while the claimant was actually in the performance of the duties of the employment, the injury is in the course of the employment. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 162 S.E.2d 47 (1968). In order to be compensable, plaintiff must prove both the \u201carising out of\u2019 requirement and the \u201cin the course of\u2019 requirement; however, as stated by former Chief Justice Branch, analysis of those factors sometimes blends:\n[T]he two tests, although distinct, are interrelated and cannot be applied entirely independently. Rather, they are to be applied together to determine the issue of whether an accident is sufficiently work-related to come under the Act. Since the terms of the Act should be liberally construed in favor of compensation, deficiencies in one factor are sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other.\nHoyle v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 252, 293 S.E.2d 196, 199 (1982).\nIn Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417, the employee was killed while aiding a motorist on the highway during a business trip. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that an injury to an employee while he is performing acts for the benefit of third persons does not arise out of the employment unless the acts benefit the employer to an appreciable extent. Id. at 355, 364 S.E.2d at 421. The Court stated:\nThe record here contains no evidence that anyone other than decedent involved in the events surrounding his accidental death had any connection to Burlington. So far as this record reveals, decedent acted solely for the benefit of a third party. We thus hold that his death did not arise out of the employment.\nId. Unlike Roberts, the present case involves numerous connections to the employer. The plaintiff fell on the employer\u2019s premises after temporarily leaving the production line in order to aid a fellow employee, who also happened to be the wife of plaintiffs nephew. The facts are very similar to those in Bellamy v. Manufacturing Co., 200 N.C. 676, 158 S.E. 246 (1931).\nIn Bellamy, the plaintiff had finished work early but was still \u201con the clock,\u201d when she took a friend to seek employment in the same mill. During that errand, plaintiff was injured in an elevator. The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the superior court, stated:\nThe mission she went on, while she was \u201con duty\u201d was in the mill, was a temporary purpose, and not such a departure from the employer\u2019s business that we could say from a liberal construction of the act that it was not in the course of the employment. In fact, she went with a friend to get her employment in the mill, and in doing so did not leave the mill. Under the facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the plaintiff, what she did was too casual to bar a recovery.\nBellamy, 200 N.C. at 680, 158 S.E. at 248. As in Bellamy, plaintiff in the present case was on the employer\u2019s premises when the accident occurred. Even more convincing, she was temporarily attending to a co-worker, whereas the plaintiff in Bellamy was helping a friend find employment.\nIn another similar case, the Court found that the worker was entitled to benefits under the Act when he was temporarily absent from his work station. In Gordon v. Chair Co., 205 N.C. 739, 172 S.E. 485 (1934), plaintiff went to work with a co-worker during icy conditions, and asked his son to follow in case his employer was to be closed due to the weather. Plaintiff got to work, learned that his employer was in operation, then went to the outside platform at the front of the plant to tell his son not to wait on him. While on the platform, he slipped and fell on the ice and was injured. The Court found that the facts of the Gordon case came within the decision in Bellamy, and the plaintiff was granted workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Gordon, 205 N.C. at 742, 172 S.E. at 487.\nThe Gordon Court cited an early United States Supreme Court case as authority, where that Court held that a worker was \u201con duty\u201d when he was struck and killed while on a personal errand, but still within the railroad yard of his employer:\nAssuming . . . that the evidence fairly tended to indicate the boarding-house as his destination, it nevertheless also appears that deceased was shortly to depart upon his run, having just prepared his engine for the purpose, and that he had not gone beyond the limits of the railroad yard when he was struck. There is nothing to indicate that this brief visit to the boarding-house was at all out of the ordinary, or was inconsistent with his duty to his employer. It seems to us, clear that the man was still \u201con duty, \u201d and employed in commerce, notwithstanding his temporary absence from the locomotive engine.\nId. at 742,172 S.E. at 487 (quoting N. C. R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248, 260, 58 L. Ed. 591, 596 (1914) (emphasis added)).\nIn Guest v. Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1955), an employee was on a business trip when he stopped at a filling station to inflate the tires on his vehicle. The filling station operator gave the employee permission to use his air hose to inflate the tires, but before he could finish, another customer was unable to start his car. The filling station operator requested plaintiff to assist in pushing the car off from a standing position so as to get it started and in order to move it away from the gas pumps. Plaintiff complied with this request, and was struck and injured by another car while pushing the disabled car on the highway. The Court found that the circumstances of mutual aid being exchanged between the employee and filling station owner were such that \u201cthe inbound aid being for the employer\u2019s benefit, the aid received and the aid given are so closely interwoven that an injury to the employee under such circumstances must be held connected with and incidental to his employment.\u201d Guest, 241 N.C. at 453, 85 S.E.2d at 600. While not the basis for upholding the award of benefits in Guest, the Court noted that \u201c[w]here the deviation is of such nature as to constitute a total departure from the employment, compensation is denied; but where the deviation is of a minor character, compensation is awarded.\u201d Id. at 454, 85 S.E.2d at 601 (citing Parrish v. Armour & Co., 200 N.C. 654, 158 S.E. 188 (1931)).\nUnder Bellamy, Gordon, and Guest, we find, therefore, that a causal connection existed and plaintiffs accident during a temporary absence from her work station arose out of and during the course of her employment. The Commission erred in its conclusions of law on this issue. Its finding of fact that \u201c[plaintiff\u2019s presence in the parking lot was not related to her employment, but was a direct result of an automobile accident involving her nephew\u201d can be properly regarded as either a conclusion of law, or mixed finding of fact and law, or finding of jurisdictional fact, and is therefore not binding upon us. Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 96 N.C. App. 293, 385 S.E.2d 515 (1989).\nWhile company policy may not have permitted plaintiff in the present case to leave the production line without her supervisor\u2019s permission, our Supreme Court has held that habitual disregard for company policy negates a defense in this regard, stating:\n[T]he more recent cases have not viewed minor deviations from the confines of a narrow job description as an absolute bar to the recovery of benefits, even when such acts were contrary to stated rules or to specific instructions of the employer where such acts were reasonably related to the accomplishment of the task for which the employee was hired.\nHoyle, 306 N.C. 248, 254, 293 S.E.2d 196, 200. In Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976), a fire fighter was injured while working on a co-employee\u2019s personal automobile. The Court affirmed a finding of workers\u2019 compensation coverage, even though a published rule prohibited repair of personal vehicles on the premises without prior approval of the assistant chief on duty. The Court noted that it was customary for fire fighters to make repairs during lunch, that their superiors were aware of these activities, and these repairs to an appreciable extent benefitted the fire department. Watkins, 290 N.C. at 285, 225 S.E.2d at 582.\nLikewise, plaintiff in the case sub judice testified that it was routine to leave the work station with the permission of other members of the production team. Supervisor Bottomly testified that employees were not supposed to leave the plant without permission, but also admitted that she would have allowed plaintiff to leave if she had asked. The plant manager, Todd Dixon, admitted that plaintiff would \u201cprobably not\u201d have been fired for going outside without permission. Plaintiffs statement that the supposed rule was routinely violated was never directly contradicted by the other employees. No evidence was presented that plaintiff, or anyone else, was disciplined for her specific actions. The Commission found that plaintiff left without a supervisor\u2019s permission. The Commission evidently considered that purported fact in determining that plaintiff was outside her employment at the time of her fall; however, the Commission made no conclusion of law based on this fact. This finding, therefore, does not prohibit the plaintiff from receiving an award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits under the laws of this state. See Spratt v. Duke Power Co., 65 N.C. App. 457, 310 S.E.2d 38 (1983) (employee\u2019s disobedience of the prohibition against running was not sufficient to break causal connection between injury and employment when employee slipped and fell en route to canteen to get a pack of chewing gum).\nThe fact that the defendant did not reprimand plaintiff nor discipline plaintiff for acting on Bright\u2019s behalf is further evidence that plaintiff\u2019s actions appreciably benefitted the defendant. Plaintiff certainly had reasonable grounds to believe her actions would benefit her employer and create a feeling of good will. Our Supreme Court has stated:\n[Wjhere competent proof exists that the employee understood, or had reasonable grounds to believe that the act resulting in injury was incidental to his employment, or such as would prove beneficial to his employer\u2019s interests or was encouraged by the employer in the performance of the act or similar acts for the purpose of creating a feeling of good will, or authorized so to do by common practice or custom, compensation may be recovered, since then a causal connection between the employment and the accident may be established.\nWatkins, 290 N.C. at 283, 225 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Guest, 241 N.C. at 452, 85 S.E.2d at 599-600).\nFor the reasons stated above, we hereby reverse the Opinion and Award filed 7 April 1997 and remand the matter to the Industrial Commission for entry of a revised Opinion and Award in favor of the plaintiff and further determination not inconsistent with this opinion. The order of the Commission is\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge JOHN concurs.\nJudge GREENE dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Greene\ndissenting.\nI do not believe plaintiffs injuries arose out of her employment, as mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6), and therefore would affirm the decision of the Commission.\nThe tests developed by our courts to determine whether an employee\u2019s injury, sustained while acting for the benefit of a third party, arises out of the employment are whether: (1) the act appreciably benefits the employer, Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 321 N.C. 350, 355, 364 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1998); Guest v. Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 453, 85 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1955); (2) the employee has reasonable grounds to believe the act is incidental to the employment, Guest, 241 N.C. at 452, 85 S.E.2d at 599; or (3) the employment places the employee at a risk of injury greater than that to which the general public is. exposed outside of the employment, Roberts, 321 N.C. at 358, 364 S.E.2d at 422-23.\nIn this case, there is no evidence that plaintiffs injury resulted from an act incident to her employment, or as a consequence of an increased risk of her employment. Accordingly, the dispositive issue is whether plaintiffs act appreciably benefitted her employer.\nEven assuming plaintiffs injury was sustained while acting for the benefit of a third party, there is no evidence of any benefit to her employer. The injury, even though it occurred on the employer\u2019s premises, did not reasonably tend to retain the employer\u2019s business or to promote the consummation of new business. Lewis v. Insurance Co., 20 N.C. App. 247, 250-51, 201 S.E.2d 228, 230-31 (1973) (injury arose out of the employment where an insurance agent was injured while assisting one of his policyholders whose vehicle was stranded on the side of the road). Although the act in this case apparently was prompted by humanitarian concern for a fellow employee, that concern is not sufficient to constitute an appreciable benefit to the employer. Roberts, 321 N.C. at 356-57, 364 S.E.2d at 422. Accordingly, plaintiffs injuries did not arise out of her employment and are not compensable.\nThe Bellamy, Guest, and Gordon cases, relied upon by the majority, are distinguishable and thus do not support the holding that plaintiffs injuries in this case are compensable. Those cases, holding that the employee\u2019s injuries did arise out of the employment, reveal some definite benefit to the employer as a result of the actions of the employee.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Greene" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donaldson & Black, PA., by Jay A. Gervasi, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.", "Orbock Bowden Ruark & Dillard, PC, by Barbara E. Ruark, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WANDA J. CHOATE, Employee, Plaintiff v. SARA LEE PRODUCTS, Employer; SELF/CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICES, Carrier; Defendants\nNo. COA98-397\n(Filed 20 April 1999)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 temporarily leaving work station\u2014 fall in parking lot \u2014 injury arising out of and in course of employment\nPlaintiff employee\u2019s injury when she slipped and fell in the employer\u2019s parking lot after she temporarily left the production line to check on a co-worker arose out of and in the course of her employment. A finding that plaintiff left her work station without her supervisor\u2019s permission in violation of company policy did not prohibit plaintiff from receiving compensation benefits where plaintiff testified that it was routine to leave the work station with the permission of other members of the production team, and she had such permission; the supervisor admitted that she would have allowed plaintiff to leave if she had asked; the plant manager admitted that plaintiff would probably not have been fired for going outside without permission; and plaintiff\u2019s statement that the rule was routinely violated was not contradicted.\nJudge Greene dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an Opinion and Award entered 7 February 1997 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 January 1999.\nDonaldson & Black, PA., by Jay A. Gervasi, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.\nOrbock Bowden Ruark & Dillard, PC, by Barbara E. Ruark, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0014-01", "first_page_order": 44, "last_page_order": 53 }