{ "id": 11217162, "name": "NANCY MARIE MEHOVIC, Plaintiff v. MEHMET MEHOVIC and VEZIC MEHOVIC, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Mehovic v. Mehovic", "decision_date": "1999-05-04", "docket_number": "No. COA97-1025", "first_page": "131", "last_page": "139", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 N.C. App. 131" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "166 S.E. 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "failure of jury to distinguish between compensatory and punitive damages in verdict did not deprive plaintiff from recovering amount awarded" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614379 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "failure of jury to distinguish between compensatory and punitive damages in verdict did not deprive plaintiff from recovering amount awarded" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "977 F.2d 885", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10516962 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894", "parenthetical": "claim of error in punitive damages award rejected although jury failed to \"specify whether the award was for both . . . counts ... or only one,\" where verdicts on both counts upheld on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/977/0885-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565488 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564081 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4705412, 4707654, 4705971, 4705464, 4708059 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0387-05", "/nc/308/0387-01", "/nc/308/0387-02", "/nc/308/0387-03", "/nc/308/0387-04" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753", "parenthetical": "quoting Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520459 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "quoting Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "quoting Strong's N.C. Index 3d, Appeal and Error, \u00a7 50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358498 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "quoting Strong's N.C. Index 3d, Appeal and Error, \u00a7 50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 So.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9646689, 2548666 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/311/0312-01", "/ala/294/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.W.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10679755 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/320/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 P.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2356799 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/92/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.W.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10677369 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/320/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557369 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527942 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502432 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "\"[b]efore punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff, the jury must find that the defendant committed an actionable legal wrong ... and it must award the plaintiff either compensatory or nominal damages\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757224 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "\"[b]efore punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff, the jury must find that the defendant committed an actionable legal wrong ... and it must award the plaintiff either compensatory or nominal damages\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" }, { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627353 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "citing Worthy v. Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 499, 187 S.E. 771, 772 (1936)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527803 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "citing Worthy v. Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 499, 187 S.E. 771, 772 (1936)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626959 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 S.E.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626561 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0680-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 815, "char_count": 16321, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1940744507592346e-07, "percentile": 0.5920557530574176 }, "sha256": "ba6a2c78c4d0ec7d97c2cd3009581ad4c4b36aa893eb9e4e3ed04afdd20ac199", "simhash": "1:d3fbc662769eee76", "word_count": 2589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:41:36.377256+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concur." ], "parties": [ "NANCY MARIE MEHOVIC, Plaintiff v. MEHMET MEHOVIC and VEZIC MEHOVIC, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN, Judge.\nDefendants appeal the trial court\u2019s order denying their motions to set aside a 19 March 1997 jury verdict, for new trial, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or new trial. We conclude the trial court did not err.\nPertinent facts and procedural history include the following: Plaintiff Nancy Marie Mehovic and defendant Mehmet Mehovic (Mehmet) were married 16 December 1981. In 1986, plaintiff and Mehmet (the couple) purchased a home and 15.75 acres of land (the property) in McDowell County for approximately $52,000.00. The couple advanced $26,000.00 at closing and paid the balance due over a period of years thereafter. Improvements were made to the residence during that time and a mobile home was added to the property. Mehmet\u2019s younger brother, defendant Vezic Mehovic (Vezic), came to live with the couple as a junior high school student and was thereafter raised by them. On 19 May 1995, the couple executed a gift deed vesting full title to the property in Vezic, and subsequently separated in the summer of 1995.\nOn 29 August 1995 in McDowell County Superior Court, plaintiff filed the instant complaint setting forth counts of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, duress, and undue influence against Mehmet. Plaintiff further asserted claims of fraud, unjust enrichment and constructive trust against Vezic. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Mehmet had subjected her to physical and mental abuse on several occasions, and that he had fraudulently \u201crepresented to [her] that the property needed to be conveyed to [Vezic] in order to protect it from [the couple\u2019s] debts,\u201d but that it would still belong to the couple following transfer to Vezic.\nOn 18 September 1995, defendants filed answer, including motions, counterclaims and a third-party complaint against McDowell County resident Jake Stockton. Plaintiff filed her reply, containing motions, 4 October 1995; the third-party defendant filed answer 20 October 1995. Plaintiff\u2019s motions to dismiss the third-party complaint and to dismiss defendants\u2019 first counterclaim were allowed 17 March 1997, and defendants voluntarily dismissed their remaining counterclaims that same date.\nJury trial commenced 17 March 1997 in McDowell County Superior Court. At the charge conference following presentation of evidence, the parties agreed, inter alia, that the trial court would instruct the jury on \u201cRescission of Written Instrument\u201d in reference to plaintiff\u2019s allegations of fraud, undue influence and duress. It was further agreed that,\nif the jury should answer Issue 4, Issue 5, or Issue 6 in favor of the Plaintiff, finding that there was either undue influence, duress, or fraud, then [plaintiff\u2019s] remedy [would be] rescission of the written instrument.\nOver defendants\u2019 objection, the jury was also subsequently instructed, inter alia, as follows:\nIssue 7 reads: what amount of punitive damages, if any, does the jury in its discretion award to the Plaintiff. . . ? You will answer this issue only if you have answered Issue 1 or Issue 2 and Issue 3 in favor of the Plaintiff or if you have answered Issue 4 or Issue 5 or Issue 6 in favor of Plaintiff. If you have answered any one of those issues in favor of the Plaintiff, then you will consider Issue Number 7.\nThe jury answered the issues submitted in the following manner:\nIssue One: Did the defendant, Mehmet . . . assault the plaintiff. . . ?\nAnswer: YES\nIssue Two: Did the defendant, Mehmet... commit a battery upon the plaintiff. . . ?\nAnswer: NO\nIssue Three: What amount is the plaintiff . . . entitled to recover for personal injury?\nAnswer: $1.00\nIssue Four: Was the plaintiff . . . induced to execute the deed dated May 19, 1995, from Mehmet. . . and [plaintiff] to Vezic . . . , a single man, by the fraudulent representations of the defendant, Mehmet. . . ?\nAnswer: YES\nIssue Five: Was the plaintiff . . . induced to execute the deed dated May 19,1995, from Mehmet... and [plaintiff] to Vezic . . ., a single man, by the undue influence of the defendant, Mehmet. . . ?\nAnswer: YES\nIssue Six: Was the plaintiff . . . induced to execute the deed dated May 19, 1995, from Mehmet. . . and [plaintiff] to Vezic , a single man, under duress exerted by Mehmet. . . ?\nAnswer: YES\nIssue Seven: What amount of punitive damages, if any, does the jury in its discretion award to the plaintiff. . . ?\nAnswer: $24.500.00\nJudgment was entered 19 March 1997 ordering rescission of the gift deed to Vezic, and ordering Mehmet to pay plaintiff $1.00 in compensatory damages and $24,500.00 in punitive damages. Defendants filed motions that same date to set aside the verdict, for new trial, and for JNOV or new trial. The trial court denied these motions 13 May 1997, and defendants thereafter filed timely notice of appeal.\nDefendants contend the trial court erroneously denied their motions attacking the jury verdict. According to defendants, punitive damages were recoverable by plaintiff only as to the assault count, and not as to those counts upon which plaintiff had foregone an awaxd of compensatory damages and elected the remedy of rescission, i.e., fraud, undue influence and duress. In light of plaintiffs election of rescission with regard to those claims, defendants continue, the trial court erred in submitting a punitive damages issue thereon. Defendants note they objected to the trial court\u2019s listing of the punitive damages issue following all the substantive issues rather than immediately following the assault charge.\nIt is well-established that a party alleging fraud must elect either the remedy of rescission or that of damages, but may not seek both, as these remedies are inconsistent. See Parker v. White, 235 N.C. 680, 688, 71 S.E.2d 122, 128 (1952). One who elects rescission \u201cmay recover back what he has parted with under [the contract], but cannot recover damages for the fraud.\u201d Id. The purpose of the \u201celection of remedies\u201d doctrine \u201cis not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong.\u201d Smith v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 N.C. 360, 368, 79 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1954).\nPointing to plaintiff\u2019s election of the remedy of rescission and forbearance of compensatory damages in reference to her fraud, undue influence and duress claims, defendants assert the principle that punitive damages \u201ccannot be awarded in the absence of compensatory damages.\u201d Lynch v. N.C. Dept. of Justice, 93 N.C. App. 57, 60, 376 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1989) (citing Worthy v. Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 499, 187 S.E. 771, 772 (1936)); see also Jones v. Gwynne, 312 N.C. 393, 405, 323 S.E.2d 9, 16 (1984) (\u201c[b]efore punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff, the jury must find that the defendant committed an actionable legal wrong ... and it must award the plaintiff either compensatory or nominal damages\u201d) (citations omitted).\nCases supporting this proposition rely upon the seminal case of Worthy v. Knight, wherein our Supreme Court stated:\n[p]unitive damages may not be awarded unless otherwise a cause of action exists and at least nominal damages are recoverable by the plaintiff.\nWorthy, 210 N.C. at 499, 187 S.E. at 772. However, our Supreme Court subsequently interpreted Worthy as holding that nominal damages must be recoverable in order to justify an award of punitive damages, but that there is no requirement that nominal damages \u201cactually be recovered.\u201d Hawkins v. Hawkins, 331 N.C. 743, 745, 417 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, \u201c[o]nce a cause of action is established, plaintiff is entitled to recover, as a matter of law, nominal damages, which in turn support an award of punitive damages.\u201d Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C. App. 529, 532, 400 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1991), aff\u2019d, 331 N.C. 743, 417 S.E.2d 447 (1992).\nTherefore,\nthe failure of the plaintiff to actually receive an award of either nominal or compensatory damages is immaterial [to the entitlement of punitive damages]. The question . . . [is] one of whether [the] plaintiff. . . has established her cause of action[.]\nId. However, \u201c[e]ven where sufficient facts are alleged to make out an identifiable tort. . . the tortious conduct must be accompanied by or partake of some element of aggravation before punitive damages will be allowed.\u201d Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976) (citations omitted). Such aggravated conduct\nmay be established by allegations sufficient to allege a tort where that tort, by its very nature, encompasses any of the elements of aggravation. Such a tort is fraud, since fraud is, itself, one of the elements of aggravation which will permit punitive damages to be awarded.\nId.\nNorth Carolina public policy does not support awarding punitive damages \u201cto compensate the plaintiff for nonquantifiable compensatory damages.\u201d Id. at 113, 229 S.E.2d at 302 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Rather, punitive damages have been \u201cconsistently allowed . . . solely on the basis of [our] policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter others from similar behavior.\u201d Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).\nWe note that\n[i]n North Carolina, actionable fraud by its very nature involves intentional wrongdoing . . . [and] [t]he punishment of such intentional wrongdoing is well within North Carolina\u2019s policy underlying its concept of punitive damages.\nId. (citations omitted).\nWhile our courts have not specifically addressed the propriety of awarding punitive damages based upon the remedy of rescission, the modern trend contemplates\nno logical reason for permitting punitive damages for the tort of fraud and deceit in a law action, and foreclosing such damages for fraud and deceit in an equitable action.\nBlack v. Gardner, 320 N.W.2d 153, 161 (S.D. 1982); see also Village of Peck v. Denison, 450 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Idaho 1969) (\u201c[t]he absence of a showing of actual damages need not bar an award of punitive damages, for such a showing is not a talismanic necessity. The reason for such a requirement is that it first insures that some legally protected interest has been invaded. . . . There is no reason why an award of equitable relief may not fulfill this same function, for in either case it is necessary first to show an invasion of some legally protected interest.\u201d); Kennedy v. Thomsen, 320 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff\u2019s rescission claim sufficient to support punitive damages where \u201cthere was ample evidence [plaintiff] had sustained actual damage,\u201d the crucial question for justifying punitive damages award being \u201cwhether actual damages were sustained rather than whether such damages are reduced to a money judgment\u201d); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Johnson, 311 So.2d 312, 318 (Ala. 1975) (exemplary damages are \u201cappropriate in cases . .. where restitution would have little or no deterrent effect, for wrongdoers would run no risk of liability to their victims beyond that of returning what they wrongfully obtained. . . . To allow [punitive damages] when a contract is affirmed, and not when there is a rescission, is illogical when the purposes of punitive damages are [for punishment and prevention]\u201d). We concur with the thrust of current thought and hold North Carolina public policy supports an award of punitive damages upon a jury verdict establishing fraud and consequent entitlement, at the plaintiffs election, either to rescission or compensatory damages.\nTurning to the case sub judice, we note preliminarily that appellate review of an allegedly erroneous jury instruction involves examination of the contested instruction in context, and\n\u201cif the charge when considered as a whole presents the law of the case to the jury in such manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe that the jury was misled or misinformed [,]\u201d\nthen the charge \u201c \u2018will not be held prejudicial.\u2019 \u201d Blow v. Shaughnessy, 88 N.C. App. 484, 491, 364 S.E.2d 444, 448 (1988) (quoting Strong\u2019s N.C. Index 3d, Appeal and Error, \u00a7 50). Having determined punitive damages may properly be awarded upon a jury verdict sustaining a claim for rescission, we further hold the trial court did not err in submitting to the jury the issue of punitive damages on plaintiffs claims of fraud, undue influence and duress.\nDefendants also complain that the trial court\u2019s placement of the punitive damages issue at the conclusion of all the substantive issues was misleading and rendered \u201cit impossible to determine upon which [issue] the jury ultimately based\u201d its award of such damages. We do not agree.\nThe number, form, and phraseology of issues is in the court\u2019s discretion; and there is no abuse of discretion where the issues are \u201csufficiently comprehensive to resolve all factual controversies and to enable the court to render judgment fully determining the cause.\u201d\nPinner v. Southern Bell, 60 N.C. App. 257, 263, 298 S.E.2d 749, 753, disc. review denied, 308 N.C. 387, 302 S.E.2d 253 (1983) (quoting Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967)). Considering the trial court\u2019s charge in its entirety and not in detached fragments, see McPherson v. Haire, 262 N.C. 71, 75, 136 S.E.2d 224, 226-27 (1964), we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the court\u2019s listing of the issues.\nAfter instructing on Issues One (assault) and Two (battery), the trial court directed the jury to answer Issue Three (personal injury compensation for the assault and/or battery claims) only if it had answered either Issue One or Two, or both, affirmatively. Then, after charging on Issues Four (fraud), Five (undue influence) and Six (duress), the trial court instructed that Issue Seven (punitive damages) was only to be considered and answered if the jury had \u201canswered Issue One or Two and Issue Three in favor of the plaintiff or . . . answered Issue Four or Issue Five or Issue Six in favor of the plaintiff.\u201d\nContrary to defendants\u2019 assertions, the foregoing format was not inherently or erroneously misleading because evidence offered by the plaintiff and admitted by the court was sufficient to sustain the jury\u2019s affirmative findings on each of the substantive issues and to support plaintiff\u2019s entitlement to punitive damages on each. See Trimed, Inc. v. Sherwood Medical Co., 977 F.2d 885, 894 (4th Cir. 1992) (claim of error in punitive damages award rejected although jury failed to \u201cspecify whether the award was for both . . . counts ... or only one,\u201d where verdicts on both counts upheld on appeal); see also Walker v. L.B. Price Mercantile Co., 203 N.C. 511, 512, 166 S.E. 391, 392 (1932) (failure of jury to distinguish between compensatory and punitive damages in verdict did not deprive plaintiff from recovering amount awarded).\nIn short, defendants\u2019 arguments in support of its post-trial motions being unfounded, the trial court did not err in denying those motions.\nNo error.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "C. Gary Triggs, P.A., by C. Gary Triggs and Susan Janney, for defendants-appellants.", "Hunter & Evans, P.A., by W. Hill Evans, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NANCY MARIE MEHOVIC, Plaintiff v. MEHMET MEHOVIC and VEZIC MEHOVIC, Defendants\nNo. COA97-1025\n(Filed 4 May 1999)\n1. Damages\u2014 punitive \u2014 fraud and undue influence\u2014 rescission\nThe trial court did not err by submitting to the jury the issue of punitive damages on plaintiff\u2019s claims for fraud, undue influence, and duress even though plaintiff had elected rescission on those claims. North Carolina public policy supports an award of punitive damages upon a jury verdict establishing fraud and consequent entitlement, at plaintiff\u2019s election, either to rescission or to compensatory damages.\n2. Trials\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 submitted after all the substantive issues \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in an action for fraud, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust by placing the punitive damages issue at the conclusion of all of the substantive issues. Although defendants contended that it was impossible to determine the issue on which the jury based its award of punitive damages, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury\u2019s affirmative findings on each of the substantive issues and to support plaintiffs entitlement to punitive damages on each.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 13 May 1997 by Judge J. Marlene Hyatt in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 April 1998.\nC. Gary Triggs, P.A., by C. Gary Triggs and Susan Janney, for defendants-appellants.\nHunter & Evans, P.A., by W. Hill Evans, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0131-01", "first_page_order": 161, "last_page_order": 169 }