{ "id": 11218253, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS EUGENE WILDS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wilds", "decision_date": "1999-05-18", "docket_number": "No. COA98-797", "first_page": "195", "last_page": "210", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 N.C. App. 195" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 741, 365 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539039 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 741, 365 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S. Ct. 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 1180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11696515, 11696548, 11696069, 11696134, 11696167, 11696584, 11696203, 11695948, 11696270, 11696623, 11696018, 11696403, 11696437, 11696314, 11696476, 11696670 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/1180-12", "/us/520/1180-13", "/us/520/1180-03", "/us/520/1180-04", "/us/520/1180-05", "/us/520/1180-14", "/us/520/1180-06", "/us/520/1180-01", "/us/520/1180-07", "/us/520/1180-15", "/us/520/1180-02", "/us/520/1180-09", "/us/520/1180-10", "/us/520/1180-08", "/us/520/1180-11", "/us/520/1180-16" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867693 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0290-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1330, "char_count": 37899, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.744531999517917e-08, "percentile": 0.4946890726061635 }, "sha256": "334b86bc1a521603b18dcc591454d18ac8612128c5823b19bd54df0bbdac9e98", "simhash": "1:876142a2b16e8ee3", "word_count": 6155 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:41:36.377256+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge EDMUNDS concurs with separate opinion.", "Judge SMITH concurs." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS EUGENE WILDS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Chief Judge.\nWe first determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant\u2019s request for a pre-trial, so-called Watson hearing to determine whether the evidence was sufficient for the case to proceed to trial as a capital case. See State v. Watson, 310 N.C. 384, 312 S.E.2d 448 (1984). The trial court refused to hold a pre-trial hearing on the basis that \u201cpremature evidence might come out during the case itself to support an aggravating factor that was not brought out at the Watson hearing.\u201d Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to offer a \u201csustainable reason for denying the defendant\u2019s motion.\u201d Defendant further contends that the trial court\u2019s failure to conduct a Watson hearing resulted in a trial of defendant before a death-qualified jury in violation of his constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury.\nDefendant\u2019s argument fails. Defendant bases his argument for a pre-trial hearing on State v. Watson, 310 N.C. 384, 312 S.E.2d 448 (1984). In Watson, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the submission of an aggravating factor to the jury. Id. at 388, 312 S.E.2d at 452. The Watson Court \u201ccommend[ed]\u201d the procedure for \u201cits judicial economy and administrative efficiency.\u201d Id. However, it is clearly within the broad discretion of the trial court to hold a pre-trial hearing, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion here. Furthermore, our courts have uniformly rejected the argument that \u201cdeath-qualifying\u201d a jury deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to a free trial. See, e.g., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 686, 325 S.E.2d 181, 191 (1985). Finally, we note that, although the trial was held before a \u201cdeath-qualified\u201d jury, the jury found that mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and recommended a life sentence rather than death. Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced in any way by the trial court\u2019s refusal to hold a Watson hearing. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a first-degree murder conviction. Defendant contends that \u201cother than unreliable and inadmissible hearsay, no evidence was presented to indicate that the defendant had at any time formed the specific intent to kill his wife or that he did so in a cool state of mind in furtherance of any plan or design. The defendant\u2019s evidence . . . tended to show that the victim initiated the violent conduct ... by being the first to pick up a knife.\u201d We disagree. \u201cFirst-degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 113, 282 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1981). \u201cMalice,\u201d which can be express or implied, is not necessarily \u201chatred or ill will,\u201d but rather \u201cis an intentional taking of the life of another without just cause, excuse or justification.\u201d State v. Robbins, 309 N.C. 771, 775, 309 S.E.2d 188, 190 (1983). \u201cPremeditation\u201d occurs when the defendant forms the specific intent to kill some period of time, however short, before the actual killing. State v. Weathers, 339 N.C. 441, 451, 451 S.E.2d 266, 271 (1994). \u201cDeliberation\u201d is when the intent to kill is formed while the defendant is in a cool state of blood rather than under the influence of a violent passion suddenly aroused by sufficient provocation. Id. at 451, 451 S.E.2d at 271-72.\nIn order for the trial court to submit a charge of first degree murder to the jury, there must have been substantial evidence presented from which a jury could determine that the defendant intentionally [] killed the victim with malice, premeditation and deliberation. \u201cSubstantial evidence\u201d is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. In ruling upon defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds of insufficient evidence, the trial court is required to interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State\u2019s favor.\nState v. Corn, 303 N.C. 293, 296-97, 278 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1981) (citations omitted). Because premeditation and deliberation ordinarily are not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, the State generally must establish them by circumstantial evidence. Weathers, 339 N.C. at 451, 451 S.E.2d at 271. Examples of circumstances that may raise an inference of premeditation and deliberation include (1) \u201cconduct and statements of the defendant before and after the killing,\u201d (2) \u201cthreats made against the victim by the defendant, ill will or previous difficulty between the parties,\u201d and (3) \u201cevidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner.\u201d State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 161, 322 S.E.2d 370, 388 (1984).\nHere, the State presented testimony by defendant\u2019s daughter China Wilds that on the morning of the killing defendant seemed \u201cpretty angry\u201d and \u201cgot up and went over there and got the knife while [Tonya] was looking down ironing her clothes and that was when he put [the knife] behind his back.\u201d China further testified that defendant then \u201cput [the knife] around [Tonya\u2019s] neck and then pushed her down on the floor.\u201d China testified that the struggle moved to the living room, where [defendant] \u201cwas over there stabbing her.\u201d China further testified that Tonya did not pick up a knife or otherwise attack defendant before he began stabbing her. Furthermore, the State also introduced into evidence the 911 call that China Wilds made, in which she told dispatchers that \u201cCurtis Wilds is trying to kill Tonya Wilds.\u201d\nAt trial, forensic pathologist John D. Butts, M.D., testified that when he performed an autopsy on Tonya\u2019s body, he found \u201ca number of stab cutting injuries present on her body\u201d that were \u201ccentered mostly around the face and neck region, [and] she had cuts on her hands, both hands, as well as a few minor cuts and scratches on her right upper arm.\u201d Dr. Butts described the wounds on Tonya\u2019s hands as \u201cdefensive wounds.\u201d\nThe State also introduced testimony by witnesses stating that defendant had threatened to kill Tonya in the weeks before he killed her. Tonya\u2019s sister Candi Crawford testified that in the two weeks before Tonya\u2019s death, defendant told Candi twice that \u201c[s]omebody has to die.\u201d Furthermore, Tonya\u2019s mother, Joan Crawford, testified that defendant told her the week before Tonya died that Tonya would end up like another woman who had been murdered by her spouse two months earlier.\nAfter careful review of the record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and allowing the State every reasonable inference, we conclude that the State offered substantial evidence from which the jury could determine that the defendant intentionally killed Tonya with malice, premeditation, and deliberation. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it submitted to the jury the aggravating factor that the killing was especially \u201cheinous, atrocious, or cruel.\u201d Defendant contends that the killing did not rise to the level of \u201cheinous, atrocious, or cruel.\u201d We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the multiple stabbings of Tonya, while in the presence of defendant\u2019s and Tonya\u2019s children, were especially \u201cheinous, atrocious, or cruel.\u201d See State v. Evans, 120 N.C. App. 752, 463 S.E.2d 830 (1995), cert. denied, 343 N.C. 310, 471 S.E.2d 78 (1996). Even if the evidence had not been sufficient, defendant was not prejudiced by the submission because the jury answered that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and recommended life imprisonment. State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 612, 365 S.E.2d 587, 598, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 109 S. Ct. 247 (1988). This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next determine whether the trial court erred when it introduced evidence of defendant\u2019s 1986 conviction for assault on a female and injury to personal property pursuant to Rule 404(b) to show intent, ill will, and malice. At trial, a security officer from Community General Hospital testified that on 11 January 1986, he was summoned to one of the hospital\u2019s locker rooms, where defendant \u201chad one hand around [Tonya\u2019s] throat and he was propped up with the other one against her.\u201d The security officer testified that after he persuaded defendant to turn Tonya loose, defendant then became angry and \u201che and I got into it after that\u201d and \u201cwe knocked a few pictures off the wall . . . .\u201d The security officer further testified that police officers arrived and arrested defendant. Defendant was convicted of assault on a female and injury to personal property. The trial court admitted the conviction under Rule 404(b) on the theory that \u201cit goes to show intent, ill will, and malice\u201d and stated that the \u201cprobative value outweighs prejudicial effect.\u201d\nG.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(b) provides:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nG.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1992). Rule 404(b) is \u201ca clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990) (emphasis in original). Evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior assaults on the victim for whose murder the defendant is being tried is admissible for the purpose of showing malice, premeditation, deliberation, intent or ill will against the victim under G.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(b). State v. Gary, 348 N.C. 510, 520, 501 S.E.2d 57, 64 (1998). Defendant argues nevertheless that the testimony regarding the assault conviction is too remote in time to be admissible under Rule 404(b). Remoteness for purposes of 404(b) must be considered in light of the specific facts of each case and the purposes for which the evidence is being offered. State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 405, 501 S.E.2d 625, 642 (1998), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 119 S. Ct. 1119 (1999). Remoteness in time may be significant when the evidence of the prior crime is introduced to show that both crimes arose out of a common scheme or plan. State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 307, 406 S.E.2d 876, 893 (1991). However, remoteness is less significant when the prior conduct is used to show intent, motive, knowledge, or lack of accident. Id. at 307, 406 S.E.2d at 893. Moreover, remoteness in time generally goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Id.\nHere, the assault conviction arose out of an incident in which defendant went to the victim\u2019s workplace and physically abused her. We conclude that the conviction was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show \u201cintent, ill will, and malice.\u201d Because the ten-year time span between the conviction and Tonya\u2019s death affected the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the conviction. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that statements made by Tonya to several witnesses constituted inadmissible hearsay. Defendant contends that the witnesses\u2019 statements regarding the incidents of physical and emotional abuse were inadmissible hearsay under State v. Hardy because they were \u201cmere recital[s] of facts\u201d and should not have been admitted under the \u201cstate of mind\u201d exception to the hearsay rule. See State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 451 S.E.2d 600 (1994). We first note that several statements that defendant refers to in his brief are statements made on voir dire rather than in the presence of the jury. We address only those statements made in the presence of the jury.\nDAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S OFFICE EMPLOYEES WENDY PERRELL AND KELLY SMITH\nAt trial, Davidson County Sheriffs Office employees Wendy Perrell and Kelly Smith testified that the day before defendant killed Tonya, Tonya came into the Davidson County Sheriffs Office to inquire about accusations of child abuse that defendant made against her. Perrell and Smith testified that Tonya told them defendant had attempted to change Tonya\u2019s life insurance policy to designate himself as the named beneficiary. Perrell and Smith also testified that Tonya told them about an incident in which she woke up in her bed one night to discover that defendant was pouring gasoline on her nightgown. Smith testified that Tonya\u2019s \u201cvoice was shaking\u201d when she spoke to them and that she was \u201ctearful.\u201d Smith testified that Tonya told her that she had a \u201cprimarily unhappy\u201d marriage \u201cfilled with physical and emotional abuse.\u201d Perrell testified that \u201c[Tonya] did not tell me directly that she was scared of him or afraid of [defendant], but her mannerism and the way she conducted herself, I just assumed on my part.\u201d When asked on direct examination whether Tonya told Smith that she was afraid of defendant, Smith answered, \u201cYes, she did\u201d and that \u201cshe was afraid he was going to try [to kill her] again.\u201d\nCANDI CRAWFORD\nTonya\u2019s sister, Candi Crawford, testified that about two or three weeks before defendant killed Tonya, Tonya called Crawford and asked her \u201cto call Domestic Violence to see what she could do to get a restraining order against [defendant] to leave the house.\u201d Crawford testified that Tonya was too scared to call the office of Domestic Violence herself. Crawford testified that when she spoke to Tonya several weeks before Tonya\u2019s death, she could tell that Tonya was \u201cupset\u201d because of her \u201ctears and then the trembling in her voice,\u201d and that during her conversations Tonya had stated that she was afraid of defendant. According to Crawford, Tonya told her that she often slept on the couch of her home with a knife underneath the cushion because she was afraid that \u201cdefendant would come out of the [bed]room one night and try to kill her one night while she was lying there.\u201d\nBEN ROBINSON\nTonya\u2019s close friend, Ben Robinson, Jr., testified that during the last two months of her life, Tonya had expressed her fear of defendant to Robinson and that she told Robinson about incidents of emotional and physical abuse. Robinson testified that Tonya had told him that defendant had threatened to kill her and that Tonya told him about the incident involving defendant putting gasoline on her nightgown.\nCHARO WASHINGTON\nTonya\u2019s sister, Charo Washington, testified that Tonya told Washington one week before she died that she was afraid defendant was going to kill her. Washington further testified that Tonya told her about the gasoline incident as well as a similar incident in which defendant poured lighter fluid or gasoline in a bathtub when Tonya was in it taking a bath. Washington further testified that Tonya had told her \u201cabout the time when she was on her knees begging for her life with a gun to her head, she said, 1 begged for my life from that man.\u2019 She was sick of it.\u201d\nJOAN CRAWFORD\nTonya\u2019s mother, Joan Crawford, testified that during the last four months of her life, Tonya would often come over to Crawford\u2019s house to sleep \u201cbecause she was afraid to close her eyes around [defendant].\u201d Crawford testified that Tonya was afraid that defendant \u201cwould kill her.\u201d Crawford also testified that Tonya had told her about past incidents of physical and emotional abuse during Tonya\u2019s marriage to defendant.\nG.S. 8C-1, Rule 803(3)\nG.S. 8C-1, Rule 803(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence allows hearsay testimony into evidence if it tends to show the victim\u2019s then existing state of mind or \u201cemotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed . . . .\u201d G.S. 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (1992). Although statements that relate only factual events do not fall within the Rule 803(3) exception, State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 229, 451 S.E.2d 600, 612 (1994), statements relating factual events which tend to show the victim\u2019s state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition when the victim made the statements are not excluded if the facts related by the victim serve to demonstrate the basis for the victim\u2019s state of mind, emotions, sensations, or physical condition, State v. Gray, 347 N.C. 143, 173, 491 S.E.2d 538, 550 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1031, 118 S. Ct. 1323 (1998). See also State v. Marecek, 130 N.C. App. 303, 306, 502 S.E.2d 634, 636, review denied, No. 362P98 (N.C. Supreme Court Dec. 30, 1998) (\u201c[WJitness testimony that recounts \u2018mere recitation of fact\u2019 should be excluded, while testimony that includes both statements of fact and emotion may be admitted.\u201d). \u201cThe determination that fact-laden statements are not excluded from the coverage of Rule 803(3) where they tend to show the speaker\u2019s then-existing state of mind is further supported by the federal courts\u2019 interpretation of federal rule 803(3).\u201d State v. Exum, 128 N.C. App. 647, 654, 497 S.E.2d 98, 103 (1998).\nIn the first place, it is in the nature of things that statements shedding light on the speaker\u2019s state of mind usually allude to acts, events, or conditions in the world, in the sense of making some kind of direct or indirect claim about them. ... In the second place, fact-laden statements are usually deliberate expressions of some state of mind.. .. [I]t does not take a rocket scientist... to understand that fact-laden statements are usually purposeful expressions of some state of mind, or to figure out that ordinary statements in ordinary settings usually carry ordinary meaning. In the end, most fact-laden statements intentionally convey something about state of mind, and if a statement conveys the mental state that the proponent seeks to prove, it fits the [federal rule 803(3)] exception.\nId. at 655, 497 S.E.2d at 103 (quoting 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence \u00a7 438, at 417-18 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining the federal courts\u2019 broad reading of federal rule 803(3)).\nHere, the witnesses\u2019 testimony regarding Tonya\u2019s prior statements is admissible, to show Tonya\u2019s state of mind, despite the fact that the statements also contained descriptions of factual events. This case is distinguishable from Hardy in that the statements in Hardy were taken from the victim\u2019s diary and contained descriptions of assaults and threats against the victim before she died but did not reveal the victim\u2019s state of mind or contain statements of the victim\u2019s fear of defendant. Tonya\u2019s explanatory comments about the prior incidents of physical and emotional abuse \u201c \u2018were made contemporaneously with and in explanation of the victim\u2019s statements\u2019 and crying, thus showing her state of mind.\u201d State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 588, 509 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1998) (quoting State v. Westbrooks, 345 N.C. 43, 60, 478 S.E.2d 483, 493 (1996)). \u201cThe factual circumstances surrounding her statements of emotion serve only to demonstrate the basis for the emotions.\u201d State v. Gray, 347 N.C. 143, 173, 491 S.E.2d 538, 550 (1997), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1031, 118 S. Ct. 1323 (1998). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was admissible under the state-of-mind exception of Rule 803(3). Furthermore, it was not necessary for Tonya to state explicitly to each witness that she was afraid, as long as the \u201cscope of the conversation . . . related directly to [her] existing state of mind and emotional condition.\u201d State v. Mixion, 110 N.C. App. 138, 148, 429 S.E.2d 363, 368, review denied, 334 N.C. 437, 433 S.E.2d 183 (1993).\nFor admission under Rule 803(3), the state of mind testimony must also be relevant to the issues in the case. State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 379, 488 S.E.2d 769, 776 (1997). Here, Tonya\u2019s state of mind during each of the conversations at issue is relevant because it relates to her relationship with defendant preceding her death. Tonya\u2019s state of mind is relevant to rebut the defendant\u2019s self-defense inferences in his testimony that Tonya attacked defendant with a knife before defendant killed her. State v. Faucette, 326 N.C. 676, 683, 392 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1990). \u201cThe jury could infer from the evidence regarding [Tonya\u2019s] state of mind that it was unlikely that [she] would do anything to provoke defendant. ...\u201d Id. at 683, 392 S.E.2d at 74-75. Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the probative value of the witnesses\u2019 testimony was not outweighed by undue prejudice. Likewise, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting Tonya\u2019s statements to these witnesses pursuant to Rule 803(3).\nFinally, we note that even if some of the statements did not fall under the \u201cstate-of-mind\u201d exception, we conclude that the admission of the statements was not prejudicial error. Defendant confessed to killing Tonya. Independent of the testimony regarding Tonya\u2019s statements to witnesses before she died, the State offered substantial evidence, through the testimony of China Wilds, the autopsy pathologist, and emergency paramedics that defendant acted with malice, premeditation, and deliberation when he killed Tonya. In light of this evidence, defendant cannot show that there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the trial court had excluded the statements. State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 395, 501 S.E.2d 625, 636 (1998), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 119 S. Ct. 1119 (1999); G.S. 15A-1443(a) (1988).\nWe next determine whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to publish to the jury a photograph of defendant taken the morning of the killing in which defendant\u2019s legs were in shackles. The photograph revealed blood on defendant\u2019s hands and clothes and small knife wounds on defendant\u2019s hands. Because defendant stated \u201cno objection\u201d when the State moved to introduce the photograph, we review for plain error. Defendant contends that the photographs were \u201chighly prejudicial to defendant in the same way that his appearance in shackles would have been.\u201d As a general rule, a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to appear at trial free from shackles to protect the presumption of innocence. State v. Thomas, 344 N.C. 639, 651, 477 S.E.2d 450, 456 (1996), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 118 S. Ct. 84 (1997). \u201cBefore deciding that an error by the trial court amounts to \u2018plain error,\u2019 the appellate court must be convinced that absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different verdict.\u201d State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 450, 340 S.E.2d 701, 706 (1986). Here, the State offered overwhelming evidence of malice, premeditation, and deliberation to support the first-degree murder conviction. Based on the record, we have concluded that the jury would not have reached a different verdict if the photograph had been excluded and that the submission of the photograph did not constitute plain error. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to exclude photographs of the victim\u2019s body, including Exhibits 12, 14, 16, 64, 65, and 67, after she was killed. The trial court allowed the State to publish to the jury photographs of the victim\u2019s wounds taken at the crime scene and autopsy photographs taken at the same angles and showing the same wounds as the photographs taken at the crime scene. Defendant contends that the photographs are unduly repetitive and their probative value is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. See G.S. 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). \u201cPhotographs of homicide victims are admissible at trial even if they are \u2018gory, gruesome, horrible, or revolting, so long as they are used by a witness to illustrate his testimony and so long as an excessive number of photographs are not used solely to arouse the passions of the jury.\u2019 \u201d State v. Thompson, 328 N.C. 477, 491, 402 S.E.2d 386, 394 (1991) (quoting State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 741, 365 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1988)). The State may introduce photographs in a murder trial to illustrate testimony regarding the manner of killing to prove circumstantially the elements of first-degree murder. State v. Rose, 335 N.C. 301, 319, 439 S.E.2d 518, 528, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 114 S. Ct. 2770 (1994). What represents \u201can excessive number of photographs\u201d and whether the \u201cphotographic evidence is more probative than prejudicial\u201d are matters within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). Factors a court may consider include what the photographs depict, the level of detail, the manner of presentation, and the scope of accompanying testimony. Id. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.\nHere, the photographs were neither cumulative nor excessive in number and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In fact, the trial court excluded several pictures because it deemed them repetitive. The photographs revealed the numerous wounds on Tonya and were relevant as circumstantial evidence to illustrate the testimony of China Wilds that defendant killed Tonya with malice, premeditation, and deliberation. State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404,416, 358 S.E.2d 329, 336 (1987). The photographs were also relevant to help the jury determine whether to find as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially, heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in admitting photographs from both the crime scene and the autopsy because the autopsy photographs revealed wounds that could not be seen in the crime scene photographs because of the blood covering Tonya\u2019s body. State v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 443, 467 S.E.2d 67, 80, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 894, 117 S. Ct. 237 (1996). This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next address whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted a tape of the \u201c911\u201d conversation between Tonya\u2019s eight-year-old daughter China Wilds and the Davidson County Sheriffs Office. Defendant argues that the introduction of the tape into evidence \u201cadded nothing to the State\u2019s case by way of evidence\u201d and that the prejudicial effect of the tape in arousing the passions of the jury outweighed its probative value. We disagree.\nUnder G.S. 8C-1, Rule 403, \u201cevidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u201d G.S. 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). The decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is left to the broad discretion of the trial court, and will only be reversed on appeal upon a showing that the decision was manifestly unsupported by reason or was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 690, 473 S.E.2d 291, 304 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1095, 117 S. Ct. 775, reh\u2019g denied, 520 U.S. 1111, 117 S. Ct. 1122 (1997). Here, the 911 tape had probative value because it was offered to cor-rob\u00f3rate the testimony of eight-year-old China Wilds regarding the events leading to her mother\u2019s death. State v. Jordan, 128 N.C. App. 469, 475-76, 495 S.E.2d 732, 736-37, review denied, 348 N.C. 287, 501 S.E.2d 914 (1998). Defendant here has not shown that the decision of the trial court to admit the 911 tape was not the result of a reasoned choice. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to sequester witnesses. Defendant contends that \u201cit becomes apparent upon a review of the transcript that the witnesses offering hearsay testimony used the voir dire and trial testimony of those who came before them to educate themselves and \u2018strengthen\u2019 their testimony.\u201d A ruling on a motion to sequester witnesses rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court\u2019s denial of the motion will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that the ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 400, 508 S.E.2d 496, 507-08 (1998). Here, we conclude that defendant has not shown that the trial court\u2019s ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. This assignment of error is overruled.\nAfter a careful review of the record, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudge EDMUNDS concurs with separate opinion.\nJudge SMITH concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Edmunds\nconcurring.\nAlthough I concur in the majority\u2019s analysis and holding, I write separately to address defendant\u2019s motion to exclude witnesses from the trial. Both North Carolina Rule of Evidence 615 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1255 (1997) are permissive, allowing the trial court discretion to exclude witnesses. See State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 474 S.E.2d 345 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 137 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1997). I agree that no abuse of discretion has been shown under the facts of this case. In comparison with the North Carolina rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 615 requires exclusion of witnesses upon motion of a party. Those with experience in state and federal trials cannot fail to have observed the impact of these different rules. Testimony provided by witnesses who hear each other testify often converges. This effect, while not necessarily sinister, appears to be a reflection of human nature; it can lead irresolute witnesses, consciously or not, to conform their testimony to what they have heard before, undermining a jury\u2019s ability to evaluate the evidence provided by each witness. Particularly in cases as consequential as the capital murder case at bar, trial courts should be mindful of the words of the Commentary to North Carolina Rule of Evidence 615: \u201c[T]he practice should be to sequester witnesses on request of either party unless some reason exists not to.\u201d", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Judge Edmunds" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Dennis P. Myers, for the State.", "White & Grumpier, by David B. Freedman, Dudley A. Witt, and Laurie A. Schlossberg, and Causey & Nixon, L.L.P., by William G. Causey, Jr. and Alec Carpenter, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS EUGENE WILDS\nNo. COA98-797\n(Filed 18 May 1999)\n1. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 pretrial hearing denied\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital first-degree murder prosecution which resulted in a life sentence by denying defendant\u2019s request for a pretrial hearing to determine whether the evidence was sufficient for the case to proceed capitally. It is clearly within the broad discretion of the trial court to hold a pretrial hearing and the court did not abuse its discretion here; moreover, the jury found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and recommended a life sentence, so that defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced.\n2. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 premeditation and deliberation \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation in a first-degree murder prosecution.\n3. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\nThere was no error and no prejudice in a capital prosecution for a first-degree murder in the submission of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance because the evidence of multiple stabbings of the victim in the presence of her children was sufficient to support this circumstance and the jury found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and recommended life imprisonment.\n4. Evidence\u2014 prior crime or act \u2014 assault on victim\u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for first-degree murder by admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s prior convictions, including assaulting the victim. Evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior assaults on the victim for whose murder the defendant is being tried is admissible for the purpose of showing malice, premeditation, deliberation, intent or ill will against the victim. The ten-year time span between the conviction and the victim\u2019s death affected the weight rather than the admissibility.\n5. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 state of mind exception \u2014 incidents of abuse against victim \u2014 factual events\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting hearsay statements of the victim where her state of mind during each of the conversations was relevant because they related to her relationship with defendant preceding her death and rebutted defendant\u2019s self-defense inferences. Statements relating factual events which tend to show the victim\u2019s state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition when the victim made the statements are not excluded if the facts related by the victim serve to demonstrate the basis for the victim\u2019s state of mind, emotions, sensations, or physical conditions. Moreover, the State offered substantial independent testimony that defendant acted with malice, premeditation, and deliberation.\n6. Evidence\u2014 photograph of defendant \u2014 shackles and blood\nThere was no plain error in a first-degree murder prosecution where the court allowed the State to publish to the jury a photograph of defendant taken on the morning of the killing in which his legs were in shackles and there was blood on his hands and clothes and small knife wounds on his hands. The State offered overwhelming evidence of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and the jury would not have reached a different verdict if the photograph had been excluded.\n7. Evidence\u2014 homicide \u2014 photographs of victim\u2019s body\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by allowing the State to publish to the jury photographs of the victim\u2019s wounds at the crime scene and autopsy photographs taken at the same angles and showing the same wounds where the autopsy photos revealed wounds that could not be seen in the crime scene photos because of the blood covering the body. The photographs were neither cumulative nor excessive in number and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n8. Evidence\u2014 homicide \u2014 911 tape from victim\u2019s daughter\u2014 not unduly prejudicial\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting a tape of the 911 conversation between the victim\u2019s eight-year-old daughter and the Sheriff\u2019s Office. Although defendant argued that the prejudicial effect of the tape outweighed its probative value, the tape had probative value in corroborating the testimony of the daughter and defendant did not show that admitting the tape was not the result of a reasoned choice.\n9. Witnesses\u2014 motion to sequester witnesses \u2014 denied\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion to sequester witnesses. Defendant did not show that the court\u2019s ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\nJudge Edmunds concurring.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 10 November 1997 by Judge Howard R. Greeson, Jr. in Davidson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 March 1999.\nDefendant appeals his first-degree murder conviction. Evidence presented at defendant\u2019s trial tended to show the following:\nOn the morning of 14 November 1996, defendant Curtis Eugene Wilds was sitting at a table in the kitchen of his home. His wife Tonya Wilds and their three minor children, ages six, eight, and nine, were also in the kitchen and Tonya was ironing clothes. Tonya told the children that the police would want to ask them questions at school that day because defendant had told the police that Tonya had abused the children. As Tonya was talking to the children, defendant got up from the table, picked up a knife, walked over to Tonya, and threw her on the floor. A struggle ensued and continued into the living room, where defendant stabbed Tonya repeatedly in the neck and body, leaving over a dozen wounds in her body. The children tried to pull defendant away from Tonya. The middle child, China Wilds, called 911 and told emergency dispatchers that \u201cCurtis Wilds [was] trying to kill Tonya Wilds.\u201d After defendant stabbed Tonya, he dropped the knife and walked out the back door of the house. Defendant testified that when he saw a police car turning into his driveway, he walked back to the house and told the police officers, \u201cI\u2019m the one who did it.\u201d Tonya died as a result of the numerous stab wounds.\nOn 13 January 1997, defendant was charged with first-degree murder. On 20 February 1997, the trial court determined that probable cause existed to believe an aggravating factor existed, i.e., that the killing was \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d and declared the case a capital murder case. On 3 September 1997, defendant filed a motion for a pre-trial hearing to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the submission to the jury of an aggravating circumstance. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. On 27 October 1997, defendant was capitally tried on the charge of first-degree murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the jury found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and recommended a life sentence. On 10 November 1997, the judge sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.\nAttorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Dennis P. Myers, for the State.\nWhite & Grumpier, by David B. Freedman, Dudley A. Witt, and Laurie A. Schlossberg, and Causey & Nixon, L.L.P., by William G. Causey, Jr. and Alec Carpenter, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0195-01", "first_page_order": 225, "last_page_order": 240 }