{ "id": 11219037, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAREN SEAGLE FOREMAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Foreman", "decision_date": "1999-05-18", "docket_number": "No. COA98-676", "first_page": "292", "last_page": "299", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 N.C. App. 292" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561633 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "holding no seizure occurred where officer approached and questioned individual sitting in parked car" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "holding no seizure occurred where officer approached and questioned individual sitting in parked car" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798851, 798883, 798950, 798797, 798783 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0309-05", "/nc/343/0309-04", "/nc/343/0309-01", "/nc/343/0309-03", "/nc/343/0309-02" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793056, 793186, 793211, 793107, 793243 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0656-02", "/nc/341/0656-05", "/nc/341/0656-03", "/nc/341/0656-01", "/nc/341/0656-04" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916476 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" }, { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "holding no seizure occurred where officer followed taxicab and opened its door after it stopped because he did not order it to stop, did not engage his siren, and did not order defendant to stay in the taxicab" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918738 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "noting that a \"police cruiser's slow following of the defendant did not convey the message that he was not free to disregard the police and go about his business\" and thus did not constitute seizure" }, { "page": "698", "parenthetical": "noting that a \"police cruiser's slow following of the defendant did not convey the message that he was not free to disregard the police and go about his business\" and thus did not constitute seizure" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "699", "parenthetical": "holding officer's pursuit of defendant did not constitute seizure until officer tackled defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236 (1983) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "129" }, { "page": "129", "parenthetical": "noting \"the threatening presence of several officers\" may constitute seizure" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2544442 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236 (1983) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785", "parenthetical": "individuals walked \"in a direction which led away from the group of officers\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314046 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170-71", "parenthetical": "individuals walked \"in a direction which led away from the group of officers\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "893-94", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888822 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0150-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 767, "char_count": 17284, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0282539565603823e-07, "percentile": 0.8543754867561777 }, "sha256": "62be47c745d570b206e3af4c6b95bebfedaad93dd2ce5e9816a299f2dfc8dc43", "simhash": "1:a004c8bc543ce8de", "word_count": 2804 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:41:36.377256+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges LEWIS and HORTON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAREN SEAGLE FOREMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nKaren Foreman (Defendant) appeals her conviction for driving while impaired (DWI).\nDefendant received a DWI citation at 2:45 a.m. on 16 November 1996. Prior to trial, Defendant made a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the investigatory stop of her vehicle on the grounds that the stop was unconstitutional. At a voir dire hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion, Officer Doug Ipock (Officer Ipock) testified that a DWI traffic enforcement checkpoint had been established on Neuse Boulevard on 16 November 1996. At the intersection of Neuse Boulevard and Midgette Road, which immediately preceded the DWI checkpoint, a large sign was posted reading \u201cDWI Checkpoint Ahead.\u201d At approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer Ipock observed a \u201csmall red vehicle\u201d traveling towards the DWI checkpoint on Neuse Boulevard. The vehicle \u201cmade an immediate left onto Midgette Avenue . . . right there at the [DWI Checkpoint Ahead] sign.\u201d Officer Ipock described the turn as a \u201cquick left turn,\u201d but noted that he \u201cdid not observe anything illegal about the turn.\u201d At this point, he could not see who was driving the vehicle. Officer Ipock began to follow the small red vehicle, and was approximately thirty to forty-five yards behind it. Officer Ipock continuously observed the vehicle until it made a second left turn, \u201calso quick and abrupt,\u201d onto Taylor Street, the first street intersecting Midgette Road. Officer Ipock briefly lost sight of the small red vehicle once it turned onto Taylor Street. Officer Ipock immediately followed onto Taylor Street, and drove about halfway down the block without crossing any intersecting roads and without seeing a moving vehicle.\nI said to myself at that point in time there\u2019s no way the vehicle could have gotten all the way to the other end of Taylor Street before I would have been able to reacquire a visual sighting of it. So, therefore, I turned around on [Taylor Street, heading back towards Midgette Road,] and began checking each residence as I came down the road.\nApproximately forty-five seconds after losing sight of the small red vehicle, Officer Ipock \u201cspotted a red small compact car\u201d parked in a residential driveway on Taylor Street. Officer Ipock \u201cpulled in behind it and I then shined my bright lights on the vehicle and my takedown lights, at which time I then saw people that were scrunched down in the vehicle.\u201d The vehicle\u2019s engine was not funning, its lights were off, and the doors of the vehicle were closed. Officer Ipock radioed for backup, and remained in his vehicle continuously watching the small red vehicle until backup arrived less than two minutes later. The occupants remained \u201cscrunched\u201d or \u201cducked\u201d down and did not change positions in the vehicle. After backup arrived, Officer Ipock approached the vehicle. Defendant was sitting in the driver\u2019s seat of the vehicle, and the keys were still in the ignition. After hearing Officer Ipock\u2019s testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence.\nAt trial, Officer Ipock offered substantially the same testimony as had been elicited during voir dire. He further testified that several open containers of alcohol were found in the vehicle once backup arrived, and that the vehicle emitted a \u201c[s]trong odor of alcohol.\u201d Officer Ipock testified that Defendant had a \u201cstrong to moderate\u201d odor of alcohol about her person once she was removed from the vehicle.\nOfficer Kenneth Hunter (Officer Hunter) testified that he arrived at the driveway on Taylor Street in response to Officer Ipock\u2019s call for backup. Officer Ipock \u201cidentified [Defendant] as the individual who had been behind the wheel of the car,\u201d and asked Officer Hunter to check Defendant\u2019s sobriety. Officer Hunter testified that Defendant had a \u201c[v]ery strong odor of alcohol about her breath. She was unsteady on her feet.\u201d Officer Hunter further testified:\nUpon observing her and learning from Officer Ipock that she was behind the wheel of the car, I did not perform the standardized field sobriety test there at the scene, for two reasons. One, the driveway was not level. It was sloped. And the weather was somewhat cold, if I remember. It was a little chilly on the outside at that time of night. But based on my observations of her I arrested her for driving while impaired.\nWhen he arrived with Defendant at the police station, Officer Hunter asked Defendant to perform various standardized sobriety tests. He testified that Defendant could not maintain her balance and noticeably wobbled and swayed while trying to perform these tests. Defendant refused to undergo chemical analysis of her breath on an Intoxilyzer.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show that Defendant was the driver of the small red vehicle. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant did not present any evidence.\nThe issues are whether: (I) Officer Ipock had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity prior to her seizure; and (II) there is substantial evidence that Defendant was the driver of the small red vehicle.\nI\n[1 ] For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an \u201cinvestigatory stop\u201d is a seizure which must be supported by \u201ca reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.\u201d State v. Hendrickson, 124 N.C. App. 150, 155, 476 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1996); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 893-94 (1980) (per curiam) (noting that \u201cprobable cause\u201d is not constitutionally required for brief detentions short of arrest that are supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the seized individual is engaged in criminal activity). Defendant first contends a legal left turn at the intersection immediately preceding a posted DWI checkpoint, without more, does not provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in criminal activity. We agree.\nAn individual may legally avoid contact with the police. State v. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. 165, 170-71, 415 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1992) (individuals walked \u201cin a direction which led away from the group of officers\u201d). This avoidance, standing alone, is not sufficient to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.\n[An individual] need not answer any question put to him [by an officer]; indeed he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.\nState v. Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 186, 424 S.E.2d 120, 128 (1993) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236 (1983) (citations omitted)). Accordingly, a legal left turn at the intersection immediately preceding a posted DWI checkpoint, without more, does not justify an investigatory stop. We emphasize, however, that it is constitutionally permissible, and undoubtedly prudent, for officers to follow vehicles that legally avoid DWI checkpoints, in order to ascertain whether other factors exist which raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle is engaged in criminal activity. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698 (1991) (noting that a \u201cpolice cruiser\u2019s slow following of the defendant did not convey the message that he was not free to disregard the police and go about his business\u201d and thus did not constitute seizure). Thus, if Defendant was seized solely based on a legal left turn preceding the DWI checkpoint, that seizure was unconstitutional.\nSeizure occurs \u201cwhen the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.\u201d Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 n.16 (1968). Police conduct does not constitute a seizure unless, in view of all of the circumstances, \u201c \u2018a reasonable person would not feel free to decline the officer\u2019s request or otherwise terminate the encounter.\u2019 In other words, a seizure does not occur until there is a physical application of force or submission to a show of authority.\u201d State v. Cuevas, 121 N.C. App. 553, 563, 468 S.E.2d 425, 431 (quoting State v. West, 119 N.C. App. 562, 566, 459 S.E.2d 55, 58, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 656, 462 S.E.2d 524 (1995)), disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 309, 471 S.E.2d 77 (1996). For example, no seizure occurs when an officer approaches an individual in a public place and asks that individual questions. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 142, 446 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1994) (holding no seizure occurred where officer approached and questioned individual sitting in parked car); Cuevas, 121 N.C. App. at 563, 468 S.E.2d at 431 (holding no seizure occurred where officer followed taxicab and opened its door after it stopped because he did not order it to stop, did not engage his siren, and did not order defendant to stay in the taxicab).\nExamples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer\u2019s request might be compelled.\nFarmer, 333 N.C. at 187, 424 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980)). A seizure does not occur, however, \u201cwhen an officer shouts, \u2018Stop, in the name of the law,\u2019 and the person continues to flee. To constitute a seizure, there must be ... a submission to the officer\u2019s show of authority ([i.e.,] the person stops as a result of the officer\u2019s command).\u201d Robert L. Farb, Arrest, Search, and Investigation in North Carolina at 286 (2d ed. 1992); see Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 699 (holding officer\u2019s pursuit of defendant did not constitute seizure until officer tackled defendant).\nIn this case, when Officer Ipock began following Defendant\u2019s vehicle, he did not engage his sirens or his flashing blue lights, and he did not otherwise indicate that he was stopping the vehicle. After locating Defendant\u2019s vehicle parked in a driveway with its lights and engine off, Officer Ipock pulled behind it and turned on his \u201ctake-down\u201d lights to enable him to see into the vehicle. Defendant did not attempt to restart or exit the vehicle. At that point, Defendant was not restrained by Officer Ipock and had not submitted to any show of authority, and a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter. Accordingly, Defendant was seized, at the very earliest, when backup arrived. See Farmer, 333 N.C. at 187, 424 S.E.2d at 129 (noting \u201cthe threatening presence of several officers\u201d may constitute seizure).\nIn determining whether Officer Ipock had a reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity, therefore, we consider the objective facts Officer Ipock observed prior to the arrival of backup, the earliest point at which Defendant could have been seized. Prior to this point, Officer Ipock observed Defendant\u2019s vehicle make a \u201cquick left turn\u201d at the intersection immediately preceding a DWI checkpoint. Officer Ipock observed the vehicle make a second \u201cabrupt\u201d left turn, and then observed the vehicle parked in a residential driveway. The occupants remained in the vehicle even though the vehicle was parked with its engine and lights off. Finally, the occupants of the vehicle were \u201cscrunched down.\u201d All of these facts were available to Officer Ipock before Defendant was seized, and these facts are sufficient to raise a reasonable and articu-lable suspicion of criminal activity.\nII\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the evidence was insufficient to establish that she was the driver of the small red vehicle.\nA motion to dismiss should be denied if there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the charged offense and substantial evidence that the defendant is the individual who committed it. State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 451, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988). Substantial evidence is \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Id. (quoting State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160, 322 S.E.2d 370, 387 (1984)). The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. Furthermore, the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. Id. at 452, 373 S.E.2d at 433.\nCircumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence. The evidence need only give rise to a reasonable inference of guilt in order for it to be properly submitted to the jury for a determination of defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nId. (citations omitted).\nIn this case, Officer Ipock observed a small red vehicle driving along Neuse Boulevard turn onto Midgette Road, and from there, onto Taylor Street. Officer Ipock found the small red vehicle in a residential driveway on Taylor Street approximately forty-five seconds later. When Officer Ipock pulled in behind the vehicle, he activated his vehicle\u2019s high beams and \u201ctakedown\u201d lights, which enabled him to see inside the vehicle. Officer Ipock testified that he watched the individuals in the vehicle until backup arrived, and they stayed in their respective positions. When the officers subsequently approached the vehicle, Defendant was sitting in the driver\u2019s seat and the keys to the vehicl\u00e9 were in the ignition. These facts, along with the reasonable inferences drawn from these facts, constitute substantial evidence that Defendant was the driver of the small red vehicle when it was traveling on Neuse Boulevard, Midgette Road, and Taylor Street. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the charges against Defendant.\nWe have thoroughly reviewed Defendant\u2019s remaining contentions and find them to be unpersuasive.\nNo error.\nJudges LEWIS and HORTON concur.\n. Officer Ipock explained that \u201ctakedown\u201d lights are \u201cspotlights that we have that we can illuminate a particular area.\u201d\n. Several states have addressed whether avoidance of a DWI checkpoint is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. See Robert L. Farb, Does Avoiding License or DWI Checkpoint Support Reasonable Suspicion to Stop a Vehicle?, N.C. Inst, of Gov\u2019t, Feb. 1999 (summarizing state cases).", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Michael F Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan P. Babb, for the State.", "William F. Ward, III, P.A., by William F. Ward, III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KAREN SEAGLE FOREMAN\nNo. COA98-676\n(Filed 18 May 1999)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 avoidance of DWI checkpoint \u2014 automobile followed \u2014 hiding in driveway \u2014 reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity\nThere was a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity prior to defendant\u2019s seizure for driving while impaired where defendant made a quick left turn at the intersection immediately preceding a DWI checkpoint, an officer followed without engaging his siren or blue lights, the vehicle made a second abrupt left turn and parked in a residential driveway, the officer used his lights to see into the vehicle, defendant did not attempt to restart or exit the vehicle, all of its occupants remained \u201cscrunched down\u201d in the vehicle even though it was parked with its engine and lights off, the officer continuously watched the vehicle until backup arrived, and the occupants did not change positions. Although a legal left turn at an intersection immediately preceding a posted DWI checkpoint does not justify an investigatory stop without more, it is constitutionally permissible for officers to follow vehicles that legally avoid DWI check points and the defendant here was seized, at the earliest, when backup arrived. The objective facts the officer observed prior to the arrival of backup were sufficient to raise a reasonable and articu-lable suspicion of criminal activity.\n2. Motor Vehicles\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 defendant as driver \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe trial court did not err in a DWI prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence that she was the driver where an officer observed a small red vehicle making two turns, he found the vehicle in a residential driveway approximately forty-five seconds later, he pulled behind the vehicle and activated lights which enabled him to see inside the vehicle, he watched the individuals in the vehicle until backup arrived and they stayed in their respective positions, and defendant was sitting in the driver\u2019s seat with the keys in the ignition when officers subsequently approached the vehicle. These facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from them constitute substantial evidence that defendant was the driver of the vehicle.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment dated 25 February 1998 by Judge James E. Ragan, III, in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 March 1999.\nAttorney General Michael F Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan P. Babb, for the State.\nWilliam F. Ward, III, P.A., by William F. Ward, III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0292-01", "first_page_order": 322, "last_page_order": 329 }